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Abstract
Through focusing on the 'civic elite' of York 1476 to 1525, this thesis explores the
structuring of late-medieval urban societies and constructions of elite status and identity.
It examines York's mayors, sheriffs, chamberlains and bridge masters, the extent that they
formed an 'elite' group within the city and the processes through which this was achieved.
Part One contains an overview of the historiography of medieval urban elites. It also
examines how historians have approached the social structure of medieval and early modern
towns. Finally, it considers and advocates alternative methodologies to compliment the
traditional approach, particularly prosopography and sociological approaches to elites.
Part Two deals with access to the civic elite. Using prosopographical methodologies it
challenges the dominant historiography which portrays late-medieval urban elites as
mercantile oligarchies. It argues that historians have neglected the importance of factors
besides occupation and wealth in the election of civic officials. It also looks at the
significance of personal characteristics in this respect. Finally, an analysis of the civic records
reveals discourses of honesty, discretion and wisdom which reflect notions of ideal civic
rulers.
Part Three examines the elite's structure. It explores the extent that the elite was a socially
unified group and the means through which social and ideological unification was facilitated.
It also examines the real and ideological perpetuation of the group. Family, patrilineage,
marriage and social ties are all explored. In the widespread absence of patrilineal ties
between members, marriage and apprenticeship seem to have played an important role in
binding the group together, and in protecting its real and ideological perpetuation. Part
Three also explores the role of ritual in this respect. It considers everyday or secular rituals
of langauge and gesture which aimed to present the elite as a unified group.
Finally, Part Four discusses the power and authority of the elite. It challenges the argument
that York's unrest was the inevitable consequence of what has been viewed as a city
polarised in terms of political power. Instead it argues that few of the outbreaks of violence
can be ascribed to the commons of York lobbying for an increased role in government. It
also considers the extent that power in York really was polarised, arguing that the authority
of the elite derived from its relationship with the commons of the city. Further, it stresses
the role that guild, parochial, territorial and minor civic posts played in diffusing power
throughout the city.
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1Part One:
Introduction
The subject of medieval English urban elites has generally been approached through the
study of civic officials or merchants.' Terms such as mercantile elite, merchant class, urban
elite and civic elite have often been used haphazardly and, in some cases, interchangeably.
With few exceptions, historians have given little consideration to the implicit or explicit
connotations of the terms 'class' or 'elite', or to the applicability of their implied qualities
and attributes to the groups in question. This thesis examines the 'civic elite' of York for
the period 1476 to 1525. Central to this thesis is the examination of the extent and ways in
which the group of men who held civic office in this period constituted an elite. It examines
in much closer detail than before the validity of assumptions embodied in the use of the term
'elite', assumptions such as the possession of coherence and power. In doing so it
contributes to and challenges much of the existing historiography concerning civic officials,
urban government and strategies of social stratification and consolidation in later-medieval
towns. Just as importantly, though, it also offers a framework through which elite groups
in other towns might be approached in the future.
'See historiography below.
2A) Historiography
I) Elites and Oligarchy: Overview
Whereas much of the interest in towns during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries was focussed on constitutional, legal and jurisdictional matters, more recently
historians have turned their attentions towards social and economic issues.2
Most urban historians have emphasized the restrictive and elitist nature of municipal
governments during the medieval period. 3 A striking exception to this trend is Anthony
Bridbury, who argues that the economic challenges of the time resulted in increasingly
democratic urban governments. 4
 Clearly, the most fundamental division in medieval towns
was that between freemen and aliens. 5
 However, most urban historians have focussed on
divisions higher up the social hierarchy. In particular, much attention has been devoted to
divisions between merchants and artisans, and between civic officials and the politically
disenfranchised masses. Historians have been especially concerned with the nature of civic
government and the extent to which towns were governed by mercantile oligarchies. 6 Of
2 early constitutional histories of medieval towns see: A. Ballard (ed.), British Borough Charters 1042-1216
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1913); A. Ballard and J. Tait (eds.), British Borough Charters 1216-
1307 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1913); C. Gross, The Guild Merchant, 2 vols. (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 1890); J. Tait, The Medieval English Borough (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1936).
3 See in particular H.C. Swanson, 'The Illusion of Economic Structure: Craft (3uilds in Late Medieval English
Towns', Past and Present 121 (1988): 29-48; R.H. Hilton, English and French Towns in Feudal Society
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991), pp. 87-104. For individual studies see notes 7 and 8 below.
4 A.R Bndbuiy, Economic Growth: England in the Later Middle Ages (Allen and Unwin: London, 1962), pp.
58-64.
5 See for example, TiC. Swanson, MedievalArtisans: An Urban Class in Late Medieval England (Blackwell:
Oxford, 1989), pp. 107-10; R.B. Dobson, 'Admissions to the Freedom of the City of York in the Later Middle
Ages', EcHR, 2nd series 26 (1973): 1-22; A.F. Butcher, 'Canterbury's Earliest Rolls of Freemen Admissions
1297-1363: A Reconsideration', in F. Hill (ed.), A Kentish Miscellany, Kent Records 21(1979), pp. 1-26; M.M.
Rowe and A.M. Jackson (eds.), Exeter Freemen, 1266-19 72, Devon and Cornwall Record Society, extra series
1(1973), pp. xi-xxix.
6 For an early study of oligarchy see C.W. Colby, 'The Growth of Oligarchy in English Towns', English
HistoricalReview 5 (1890): 633-53. The recent literature dealing with this subject is vast and much of it is cited
below. For more thorough considerations of the topic as applied to a range of towns, see in particular S.
Reynolds, 'Medieval Urban History and the History of Political Thought', Urban History Yearbook (1982): 14-
central interest have been issues such as methods of election, the organisation of councils
and the membership of governing bodies, and in particular the wealth, occupation and family
connections of civic officials. In general, though, the consensus is that oligarchic control
was either consolidated or increased over the medieval period. Historians of towns such as
Norwich, Lincoln, Southampton, Bury St. Edmunds and Exeter, have all concluded that the
higher civic offices were dominated by a clique of men, generally wealthy merchants.7
Indeed, it has been argued that the development of the 'closed' corporations of the Tudor
period began during the late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth centuries. 8 For example, Stephen
Rigby has drawn on sociological theories of social closure to argue that "exclusionary social
closures on the basis of property ownership and wealth were central to the urban social
hierarchy, offering status and a role in town government", although some wealthy
occupations such as butchers were excluded from civic office. 9 He goes on to argue that
pressure from the politically disenfranchised for a more 'democratic' system of government
was successfully resisted and that urban governments became increasingly closed and
23; S. Rigby, 'Urban "Oligarchy" in Late-Medieval England', in J.A F. Thomson (ed.), Towns and Townspeople
in the Ffieenth Ceniwy (Sutton Publishing: Gloucester, 1988), pp. 62-86; J. Kermode, 'Obvious Observations
on the Fonnation of Oligarchies in Late-Medieval English Towns', in Thomson (ed.), Towns and Townspeople,
pp. 87-106.
7 W. Hudson and J. Cottingham Tingey (eds.), The Records of the City of Norwich, 2 vols. (Jarrold and Sons
Limited: Norwich, 1906-10), pp. xlii-hui; F. Hill, Medieval Lincoln (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
1965), pp. 289-303; C. Platt, Medieval Southampton: The Port and Trading Community, 1000-1600
(Routledge and Keegan Paul: London, 1973), pp. 92-105 & 175-7; R.S. Gottfried, Bury St Edmunds and the
Urban Crisis: 1270-1539 (Piinceton University Press: Princeton, 1983); M. Kowaleski, Local Markets and
Regional Trade in Medieval Exeter (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995), pp. 95-119.
S P. Clark and P. Slack, Crisis and Order in English Towns 1500-1700: Essays in Urban History (London:
Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 20-25. Works which have emphasised the increased trend towards oligarchy
over the fifieenth and sixteenth centuries include: C. Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City: Coventry and the
Urban Crisis ofthe Late Middle Ages (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1979), pp. 269-90; D. Palliser,
Tudor York (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1979), pp. 92-110; A.D. Dyer, The City of Worcester in the
Sixteenth Century (Leicester University Press: Leicester, 1973), pp. 224-6.
9 S.H. Rigby, English Society in the LaterMiddle Ages: Class, Status and Gender (Macmillan: London, 1995),
p. 176. See also Swanson, MedievalArtisans, p. 124-6. For the closure theory which underlies Rigby's work
see, for example, F. Parkin, 'Strategies of Social Closure in Class Formation', in F. Parkin (ed.), The Social
Analysis of Class Structure (Tavistock: London, 1974), pp. 1-18.
4The most vociferous objection to the emphasis on oligarchy has come from Susan
Reynolds. Taking issue with the use of the term and its associated pejorative implications,
Reynolds has argued that more aftention should be paid to the contemporary intellectual
context of medieval civic rule." She stresses the importance of a dominant ideology which
advocated rule by the wealthy. For her, harmony within medieval communities was
maintained through an ethos which stressed the particular roles expected of different
sections of the community in creating an effective and integrated society. Few historians
have taken up Reynold's call for more attention to be paid to the intellectual or ideological
context of late-medieval urban politics.' 2 Notable exceptions have included Stephen Rigby
and, more recently, David Shaw.' 3 Through his work on medieval Wells, Shaw has sought
to explore "the crucial connections between mentality and economy, social structure and
political life".'4 Shaw's examination of the civic officials of medieval Wells is interesting and
unusual in that he explores the personal qualities and characteristics deemed necessary or
desirable in urban officials, and the values which underpinned these. 15 His work suggests
'°Rigby, English Society in the Later Middle Ages, pp. 145-177.
Reynolds, 'Medieval Urban Histoiy and the History of Political Thought', pp. 14-23; idem,An Introduction
to the Histoiy of English Medieval Towns (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1977), p. 171; idem, Kingdoms and
Communities in Western Europe, 900-1300,2nd edn. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1977), pp. 198 & 203-
4.
12 An exception here is the work which has been carried out on late-medieval urban drama and ritual, see for
example, C. Phythian-Adams, 'Ceremony and the Citizen: The Communal Year at Coventry, 1450-1550', in G.
bit and G. Rosser (eds.), The Medieval Town: A Reader in English Urban History 1200-1540 (Longman: New
York, 1990), pp. 23 8-64; M. James, 'Ritual, Drama and the Social Body in the Late Medieval English Town',
Past and Present 98(1983): 3-29; B. Hanawalt and K. Reyerson (eds.), City and Spectacle in Medieval Europe,
Medieval Studies at Minnesota 6 (1994), especially. pp. 171-207.
'3 Rigby, 'Urban "Oligarchy", pp. 62-86; idem, English Society in the LaterMiddle Ages, pp. 170-6; D. Shaw,
The Creation ofa Community: The City of Wells in the Middle Ages (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1993), pp. 167-
215.
14 Shaw, Creation of a Community, p. 1.
' 5 lbid,pp. 188-197.
5that more attention needs to be given to these issues in the study of other medieval towns.
Both Reynolds and Shaw have highlighted the role of integration and the tradition of
harmony within medieval communities.' 6
 For them disharmony tended to arise only when
the system was abused. 17
In general, however, the overriding emphasis has been on "crisis, conflict and social
polarisation", in medieval as in early-modern towns.'8 Violent tensions and unrest have been
seen as the inevitable outcome of what has been viewed as a society polarised in terms of
wealth and power. Urban unrest was common throughout the late-medieval period and
much of it has been ascribed to quasi class-based struggles over the control and
administration of town government.' 9 Indeed, Barrie Dobson has argued that attacks
against the ruling elite by a disgruntled commons anxious for constitutional change were
"one of the major themes in the constitutional history of the late medieval town".2°
It could be argued, though, that this dominant historiography which stresses
oligarchy, exclusion, social polarisation and conflict contains several serious lacunae, as will
16 On early medieval aspects of community see Reynolds, Kingdoms and Commun ities, pp. 155-2 18.
'7 1n contrast, Rigby argues that the inferior socio-political position of those excluded from power meant that they
were limited in their means of protest, even when they objected to the established hierarchy of power. He
suggests that, unable to attack the overriding structure of civic power and exclusion, malcontents instead tended
to direct complaint towards specific abuses of power. Only rarely was discontent voiced in an overtly radical
form. Rigby, 'Urban "Oligarchy", passim.
18 V. Pearl, 'Change and Stability in Seventeenth-Century London', in J. Barry (ed.), The Tudor and Stuart
Town: A Reader in English Urban Histo,y 1530-1 688 (Longman: London, 1990), p. 140. For the leading
exponents of what Pearl has cited as a "philosophy of doom and gloom" see Clark and Slack (eds.), Crisis and
Order, especially pp. 19-3 5; P. Claiic and P. Slack, English Towns in Transition 1500-1700 (Oxford University
Press: London, 1976), especially pp. 126-140.
detailed studies of urban unrest in medieval towns, see for example, P. Nightingale, 'Capitalists, Crafts
and Constitutional Change in Late Fourteenth-Centuiy London', Past and Present 124 (1989): 3-35; C.M.
Barton, 'Ralph Holland and the London Radicals, 1438-1444', in Holt and Rosser (eds.), The Medieval Town,
pp. 160-83; B. McRee, 'Religious Gilds and Civic Order', Speculum 67 (1992): 69-97; R.B. Dobson, 'The
Risings in York, Beverley and Scarborough, 1380-1381', in R.H. Hilton and T.H. Aston (eds.), The English
Rising of 1381 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1984), pp. 112-42; M. Dormer Harris, 'Laurence
Saunders', English HistoricaiReview 9 (1884): 633-51.
20 R. B. Dobson (ed.), The Peasants 'Revolt of 1381, 2nd edn. (Macmillan: Basingstoke, 1983), p. 284.
6be outlined below.2' Further, the debate over oligarchy and the place of civic officials in
medieval urban society is in danger of stagnating. The work of early-modem historians,
continental historians and some of the more recent scholarship within the field of medieval
English urban history all suggest new ways in which this area might profitably be
approached in the future.
II Elites and Prosopography
Prosopography has been used extensively in continental studies of urban elites where the
influence of the work of Ottokar has been important. 22 Writing on the political history of
Florence during the late thirteenth century, Ottokar rejected the prevailing Marxist
interpretation of Florence's history which he believed had reduced the history of the city to
a crude conflict between an aristocratic clique and a popular movement.Z Like his
contemporary, Namier, he broke with the tradition of placing emphasis on classes and
constitutional forms, and instead sought to explain the political life of Florence through a
detailed investigation of the composition of the personnel of government and a careful study
of the city's rival political factions, their use of power and their social foundations. 24
 The
work of Ottokar and Namier is important for the student of historical elites for two
interrelated reasons. First, it marked the beginning of a trend towards detailed
21 See pp. 6-22 below.
N. Ottokar, II Commune di Firenze a/la fine delDugento (Valleechi: Florence, 1926).
23 For brief summaries of the main phases of writing on Florentine history see J.N. Stephens, The Fall of the
Florentine Republic 1512-1530 (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1983), Pp. 1-5; D.V. Kent, 'The Florentine
Reggimento in the Fifleenth Century' ,Renaissance Quarterly 28 (1975): 575-577.
24 L. Namier, The Structure ofPolitics at the Accession of George III, 2nd edn. (London: Macmillan, 1929). In
turn the prosopographic methodology employed by Namier and Ottokar sterns back to the work of German
historians working on classical Rome. See in particular, M. Geizer, Die Nobilität der ROmischen Reepublik
(B.G. Teubner: Leipzig-Berlin, 1912); F. Munzer, ROmischeAdelspartein undAdeisfamilien (J. B. Meizler:
Stuttgart, 1920).
7pro sopographical investigations of ruling elites and patriciates in late-medieval urban
centres. Second, it rejected the dichotomy by which society was viewed in terms of
inherently antagonistic social polarisation.
Since Ottokar, several generations of continental historians have been concerned
with researching the role and attributes of influential groups and factions within urban
government and society, and prosopography has become one of the mainstays of research
into urban elites. 25 Similarly, what Powell has termed as "one of the most common forms
of historical research" has also been much used in English medieval history in studies of the
gentry and peasantry. 26 Surprisingly, though, prosopography is a tool that has been under
used by English urban historians. With the notable exception of work by Jennifer Kermode
and Sylvia Thrupp on medieval merchants, and work by Maryanne Kowaleski on the civic
elite of medieval Exeter, few urban historians have undertaken detailed studies of urban elite
groups. 27 Indeed, biography has been favoured over prosopography by many historians
25 For example, for summaries of influential prosopographical research which has since been carried out on
Renaissance Florence see, Stephens, The Fall of the Florentine Republic, pp. 2-3; Kent, 'The Florentine
Reggimento in the Fifteenth Centuly', pp. 576-77. For summaries and evaluations of prosopographical work
which has been earned out on the Low Countries for the medieval period see H. Dc Ridder-Symoens,
'Prosopographical Research in the Low Countries Concerning the Middle Ages and the Sixteenth Century',
Medieval Prosopography, 14:2 (1995): 27-120. For prosopographical studies of Continental elites in general,
see D. Nicholas, The Later Medieval City 1300-1500 (Longman: London, 1997), pp. 180-202; S. Rowan,
'Urban Communities: The Rulers and the Ruled', in T.A. Brady Jar., H.A. Oberman, & J.D. Tracy (eds.),
Handbook ofEuropean History 1400-1600: Late Middle Ages Renaissance andReformalion, Volume One:
Structures andAssertions (E.J. Brill: Leiden, 1994), pp. 197-229.
26 E. Powell, 'After "After McFarlane": The Poverty of Patronage and the Case for Constitutional Flistoiy', in
DJ. Clayton, kG. Davies and P. MeNiven (eds.), Trade, Devotion and Governance: Papers in LaterMedieval
History (Alan Sutton: Siroud, 1994), p. 7. For the impact of prosopography on English constitutional history
see also: C. Richmond, 'After MoFarlane', History 68 (1983): 46-60. Examples of gentry studies utilising this
form of historical research include N. Saul, Knights and Esquires: The Gloucester Genliy in the Fourteenth
Century (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1981); S.M. Wright, The Derbyshire Gentry in the Fieenth Century
(Derbyshire Record Society: Chesterfield, 1983). For its use in studies of the peasantty see L.R. Poos, 'Peasant
"Biographies" from Medieval England', in N. Bulst and J.P. Genet (eds.), Medieval Lives and the Historian:
Studies in Medieval Prosopography (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1986), pp. 201-14.
27 S. Tbrupp, The Merchant Class ofMedieval London (1300-1500), revised edition with a new introduction
(Ann Arbour: Michigan, 1989); Kowaleski, Local Markets and Regional Trade; J. Kermode, Medieval
Merchants (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1998). See also R Frost, 'The Aldermen of Norwich
1461-1509: A Study of a Civic Elite', PhD thesis, department of History, University of Cambridge (1996).
8within this field, no doubt in part due to the fact that urban historians have been waly of an
inherent tendency of prosopographic studies to encourage generalisation or
homogenisation. 28 Ironically, though, it could be argued that it is precisely this lack of
thorough prosopographical research which has helped to foster dangerous generalisations
within the study of medieval urban elites.
Much of what we know about English urban elites is based on occasional chapters
in wide-ranging studies of individual towns. 29 Although these can be useful in sketching a
broadly representative overview of late-medieval towns, such studies are limited in the detail
and scope which they can give to individual groups within society. Inevitably, the better
documented, higher profile social groups dominate even in the more specialised studies.
Indeed, even these studies are often limited precisely because they concentrate on one, not
necessarily representative, constituent group within the urban elite. 30 The criticisms that
Dale Kent, writing in 1975, levelled at work carried out on the civic government of
Renaissance Florence can equally well be applied to much of the study of medieval English
urban history today. 3 ' Namely, while our overall understanding of the nature of the civic
elites of English towns in the later-middle ages is broadly sound, the detail has often been
sketched in impressionistically and has tended to be modelled on assumptions that might be
See, for example, the criticism that Caroline Barron makes against prosopography in the iniroduction to C.M.
Barmn and A.F. Sutton (eds.), Medieval London Widows 1300-1500 (The Hambledon Press: London, 1994),
especially p. xv. For biographic studies see also CM BalTon,, 'Richard Wbittington: The Man Behind the Myth',
in A.E. Hollaender and W. Kellaway (eds.), Studies in London History Presented to Philip Edmund Jones
(Ilodder and Staughton: London, 1969), pp. 197-248; A. Hanham, The Celys and Their World: An English
Merchant Family ofthe Ffieenth Century (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1985); R. Horrox, The de
Ia Poles ofHull, East Yorkshire Local History Series 38 (1983).
29 See notes 7 and 8 above.
excellent examples of such studies see: Thrupp, Merchant Class; Kermode, Medieval Merchants ; EM
Carus-Wilson, 'The Merchant Adventurers of Bristol in the Fifteenth Century', Transactions of the Royal
Historical Society, fourth series 11(1928): 61-82: P. Nightingale, A Medieval Mercantile Community: The
Grocers 'Company and the Politics of Trade ofLondon, 1000-1484 (Yale University Press: Yale, 1995).
31 Kent, 'The Florentine Reggimento in the Fifteenth Century', pp. 576-7.
9more thoroughly tested and explored.
While the few detailed prosopographical studies carried out on English medieval
civic elites have tended to confirm the "impressionistic picture in its broader outlines", they
have also "stressed the complexity and even the ambiguity of the details". 32 For example,
Kowaleski's impressive study of late fourteenth-century Exeter has shown that the civic elite
of the town was confined to a small but inordinately powerful group of merchant oligarchs
which carefully excluded artisans. 33
 Indeed, she notes that "the evidence concerning
Exeter's guilds supports the argument of Swanson regarding the ultimate power of urban
mercantile elites over craft guilds". 34 In contrast, detailed prosopographical studies carried
out on members of the civic elites in other towns, particularly those studies concerned with
the late-fifteenth century, have concluded precisely the opposite. These studies show that
while civic government was restrictive, it was far more open to artisans, non-guild members
and people of only moderate wealth than has previously been suggested. 35 Two important
points need to be made concerning these differences. First, it is apparent that the control
of merchants over the civic government of late medieval towns was not constant throughout
the whole of the medieval period, and second, such control was not equal in all places at the
same time. The different findings do not merely reflect different dates and geographical
locations, though. They are also due to different methodologies.
32 Kent, 'The Florentine Reggimento in the Fifleenth Century', pp. 576-7.
33 Kowaleski, Local Markets andRegional Trade, pp. 90-119.
ibid., p. 101. For Swanson's thesis see Swanson, 'The illusion of Economic Structure', pp. 29-48.
35 C.I. Hammer, 'Anatomy of an Oligarchy: the Oxford Town Council in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries',
Journal ofBritish Studies 18 (1978): 1-27; A. Rogers, 'Late Medieval Stamford: A Study of a Town Council
1465-1492', in A. Everitt (ed.), Perspectives in English Urban History (London, 1973), pp. 16-38, 242-43, 252-
54; C. Carpenter, 'The Office and Personnel of the Post of Bridgemaster in York 1450-99', unpublished MA
dissertation, Centre for Medieval Studies, University of York (1996).
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III) Dichotomous Divisions
The lack of detailed prosopographical research into the composition of medieval civic
councils is only one of several lacunae in the historiography of medieval English urban elites.
Perhaps more seriously, it could be argued that the emphasis placed upon the highest posts
of municipal government and the dominance of the mercantile occupations within these
posts has influenced the ways in which historians have perceived the wider social structure
of the late medieval English town. Historians of medieval English urban communities have
both implicitly assumed and explicitly argued that the civic hierarchy reflected and reinforced
social status and relations within the medieval town. Thus, much of the literature on the
subject reflects a bipartite conception of the social structure of medieval urban society
whereby such society is viewed in terms of inherently antagonistic social polarisation
between merchants and artisans and between civic officials and the 'masses'. For example,
Swanson states in her study of York artisans that "the assumption that has been made here
is that urban artisans can be defined as a class". 36
 Additionally, she states that "the towns
considered.. .are those large enough to support a distinct and self-conscious merchant class,
in sufficient numbers to isolate themselves from the artisans. It is in terms of this deliberate
polarization of merchant and artisan that the artisan class can be defined".37
Part of the reason for this emphasis on polarisation and oligarchy is that, to date,
studies of late-medieval or Tudor town governments have overwhelmingly concentrated on
the higher civic offices. Recently, though, this approach has begun to be challenged. Of
particular interest in this respect is work which has been carried out by urban historians of
a slightly later period. Reacting against the work of Clark and Slack, London historians
such as Stephen Rappaport have argued that it is erroneous to view higher civic offices as
36 Swanson, MedievalArtisans , pp. 2-3.
37Ibid.
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a city's "primary sources of power". 38
 Stressing the important role minor civic, guild and
parochial offices played in increasing participation in civic government, Rappaport and
Valerie Pearl have argued that participation in government was much wider than has
previously been accepted.39
 Pearl has suggested that, as a result of such participation, "the
roots of urban government" in early-modern London "were diverse and pluralistic".40
Similarly, David Shaw, working on medieval Wells, has also stressed the extent to which
positions of responsibility were accessible to men from a wide variety of socio-economic
backgrounds. He argues that while these posts did not engender social homogeneity or
equality, they did engender social cohesion and allow the honour of public recognition at
each stage of the socio-economic hierarchy.4'
Work in this field should be viewed as important in several respects. First, it
highlights the arbitrariness of focussing on only the higher civic officials. Second, it
suggests that rather than dividing medieval society into those who ruled and those who were
ruled, a more accurate or helpful way to conceptualise civic status may be in terms of a more
gradual hierarchy of power. More attention needs to be given to elite hierarchies within
civic elites and also to elite substructures. One historian who has done just that is
Kowaleski. In her study of civic officials in medieval Exeter, Kwski h	 pLec
Exeter society in terms of a number of different ranks. 42 For example, included among the
S. Rappaport; Worlds Within Worlds: Structures ofLfe in Sixteenth-Centuly London (Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge, 1989), p. 175.
39 Riippaport, Worlds Within Worlds, pp. 180-2; Pearl, 'Change and Stability in Seventeenth-Century London',
pp. 139-166. For a more general critique of the overall Clark and Slack thesis see I.W. Archer, The Pursuit of
Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan England (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991), passim.
For studies of the role of minor posts in the medieval period see Kowaleski, Local Markets andRegional Trade,
pp. 95-119; Carpenter, 'The Office and Personnel of the Post of Bridgemaster',passim.
40 Pearl, 'Change and Stability in Seventeenth-Century London', p. 152.
41 Shaw, Creation of a Community, p. 159.
42 Kowaleski, Local Markets andRegional Trade, pp. 95-119, esp. pp. 101-4.
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town's 'oligarchy' were 'rank A' and 'rank B' citizens. Whereas the men who frequently
held higher civic offices were drawn from 'rank A', 'rank B' encompassed those who held
higher civic offices less frequently. Clearly, in Exeter there existed a hierarchy of status and
power within the civic elite. Furthermore, below the oligarchy was a third substructure of
'rank C' citizens who lacked what Kowaleski terms 'real power', but who were nevertheless
invested with a degree of civic responsibility by virtue of holding minor civic posts. 43 She
concludes that significant in this respect was "Exeter's electoral system, which allowed men
of more moderate means to have some say in local government, and which created a buffer
zone or 'middle class'...between the truly wealthy and the poorer majority" thus easing
"social and political tensions within the town".
TV) Alternative Systems of Stratification
Kowaleski's work is also notable in that she examines in great detail correlations between
wealth, occupation, political power, family connections and status. In general, though, the
emphasis she places upon the 'mercantile elite' has caused her to underestimate the potential
significance of factors other than wealth or occupation in the formation of urban elites.
Furthermore, the delineation of certain social groups on the sole basis of occupation fails
to take account of Weberian sociology which stresses the many dimensions of social
stratification.45 In contrast, continental historians such as Weissman have argued that we
should be wary of one-dimensional stratification systems which search for a single
underlying category of classification (such as family, guild membership, or class dynamics)
43 Ibid., pp. 103.
¶lbid.,pp. 118.
45 M. Weber, The Theo?y of Social and Economic Organization, trans. AM. Henderson & T. Parsons (New
York: Free Press, 1964); idem, Economy and Society: An Outline ofInterpretative Sociology, 2 vols. (Berkeley:
California University Press, 1978).
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in order to provide the key to the ftindamental structure of a past society. He suggests that
instead we should accept the fact that "modes of stratification were simultaneous and
varied", and that "groups segmented along the lines of class did not always overlap well with
groups partitioned along the lines of prestige or political power".47
Within the field of English medieval urban history, the importance of the multivalent
nature of social stratification has been most strongly argued for by Gervase Rosser.48
Rosser directs his argument against the division of medieval society by both medieval and
modem writers into "those who prayed, those who fought, and those who worked".49 He
also objects to a persistent view of the ordering of labour as "a mere ft,nction of socio-
economic relations" that was "characterized by a developing polarization between.. .masters
and journeymen". 50 Instead he calls for the study of a wider range of social processes
including "patterns of local residence, marital behaviour, political involvement and
membership (of clubs or societies)". 5 ' Rosser argues that labour relations were not dualistic
but multivalent, and that they linked individuals "not only 'horizontally' but also across
46 R.F.E. Weissman, 'Reconstructing Renaissance Sociology: The "Chicago School" and the Study of
Renaissance Society', in R.C. Trexier (ed.), Persons in Groups: Social Behaviour as Identity Formation in
Medieval andRenaissance Europe (Bingharnpton: New York, 1985), pp. 39-46.
47 Weissman, 'Reconstructing Renaissance Sociology', p. 40. For this reason Weissman has suggested that the
nature of society lies in its conduct and not its systems of stratification, and he therefore argues that historians
should move away from the study of social groups and structures. See also R.C. Trexier, Public Life in
Renaissance Florence (Academic Press: New York, 1980), pp. 12-44. Weissman's work draws heavily on the
work of the 'Chicago School' of Sociology and the writings of John Dewey and Herbert Mead. See for example
J. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (George Allen and Unwin:
1922); G}1. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1938). For an introduction
to Symbolic Interactionism see J.M. Charon, Sy,nbolic Interactionism: An Introduction, An Interpretation, An
Integration, 5th edn. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995).
48 See in particular, G. Rosser, 'Crafis, Guilds and the Negotiation of Work in the Medieval Town', Past and
Present 154 (1997): 3-3 1.
49 Ibid., p. 3.
50 1b1d., pp. 3-4.
51 Ibid., p. 7.
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socio-economic divisions".52
This emphasis on the variety of forms of social stratification and consolidation
necessitates a much more fluid understanding of social structures and hierarchies.
Moreover, it demands a far more thorough exploration and understanding of social
processes. In terms of studies of elite groups, it encourages the examination of how
alternative modes of social stratification and cohesion (neighbourhood, family, occupation
or wealth) might have affected the interaction of members within the elite as well as the
interaction of discrete groups within the rest of society. Further, an emphasis on the variety
of forms of social stratification and consolidation can also be useful in examining issues
connected with the perpetuation of elites.
Besides occupation and wealth, family is the mode of social stratification which has
most interested historians of medieval English urban elites. As early as 1948 Sylvia Thrupp
was examining a wide range of family issues in relation to urban elites. She considered
demographic, social and cultural aspects of family life, from the average number of surviving
male heirs to the received roles of husbands and wives within the domestic sphere.53
Similarly, Phythian-Adams's work on late-medieval and early-modern Coventry is also
important in terms of its examination of the role of families and households in the social,
economic and political life of the city. 54 Nonetheless, the extent and scope of research on
the English family within the urban sphere has remained somewhat limited. 55 Many studies
52 Ibid.,p. 8.
Thrupp,Merchanl Class, pp. 169-74, 19 1-206, 222-33, 263-9.
54 Phythian-Adan3s, Desolation of a City, pp. 80-98 & 148-57.
55 lndeed, Kowaleski argues that such studies have "only added small details into the picture drawn...by Thrupp".
lvL Kowaleski, 'The Flistoiy ofUrban Families in Medieval England', Journal ofMedieval Histoty 14:1 (1988):
47-63 (quote p. 48). Thisviewhasbeenechoedmomrecently in J.I. Kermode, 'Sentiment and Survival: Family
and Friends in Late Medieval English Towns', Journal of Family Histoiy: Studies in Family, Kinship and
Demography 24:1 (1999): 5-18 (quote p. 5).
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have concentrated primarily on demographic issues, such as determining the average age at
marriage, average family size and average replacement rates. 56 The three other dominant
issues in urban studies have been: the extent to which elite families were interrelated; the
extent to which there existed an urban patriciate; and the extent to which urban elites were
subject to a process of gentrification. 57 The concentration on these issues has clearly
affected historians' understanding of late-medieval urban elites. In particular, the
preoccupation with the extent that elite families were interrelated has tended to reinforce
already pervading notions of oligarchy.
Many historians have noted the prevalence of family networks linking prominent
merchants and civic officials, although there is a general consensus that (possibly due to
failure to produce male heirs) dynasties lasting for more than a couple of generations were
rare in English towns. 58 If correct, this situation obviously contrasts sharply with that on the
continent, and particularly in southern Europe, where long-lasting dynasties and patriciates
were common. 59 Concentrating on merchants in northern England, Jennifer Kermode has
56 example, S. Thrupp, 'The Problem of Replacement Rates in the Late-Medieval Population', Economic
History Review, Second Series 18 (1965): 101-19; R.M. Smith, 'Some Reflections on the Evidence for the
Origins of the "European Marriage Pattern" in England', in C.C. Harris (ed.), The Sociology of/he Family: New
Directions for Britain (University of Keele, Keele, 1979): 74-112; J. Beauroy, 'Family Patterns and Relations
of Bishop's Lynn Will-makers in the Fourteenth Century', in L. Bonfleld et a! (eds.), The World We Have
Gained: Histories ofPopulation and Social Siructure (Blackwell: Oxford, 1986), pp. 23-42; P.J.P. Goldberg,
'Marriage, Migration, Servanthood and Life-Cycle in Yorkshire Towns in the Later Middle Ages: Some York
Cause Paper Evidence', Continuity and Change 1(1986): 14 1-69; Idem., Women Work and Life Cycle in a
Medieval Economy: Women in York and Yorkshire c. 1300-1520 (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1992).
57 For an examination of these issues in relation to the elites of late-medieval towns see, in addition the citations
listed in notes 55 and 56 above; Dyer, Worcester in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 179-88; W.T. MacCaffley,
Fxeter, 1540-1640: The Growth of an English County Town, 2nd edn. (Harvard University Press: Cambridge
Mass., 1975), pp. 246-69; Gottfried, Bury StEdmunds, pp. 131-66; J.I. Kermode, 'The Merchants of Three
Northern English Towns', in CR Clough (ed.), Profession, Vocation and Culture in LaterMedieval England:
Essays Dedicated to the Memory ofA.R. Myers (Liverpool University Press: Liverpool, 1982), pp. 7-48.
Thrupp,Merchant Class, pp. 191-206; Gottfried,Buiy St Edmunds, pp.59-63 & 137; Shaw, Creation of a
Community, pp. 173-5; Platt, Medieval Southampton, pp. 23 & 104-5; Dyer, Worcester in the Sixteenth
Century, pp. 179-188.
See, for example, J. Heers, Family Clans in the Middle Ages: A Study ofPolitical and Social Structures in
Urban Areas, trans. B. Herbert (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1977); D. Herlihy and C.
Klapisch-Zyber, Tuscans and TheirFamilies: A Study of the Florentine Catasto of 142 7 (Yale University Press:
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recently argued that family networks and affinities among the merchants of York, Beverley
and Hull were prevalent enough for them to be viewed as evidence of embryonic class
formation.60 Nevertheless, one is inclined to agree with Shaw's observation that historians
studying elite urban dynasties in England have been inclined to "make more of the successful
dynasties than of the general trend". 61 Moreover, it must be emphasised that studies
concentrating on links between merchants or aldermen (civic officials of a lower status have
rarely been studied in this respect) are limited in their value for a variety of reasons.
First, it is not clear whether similar patterns of family and social ties were always the
same lower down the civic hierarchy or amongst men of different occupations. Derek
Keene has shown that tanners' widows tended to remarry other tanners. 62 However, it
seems likely that there may have been differences in patterns of social cohesion amongst
different groups of artisans. It is clear, for example that butchers were much more likely to
live in clustered groups within some late-medieval towns, whereas other occupations were
more dispersed. It is possible that a clustered residency pattern such as that displayed by
the butchers may in turn have led to a higher degree of social cohesion and inter-familial
integration among men of this occupation.63
Second, most English research into urban families has concentrated on identifring
links between members of similar social groups. Unlike on the continent, family links
between people of different socioeconomic or occupational backgrounds have been largely
New Haven, 1985), pp. 337-360.
Kennode, 'Senthnent and Survival', pp.5 & 12; idem, Medieval Merchants, pp. 77-90; idern, 'The Merchants
of Three Northern English Towns', pp. 16-19. See Swanson, MedievalArtisons, pp. 3-4; Thrupp, Merchant
Class, especially pp. 27-41.
61 Shaw, Creation of a Community, p. 174, note 117.
D. Keene, 'Tanners' Widows, 1300-1350', in C.M. Barron, and A.F. Sutton (eds.), Medieval London Widows
1300-1500 (The Haxnbledon Press: London, 1994), pp. 1-27.
63 Goldberg, Women, Work andLfe Cycle, pp. 64-7 1.
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ignored in English studies. Clearly, this methodological oversight introduces a strong
predetermining factor into the English findings. Interestingly, continental research, such as
that of Heers on Italian cities has actually emphasised the importance of ties between men
of very different social, economic and occupational status.M Similarly, it has been tentatively
suggested by van Kan that bonds of dependance between members of the urban elite and
lower levels of urban society also existed within medieval Leiden. 65 One of the few English
urban historians to consider this phenomenon is Phythian-Adams. Although he did not
explore this area in depth, Phythian-Adams suggested that familial ties between men with
different occupations, and between men who did and did not hold civic office, may have
acted to reinforce a sense of social responsibility amongst civic office holders, and may also
have served to lessen potential 'class' divisions and foster a sense of community within late-
medieval Coventry. Indeed, Phythian-Adams' work on Coventry is notable in that he
opens up issues concerning the interaction between different social spheres such as family,
household, neighbourhood and guild, and the wider social structures of the town. 67 One of
the essential features of his research is his exploration of the importance of the "inter-action
of both separate social themes and of differing social grouos".68
Although English historians have highlighted maniage links between elite mercantile
and aldermanic families, they have concentrated on patrilineal descent. 69 Little research has
Heers, Family Clans in the Middle Ages, passim.
F.J.W. van Kan, 'Elite Md Government in Medieval Leiden', Journal ofMedieval Histoiy 21(1995): 51-75
(quote pp. 6 9-70).
Phythian-Adanis, Desolation of a City, pp. 148-157.
67 1b1d pp. 80-98, 142-7, 148-57, 189-98,221-37,238-48. For the early-modern period see Rappaport, Worlds
Within Worlds, pp. 162-2 14 & 285-376.
6SPhy*j..Adjs Desolation of a City, p.1.
Thrupp,Merchant Class, pp. 28-9, 191-204,222-33; Kermode, 'Sentiment and Survival', pp. 6-10; Kermode,
MedievalMerchants, pp. 77-90; Kermode, 'The Merchants of Three Northern English Towns', pp. 16-19.
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been carried out into the perpetuation of elite families through the female line. Writing on
the state of family history in England, Kowaleski has challenged the emphasis on
patriarchy. 70 She argues that women played an important role in the "formation and descent
of urban properties and businesses".7' The role of women in the formation of civic elites and
the inheritance of civic identity or status has received even less attention. Kermode has
suggested that marriage alliances often "echoed political associations". 72 However, as
Carole Rawcliffe has demonstrated, marriages could also be used to create political alliances
and associations. 73 Clearly, the role of women in the formation and perpetuation of elite
groups demands further consideration.
Akin to the issue of the dynastic reproduction of urban elites is the less studied issue
of the ideological perpetuation urban elites. How were the values and ideologies of civic
elites perpetuated over the generations? It would be interesting to consider the role that
family, guardians and godparents may have played in the socialisation of young men as
future office holders and members of the civic elite. For example, might family,
apprenticeship and fictive kinships have acted as locale for the training and inculcation of
a specific set of urban or civic values?
Beyond the family, parish and guilds also played important roles as systems of social
stratification and consolidation, and as channels of recruitment and socialisation. Late-
medieval English cities often displayed marked social and occupational topography.74
70 Kowaleski, 'The History of Urban Families', p. 49
' Ibid. See also Kermode, Sentiment and Survival, p. 7.
72 Kode Sentiment and Survival, p.7.
C. Rawcliffe, 'Margaret Stodeye, Lady Philipot (d. 1431)', in Barron and Sutton (eds.), Medieval London
Widows, pp. 85-98.
74 Goldberg, Women, Work andLfè Cycle, pp. 64-71; Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, pp. 159-69; Platt,
'Southampton, 1000-1600 A.D.: Wealth and Settlement Patterns in a Major Medieval Seaport', Hanische
Geschichtsblatter 91(1973): 12-23.
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However, even the most homogeneous parishes tended to contain a variety of occupations
and levels of wealth.75
 Phythian-Adams has argued that this heterogeneity cmust have done
something to dilute social segregation". 76
 Similarly, for London, Archer has stressed the
role of parishes as important units of identity and cohesion units which created "mutual ties
among (their) members, rich and poor alike". This is not to suggest that the late-medieval
parish was some form of ideal egalitarian community.78
 There is a consensus among
historians that parishes were very hierarchical and far from egalitarian. 79 In his study of St.
Mary-At-Hill in London, Clive Burgess has illustrated that the institution of the parish, its
financial and social activities and its intercessory regimes all served to create or reinforce
highly integrated, yet hierarchical communities. 8° Nevertheless, it is likely that parishes
played an important role in increasing cohesiveness within the wider urban sphere and in
reducing potentially antagonistic social polarisation precisely because they cut across socio-
Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, pp. 163-6; N. Alldridge, 'Loyalty and Identity in Chester Parishes
1540-1640', in S.J. Wright (ed.), Parish, Church and People: Local Studies in Lay Religion 1350-1 750
(Hutchinson: London, 1988), pp. 88-90; B. Ktlmin, The Shaping of a Community: The Rise andReformation
of the English Parish c. 1400-1560, St Andrews Studies in Reformation History (Scholar Press: Aldershot,
1996), pp. 222-5.
76 PhaAdams Desolation of a City, p. 166.
77 Archer, The Pursuit ofStability, p. 92, but see also pp. 74-92. For the expression of similar sentiments see
also Kümin, The Shaping of a Community, p. 27; Alldridge, 'Loyalty and Identity in Chester Parishes', pp. 90
& 118.
calls for the rejection of the use of the term 'community' in historical studies on the grounds that it has
become too encumbered with nostalgic connotations of social harmony and egalitarianism, see C. Carpenter,
'Genliy and Coinmuinty in Medieval England', Journal ofBritish Studies 33 (1994): 340-80; M. Rubin, 'Small
Groups: Identity and Solidarity in the Late Middle Ages', in J. Kermode (ed.), Enterprise and Individuals in
Fieenth-CenIury England (Alan Sutton: Stroud, 1991), pp. 132-50.
79 KUmin, The Shaping of a Community, pp. 232-3; J.A. Ford, 'Marginality and the Assimilation of Foreigners
in the Lay Parish Community: The Case of Sandwich', in K.L. French, 0G. Gibbs and B.A. Ktlmin, The Parish
in English Life 1400-1600 (Manchester University Press: Manchester and New York, 1997), pp. 211-5.
n C. Burgess, 'Shaping the Parish: St Maiy at Hill, London, in the Fifteenth Centuiy', in J. Blair and B. Golding
(eds.), The Cloister and the World: Essays in Medieval History in Honour of Barbara Harvey (Clarendon
Press: Oxford, 1996), pp. 246-86. For the role of charity and intercessory regimes in this respect see in
particular, C. Burgess and B. Küuiin, 'Penitential Bequests and Parish Regimes in Late Medieval England',
JournalofEcclesiasticalHistoiy 44 (1993): 610-30; J.M. Bennett, 'Conviviality and Charity in Medieval and
Early Modem England', Past and Present 134 (1992): 19-41.
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economic boundaries in the same way as did urban family networks.
In contrast, some historians have suggested that guild communities played an
important role in increasing homogeneity among otherwise disparate elites. For example,
Blockmans has argued for the Netherlands that the "maintenance of social contacts in a
genial atmosphere was essential for the formation of an homogeneous urban elite which
would embrace all professional groups". 81 Similarly, Andrew Brown has suggested that the
St. George Guild of Salisbury served to bind civic officials in a common cause and lessen
social tensions. However, the role of guilds in lessening tensions and increasing integration
within the elite of late-medieval towns has been most closely examined by Gervase Rosser
and Ben McRee. For Rosser, one of the most important roles of medieval guilds was their
function as mechanisms through which changes in the 'social structure' could be negotiated
and overcome. 84 He has argued that feasting offered opportunities for the establishment,
re-enforcement and re-negotiation of relationships between guild members, particularly
those of different occupations and social status. 85 Both men have viewed feasts, ceremonial,
and guild codes and legislation as particularly important in this respect. Interestingly,
though, McRee also recognizes that guilds could act as catalysts for divisions within the
social community. 86 In particular, he has suggested that the importance placed on
81 WM Blockmnns and W. Prevenier, The Burgundian Netherlands (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
1986), p. 175.
Brown,PopularPiety, pp. 168-9 & 177.
83 See in particular, G. Rosser, 'Going to the Fraternity Feast: Commensality and Social Relations in Late
Medieval England', Journal ofBritish Studies 33 (1994): 430-46; B. McRee, 'Unity or Division? The Social
Meaning of Guild Ceremony in Urban Communities', in Hanawalt and Reyerson (eds.), City and Spectacle, pp.
189-207; MeRee, 'Religious Gilds and Civic Order', pp. 69-97.
G. Rosser, 'Communities of Parish and Guild in the Late-Middle Ages', in Wright (ed.), Parish Church and
People, pp. 29-55.
85 Rosser, 'Going to the Fraternity Feast', pp. 431-3.
McRee, 'Unity or Division?', pp. 189-207.
21
precedence in guild and civic processions could itself be a highly divisive rather than unif,iing
force within the urban community.87
The work of Rosser and McRee is important to the study of elites in two respects.
First, it points to the importance of guild membership in systems of social stratification and
consolidation. 88 Second, their approach to the role of feasting, ceremonial and social codes
is one that could equally well be applied to civic elites. The role of drama and of civic and
guild ceremonial in the renegotiation and consolidation of English urban social systems is
well researched. However, much less attention has been given to everyday or secular ritual
and ritualised actions. Nevertheless, it is likely, that ritualised activities such as feasting, and
the use of special language and social codes served as mechanisms through which alliances
could be renegotiated, differences could be overcome and relationships could be
consolidated within wider civic elites as well as among guild members.
Also of relevance to the study of urban elites is the role of parishes and guilds as
channels of recruitment and socialisation. Interestingly, Burgess suggests that parochial pre-
eminence "was the result not simply of economic and social success, but had to be attained
by following certain pathways". 9° This raises several questions. First, was the same also
true of civic offices? Second, to what extent did parochial institutional hierarchies interlock
Ibid.,p. 189.
See also David Crouch's work on guilds in Hull and York in this respect D. Crouch, 'Piety, Frateniity and
Power: Religious Gilds in Late Medieval Yorkshire', D.PhiI Thesis, department of History, University of York
(1995).
See, for example, Phythian-Adams, 'Ceremony and the Citizen', pp. 238-64; M. James, 'Ritual, Drama and
the Social Body in the Late Medieval English Town', in M. James (ed.), Society, Politics and Culture, Studies
in Ear'y Modern England, Past and Present Publications (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1986), pp.
16-47;D.H. Sacks, 'Celebrating Authority inBristol 1475-1640', in S. Zimmerman and R.F.E. Weissman (eds.),
Urban Life in the Renaissance (University of Deleware Press: Newark, 1989), pp. 187-223; N. Zemon Davis,
'The Sacred and the Body Social in Sixteenth-Centmy Lyon', Past and Present 90 (1981): 40-70; E. Muir, Civic
Ritual in Renaissance Venice (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1981); see also the essays in Hanawalt and
Reyerson (eds.), City and Spectacle.
9°Burgess, 'Shaping the Parish, p. 262.
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with the civic cursus honorum? Finally, it must be wondered whether guilds played an
explicit role in the socialisation of future civic officials. Both McRee and Rosser have
highlighted the importance of moral regulation in guilds. To what extent might this moral
regulation correspond with the type of civic discourses on the importance of personal
characteristics in civic officials that have been examined by Shaw? Ultimately, might not
urban guilds have acted as an informal training ground or a type of filter mechanism for civic
office itself?9'
V) York 1476-1525
This thesis aims to address the above issues and lacunae through a detailed case-study of the
civic elite of late-medieval York during the period 1476-1525. York's administrative
structures and civic offices have been well-detailed elsewhere. In particular, Edward
Miller's account of Medieval York includes a thorough and lucid overview of the city's
councils and civic offices 92
 However, for the benefit of those not already acquainted with
the structures of government in the city, a short recapitulation is necessary here.
The highest civic office in late-medieval York was that of the mayoralty. The mayor
represented the king's interests within the city and swore to maintain peace and justice
within the city and to maintain and advance its franchises, usages and customs. 93
 From at
least as early as 1343 the mayor was elected annually on St. Blaise's day (3 Februaiy). 94 Re-
9t Rosser, 'Communities of Parish and Guild', pp. 36-7.
E. Miller, 'Medieval York', in P.M. Tillott (ed.), A Histoiy of Yorkshire: The City of York, Victoria Histoly
of the Counties of England (1961), especially pp. 70-5, 76-9 & 80. See also Kermode, Medieval Me rchants,
appendix 1. For an excellent unpublished account see A. Kulikundis 'The Cursus Honorum in Fifleenth-Centwy
York: The Rise to Power', unpublished MA dissertation, Center for Medieval Studies, University of York
(1993), pp. 1-28.
93 YCA, Freemen's Register, Dl, fol. lv.
lists recording the election of mayors see YCA, Freemen's Register, Dl, fols. 4r-27r.
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election to this post was common during the first half of the fourteenth centuly, but
increasingly, measures were introduced to prevent this happening. 95 In 1372 it was enacted
that no one was to be re-elected in the eight years following their holding the post of mayor,
and in 1392 re-election was barred until all other aldermen had served in the post 96 By
1475 it was very unusual for anyone to hold the post of mayor more than twice, and most
mayors held the office only onceY The method of election of the mayor also changed over
the later-medieval period, possibly as a result of the repeated occurrence of election-day
riots.98 During the late-fourteenth century the outgoing mayor presented the commonalty
of the city with the names of two or three candidates drawn from the city's council of
aldermen. The commonalty then chose one of these men to be the city's mayor for the
following year. In 1464 this process was reversed by Edward IV. The king decreed that
the crafts should choose two aldermen as mayoral candidates and that the mayor, aldermen
and council of twenty-four should then decide which of these men was to become the next
mayor.'°° In 1473 the role of the crafts was further increased by Edward when he gave them
the power to elect directly any one of the aldermen as mayor. 101 Finally, in response to a
petition from the city's council, the process was changed once again in 1490 when the 1464
95 Miller, 'Medieval York', p. 70.
M. Sellers (ed.), YorkMemorandum Boo/c part I, 1376-1419, Surtees Society 120 (1912 for 1911), P. 116;
YCA, Freemen's Register, Dl, fol. 9v.
See Appendix I.
The changes in the electoral procedures and the reasons behind these changes are explored more fully in Part
Four below.
M. Sellers (ed.), YorkMemorandum Boo/c part II, 1388-1493, Surtees Society 125 (1914), p. 255.
'°°Calendar ofPatent Rolls 1461-7, p. 366.
°' Calendar of PatentRolls 1467-77, p.416.
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electoral procedure was restored.102
Below the office of mayor was that of sheriff Until 1396 the city had three
bailiffs. 103
 However, under the royal charter of that year the bailiffs were replaced by two
elected sheriffs chosen annually on the 21 September.'° 4 The sheriffs' primary functions
were judicial and financial. They headed three of the city's main courts which dealt mainly
with cases of debt, assault and trading or market offences.'° 5 The sheriffs also collected the
city's revenues for the crown and paid its fee farm. In general the candidates for the posts
of sheriff were chosen from amongst the past chamberlains of the city by the mayor,
aldermen and the council of twenty-four, and their choice of candidates was then endorsed
by the commonalty.'°6 In 1504 this electoral procedure was unsuccessfully challenged by
the commonalty who demanded the right to elect the sheriffs directly.107
Immediately below the sheriffs in rank were the city's chamberlains. They were
responsible for the collection and control of the city's internal finances. 108 This primarily
amounted to collecting land and property rents (often through the services of the city's
bridge masters), revenues from city farms such as that of the common crane, and fines and
duties. The revenue raised from these sources paid the wages of the city's MPs, legal
This procedure was also reconfirmed in 1492. Calendar ofPatent Rolls 1 485-94, p. 297; A. Raine (ed.), York
Civic Records, S vols., Yorkshire Archaeological Society Records Series 97, 103, 106, 108, 110, 112, 115 &
119 (1939-52), 2: 39-44, 49, 54-5 & 104.
a list of York's bailiffs see YCA, Freemen's Register, Dl, fols. 288v-294r.
'°4 For York's charter, which conferred on the city the right of internal self-government and elevated the city to
county status, see Calendar of Charter Rolls 1341-1417, pp. 354-6 & 358-60.
'°5 Mlller, 'Medieval York', p. 75. For the few surviving medieval records of York's Sheriffs' Courts see YCA,
Sheriffs' Court Books, E25 & 25a.
106 Sellers (ed.), York Memorandum Book, part II, pp. 52, & 74-5.
'°7 Raine (ed), York Civic Records, 3: 8-9. This event is discussed in greater depth in Part Four.
'°8 For the duties of the chamberlains see RB. Dobson (ed.), York City Chamberlains Account Rolls, Surtees
Society 192 (1980), especially pp. xxi-xxxi.
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advisers and chaplains and additionally covered the expenses and paid for the liveries of the
civic officials.'°9 By the late-fifteenth century it was common for the balance of revenues
to be in deficit."° Any expenses which could not be paid for out of the common funds were
met from the personal finances of the incoming chamberlains, who were then reimbursed
their initial outlay at the end of their period in office." As a result of the increasing
financial difficulties faced by York over the period of this study and the resultant financial
burden placed on the chamberlains, the number of men elected to the post was increased.
Whereas only three men had been originally elected each year, this number increased to four
in 1484, and to six in 1487.112 However, in 1499 it was possible to reduce the number of
chamberlains back down to four, and in 1501 the number once again reverted to three.'13
From 1376 the chamberlains were elected on St. Blaise's day following the election of the
mayor. Like the sheriffs, they were chosen by the mayor, aldermen and twenty-four."4
While it was common throughout the second half of the fifteenth century for chamberlains
to have served as bridge masters before becoming chamberlains, it became compulsory for
them to have done so from 1475." In practice, however, this ruling could be circumvented
easily by the payment of a fine, as happened in the case of 52% of the men who held of the
' °9 Numerous records pertaining to the city's chamberlains survive from the period up to 1525. In addition to
the Chamberlains Rolls, YCA, C1:1(1396-7)-C6:5 (1523-4), of which those up to YC4:4 (1499-1500) have
been edited by Dobson (ed.), York City Chamberlains Account Rolls, three Chamberlains Account Books also
survive, YCA, CC1 (1446-50), CC1A (1448-54), CC2 (1520-5).
110 See Dobson (ed.), York City Chamberlains Account Rolls; Miller, 'Medieval York', pp. 72-3.
Miller, 'Medieval York', pp.73-4.
"2 Mi11er 'Medieval York', p. 74; Dobson (ed.), York City Chamberlains Account Rolls, p. xxxvii. For lists of
chamberlains which show their fluctualing numbers see YCA, Freemen's Register, Dl fols. 32 lr-v, 330r-33 lv,
58r-209r (cited in chronological order).
3 Mil1er, 'Medieval York', p. 74.
114 Sellers (ed.), YorkMemorandum Book part 1, pp. 16-17.
" Sellers (ed.), YorkMemorandum Boo/c part II, pp. 245-6.
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post of chamberlain during the period 1476 to 1525.116
The post of bridge master was the lowest of the annually elected civic offices in
terms of status.' 17 Until 1569 four men were elected each year, two for Foss bridge and two
for Ouse bridge." 8 These men were responsible for collecting all of the rents assigned to
their bridges for the purposes of the bridge's maintenance. In addition, the Ouse bridge
masters also oversaw the upkeep of Saint William's chapel on Ouse bridge and were
responsible for the payment of the chapel priest's fees.' 19
 Any surplus revenue generated
was then passed on to the chamberlains. As Professor Dobson has noted, the net income
collected by the bridge masters constituted the single most valuable source of revenue
received by the city council during the late-medieval period.' 2° From 1381 the bridge
masters were elected on the same day as the mayor and the chamberlains.'2' Like the
chamberlains, they were elected by the mayor, alderman and ne counth\ o iit'-cc cI
were then presented to the commonalty for endorsement.' However, in February 1490 this
situation changed when in response to a petition from the commonalty the posts of bridge
master became directly elected by the com1nons.lZ
Besides the annually elected officials there were also a number of other personnel
"6 Appendix 1.
117 For a far more detailed exploration of this post see Carpenter, 'The Office and Personnel of the Post of
Bridgemaster'.
holders of this post are listed in YCA, Freemen's Register, Dl, fols. 3 18r-320v & 322r-329v.
the records of the medieval bridge masters up to 1525 see YCA, Bridge Masters' Account Rolls, C80-
C87.
'20 Dobson (ed.), Chamberlains Accounts, p. xxvii.
121 YCA, Freemen's Register, Dl, fol. 319r & 327r.
'L.C. Atlreed(ed.), YorkHouse Books, 1463-1490 (Alan Sutton Publishing: Stroud, 1991), pp. 80-1, 300 &
630-1.
'23 Ap eed (ed.), York House Books, j,. 675.
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associated with the government of late-medieval York who are referred to in this thesis. To
support the civic officials the city had a recorder and a common clerk.' 24 Both men were
employed for their professional expertise and were paid a salary. The recorder acted as the
city's main legal adviser, while the common clerk compiled the city's civic records.
Alongside these professional men the city also employed a number of ceremonial officials
such as the sword and mace bearers and the sergeants. The most important of the
ceremonial officers were the mayor's mace and sword bearers- he had one of each from
1388Y' These men were required to process before the mayor throughout the city bearing
the civic regalia.
Besides the thnctions of the annually elected civic officials much of the government
of the city was achieved through the use of councils. It seems likely that York was initially
governed by a territorial system of courts based on the city's wards and parishes.'26
Although this system had largely been replaced by the late-fourteenth century, remnants still
persisted as late as the sixteenth century. Each of the city's six wards were assigned two
aldermen, and they, or a warden, headed the quarterly wardmote courts which dealt with
neighbourhood problems such as encroachment, blocked drains and gutters, rubbish
dumping, gossip mongering or night walking . '27 More serious criminal or financial cases
were increasingly dealt with in the central courts or by the craft searchers, but they were
' 24 Miller, 'Medieval York', pp. 74-5.
' 25 Ibid., p. 70. The mayors' esquires are listed in YCA, Freemen's Register, Dl, fols. 6v-27r.
126 s Rees Jones, 'York's Civic Administration', in S. Rees Jones (ed.), The Government ofMedieval York:
Essays in Commemoration of the 1396 Royal Charter, Borthwick Studies in Histoiy 3 (1997), p. 123. For a
discussion of this development in Norwich, see W. Hudson (ed), Leet Jurisdiction in the City of Norwich,
Selden Society 5 (1892), pp. Ixxii-lxxxiii.
'Miller, 'Medieval York', p. 77. For the wardmote records see YeA, Chamberlains Account Book CBI a, fols.
I 36r- 1 39r; YCA, Wardmote Court Book E3 1, pp. 1 a-20a. Although these are unpublished they have been
transcribed by T. Andrew, 'The Fifleenth Centuiy Wardmote Court Returns for York' (Unpublished MA thesis,
Centre for Medieval Studies, University of York, 1997), Appendix.
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often presented at the wardmote courts in the first instance.' 28
 Alongside their judicial
function, the wards also retained their role as the principal unit of organisation for the
mustering, training and financing of troops throughout this period.'29
Below the ward, the parish also acted as a further unit of government. Each parish
had several annually elected constables who were sworn to oversee the keeping of the peace
in their parish (which included the power of arrest) and who had to ensure that the streets
and walls were kept clean.'30 The parish constables also played a role in the mustering of
troops and the collection of money for soldiers wages. The role of posts such as ward
sergeant or parish constable in York's civic administration and in the general hierarchy of
civic posts is explored in much greater depth in the final section of this thesis.'3'
Although the city's parishes and wards retained a residual role in the government of
fifteenth and sixteenth-century York, the city's style of government had undoubtably
become conciliar and, to a large extent, centralised by 1476. From the late-fourteenth
century, York was governed by a three-tiered conciliar system of administration which ran
alongside the hierarchy of executive offices. At the heart of the civic government sat the
mayor and the city's council of aldermen, usually twelve in number. Whereas the mayor was
elected annually, membership of the council of aldermen was normally for life. New
aldermen were drawn from the ranks of the twenty-four and were chosen by the mayor and
existing aldermen.' 32 The council of twenty-four, often referred to as the probi homines
'28 Rees Jones, 'York's Civic Administration', p. 123.
129 Miller, 'Medieval York', p. 77.
' 30 Ibid., p. 77.
131 See Part Four, pp. 248-273 below.
132 See, for example, Atreed (ed.), YorkHouse Book., pp. 305-6, 334 & 669; Raine (ed), YorkCivicRecords
2:141,160, 176,& 190.
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comprised those men who had reached the office of sheriff in the city.' 33 Membership of this
fomm was for life or until further promotion to the council of aldermen. The third layer of
administration was the council of forty-eight, sometimes referred to as the communitas. This
was a far more shadowy body than the two senior councils, and one whose function seems
to have been to represent the interests of the 'commonalty' of the city. The membership of
the council of forty-eight is only recorded twice in surviving York records for the whole of
the medieval period. Its membership and functions are explored in much greater depth
below.' Unlike the other two councils it does not seem to have met frequently. From the
evidence available it appears that the forty-eight acted primarily as a petitioning body and
as a mechanism through which the commons were able to give assent and approval to
financial burdens and to changes in civic legislation and ordinances. Indeed, as Sarah Rees
Jones has argued, the existence of a civic petitioning and assenting body designed to
represent the interests of the wider civic community was perhaps reminiscent of the
functions exercised by parliament within the framework of contemporary royal
government.'35
' Miller, 'Medieval York', p. 78.
134 See Part Four, pp. 248-273 below.
135 Rees Jones, 'York's Civic Administration', p. 123.
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B) Elite Theory136
I) Class, Status and Authority
As we have seen, the work of many medieval urban historians assumes a convergence
between Marxist class divisions, Weberian status divisions and the notion of a ruling or
governing elite. For some historians this assumption is explicit. For others, though, it is the
result of confusion which is perpetuated through a failure to define key concepts. This
confusion is unsurprising. As Giddens has noted, even within the discipline of sociology
"the theoretical literature dealing with elites and power.. .wallows in a sea of ineffable
confusion- a situation which results from variation in terminological convention, conceptual
ambiguity, and profound divergencies in theoretical standpoints of different authors".' 37
 To
a notable extent such confusion can be framed in terms of fundamental ambiguities in our
understanding of the concepts of class and status.
In its truest form, Marxist class divisions relate structural and social inequalities to
economic divisions within a society. Under this schema, class is defined by a group's
position in the system of production.'38
 Since Marx, the concept of class has been
broadened to embrace groups defined in the first instance by non-economic systems of social
stratification. In particular, class has increasingly embraced primarily political and
ideological divisions.' 39
 Seeking to clarifj this situation, Weber developed a theory of social
136 This section is not intended as an exhaustive overview of elite theory. Rather it is a discussion of the key
concepts within the work of Pareto, Mosca and subsequent sociologists which relate to this thesis and the
historiography of medieval urban elites.
'37 A. Giddens 'Preface', in P. Stanworth and A. Giddens (eds.), Elites and Power in British Society (Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 1974), p. ix.
'38 For a discussion of 'class' as a mode of social stratification and the varieties of ambiguities, confusions and
conceptual disagreements involved, see R. Scase, Concepts in Social Sciences: Class (Open University Press:
Buckingham, 1992), especially pp. 1-26; R. Crompton, Class and Stratification: An Introduction to Current
Debates, 2nd edn. (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1998), especially pp. 1-23; J. Scott, Strat(/Ication and Power:
Structures of Class Status and Command (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1996), especially pp. 1-19.
139 Scott, Stratification and Power, p. 3.
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stratification in which he clearly separated 'class' and 'status' To Weber and his
followers, 'status', that is to say divisions "referring to moral judgements of relative social
standing and differences in life style", was clearly distinct from 'class', which referred to
economic power and resources.'41
 Although hugely influential, this division is still not
universally accepted, no doubt in part due to the fact that in many societies there is a strong
correlation between economic classes and lifestyle status groups. Many sociologists have
therefore continued to fuse these two key concepts. As John Scott argues, this has
particularly been the case with American sociologists who, being concerned with the
openness and 'classlessness' of American society, have been reluctant to embrace the
economic divisions, political ideologies and sharp boundaries of Marxist class
delimitations.'42
For students of historical elites a further element of confusion is added with notions
of authority, power and command. The concept of power is, in itself; highly problematic.'43
If power is understood in Weber's terms as "the chance that an actor's will can be imposed
on the other participants in a social relationship, even against their resistance", then it can
clearly be seen that certain economic classes and status groups will inevitably also constitute
power groups. 1
 However, Weber and several of his contemporaries also sought to
introduce a system of categorisation whereby authority or command was viewed as a third
140 Weber's conception of 'status' and its development as a tool of sociological analysis see, in addition to
works cited in note 138; B.S. Turner, Concepts in Social Sciences: Status (Open University Press: Milton
Keynes, 1988).
'' Scott, Stratflcation and Power, p. 3. See also Turner, Status, especially pp. 2-16.
142 Scott, StratifIcation and Power, pp. 4-5.
143 See for example, S.M. Lukes, Power (Blackwell: Oxford, 1986).
Weber, Economy and Society, 1: 56; cited in Scott, StratJIcation and Power, p. 22. So for example, Marxist
sociologists have argued that in all class-based societies there is a dominant class which controls material
pmduction, but also mental pmduction, by which means they are able to supervise the construction of a coherent
set of beliefs. This view is contested inN. Abercrombie, S. Hill and B.S. Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis
(George Ailen & Unwin: London, 1984).
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theoretically independent mode of social stratification alongside class and status.
Unfortunately Weber's work on 'parties' remained unfinished and was the least developed
area of his research.'45 Instead, it is in the work of Mosca and Pareto, the founders of elite
studies, that this area was first frilly developed.' Pareto's conception of elites embraced
those at the top of any socially significant hierarchy, and his understanding of elite groups
still holds much validity today.' 47 Both Pareto and Mosca were primarily concerned with
governing or ruling elites (in other words, groups which exercised power by virtue of the
offices they held), and it is these groups which are of interest here.
Both Pareto and Mosca developed the notion of a minority ruling group in the
context of theories which, like Marxism, emphasised "the centrality of conflict and struggle
in social development".' 48 Further, both men drew on the Marxist vocabulary of 'classes'.
Pareto in particular tended to assimilate the terms 'elite' and '(ruling) class'.' 49 However,
Mosca's 'classe politica' and Pareto's 'le classi elette' (which he translated from Italian
into French as '1 'elite' and then into English as 'elite') were not classes in a Marxist sense.'5°
145 Sociologists have since disagreed over how to interpret this aspect of his work, variously arguing that We6er
was concerned with parties, power, authority or command. Scott, Stratification and Power, pp. 20-47.
key works of these two men are: V. Pareto, a Treatise in General Sociology, ed. a. Livingstone (Dover:
New York, 1963); G. Mosca, 'Elimenti de Scienza Politica', 1896 edn. and 1923 edn., both in G. Mosca, The
Ruling Class (McGraw Hill: New York, 1939). For a discussion of the work of these two men and the evolution
of dlite studies see in particular, T. Bottomore, Elites and Society, 2nd edn. (Routledge: London, 1993); S.F.
Nadel, 'The Concept of Social Elites', International Social Science Bulletin 8:3 (1956): 413-424; G. Moyser
and M. Wagstaffe (eds.), Research Metho ds for Elite Studies (Allen and Unwin: London, 1987), pp. 1-24.
147 Moyser and Wagstafi Research Methods for Elite Studies, p. 8. Following on from this work Nadel has
argued that in many societies there exists "a stratum of the population which, for whatever reason, can claim a
position of superiority and hence a conusponding measure of influence over the fate of the community". He has
suggested that it is useful to distinguish between three different types of elite: social elites, specialised elites and
governing elites. Although these three groups oflen overlap, there is never a perfect correspondence. Therefore,
the assumption of a single elite "probably always involves some degree of over-simplification, of a more or less
dubious reality". Nadel, 'The Concept of Social Elites', pp. 413 & 421.
' Scott, Strat/Ication and Power, p. 128.
149 Giddens, 'Preface', p. ix.
'° Scott, Stratflcation and Power, p. 139.
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This autonomous conception of social categorisation was "essentially a political division,
concerning those who rule and those who are ruled (the mass)" and was not dependent on
relationships of economic production.' 5 ' However, the initial assimilation of the terms
'class' and 'elite', and the subsequent introduction and ill-defined use of terms such as
'power elite' or 'ruling elite', has led to a confusion among sociologists and historians as
to the relationship between the concepts of class and elite theory.
While accepting the interdependence of class, status and authority, this study
embraces the Weberian distinction between these three spheres of social stratification. The
primary reason for this is that only by distinguishing between class, status and authority can
the true significance and interplay of these forms of social stratification be fully
understood.'52 However, rather than relying on Weber's underdeveloped theories of parties,
the concept of authority as a form of social stratification has instead been understood in this
thesis in relation to approaches pioneered by Mosca and Pareto in the field of elite studies.
As has already been discussed, Pareto and Mosca were primarily concerned with
elites as constituted by people who exercised power by virtue of holding offices and
positions of government. The theories of these two men, together with those of subsequent
sociologists, offer the means by which the formation and operation of ruling groups in past
societies may be more fully explored. In the words of Scott, "Mosca and Pareto provide
tools for understanding the ways in which authority relations establish divisions between
rulers and the ruled that may underpin class and status relations or run counter to them".153
Therefore, rather than accepting or assuming an inherent correlation between civic office
' Giddens, 'Preface', p. ix.
'52 Bottomore argues that in the case of class and elite theory, although they are "totally opposed" as wide ranging
theories, at another level they may be seen as "complimentaiy concepts, which refer to different types of political
system or to different aspects of the same political system". Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 44.
'' Scott, StratifIcation and Power, pp. 17-18.
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in later-medieval York and class-based or status-based forms of stratification, it is actually
the analysis of the interplay between these two spheres which will constitute one of the key
aspects of this thesis.
II) Boundpries 'Circulation'. Coherence, Consciousness and Power
Several other key issues and points of debate within elite studies are germane to this study.
Most obviously there is the problem of boundaries. To what depth should the elite stratum
extend?' 54 The point of departure for both Pareto and Mosca was the conception of a
division between rulers (the elite) and the masses.' 55 The masses were defined as those who
lacked any meaningful involvement in government or politics.'56 But how do we define
meaningfiul involvement? In an attempt to lessen the dichotomous conception of society
embodied in the division of society into rulers and masses, many sociologists advocate the
inclusion of substratums. For example, Bottomore refers to the existence in modern
societies of 'sub-elites' which join the elite to the non-elite.' 57 Similarly, Giddens argues that
authority is best represented as a graduated hierarchy of spheres of administration. 158
 He
suggests that concepts of authority should include the elite, a 'secondary structure' and the
non-elite. Under this schema the secondary structure includes an 'administrative stratum'
of office holders of a lower rank, and also a 'recruitment stratum' which represents a pool
'54 Moyser and Wagstaffe (eds.), Research Methods for Elite Studies, p. 10.
155 However, both men were concerned with the relationship between an elite comprised of people who held
positions of authority and other elite groups comprised of the people at the top of other socially significant
hierarchies.
156 Scott, Stratification and Power, p. 132.
' 57 Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 5.
158 A. (liddens, 'Elites in the British Class Structure', in Stanwortli and Giddens (eds.), Elites and Power in
British Society, p. 4.
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of individuals from which the elite are drawn.' 59 These two groups may or may not overlap.
Clearly, the problem of boundaries remains. Flowever, these models do at least recognise
the artificiality of concrete divisions and allow and encourage an exploration of the ways in
which elite groups are linked to the rest of society.
Closely related to the issue of boundaries is the issue of recruitment to political
elites. One of the key elements of Mosca and Pareto's theories was the notion of the
'circulation of elites', which addressed changes in the make up of elites over time through
the introduction of new members and the assimilation of new interests.' 6° Mosca believed
that the circulation of elites is necessary because of the emergence of new social forces
which represent new interests in society. 161 For Mo sea and Pareto, the circulation of elites
is the fundamental force of history which drives social development. In order for an elite
to survive it is necessary that it should continue to recruit members whose interests and
skills should correspond with those required for the successful implementation of political
or authoritative power. 162 Fundamental to the successful process of regeneration is the
capacity of individual elite members to continue to represent the interests and purposes of
other important and influential groups in society.'63
While elites should engender within society a generalised recognition of their own
superiority, they should also remain close enough to the rest of society to retain influence
and power.' Several key notions are therefore crucial to the exploration of the circulation
' Giddens, 'Elites in the British Class Slructure', pp. 13-14.
160 Bottomore, Elites and Society, pp. 5-6. The circulation of elites is also used to refer to the interchange of
personnel between elites in different spheres of society. (3iddens, 'Elites and Power in British Society', p. 16.
161 Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 6.
162 Scott, Strat/ication and Power, p. 133.
'63 Boftomore Elites and Society, pp. 4-5.
' 64 Nadel 'The Concept of Social Elites', p. 417.
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of elites between the generations. First, it is necessary to explore the degree of openness
of elites to the acquisition of new skills and attributes. 165 Second, rule by an elite minority
can only be held to be possible because individuals within elites possess attributes which are
highly esteemed by their society.' Indeed, Nadel has suggested that elite groups exemplify
by their conduct those qualities considered valuable or important within a society. 167
 Clearly
then it is equally necessary to examine the ethos and actions of elite groups, as it is to
examine the issues of mobility and recruitment within elite group S.'68
In addition to the issues of boundaries and circulation there are two other elements
of elite theory which are problematic, namely the assumptions of coherence and power.
These two issues are of particular interest here, as they are both germane to historical
studies of elites. Bottomore has argued that there is an assumption within elite doctrines
that elites, or individuals possessing power, constitute cohesive groups. 169 This assumption
is also readily apparent in the work of many historians of medieval elites.' 70 In more recent
years this area has been increasingly problematised. In particular, Giddens has suggested
that in addition to the study of 'social integration', 'moral integration' should also be
examined, by 'moral integration' Giddens refers to the extent to which members of elites
share common ideas and a common moral ethos. 17' To Giddens, consciousness of an overall
solidarity is also one of the key facets of moral integration.' 72 Similarly, Nadel has argued
165 Scott, Stratification and Power, p. 133.
Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 3.
'67 Nadel, 'The Concept of Social Elites', p. 418.
1 Giddens, 'Preface', p. xii.
169 Boftomore, Elites and Society, p. 22.
'70 For the application of this criticism against medieval historians see above pp. 10-22.
171 Giddens, 'Elites in the British Class Structure', p. 5.
'72 lb Id, p. 5.
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that elite groups must have some sense of corporateness, group characteristics and self-
awareness of exclusivity: that in short, an elite must be a "more or less self-conscious unit
in society".'73
Undoubtedly, the assumed relationship between office-holding and power has been
viewed as one of the main problems within Mosca and Pareto's work.' 74
 Indeed, the
problem of the notion or definition of power is in itself a thorny issue in this context.'75
While some sociologists argue that the possession of some form of power is necessary for
a group to be deemed elite, others argue that this is not so. For example, Giddens makes
a distinction between formally defined authority and what he regards as 'real' or 'effective'
power. He suggests that "the fact that an individual possesses certain formal trappings of
authority does not, ipso facto, allow us to infer what effective power he wields".'76
III) The Purpose of Elite Studies
Despite problems with the definition of elites, the study of elite groups remains highly
important. For Pareto and Mosca it was the rise and fall of elite groups which provided the
key to social progress.'77 Other sociologists have argued that it is only through the study
of elite groups that systems of power or domination can be adequately understood: how and
in what ways power is exercised and by whom.' 78 This in turn allows judgments to be made
' 73 Nadel, 'The Concept of Social Elites', p. 415.
' 74 Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 22.
' 75 Moyser and Wagstaffe (eds.), Research Methods for Elite Studies, pp. 8-9.
'76 Giddens 'Elites in the British Class Structure', p. 4.
177 Scott, StrazJication and Power, pp. 127-138.
Giddens, 'Preface', p. xii; Giddens, 'Elites in the British Class Structure', p. 1; Moyser and Wagstaffe (eds.),
Research Methods for Elite Studies, p. 2.
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concerning the freedom and equality of a society. 179 In the context of a study of late-
medieval York, the usefulness of elite studies can be located in its providing a means of
illuminating systems of social stratification, and its providing a mechanism for measuring the
degree and nature of interaction between such different systems of stratification. This
applies to more overt systems of stratification such as class and political power, but also to
more veiled aspects of stratification and consolidation such as family or occupation.
Further, through examining the criteria on which privilege was accorded, and the processes
by which political, moral or cultural power was exercised, the study of elites can shed light
on the values of a particular group or society. Finally, the study of elites also holds wider
relevance to questions concerning the processes of social mobility and social stability in the
past.
IV Methodological Framework
It is not the intention of this thesis to resolve any of the above outlined issues per Se.
Rather, these issues have been highlighted for two reasons. First, many of the conceptual
confusions and ambiguities present in elite studies are also present in historical studies of
elites. These are, in particular: the conflation of class, status and authority: the assimilation
of the terms 'class' and 'elite': the dichotomous division of society into rulers and the ruled:
and the assumption of coherence, consciousness and power. Second, these debates cut to
the heart of this thesis. Rather than taking as given the elite status of the men who held civic
posts in later-medieval York, the overriding aim of the thesis is to determine to what extent
and in what respects this group of men may be classed as an elite. For this reason, and in
order to address the problems outlined above, this thesis follows the methodological
'79 Moyser and Wagstaffe (eds.), Research Methods for Elite Studies, p. 2.
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structure suggested by Giddens for the study of modern ruling elites.'80
First, on the issue of boundaries, this thesis follows Giddens in adopting a broad
overall definition of elite' as "referring to positions of higher authority... (recognising) that
it should be a principal endeavour of research to determine how far the effective distribution
of power diverges from this".' 8 ' The bulk of the prosopographical work in this thesis and
much of the analysis, particularly that contained in Parts Two and Three, relate only to the
higher civic officials, that is to say those who held the posts of mayor, sheriff, chamberlain
or bridge master, and the term 'civic elite' is used in reference to this group of men. To a
certain extent this group was self-delimiting as it encompassed all civic officials who were
regularly listed as such in York's Freemen's Register.' 82 Moreover, in terms of the
prosopographical research, only sporadic evidence survives detailing the personnel of the
common council or the parochial or ward-based posts. My analysis also focuses on the
'civic elite' in order to address issues raised in the existing historiography, particularly in
relation to the occupation, wealth, and family and social connections of higher civic officials.
However, it should be noted that this thesis does not seek to define York's civic elite solely
in terms of these higher posts. Indeed, it is one of the main contentions of the thesis that
more attention should be paid to the fluidity of the boundaries between the higher civic
officials and members of the common council, and holders of territorial or guild offices. For
this reason, the thesis consciously examines problematic issues such as whether, the concept
of the civic elite should be widened to encompass ad hoc civic posts, members of lower
councils and territorial or guild officers. The importance of these posts and their
relationship with the higher civic officials is addressed in greater detail in Part Four.
'° Giddens, 'Elites in the British Class Structure', pp. 1-2 1.
181 Ibid., p. 13.
' See, for example, YCA, Freemen's Register Dl, fols. 4r-27r, 209v, 288v-3 lOr, 31 8r-339r.
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Second, Giddens isolates three primary dimensions involved in the study of elites:
recruitment, structure and power. 183 These areas form the basis of the three main sections
of this thesis. Part Two on 'Access' is concerned with recruitment to the elite. In particular
it is concerned with how 'open' or 'closed' the civic elite was to men of different socio-
economic backgrounds. As well as analysing different rates of mobility this study is also
concerned with examining typical avenues of mobility and processes of 'socialisation'.184
However, since these processes are often related to the social structure of the elite,
however, they are mainly examined in Part Three. In addition, Part Two goes beyond
Giddens' methodological schema in analysing, in the words of Parkin, the 'moral
vocabularies' used by York's civic elite in order to justifj their authority. 185 Part Three on
'Structure' is concerned with the level of integration displayed by York's civic elite.
Whereas Giddens distinguishes between social and moral integration, it is primarily the
former which is examined here, although issues relating to the moral integration of the elite
are discussed throughout the thesis. Finally, Part Four on 'Authority and Power' examines
the extent to which power was either centralised in the hands of the elite or diffused
throughout society. Again, the possession of power by the civic elite is not taken as given,
rather it is one of the main points of analysis.
183 (3iddens, 'Elites in the British Class Structure', pp.4 if.
'Ibid.,p. 14.
l85' Parkin, Max Weber (Ellis Horwood: Chichester, 1982), p. 77. Throughout this thesis 'discourse' is used
to mean a range of language which "implies particular ideological valuations of the subjects it has defmed". S.
Copley, Literature and Social Order in Eighteenth-Century England (Croom Helm: London, 1984), p. 2. For
an introduction to discourse theories see D. Macdonell, Theories of Discourse: An Introduction (Blackwell:
Oxford, 1986).
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C) Prosopography
Fundamental to the study of any elite group is the examination of its personnel. For this
reason this thesis makes extensive use of prosopographical methodologies. Prosopography
has been defined as "the investigation of the common background characteristics of a group
of actors in history by means of a collective study of their lives".' 86 It involves the collection
of biographical data for a group of people on subjects such as occupation, family
background and personal relationships, education and career. Aside from its heuristic
benefits, prosopography has two main purposes. First, it allows a detailed understanding
of otherwise unvoiced mechanisms and structures of society. It is used to explore the "roots
of political action: the uncovering of the deeper interests that are thought to lie beneath the
rhetoric of politics; the analysis of the social and economic affiliations of political groupings;
the exposure of the workings of a political machine; and the identification of those who pull
the levers". 1 Second, it is useflul for exploring a society's social structure and the methods
of social mobility.'88 Finally, although not an aim, prosopography can also offer the
advantage of aiding the elimination of the traditional boundaries between social,
institutional, political and economic history.
Of course, prosopography is not without its detractors and, like most historical
methodologies, it inevitably poses conceptual and methodological problems. Obviously,
there are the practical methodological problems such as those of identification and
' 86 L Stone, 'Prosopography', in F. Gilbert and S. Graubard (eds.), Historical Studies Today (Norton: New
York, 1972), P. 107. For what follows see ibid., pp. 107-140 and G. Beech, 'Prosopography', in J.M. Powell
(ed.), Medieval Studies: An Introduction (Syracuse University Press: Syracuse, 1992), PP. 185-226.
Stone, 'Prosopography',p. 107.
Ibid., p. 107.
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classification. 1 Since these problems relate to specific historical sources they are discussed
in more depth in the appendices.' 9° However, prosopography also poses more fundamental
problems of a conceptual nature. In particular, there is the assumption that factors such as
family ties or occupation were more important than personality or ideals in determining
social and power structures and networks. The historical role of "ideas, prejudices,
passions, ideologies, ideals or principles" is ignored.' 9' Indeed, the historical intangibility
of personality and ideals means that inevitably "we deemphasise the individual vignette and
the individual experience".' Although it is possible to include more personal sources
including wills, tombs, and records of book ownership, Powell points out that we are still
"largely in the world of externals of acquisition, consumption and display, touching only
indirectly upon the internal world of reflection and motivation".' 93 To an extent this is
compounded by problems of evidence involved in any prosopographic study. Records of
one kind tend to survive more than records of another. In particular, economic records are
often far more abundant than more personal records. Due to this imbalance there can be a
resultant tendency to treat the individual as "homoeconomicus, and to study him primarily
in the light of his financial interests and behaviour".'94
Similarly, family ties often tend to be one of the keystones of prosopographic
studies. Unfortunately, however, the study of family ties is often accompanied by an
For the more practical difficulties associated with prosopography, see F.T. Camey, 'Prosopography: Payoffs
and Piffalls', Phoenix 27, (1973): 156-179; Stone, 'Prosopography', pp. 107-140.
190 See Appendices below.
191 Stone, 'Prosopography', p. 124.
'Barron & Sutton (eds.), Medieval London Widows, p. xv.
193 Powell, 'After 'After MeFarlane", pp. 7-8.
194 Stone, 'Prosopography', p. 120.
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assumption about the consolidating role of family ties in systems of stratification.' 95 Clearly,
family ties do not guarantee political consensus or solidarity. Further, it remains important
to be wary of researching kinship connections beyond the point at which they would truly
have been meaningful (or even traceable) to the people in question.
An over-concentration on key group characteristics to the neglect of other
characteristics also holds ramifications for the issue of group integration. As Caroline
Barron has noted, by focussing on only a handful of group characteristics it is all too easy
to "(lose) sight of the extent to which the apparent unity (of the group in question) is our
own constmct".' Clearly, one of the main problems of prosopographical studies is that
they risk becoming deterministic and myopic. It is all too easy for historians to become
engrossed in the collection of biographic data to the neglect of analysing the larger
implications of this information. Too often prosopographical studies fall into the category
of "New Antiquarianism- data collection for data collection's sake".' Particular care must
be taken with the study of elite groups. As Stone has warned, by focussing on elites there
is always a danger that changes amongst other groups in society "to which the elite will
eventually be obliged to respond" will be ignored.'98
These problems have been addressed in this thesis in a variety of ways. Since the
thesis is structured around a clear theoretical framework, the problem of 'data collection for
data collection's sake' has been avoided. The relative abundance of evidence available for
later-medieval York would have allowed the compilation of far more detailed biographical
' 95 Ibid.,p. 121.
'96 Bon and Sutton (eds.), Medieval London Widows, p. xv.
197 Stone, 'Prosopography', p. 132.
'Ibid., 'Prosopography', p. 123.
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profiles for many of the men.' However, this thesis has concentrated on the evidence
which is best suited to addressing those issues which have been raised in the Introduction.
Further, in an attempt to avoid generalising on the basis of limited evidence (which possibly
only pertains to certain groups of men) this thesis has concentrated on records which are
more complete or which are representative of the group as a whole. 20° Areas of research
which lie beyond the methodological boundaries of prosopographic analysis have been
addressed through the use of alternative methodologies. For example, in parts of the thesis
ideologies and ideals have been approached through the examination of the varieties of
discourse contained within York's civic writing. Indeed, it could be argued that
prosopography is particularly suited to interdisciplinary theses such as this one where its
strengths and limitations can be complemented by those of other disciplines and
methodologies.
'	 example, see Kermode, Medieval Merchants, appendix 3 (pp. 33 2-47).
200 EXfiOnS to this are discussed in the relevant parts of the thesis text.
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Part Two:
Access to Civic Office
What were the qualities which constituted a medieval civic elite? To Pareto and Mosca a
political elite was a minority group that ruled. As has been discussed in the thesis
introduction, Mosca' s classe politica was not a class in a Marxist sense. Rather, in common
with Pareto's governing elite, it was primarily an authoritarian group, as opposed to a group
whose position was based on wealth. However, for many late-medieval historians, urban
civic officials were members of the elite in two senses. First, they were members of a
political elite by virtue of the civic offices they held.' Second, it is also generally thought
that they were members of an economic elite or 'class', by virtue of their possession of other
qualities such as wealth and occupation. As I have already indicated, most historians have
assumed that there was a conflation between political power and economic power in later-
medieval towns. 2 In short, they view towns and cities as having been ruled by closed,
wealthy, mercantile oligarchies.
This thesis challenges the dominant historiographical view of late-medieval urban elites
in England through a study of the civic officials of late-medieval York. Drawing on social
closure theories, extensive prosopographical research and discourse analysis to examine
access to civic office, Part One of the thesis aims to explore a number of related issues.
Who held civic office? How open was civic office to men of different occupational and
wealth backgrounds? And in what ways was access to civic office informed by wider
contemporary notions of urban government and social structure? Part One is divided into
two sections. The first section on occupation and wealth examines the importance of these
'The position of the civic elite as a political elite and its relationship with the rest of York's population is
discussed in Part Four of the thesis below.
2	 a fuller thscussion of this historiography see Part One, pp. 1-22 above.
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two qualities for recrnitment into civic office in later-medieval York. It is argued that with
the exception of the highest civic offices of mayor and alderman there is little literary or
prosopographical evidence of exclusionary closure on the grounds of occupation. However,
both forms of evidence suggest exclusionary closure at all levels of the civic hierarchy on
the grounds of wealth. It is argued that this exclusion was 'individualist' and could not be
inherited. 3 Consequently, the perpetuation of the civic elite depended on the nomination of
'suitable' replacements. In turn this process of nomination was controlled by prevailing
ideologies concerning occupation and wealth, as well as related qualities of 'character'.
Although much attention has been paid to the relationship between civic office and
occupation and wealth, very little consideration has been given to the importance of
contemporary perceptions of character. The second section in Part One addresses this
lacuna by exploring personal qualities and characteristics such as wisdom, discretion and
honesty, all of which were portrayed as being necessary or desirable in holders of civic
office. This section is also concerned with the values or ideologies which informed this
portrayal of the ideal civic official. An examination of the variety of discourses of
governance contained within York's civic writing suggests that these ideologies were
important in two respects. First, they offered a mechanism through which 'unsuitable' men
could be denied access to civic office. Second. they were vital in serving to create or
reinforce the civic identity of the office holders, and to legitimise their exercise of power.
3 Clearly, wealth, unlike academic distinctions (for example), would normally be regarded as a readily heritable
attribute. However, it is argued in Part Three of the thesis that father to son wealth transmission in late-medieval
York was in fact poor.
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A) Occupation and Wealth
I) Social Closure Theory
The idea of social closure was first proposed in an undeveloped form by Max Weber in his
Economy and Society. 4 Later sociologists, and in particular Frank Parkin, helped evolve
Weber' s initial idea into what has become known as 'social closure theory' . As Parkin
states, "by social closure Weber means the process by which social collectivities seek to
maximise rewards by restricting access to rewards and opportunities to a limited circle of
eligibles". 6
 Opportunities for outsiders beneath this group are closed off because these
outsiders are held to be inferior or ineligible. 7 From this it can be seen that social closure
theory assumes an inherently antagonistic relationship between those excluded and those
who are excluding. Indeed, one major contributor to 'closure theory' prefers to call it
conflict theory'. 8 This antagonism is seen to result from the struggle to monopolise
(scarce) resources.
In terms of medieval urban history, closure theory can be used to analyse the ways in
which certain groups sought to monopolise political power by excluding others on such
grounds as occupation or social background. Parkin suggests that this type of exclusion can
be either individualist or collectivist. 9
 Clearly, this distinction is highJy important to the
4 Weber, Economy and Society, 1: 43-6, 302-7,341-3. This thesis follows on from the work of Stephen Rigby
in the application of these theories. For a fuller introduction to social closure theory and its uses for the medieval
historian see: Rigby, English Society in the Later Middle Ages, pp. 9-14.
5 This introduction to social closure draws on Parkin, 'Strategies of Social Closure', pp. 1-18; and it Murphy,
Social Closure: The Theoy ofMonopolization and Exclusion (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1988), especially pp.
8-14.
6 Paiiin 'Strategies of Social Closure', p. 3.
7 Murphy, Social Closure, p. 8.
8 lbid., p. 8.
9 Parkin, 'Strategies of Social Closure', p.6.
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historian as it holds profound implications for the perpetuation of social groups. Collectivist
exclusion refers to exclusion on the grounds of "generalized attributes of collectively defined
qualities", such as race, religion or lineage.' 0 As these attributes are often inherited, it
becomes relatively easy for a group to safeguard privileges for subsequent generations of
the same group, thereby preserving the status quo. By contrast, individualist exclusion
refers to exclusion on the grounds of personally acquired characteristics such as academic
qualifications, or a commitment to a specific set of values or ideas. Here the perpetuation
of social groups can only be achieved through the nomination of suitable replacements."
Arguably, strategies of individualist exclusion allow for greater scope for social mobility
within a group than are allowed by strategies of collectivist exclusion, while still ensuring
the preservation of an ideological status quo.
By locating my research into the civic officials of later-medieval York within the
framework of closure theory it will be possible to explore the issue of what type of men
comprised the membership of York's civic elite, as well as the associated issue of what were
the means through which the perpetuation of the civic elite was safeguarded. The following
section will begin by examining the degree to which social closure was evident among the
civic elite in terms of occupation and wealth. It will then explore the extent to which there
existed contemporary ideologies concerning access to civic government that were
influenced by the contemporary intellectual climate. Finally, the section will consider how
any such ideologies interacted with the methods of exclusion that have been identified.
Social closure theory will also enable some consideration to be given to the implications of
any revealed ideologies for urban social mobility and the perpetuation of specific value
systems in late-medieval York.
'°Ibid.
Ibid.,pp. 6-7.
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II) Occupation and Wealth: Introduction
It has frequently been asserted that "rank in the medieval city was determined by wealth".'2
In practical terms, the financial burden of many of the civic posts meant that wealth was
necessary in order to hold higher civic office. Prosopographical analysis of the civic elites
of medieval English and continental urban centres has demonstrated a correlation between
the most wealthy citizens and the holders of civic posts.'3 More recently this view has been
refined slightly to take into account the additional importance of occupation: it has been
argued that access to government in late-medieval English towns was restricted not just to
the most wealthy, but specifically to those practising mercantile trades. Indeed, as was
outlined in the introduction to this thesis, late-medieval English urban history has often been
characterised in terms of urban centres that were controlled by wealthy mercantile
oligarchies.
The historiography of late-medieval York is no exception to this general trend.
Historians such as Edward Miller, David Palliser, Jennifer Kermode and Heather Swanson
have all concluded that for much of the late-medieval period the government of York rested
in the hands of a wealthy mercantile oligarchy.' 4 On the whole, these historians appear to
view oligarchy as a natural result of inherited systems of election and government combined
with economic determinism. Heather Swanson, however, places a much greater emphasis
on what she views as inherently antagonistic class tensions that existed between the ruling
merchants and the politically disenfranchised artisan 'class'. For her, the government of
' 2 EM Carus-Wilson, 'Towns and Trade', in A.L. Poole (ed.), Medieval England (Oxford University Press:
Oxford, 1958), P. 251; Thrupp,Merchant Class, pp. 14-27.
' For a fuller historiography of the government of later-medieval towns and their dominance by mercantile
oligarchies, see the iniroductory chapter of this thesis.
'4 See, for example, Miller, 'Medieval York', pp. 70-5,77-9; Palliser, 'York in the Sixteenth Centuiy', especially
pp. 165-6,206-14,225-44; Kermode, 'Obvious Obseivalions', pp. 87-106; Swanson, 'The Illusion of Economic
Structure', pp. 29-48.
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late-medieval York was symptomatic of a self-interested and exploitative dominance of
political and economic resources by merchants, to the deliberate exclusion of artisans.
While Swanson's work clearly reflects a Marxist dialectic, her understanding of the
government of late-medieval York has much in common with closure theory.' 5 For
example, she describes the merchants as seeking collectively to safeguard their political (and
therefore their economic) position by restricting access to political power through the
deliberate exclusion of men with artisan
Before proceeding to explore the broader implications and intellectual context of this
system of government, it is first necessary to determine whether the men who held civic
office in York during the period 1476 to 1525 conform with the model advanced in the
established historiography. At this point, a thorough prosopographic study may seem
superfluous given that the occupation and wealth of civic officials in late-medieval York is
already well-researched. However, such a study is necessary for two main reasons.
First, although work has been undertaken on the wealth and occupation of higher civic
officials such as the council aldermen, the lower posts have not previously been fully
researched. For example, Palliser' s study of the sixteenth-century councillors of York is
confined to those who belonged to the councils of twenty-four and twelve, or in other
words, to those officials who had at least reached the post of sheriff' 7 Kermode' s study of
York merchants and Swanson's study of York artisans are more wide-ranging in their
inclusion of chamberlains, yet neither study considers in any detail the post of bridge master,
' This is perhaps not surprising for although closure theory originated in the work of Weber, it also drew heavily
on elements of the Marxist school. Indeed, as was noted above, social closure is held to be inherently
antagonistic and is held to be driven by competition for scarce resources.
'6 Swon, The illusion of Economic Structure', pp. 29-48; MedievalArtisans, pp. 107-126; idem, 'Craftsmen
and Industry', pp. 107-126.
17 For his study of this group of men see Palliser, 'York in the Sixteenth Century', chapters 4, 5 & 6. A less
detailed version of Palliser's thesis is published as Palliser, Tudor York.
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the personnel of the forty-eight or holders of parochial and ward posts. 18 A notable
exception to this trend is my own study of the bridge masters of later-medieval York.' 9 As
this study demonstrated, the post of bridge master was extremely important both as an
access point to the higher civic offices, and as a 'buffer-zone' between the innermost circles
of the political elite and the wider, politically disenfranchised civic community. 2° The
importance of more minor municipal, crafi and territorial posts in increasing popular
participation in local government during the later-medieval and early-modern periods has
also been discussed briefly by several historians of other English towns. 2 ' These 'gateway'
posts were held predominately by men of only moderate wealth and non-mercantile
occupations. Indeed, it could be argued that one of the many reasons why historians have
concluded that late-medieval civic government was dominated by wealthy merchants is
precisely because they have not given enough consideration to the numerous personnel who
held the lower civic offices. Historians have argued that little real power was attached to
posts below the rank of sheriff; noting that the chamberlains and bridge masters were not
admitted to the council of twenty-four, which was the main governing body of the town.
Arguably, however, this view establishes an unrealistically dichotomous division within the
socio-political hierarchy of the late medieval town. Furthermore, this rationale also
18 See in particular J.I. Kermode, 'The Merchants of York, Beverley and Hull in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Centhries' (PhD thesis, Department of History, University of Sheffield, 1990), especially chapter 5; idem,
Medieval Me rchan is, especially pp. 25-69; idem, 'Obvious Observations', pp. 87-106; Swanson, 'Craftsmen
and Industry', pp. 107-126; idem,MedievalArtisans, pp. 107-26.
'9 Carpenter, 'The Office and Personnel of the Post of Bndge Master'.
20 1b1d., pp. 38-9,45 & 68-9.
21 Rappaport, Work/s Within Worlds, pp. 180-3; Hudson and Tingey (eds.), Leet Jurisdiction in the City of
Norwich, pp. ix-xcv; Kowaleski, Local Markets andRegional Trade, pp. 102-6; Phythian-Adams, Desolation
ofaCity,pp. 183-4.
22 For a fuller discussion of this point see the Introduction.
23 See for example J. Kermode, 'Urban Decline: The Flight from Office in Late-Medieval York', Economic
History Review 2nd Series 35 (1982): 187.
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presupposes that the primary motivation of the civic office holder was the achievement of
power. This somewhat bunkered analysis fails to give proper consideration of the
sociological importance of the honour, prestige and even the self-esteem which may have
been conferred by office holding even at minor levels.24
Second, a detailed prosopographical study has not actually been carried out on civic
office holders in York for the whole of the period 1476 to 1525. Part of the reason for this
is that 1500 has tended to be regarded somewhat arbitrarily as an historical cut-off date so
that the decades either side of this divide have become artificially marginalised. If
considered at all, these years tend to be viewed as the end or the beginning of a much wider
time span, rather than as a coherent period in their own right. In fact, the period 1476 to
1525 was one of turmoil, change and unrest within York. Not only did this period witness
an array of constitutional changes in York, it also saw the city's economic fortunes plunge
to a new nadir. Tentative comments in other less detailed studies have indicated that York's
economic decline may have encouraged an increase in access to civic office within the city.
Indeed, my own study of the York bridge masters, together with another useful and detailed
MA thesis on York's civic elite in the fifteenth centuiy, have both indicated that the
influence of wealthy merchants over the government of later-medieval York was never
constant and has in some instances been overemphasised.26
24 hdl, at a higher level, Anthony Fletcher has argued that, "prestige not wealth was the principal reward of
office"; AJ. fletcher, 'Honor, Reputation and Local Office Holding in Elizabethan and Stuart England', in A.J.
Fletcher and J. Stevenson (eds.), Order and Disorder in Early Modem England (Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, 1985), p. 92. Social status deriving from political success is discussed in Part Three of the thesis
on the structure of the civic elite of later-medieval York.
25 Sig David Pallisefs studies are primarily concerned with the Early Modern period, his consideration of
Yoik's civic elite begins in 1500. Although Kermode and Swanson are both dealing 'cvith the medieval period,
they concentrate on the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. See in particular Kermode, 'The Merchants of York,
Beverley and Hull in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries'; Kerinode, Medieval Merchants; Swanson,
'Craftsmen and Industry'; Swanson, MedievalArtisans.
26 Carpenter, 'The Post of Bridge Master', p. 38. See also Kulikundis, 'The Cursus Honorum in Fifteenth-
Century York', pp. 3 8-9. This veiy useful dissertation largely consists of a detailed prosopographic analysis of
the occupational background of the men who held the offices of mayor, sheriff and chamberlain in York during
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It is in order to address these lacunae that I have conducted an extensive and detailed
prosopographical study of the occupation, wealth, political careers, and family and kinship
networks of the 315 men who can be identified in the civic records as having held the civic
offices of bridge master, chamberlain, sheriff or mayor in York between the period 1476 and
1525? This part draws largely on findings relating to the political careers, occupation and
wealth of these 315 men. A detailed summary of this together with a list of the numerous
and diverse sources used in this study can be found in tabular form in Appendix 1.
Ill) A Note on Occupational Categorisation
Perhaps the key reason why occupation has received so much attention from urban
historians is because it is the personal attribute of civic officials that is most readily
identifiable and quantifiable. However, occupation is not unproblematic as a basis for
analysis. In order to address the various issues outlined in the historiography it is necessary
to classify occupations into categories and groups. However, such classifications are
problematic in several respects: no clear consensus exists over how medieval occupations
should be grouped, and once a method of classification has been adopted, the historian is
inevitably faced with the problem of 'marginal occupations' which can be placed in several
categories. Particularly problematic is the process of choosing which occupations should
be placed into which categories. Rather than inventing a new scheme, this thesis follows the
the fifteenth century. I have checked the prosopographic information contained in the thssertation's appendices
and am very satisfied with its accuracy and reliability.
27	 methodology behind this research is outlined in the Introduction.
28For examples of conirasting patterns of classiflealion for late-medieval urban occupations see Kowaleski, Local
Markets and Regional Trade, pp. 350-2; Palliser, Tudor York, pp. 154-9; Goldberg, Women, Work and Life
Cycle, pp. 44-5; Phytbian-Adams, Desolation of a City, pp.308-17.
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scheme adopted by Phythian-Adams and adapted by Goldberg. 29 This scheme also fits
closely with the occupational categorisation adopted by Swanson in her analysis of wealth
distribution, inter-generational occupational progression, and entrance to the freedom of
York by occupation.3°
Table 2:1
Occupational Categories Adopted
Category	
I 
All Occupations Included
Mercantile
Clothing! Textiles
Craft
Leather
Victuals
Professional! Other
Chapman, Draper, Haberdasher, Merchant, Mercer, Shipman.
Capper, Cardmaker, Dyer, Fuller, (3irdler, Hosier, Tailor, Tapiter, Textor,
Upholdsterer, Vestmenter, Walker, Weaver, Woolman.
Armourer, Bower, Carvour, Cooper, Fletcher, Glazier, Goldsmith, Ironmonger,
Mason, Organ Maker, Painter, Pewterer, Pinner, Plumber, Potter, Smith, Tilemaker,
Waxchandler, Wiredrawer.
Cordwainer, Glover, Homer, Parchment maker, Saddler, Skinner, Tanner.
Baker, Butcher, Cook, Fisher, Fishmonger, Grocer, Hosteller, Inuholder, Miller,
Spicer, Vintiier.
Apothecary, Barber, Chandler, Clerk, Gentleman, Litteratus, Marshall, Notary,
Pardoner, Parish Clerk, Questor, Sergeant, Yeoman.
Sources: Phythian-Adains, Desolation of a City, pp. 308-17; Goldberg, Women, Work and Lfe Cycle, pp.
44-5.
Since these categories are artificial constructs, several of the occupations could be placed
in more than one category. In this regard, categorisation of occupations as being either
mercantile or non-mercantile is particularly problematic, not least because it is not possible
to make a concrete distinction between the categories of artisan and merchant. An
important point to make is that the definition of 'mercantile' adopted here is narrower than
The only exception here being that the metal, building, wood and annaments crafts have been placed into one
general craft category.
3°Swumon offers two simultaneous schemes of occupational classification: one is used for her analysis of wealth
distribution, inter-generational occupational progression and entrance to York's freedom, while the other is used
for her océupational analysis of civic officials. The latter scheme offers a narrower definition of mercantile than
does the former scheme. The method of occupational classification adopted here lies somewhere between the
two.
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that adopted by Swanson in her occupational analysis of fourteenth and fifteenth-centuiy
civic officials. Swanson includes spicers, grocers, vintners and apothecaries in her
calculations of mercantile civic officials. However, since only 4% of the men who held civic
office in York during the period 1476 to 1525 practised these occupations, the difference
between Swanson's definition of 'mercantile' and the definition adopted in this thesis is not
as significant as it may at first seem.
It might be argued that the classification system adopted here is crude in its failure to
take ftill account of craftsmen who were also involved in wholesale retail and distribution.3'
For example, some tanners may have been artisans who merely worked to produce goods
which others sold. Meanwhile, other tanners may mainly have acted as wholesalers or
retailers, selling on the finished goods made by others and supplying the producers with raw
materials. 32 The essential problem here is that surviving civic records do not provide the
historian with the type of evidence that would allow them to draw these types of distinctions
with confidence. Of course, it might be countered that membership of York's guild of
merchants can be taken as evidence of mercantile interests. However, such an approach
presupposes that membership of this guild during the period in question was conditional on
wholesale retail or distributive activities. Yet it is by no means clear that this was the case.
Between 1470 and 1510 less than 50% of those admitted to the Mercers' Guild were
merchants or mercers in comparison with 71% of those admitted prior to this period. 33 It
31 Kowaleski, Local Markets andRegional Trade, pp. 120-74, 350-2.
32Ibid., Town and Countiy in Late Medieval England: The Hide and Leather Trade in P.J. Corfield and D.
Keene, Work in Towns 850-1850 (Leicester University Press: Leicester, 1990), pp. 57-73.
See L. Wheatley, 'The York Mercers' Guild, 1420-1501: Origins, Organisation and Ordinances' (MA
dissertation, Department of History, University of York, 1993), table 2, p. 11. Research earned out by Wheatley,
archivist of the York Mercer' Guild, for her D.Phil thesis on the Guild has indicated that while the percentage
of men admitted to the guild who were merchants steadily declined from 83% in 1420-9 to 46% in 1500-9, this
trend saw a reversal around 1510 with the result that by 1530-9, 90% of men admitted to the Mercers' Guild
were merchants. I am grateful to Mrs Wheatley for this information.
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could of course be argued that this trend merely represents increased trading activities
among the craft-based occupations. However, two additional pieces of evidence suggest
that this pattern of admissions may be more indicative of changing admission policies on the
part of the guild than a changing occupational structure. First, 6% of those admitted to the
guild between 1420 and 1510 were members of the clergy, a group unlikely to be engaged
in wholesale or distributive trade, in comparison with less than 0.5% before this date.34
Second, the percentage of entrants who can be found engaged in shipping activities declined
significantly between 1420 and 1505. Whereas evidence can be found to suggest that 51%
of those who entered the guild in the period 1420-69 were engaged in shipping activities,
this percentage falls to 33% for the period 147O-1505. This evidence suggests that it
would be unwise to adopt membership of York's Mercers' Guild per se as evidence of
engagement in mercantile activities. Perhaps a more reliable measurement would be
membership of the Mercers' Guild combined with some other form of evidence suggesting
mercantile activities; for example, evidence of overseas shipping contained in the Mercers'
accounts. Cases where membership of the guild can be linked with evidence of shipping are
indicated in Appendix 1 of this thesis. Meanwhile, the extent to which craftsmen who held
civic office, particularly the offices of sheriff and mayor, may have been engaged in
mercantile activities is discussed in the relevant sections below by means of reference to this
information.
Aside from the methodological problems associated with occupational categorisation
there remain wider reasons to doubt the validity or useflulness of this means of analysis. The
Similar trends are evident among other groups unlikely to be engaged in wholesale or distributive activities,
such as gentlemen.
Source: L. Wheatley, 'The York Mercers' Guild', table 5, p. 16.
I amvely grateful to Louise Wheatley, archivist of the York Mercers' Guild for this information. For details
of membership of the guild and shipping activity before 1500, see Wheatley, 'The York Mercers' Guild',
appendix.
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Introduction has argued that far too much emphasis has been placed on the importance of
occupation and wealth in systems of stratification. 37 It is one of the primary aims of this
thesis to challenge this dominant approach and to look beyond these categories to other,
possibly more significant or important, methods of social consolidation and delineation.
These alternative methods are explored primarily in Parts Three and Four of the thesis.
However, before turning to new approaches, it is first necessary to analyse the role of
occupation in late-medieval York in order to address a number of issues prevalent in the
existing historiography.
IV) Occupation
A total of 315 men can be identified as having held the offices of mayor, sheriff, chamberlain
or bridge master between 1476 and 1525.38 Of these 315 men, the occupation of all but
seven (2%) can be traced. 39 As has already been indicated, historians in the past have tended
to argue that York was ruled by a mercantile oligarchy. 4° However, this view is not entirely
supported by the prosopographical evidence collated for the purpose of this thesis. The
table below, which is derived from Appendix 1, illustrates the occupations of the 315 men
who can be identified as having held the civic offices of bridge master, chamberlain, sheriff
See above, pp. 12-22
The main sources used to identif' these officers were, for mayors (and also the officers of the mace and sword):
York, York City Archives, Di (Freemen's Register), if. 17r-27r. For sheriffs: YCA, DI, if. 209v & 298v-306v;
House Book 11, if. 27r, 46r, Sir, 104v. For chamberlains: F. Collins (ed.), The Register of the Freemen of the
City of York volume 1 1272-1 558, Surtees Society 96 (1897), PP. 174-262. For bridge masters: YCA, Di, if.
324r-329v; YCA, CB2 (chamberlains' account book), f. 40r, 77r, 79r, 126v, 172r. For the main sources used
for the identification of recorders, common clerks and men who acted as lawyers during the period 1476 to 1525
see: R.B. Dobson (ed.), York City Chamberlains 'Account Rolls, Surtees Society 192 (i980), passim; YCA,
C5 :1 - C6:4 (chamberlains account rolls), passim.
main source used in the identification of occupation was Collins (ed.), York Freemen 's Register.
° See in particular, Miller, 'Medieval York', pp. 70-5, 77-9; Palliser, 'York in the Sixteenth Century', especially
PP. 165-6,206-14,225-44; Kermode, 'Obvious Observations', P p. 87-106; Swanson, 'The illusion of Economic
Structure', pp. 29-48; idem, MedievalArtisans, pp. 20-5.
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or mayor at some point between 1476 and 1525.41
Table 2:2
Occupations of Men Holding the Civic Offices of Bridge Master. Chamberlain. Sheriff and Mayor
During the Period 1476-1525
(Numbers expressed as a percentage of all men in each period.
Occupational Group
	
1476-1500	 1501-1525	 1476-1525
Mercantile	 28	 29	 28
ClothingfTextiles	 18	 18	 18
Craft	 19	 17	 18
Leather	 9	 13	 11
Victuals	 19	 15	 17
Unknown	 1	 3	 2
Professional! Other
	 6	 5	 5
Total	 100	 100	 99*
* Totals do not always equal 100 due to rounding error.
Source: Appendix I
As the prosopographic research indicates, at 28%, men with mercantile occupations
were the largest single occupational group among the civic officials. However, almost three
quarters (71%) of the men who held civic office during the period 1476 to 1525 cannot be
identffied in the original sources as having practised mercantile occupations. Clearly, in
numerical terms, men with mercantile occupations did not dominate the civic elite of York
during this period. This finding is at odds with the past conclusions of other historians. In
part, the difference reflects the wider definition of 'civic elite' employed in this study.
However, a second reason relates to chronological changes. Kulikundis's detailed
prosopographical study of the civic officials of ftfteenth-century York has demonstrated that
while men with mercantile occupations did dominate the civic government at the beginning
" Men have been placed in the time period during which they held their highest reached civic office in York.
The methodology of and problems associated with occupational grouping is discussed in the introductory chapter.
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of the fifteenth century, this was no longer the case by 1475.42 Indeed, as her study has
indicated, the final quarter of the fifteenth century was the period in which the civic elite of
later-medieval York was the most open in terms of occupation. 43 While historians'
conclusions concerning the dominance of civic offices by merchants seem to be valid for
much of the medieval period, this view is clearly not valid for the late-fifteenth, or indeed,
the early-sixteenth centuries. Moreover, Table 2:2 does not indicate any significant changes
in the composition of the civic elite having taken place over the fifty-year period under
study.44
The decline in the percentage of men with mercantile occupations holding civic offices
towards the end of the fifteenth-century may have been at least partly due to a decline in the
percentage of freemen practising these occupations. Kermode has demonstrated that this
period witnessed a marked decrease in the numbers of men who became free as mercers or
drapers. The numbers of merchants entering the freedom also declined over the course of
the fifteenth century, although the decade 1460-70 saw a temporary reversal of this trend.45
Historians have argued that factors such as competition from the West Riding and a
deterioration of trading links with the Hanse and Gascony adversely effected York's textile
and woollen industries, thereby effecting the prosperity and hence also the size of York's
mercantile and textile community. While these explanations partially explain the decline
in York's economic fortunes, it has also been suggested that the economic crisis was due
42 Kulikundis, 'The Cursus Honorum in Fifteenth-Century York', p. 28.
That the civic elite of York may have been generally more closed (in terms of occupation at least) in the
fourteenth century than it was in the fifteenth is indicated in Miller, 'Medieval York', pp.7 I-2 & 78-9.
None of the occupational groups witnessed a change of more than 5%. The two largest changes were the
decline in the percentage of civic officials who were victualers (from 19% to 15%) and a corresponding increase
in the percentage of civic officials who were leather workers (from 9% to 13%).
45 Kermode, 'Merchants, Overseas Trade and Urban Decline', p. 53.
46 BaPde 'Expansion and Decline of York', pp. 17-33; V.C.H., pp. 89-91.
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in some part to a shortage of investment in terms of both cash and credit. 47 Thus, by the end
of the fifteenth century, a variety of economic and monetary factors seem to have caused
a decline in the city's overall economic prosperity. 48
 This situation is likely to have effected
the occupational make-up of the city's civic officials in two ways. First, the pool of
merchants from which civic officials could be drawn was shrinking in proportion to the
overall population of freemen. 49
 Second, the afore-mentioned economic and monetary
factors effected the occupational distribution of wealth in the city in favour of those with
non-mercantile occupations.5°
Although the civic government of later-medieval York was not dominated by men
with mercantile occupations, such men were more likely to gain civic office than men with
non-mercantile occupations. This is evident from the fact that although 28% of all civic
officials during this period can be identified through prosopographic research as merchants,
only approximately 12% of men who were eligible to hold civic office practised a mercantile
trade. 51
 The prosopographical evidence also suggests that men who practised mercantile
occupations were more likely to progress higher up the civic hierarchy than those who did
not. The table below divides the 315 civic officials into groups according to the highest
J. Kermode, 'Merchants, Overseas Trade and Urban Decline: York, Beverley, and Hull, c.l 380-1500',
Northern Hisloty 23 (1987): 5 1-73.
° It should be noted though that some areas of the city's economy, the service sector in particular, continued to
prosper. Goldberg, Women, Work and Life Cycle, pp. 77-8.
For a detailed decadal breakdown of entrants into the city's freedom by occupation, see H.C. Swanson,
'Craftsmen and Industiy in Late-Medieval York', (DPhil thesis, Department of History, University of York,
1980), pp. 24-25. It is possible that the decline in merchants and mercers within the city during this period led
to a 'recruitment crisis' for the Mercers' Guild itself, precipitating a more expansive recruitment policy.
° J.N. Bartlett, 'The Expansion and Decline of York in the Later Middle Ages', Economic Histoiy Review,
second series 12(1959), 17-33; Kermode, Medieval Merchants, pp. 159-90; Swanson, MedievalArtisans, pp.
17 3-5.
51 Goldberg, who employs the same occupational categorizations as this thesis, has calculated that 12% of men
entering York's freedom during the period 1450 to 1509 practiced mercantile trades. The vast majority (90%)
of the men who held civic office between 1475 and 1525 entered York's freedom during this period. Goldberg,
Women, Work and Ltfe Cycle, p.61.
61
civic office reached during each man's lifetime.
Table 2:3
Percentage of Men Who Held Civic Office 1476-1525 Who Practised Mercantile Occupations: Shown
by Highest Office Attained
Highest Civic Office 	 As a % of all men who
	 % of group practising mercantile
Attained	 held civic office 1476-	 occupations.
1525
Bridge Master	 28	 2
Chamberlain	 32	 28
Sheriff	 22	 36
Mayor	 18	 61
Total	 100	 28
Source: Appendix 1
As the prosopographic evidence summarised in Table 2:3 above illustrates, just over
a quarter (28%) of the men who held civic office during this period reached no higher than
the post of bridge master. Only an extremely small minority of these men (2%) can be
identified as having practised mercantile trades. In contrast, just over one quarter (28%) of
those who only reached the post of chamberlain, and over one third (36%) of those who
only reached the post of sheriff can be identified as merchants. The most striking figure in
this respect is that for the post of mayor (6 1%), which will be discussed below.
Although these figures suggest that men with mercantile occupations become
increasingly represented higher up the civic hierarchy, it can be argued that merchants did
not comprise a truly dominant group within any post below the rank of mayor, even when
those posts are viewed in terms of the total percentage of merchants holding each post.52
Furthermore, the prosopographical evidence does not corroborate suggestions that the
52 The total percentage of merchants who held each of the posts (irrespective of whether they went on to hold
higher civic office) is 12% for the post of bridge master, 43% for the post of chamberlain, 46% for the post of
sheriff and 61% for the post of mayor.
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occupations of men who held the posts of sheriff or below were vetted in order to exclude
those with non-mercantile occupations, or those deemed 'common' or 'vulgar'. For
example, among those who held the post of sheriff between 1476 and 1526 there were three
butchers, four tanners, two saddlers, two bowers, a cook, a cardmaker, a potter and a
homer. 53
 Of course, it is possible that such men were admitted to the post of sheriff on the
basis that although nominally craftsmen, they were in fact engaged in mercantile activities.
While impossible to disprove, the evidence does not support such a hypothesis. Of the
forty-five sheriffs who whose occupation was not designated as 'mercantile' in the records,
the evidence suggests that only two, John Elys (sheriff 1503), variously described as a
waxchandler, innholder and vintner, and William Huby (sheriff 1506), a homer, were
involved in overseas or inland shipping activities.54
David Shaw, working on late-medieval Wells has suggested that the grip of merchants
on the civic offices of Wells may have been loosening towards the end of the fifteenth
century. 55 The discussed evidence suggests that York may have been experiencing a similar
phenomenon: the civic elite of later-medieval York was more open in terms of occupation
than at any other time previously. However, while the prosopographic evidence does not
suggest an overall exclusionary closure of the civic elite on the grounds of occupation, it
does suggest exclusionary closure on the grounds of occupation within the civic elite,
53 Butchers: Richard Huchonson (sheriff 1523), Thomas Bailey (sheriff 1522) and Richard Tebbe (sheriff 1507);
tanners: Thomas Freeman (sheriff 1485), John hail (sheriff 1501), Richard North (sheriff 1513), John Smith
(sheriff 1526); saddlers: John Chapman (sheriff 1512), Miles Greenbank (sheriff 1482); bowers: Roger (iegges
(sheriff 1521) & John Gegges (sheriff 1509); cook: Robert Turner (sheriff 1525); cardmaker: Richard Marston
(sheriff 1479); potter: John Huton (sheriff 1491); homer: William Iluby (sheriff 1506). These findings
contradict Kermode, 'Urban Decline', p. 193, who argues that such men were not admitted past the post of
chamberlain.
54 Appendix 1.
55 Shaw, Creation ofa Community, p. 173; see also Hammer, 'Anatomy of An Oligarchy', pp. 1-27; Frost, 'The
Aldermen of Norwich', pp. 6 1-2.
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namely at the level of alderman and mayor.56
As Table 2:3 above demonstrates, well over half (61%) of the men who reached the
post of mayor were merchants by occupation. Additionally, a further three men, Robert
Johnson (mayor 1496), William Lambe (mayor 1475) and Richard Thometon (mayor 1502)
were involved in inland or overseas shipping, although they were not formally designated
as merchants by occupation. 57 William Hoskins has argued that occupations which were
deemed suitable for officials at certain levels of the civic hierarchy were considered
unsuitable or unfitting for the honour and dignity of the highest posts. 58 This may well have
been the case in late-medieval York. As David Palliser has shown, there does exist a small
amount of documentary evidence for such exclusion taking place in York. 59 The first
example concerns the innkeeper, John Petty. Upon his election to the post of alderman in
1504 Petty was ordered to "Leve his kepyng of hostery and take downe his signe". 6° What
is striking about this example is that although the civic elite appear to have objected to
Petty's occupation this did not prevent him from becoming elected: it was the occupation
rather than the man that was deemed unsuitable. Petty's case is not unusual as innkeepers
were also barred from certain offices in other towns.6 ' Indeed, the universality of this
exclusion is perhaps best indicated by the fact that the town records of medieval Romney
specifically state that innkeepers could hold town posts. 62 This was not a blanket ban,
56 See Frost, 'The Aldermen of Norwich', p. 41.
57 Appendix 1. The addition of these three men would take the percentage of men who reached the post of mayor
who practiced mercantile occupations to 66%.
58 W.G. Hoskins, The Age ofPlunder: King Henry's England, 1500-1547 (Longman: London, 1976), p. 100.
59 Palliser, Tudor York, p. 107.
60 Rame (ed.), YorkCivicRecords, 3: 9-10.
61 Kermode, 'Urban Decline, pp. 193-4; Hudson and Tingey (eds.), Records of the City ofNorwich, 1: 98.
62 AS Green, Town Lfe in the Ffleenth Century (Macmillan: London, 1894), p. 404.
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though. In York the civic offices below that of mayor or alderman do not seem to have
been affected. For example, besides John Petty another innkeeper, John Ellis, was admitted
to the post of sheriff without any fuss during the period 1476 to 1525.63 Furthermore, as
David Pailiser has noted, restrictions on the admittance to the aldermanic circle of men
whose occupation was hostelry lessened over the course of the sixteenth century.TM
Why was innkeeping singled out in this way? One explanation relates to the notion
that inns and ale houses frequently played a seditious role in urban unrest during this period
both in York and elsewhere. 65 Naturally, from the corporate point of view, the civic elite
would be anxious not to compromise its authority by being in any way associated with such
conventicles. Indeed, Marjory McIntosh has argued that the second half of the fifteenth
century witnessed increasing attempts to control and police "bad rule or governance" which,
she suggests, challenged the social order. In particular, McIntosh argues that this period
witnessed the extension of blame to "those who permitted or promoted misbehaviour",
including keepers of disorderly inns and alehouses. Such houses were associated not only
with drunkenness, but also with gaming, prostitution, and vagabondage. 67
 Taverns were
also criticized during this period for causing idleness, indulgence and crime. 68
 A second
explanation relates to the negative moral connotations that were associated with drink. For
° John Petty was elected to the post of sheriff in 1494 and John Ellis in 1503.
Paffiser, Tudor York, p. 107.
65 See for example, L.C. Atireed (ed.), The York House Books 1461-1 490 (Alan Sutton Publishing: Stroud,
1991), pp. 311,394-5,540-2,643 & 707; P. Clark, The English Alehouse: A Social History (Longman: London,
1983), pp. 145,157-9.
66 M. McIntosh, 'Finding Language for Misconduct', in B. Hanawalt and D. Wallace (eds.), Bodies and
Disciplines: Intersections ofLiterature and History in Ffteenth-Centu?y England, Medieval Cultures 9 (1996),
pp. 97-102.
Ibid., pp. 97 & 99. See also M.K. McIntosh, ControllingMisbehavior in England 13 70-1600, Cambridge
Studies in Population, Economy and Society in Past Time 34 (1998), pp. 74-8.
Clark, The EnglishAlehouse,p. 12.
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example, numerous 'courtesy texts' of this period warned against excessive drinking or
drunkenness and one cautioned "Be waar of vsinge ofe taueme/ And als e dijs y 1)ee
forbede". 69 Indeed, London's Liber Custumarum includes advice to mayors to keep
themselves from drunkenness. 7° Finally, it is also possible that the principal problem with
the occupation of innkeeper (as opposed to the occupation of vintner) was that it entailed
the retail rather than the distributive trade of victuals. The medieval period witnessed
intense scrutiny of the sale of victuals in York, with the civic officials closely regulating the
price, weight and conditions of sale for all victuals sold in the city. 7 ' One of the most
contested of these areas was the city's bi-annual assizes of wine, bread and ale, according
to which the prices of these goods were fixed by a jury selected by the civic elite. 72 Given
this situation it is possible that the civic government of later-medieval York would have felt
there was a potential conflict of interests with regard to the regulation of the retail price of
Petty's goods.
While no other written evidence exists to suggest that victuallers were excluded from
the highest ranks of civic office in York during the late-medieval period, such evidence
certainly does exist for other towns. For example, Thrupp notes that in London even "the
subordinate officers ... were under oath to ... abstain, as mayor, sheriffs and alderman were
FJ. Fumival (ed.), The Babees Book; Early English Text Society, original series 32 (1868), P. 50, lines 5 9-60
(on drunkenness see also pp. 1 1& 17). For a comprehensive overview and discussion of this genre see J.
Nicholls, The Matter ofCourtesy: Medieval Courtesy Books and the Gawain-Poet (D.S. Brewer: Woodbridge,
1985).
° H.T. Riley (ed.), Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis: Liber A/bus, Liber Custumarum et Liber Horn, 3
volumes, Rolls Series 12(1859-1862), 1:22.
71 Sellers (ed.), York Memorandum Book; part I, pp. lxv, lxvi-lxviii, 12-19 & 45-6; Sellers (ed.), York
Memorandum Book; part II, pp. 13, 72-3. For a summary of the control of markets and the retail sale of victuals
in York, see Miller, 'Medieval York', Pp. 97-100.
Sellers (ed.), York Memorandum Book; part!, p. xxii-lxv, 39, 142, 172-3; Raine (ed.), York Civic Records,
2:85-6, 121; 3: 109, 117-8, 135.
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also bound to do, from any retail trade in victuals on their own account". 73 Similarly, the
13 18-19 statute of York forbade victuallers from trading in wine or food whilst holding any
office of assize. 74
 So, does the prosopographic evidence suggest that victuallers of other
occupations were likewise excluded from the highest civic office in York? It is certainly true
that only four victuallers reached the office of mayor during the period 1476-1525, all of
whom were grocers or spicers, occupations often classed as being quasi-mercantile.
Moreover, several other victuallers failed to reach the post of mayor despite their great
wealth. 75 The most striking example of this type is that of the fishmonger, John Roger.
According to the lay subsidy of 1524 Roger was assessed on goods to the equivalent value
of nearly £200, which was almost double the value of the goods of the next most wealthy
civic official. 76
 However, it should be noted that no examples can be found of victuallers
whose assessed wealth in 1524 was equal to or above that of the average assessed wealth
of mayors of the period, and who also lived long enough for them to have been reasonably
expected to have reached the post.77
The only other explicit example of prejudice against certain occupations concerns not
a victualler but a tailor. Thomas Bankehouse, a tailor, was elected to the council of
Thnipp, Merchant Class, p. 95. One of the reasons for this ban was that officials were expected to control the
price of victuals. For the wider context of political conflict in medieval London between victualers and non-
victualers and disputes over trading rights see Nightingale, 'Capitalists, Crafts and Constitutional Change', pp.
1-35; R. Bird, Turbulent London ofRichardll (Longmans: London 1949).
' Swanson, MedievalArtisans, p. 25.
According to the lay subsidy of 1524 the average assessed value of the goods of men who held the post of
mayor was £23. Three victualers were assessed on wealth over this level: Robert Turner (sheriff in 1525), John
Roger (sheriff in 1524) and Thomas Toone (chamberlain in 1519), all of whom failed to reach the post of Mayor.
See E. Peacock (ed.), 'Subsidy Roll for York and Ainsty', Yorkshire Archaeological Journal 4 (1877): pp. 173,
177 & 183.
76 Peak (ed.), 'Subsidy Roll for York and Ainsty', p. 177.
" John Roger died 8 years after he had held the post of sheriff. Since the average amount of tune between
holding the post of sheriff and becoming mayor was 9 years, it could be argued that Roger's failure to become
mayor was due to his death rather than his occupation. Thomas Toone died before he could even reach the post
of sheriff, while Robert Turner's date of death is not know; see Appendix 1.
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aldermen in 1511. Upon his election the House Books note that cjt was graunted t he
might occupie and wyrke by his servante e taillercraft by the space of ij yeres next
ensuying.....and from then ... he nor no servant of his within his house to occupie the same
craft upon payne of xli. for every yere that he occupie the said Taillor craft.. .". This
extract reflects the sentiments expressed in the London ordinance cited above that while
certain occupations were sometimes excluded from the highest offices, this rule could
occasionally be circumvented by allowing the officer's servant to trade or practise on his
behalf. As with Petty, it was the occupation rather than the man that was objected to.
What was probably at issue in the case of Bankehouse was that he should not be seen
to be actively engaged in a manufacturing occupation or in menial labour. 79 This might
suggest that what we are witnessing is not the desire to control or monopolise access to the
highest offices, but an attempt to protect the perceived status of the higher officials. It is
beyond the scope of this thesis to explore fttlly the relative status of different trades and
occupations. 8° However, two points can be made concerning this issue. The first is that the
fifteenth century witnessed a pejorative attitude towards those who worked with their hands.
Indeed, fifteenth-century continental writers divided the commons into two distinct estates:
those who practised trade and those who laboured. 8' Furthermore, Sylvia Thrupp has
demonstrated the stigma attached to manual labour in medieval England: Nicholas Upton,
the early fifteenth-century cannon of Salisbury and Wells, was not alone in referring to all
78 York, York City Archives, House Book 9, fol. 57r.
Although Bankhouse entered the freedom of York as a tailor he is later refeffed to as a draper, indicating that
he was concerned with the distribution and retail of textiles as well as their manufacture. It was presumably the
later aspect of his business that caused concern among the civic elite. See the sixteenth-centuiy Norwich
ordinance which ended the city's policy of banning cordwainers from the higher civic offices; Hudson and Tingey
(eds.), Norvich Civic Records 2: 135.
u Indeed, attitudes towards different occupations and the ideological context for these attitudes is an area which
deserves further research.
81 Thrupp, Merchant Class, p. 292.
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occupations involving manual labour or menial service as 'vile' 82 However, the evidence
concerning attitudes in late-medieval York towards the indignity of manual labour is not so
straightforward. Although Barikehouse was not permitted to practise the craft of tailor
while in office, there exist no other examples of artisans who reached the post of mayor
during this period who were similarly required to change their occupations. This is despite
the fact that it is possible to identify seventeen other artisan mayors. 83 Included in this
number were four dyers, four goldsmiths, two tanners, a carver and a glove maker.84
Although ten of these seventeen were members of the Mercers' Guild, which possibly
indicates that they also had trading interests, the remaining seven were not members.
Further the evidence suggests that only two of these men were engaged in inland or overseas
shipping. 85
 Indeed, there is no evidence suggesting that these men were involved in
mercantile activities. Furthermore, the carver Thomas Drawsherd was admitted to the
company on the condition that he remade the company's pageant wagon and the props for
the Corpus Christi plays.86
In the case of late-medieval York it could not even be argued that a distinction was
made between clean and unclean trades on the basis of the nature of the work. It has
already been mentioned that three of the artisans who held civic office as mayor were leather
workers. As the civic records demonstrate, with the exception of butchery, tanning was one
Cited in ibid., p. 305-6.
n Excluded from these 17 is John Petty and other men besides Thomas Bankhouse who fall into the tailor! draper
category.
The dyers Henry Dayson, John Newton, Michael White and William White, were mayors in 1531, 1483,1494
& 1505, and 1491 & 1505 respectively; the goldsmiths George Gayle, Thomas Gray, Randolph Pulleyn and
William Wilsonweremayorsin 1534, 1497,1537 and 1504; thetanners JohnHall and John North were mayors
in 1516 and 1538; the carver Thomas Drawsherd was mayor in 1515 & 1523; and Thomas Mason the glover
was mayor in 1528. See Appendix 1.
85 Appendix 1. The two men engaged in shipping activities were the spicer/ grocer Robert Johnson (mayor 1496)
and the grocer/ spicer Richard Thometon (mayor, 1502). I am grateful to Louise Wheatley for this information.
Wheatley, 'The York Mercers' Guild', appendix p. 251.
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of the most antisocial of the trades in terms of its smell and its waste products.87
While merchants were more likely to become mayor than men of other occupations,
there is little evidence from York to suggest an overt prejudice against manufacturing
occupations per se during this period. 88 However, what was perhaps more of an issue was
the relative status of the different crafts. On this point it is useful to turn to London
evidence. As Alfred Beaven noted when writing on the history of the aldermen of London
during the medieval period: "it was understood, though I have not found any express
enactment or ordinance to that effect, that an Alderman must necessarily belong to one of
the greater Companies: hence the translation on election as Alderman from their parent
inferior Companies, in some cases under extreme pressure.. "•89 There are five such London
examples recorded for the first third of the sixteenth century: John Warner, an armourer,
was translated to the grocers; John Thurston, a broderer, was translated to the goldsmiths;
Ralph Dodmer, a brewer, was translated to the Mercers; John Brown, a painter and stainer
was translated to the Haberdashers; and Richard Choppyn, a tallow chandler, was translated
to the grocers 9° In other words, it seems to have been important that the aldermen and
mayors of late-medieval London were seen to belong to one of the city's most powerful and
wealthy trade groups.
Returning to York, it might be wondered whether similar patterns in craft members
are discernible. Although occupations such as tanning might be viewed negatively because
of the antisocial and dirty nature of this trade, the tanners were also one of the most wealthy
Sellers (ed.), YorkMemorandum Boo/c part), pp. xix, 14-16.
°° This begs the question of whether attitudes towards labor might have changed substantially between the
fourteenth to sixteenth centuries.
9°A.B. Beaven, The Aldermen ofthe City ofLondon: temp. Hen y Ill.- 1912 (Corporation of the City of London:
London, 1913), 2: xlvi.
9°Ibid., pp. 20,23,25,27. After the mid sixteenth century the practiced of translating aldermen appears to have
ceased, although the practice persisted for mayors until the eighteenth century. Ibid., p. xlvi.
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occupational groups in late-medieval York. 91 Indeed, Heather Swanson has demonstrated
that by the first quarter of the sixteenth century, mercers and merchants were no longer
unquestionably the most wealthy occupational group in the city. She has shown that aside
from victuallers, the goldsmiths, tanners, dyers and glovers were among those crafts which
were increasingly challenging the economic dominance of the merchants. 92 It must be
presumed that any possible negative connotations which may have been associated with the
manufacturing element of such occupations were in some part ameliorated, if not by the
personal characteristics of the men in question, then by the social status and economic
power conferred by their great wealth.
To conclude this section on occupation, it would appear that there existed certain
occupational distinctions within the civic elite of later-medieval York. There is little
evidence to suggest any exclusionary closure of the civic elite in general on the grounds of
occupation: the civic elite of later-medieval York was open to men from a wide variety of
occupational backgrounds. However, the evidence does suggest exclusionary closure within
the highest civic posts. Men with mercantile occupations seem to have been favoured to the
exclusion of victuallers and the more lowly crafts, such as that of tailor. It seems possible
that such exclusion may have rested not on the basis of attitudes towards manufacturing
occupations, but on the relative status and wealth of the different craft groups.
Furthermore, the fact that some men elected to the highest posts were required to change
their trade to a trade that was more suitable, would seem to indicate that recruitment to
office was sufficiently flexible to allow factors such as positive personal characteristics or
' Swanson 'Craftsmen and Industiy', p. 433. Similarly, Andrew King has suggested that the appearance of dyers
among the mayors of the city of Norwich during the second hail of the fifteenth century was due to their
economic ascendance. A. King, 'Merchant Class and Borough Finance in Later-Medieval Norwich. PhD thesis,
deparinient of History, University of Oxford (1989), p. 234.
Swanson, Craftsmen and Indushy, pp. 4 15-33.
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connections to override or to outweigh other basic occupational considerations.
At the beginning of this Part a distinction was made between collectivist and
individualist exclusion, the distinction being dependent on whether the attribute in question
was a personally acquired characteristic or not. 93 This issue is clearly pertinent here since
it holds profound implications for the perpetuation of elites. It could be argued that in some
cultures, occupation should be seen not as a personally acquired characteristic but more as
a 'generalized attribute', since there exists little room for occupational mobility even
between generations. To a certain extent this was the case for later-medieval York. It was
common for merchant's sons to go on to become merchants themselves, as is shown by the
fact that in sixteenth-century York only 21% of aldermens' Sons failed to follow their
father's trade. In this sense, through a favouring of those with mercantile occupations, the
innermost circle of the civic elite of York can be said to have safeguarded the privileges of
the city's highest civic offices for subsequent generations of their own families. However,
even this top section of the civic elite of York was not quite as closed as such evidence
might at first suggest. David Palliser has demonstrated that throughout the late-medieval
period the percentage of all freemen following their father's occupation was steadily
decreasing, so that by the period 1500 to 1530 only 35% of all freemen followed their
father's tradeY Furthermore, it was not uncommon for men to change occupations within
their own lifetime. For example, there exist numerous examples of successful artisans
expanding into a retail or distributive trade associated with their former occupation 96 While
See above pp. 47-8.
94 Palliser, 'York in the Sixteenth Century', p. 179.
Ibid., p. 289. See also Heather Swanson who distinguishes between the different crafts in this respect:
Swanson, 'Craftsmen and hiduslry', pp. 449-53.
Perhaps the best form of evidence for this in medieval York are examples of men who entered the franchise
as tailors and who at a later date are denoted as drapers. See for example Thomas Bankhouse, Bertram Dawson,
John Lister and Thomas Parker; Appendix I. There is also evidence that men th other artisan occupations also
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it was not common, upward occupational mobility was evident in later-medieval York,
although Swanson has concluded that this was most easily achieved over two generations,
with the placing of a successftil craftsman's son as an apprentice to a merchant. 97 Indeed,
several men of merchant status who went on to hold the highest civic offices in York were
the Sons of fathers who practised a craft. 98 In conclusion, the occupational exclusion
evident in the highest posts of civic office in later-medieval York must be viewed as having
been primarily individualist: although the ideological status quo was preserved, there clearly
remained room for social mobility albeit on a restricted scale.
VWealth
The comparatively high proportion of merchants serving as civic officials throughout the
medieval period might be explained in terms of their relative wealth, rather than in terms of
any deliberate exclusion of craftsmen from civic office by merchants eager only to admit
their own. Clearly, this conclusion has been reached by historians of some other towns. In
the case of Wells, David Shaw has argued that there was "no overwhelming bias against any
craft per Se, no custom that only merchants could rule... merchants and gentlemen were
simply the most successftil, the richest men in a system that rewarded wealth with socio-
political recognition"
It is possible that a similar case could be made for later-medieval York.
expanded into distributive trade as is demonstrated in the Mercers account rolls. See for example, William Huby,
a homer, for whom there is evidence of shipping activity; Wheatley, 'The York Mercers' Guild', appendix p.
262.
Swanson, 'Craftsmen and Industiy', p. 453.
98 For example, the merchant John Hoggeson (mayor 1533) was probably the son of Thomas Hoggeson, a glover
and inuholder; the draper I-Ieniy Holme (sheriff 1519) was the son of the hosier John Holme; the merchant
Thomas Jameson (mayor 1504) was the son of the yeoman William Jameson; and the merchant John Norman
(sheriff in 1490) was the son of the chapman John Norman of Malton; Appendix 2.
Shaw, Creation of a Community, pp. 165-7. For identical conclusions see Dyer, Worcester in the Sixteenth
Century, p. 225.
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Unfortunately, however, the period 1476 to 1525 saw only one assessment of wealth in
York: the lay subsidy of 1524. This means that it is not possible to assess with any high
degree of accuracy the wealth of the men who held civic office during the beginning and
middle portions of the period under review. 100 Nevertheless, the subsidy can be used to
assess the wealth of those who held office during the latter period. The tables below, which
are derived from Appendix 1, summarise the results of prosopographic research on the
wealth and dates of death of the men who held civic office between 1476 and 1525 . b0
 Of
the 315 men who were civic officials at some point between 1476 and 1525, only 73 men
are known to have been alive at the time of the subsidy. However, two of these men no
longer lived in York.'°2 The assessed wealth of the remaining 71 men who are known to
have both been alive and living in York at the time of the subsidy is summarised in the first
table below. This table also shows David Palliser's breakdown of the percentage of tax-
payers in each tax bracket.'°3
'°°ills or inventories have been used by historians as an indicator of wealth. However, not enough inventories
survive to be used in this instance, while the reliability of wills as an indicator of individual wealth remains
questionable. See Swanson, 'Craftsmen and Jndustiy', p. 414.
'°1 lnformation concerning the assessed wealth, and the dates of death of the men who were civic officials in York
during the period 1476 and 1525 is given in Appendix 1. Information on dates of death was largely garnered
from: York, Borthwick Institute of Historical Research, Probate Registers of the Exchequer and Prerogative
Court of the Archbishop, regs. 3, 5-11, 13-14; York Consistory Court Act Books AB 2 & 4; York Minster
Archives, Dean and Chapter Probate Registers 1-3. The source used for the assessed wealth of the civic officials
was Peacock (ed.), 'Subsidy Roll for York and Ainsty', pp. 170-220.
JohnLangton (sheriff 1509), a draper, had moved to Hull and had subsequently become Mayor of that town,
while John Robynson (bridge master 1511), a clerk, had moved to Malton.
' This division of tax-payers into different groups is a modem construct that has been imposed on the evidence,
and which is used here as a convenient mechanism for summarising findings. Some of the men's goods were
valued in marks and for the purposes of comparison all values have been converted into pounds at a rate of 0.66
marks to the pound.
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Table 2:4
Breakdown of Assessed Wealth of Civic Officials from the Period 1476-1525 Who Were Alive and in
York during the 1524 Lay Subsidy
Assessment	 No. of	 As % of Civic	 % of all Tax-payers in Each Tax
men	 Officials Alive at	 Bracket
Time of Subsidy
Wage Earners	 0	 0	 37.8
Under £10 in Goods	 5	 7	 40.3
£10-fl9inGoods	 23	 32	 9.5
£20-flOO in Goods	 39	 55	 6.7
OverCl00inGoods	 1	 1	 0.3
Income from land	 1	 1	 2.3
Unstated	 0	 0	 3.1
Not Assessed	 2	 3	 NA
Total	 71	 99*	 100
*Tota1 do not always equal 100% due to rounding error.
Sources: Appendix 1; Peacock (ed.), 'Subsidy Roll for York and Ainsty', pp. 170-220; Palliser, Tudor York; p.
136.
Table 2:4 above demonstrates that most of the men who held civic office between
1476 and 1525 and who can be shown to have been alive at the time of the 1524 subsidy
were men of substantial wealth. The subsidy records indicate that over half (55%) of the
71 men analysed were assessed on goods between the value of £20 and £100, while a further
third (32%) of these men were assessed on goods between the value of10 and £19. When
these figures are compared with the breakdown of the percentage of all tax-payers in each
category, it becomes quite clear that in many cases the civic officials who were assessed in
the 1524 subsidy were on average substantially better off than the majority of other York
tax-payers. 1°4 Clearly, these findings pertain to wealth amassed over the course of a lifetime
rather than to wealth at the time of an officials election to civic office. Nonetheless, few
'°4 However, there is evidence to indicate a wealth elite in York in 1524 which was distinct from the civic elite.
Only 15 men were assessed in 1524 as owning goods or land equal to or greater than the value of40. Of these
15 men 5 never held civic office in York. Indeed, David Palliser notes that whereas by the latter part of the
sixteenth centuly the richest citizens of York were almost all aldermen, in 1524 most of the most wealthy men
were not aldermen of the city: Paffiser, 'York in the Sixteenth Centuiy', p. 240.
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among the civic population could ever hope to attain such levels of wealth. What the
prosopographic evidence seems to suggest is that wealth was normally a pre-requisite for
holding civic office in the early-sixteenth century.
Further, evidence seems to suggest that there existed a relationship between levels of
wealth and opportunities for promotion up the cursus honorum. Table 2:5 below combines
the prosopographic research concerning the political careers of the men who held civic
office between 1476 and 1525, with information garnered from the lay subsidy of 1524. It
shows the average wealth of the men who held civic office during the period 1476 to 1525
according to the highest office they reached.
Table 2:5
Average Level of Assessed Wealth of Civic Officials from the Period 1476-1525 Who Were Alive and in
York During the 1524 Lay Subsidy by Highest Civic Office Attained'05
Highest Civic Office	 Average Assessed
Attained During Lifetime	 Value of Goods (to the nearest £)
Bridge master	 13
Chamberlain	 16
Sheriff	 28
Mayor	 23
Sources: Appendix 1; Peacock (ed.), 'Subsidy Roll for York and Ainsty', pp. 170-220.
Table 2:5 demonstrates that a clear correlation existed between levels of wealth and
the highest civic office attained. However, this relationship appears to break down at the
level of sheriff. The average assessed value of goods of those who held the posts of sheriff
and mayor during this period was £28 and £23 respectively. Men who reached the posts of
sheriff and mayor were therefore substantially better off in terms of their assessed wealth
105 These figures exclude the two bridge masters who were not assessed and also John Roger the sheriff who was
assessed on goods valued at £198. The effect of including these anomalous examples would have heavily skewed
the average. It would not, however, have affected the conclusions to be drawn from this table.
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than men who only ever reached the posts of bridge master or chamberlain. However, on
average, the assessed wealth of the men who only ever reached the post of sheriff was
greater than that of men who reached the highest post of mayor. One possible explanation
for this phenomenon is that at the level of the mayoralty the civic elite were more concerned
to choose men on the grounds of personality, occupation or social connections, than they
were simply to choose men on a criterion of greatest wealth. Additionally, it may also be
pertinent to note that the post of sheriff seems to have required a higher level of expenditure
than that of mayor, as it involved the payment of the city's farm.'°6
It has already been shown from prosopographic and documentary evidence that
recruitment to civic office in York was biased in favour of men with mercantile occupations.
This finding is further confirmed if we look in more detail at the nineteen men who were
assessed in 1524 on goods valued at greater than £23.b07 This information is summarised
in table 2:6 below.
Table 2:6
Men Who Held Civic Office 1476 -1525 Who Were Assessed In the 1524 Lay Subsidy on Goods Over the
Value of23: By Occupational Group
Occupational	 Number of Men	 Of Whom were	 % of Occupational Group Who
Group	 Mayors	 Were Mayors
Mercantile	 9	 5	 56
Non-Mercantile	 10	 2	 20
Total	 19	 7	 37
Sources: Appendix 1; Peacock (ed.), 'Subsidy Roll for York and Ainsty', pp. 170-220.
Table 2:6 demonstrates, only 20% of the men with non-mercantile occupations who
were assessed on goods valued at over £23 in the 1524 lay subsidy reached the post of
'°6 YCA, House Book 9, fol. 60v.
'° This being the average assessed value of the goods of men who were mayor.
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mayor as compared to 56% of merchants with goods valued at a similar level. This would
clearly suggest that occupation was a more important factor than wealth in the choice of
mayor.
At the beginning of this statistical section on the relative importance of wealth and
occupation for civic office it was argued that the prosopographical evidence suggests an
exclusionary closure of the civic elite in general on the grounds of wealth. These findings
are supported by evidence of regulations and discourses of wealth contained in York's
House Books. For example, it was agreed in 1496 that men who had borne the office of
chamberlain were to be excused from the post of sheriff for the following six years. If any
former chamberlain was called to the post of sheriff before six years had elapsed from
vacating office he was not admitted to the office if he came and swore "Iat he is not able
in havour of goods, bt is to said to ke value of CC1i to bere and occupie e said rome and
office of shereffwyke".'°8 This amount was later reduced to £100, and indeed in 1511 we
are told that Roger Gegges came before the council pleading that "he was not able to
consent and pay the kyngs farme and bere the other charges of this citie for the said tyme
and a upon made his othe and swore on the holy Evangeliste that he was not of goode to
the value of Cu".'09
In part, such concern over the wealth of office holders was undoubtedly driven by
practical motivations. The burden of bearing office was great in terms of both time and
money spent. Financial deficits were expected to be met from the official's own purse. The
sheriffs were expected to provide an annual feast for the rest of the senior council,
meanwhile, the House Books show that members of the councils of twelve and twenty-four
were occasionally expected to contribute to ad hoc levies to cover costs such as
108 YCA, House Book 7, fol. 142r.
'°9 YCA, House Book 9, fol. 60v.
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clensyng of be
	
Indeed, this period witnesses numerous examples of men pleading
to be excluded from holding civic office on the grounds that they could not afford to do so.
For example, it was agreed in 1478 that "Brian Conyers shalnot be called to the office of
shirefwyk within this cite of Yorke within the space of viij yeris, olesse than he be the grace
of God within the said viii yeres may growe in gudes and ryches to have the said office, than
he to be exiect and accepte to the same office"." Similarly, in 1492, Roger Breer was
found to be unable to occupy the office of chamberlain because he was "not sufficient and
no able in havour of goods". 112 Likewise, it is recorded that in 1509 the fishmonger John
Roger was granted an exemption from holding the post of sheriff on the grounds that he was
a "smal person and not of sufficiaunt statur to occupy the sayd office...".'13
However it needs to be asked to what extent the exclusion of less wealthy men from
civic office may have been sanctioned on ideological grounds as much as practical grounds?
In particular, could it have been that wealth was viewed as befitting the dignity or honour
of civic offices partly due to the status that wealth conferred? This implication was certainly
present in the slandering of John Tonge, mayor of York in 1479, by the parson of the church
of St. Peter the Little. It is reported that the parson suggested Tonge was "not able to be
"°YCA, House Book 7, fols. 37r-v. The ideological importance of such collections are explored in the next
chapter.
Attreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 137; Indeed, the number of chamberlains elected each year increased
from three to four in 1484, and then again to six in 1487 in response to the increasing financial burdens of the
post; YCA, Dl, fols. 207r & 21 ir. Jenny Kermode has argued that the corporation of York cynically elected
men to the higher civic post in the late flfieenth and early sixteenth centuries when they knew they could not
afford to hold civic office and then fined them as a means of increasing civic revenue during a time of fmancial
crisis. Kermode, 'Urban Decline',passitn. This is discussed in greater depth below, see pp. 220-221.
112	 Book 7, fol. 55v.
"3 YCA, House Book 9, foL 50. A statement that is particularly ironic given that by the lay subsidy of 1524 John
Roger was by far the most wealthy of the civic officials, his goods being valued at almost twice the value of the
next most wealthy officer; Peacock (ed.), 'Subsidy Roll for York and Aiusty' p. 177.
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mare of the wirshupft,ll cite and bad fye uppon hym for he was bot a begger"." 4 Similarly,
the association between wealth, rank and the desirability of these qualities for civic office
is also evident in the description of the men chosen to act on a land inquisition in 1522.
These men were to be the "fowre worthiest parisshonours of state, degree and substaunce",
in other words, men of suitable social standing and wealth."5
Arguably, status was not the only quality thought to have been conferred by great
wealth. For example, in 1494, Alan Stavely was exempted from the office of chamberlain
for such time until he was "able & sufficient" in terms of "Reson & discrecion &... of his
gudes"." 6 Here the civic officials seem to have perceived a correlation between Stavely's
lack of wealth and his personal characteristics. Susan Reynolds has argued that "the richest
and most established burgesses or citizens of a town... were perceived as the most solid,
respectable and responsible members"." Certainly some medieval political commentators
advocated rule by the wealthy, as is most famously exemplified in Brunefto Latini's twelve
requirements for a good governor which were copied into London's Liber Custumarum.
In his prescriptions Latini suggests that a ruler should be rich and powerful because then
with the other virtues he should possess he will be less likely to be tempted towards
corruption."8
"4 Atlreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 207. While 'beggar' had developed into a general term of abuse by the
sixteenth century, it appears to have been used as an alternative to rascal or knave, which would not be relevant
in this context, or, more pertinently, to identify someone of the lowest social class. H. Kurath, S.M. Kuhn and
RS. Lewis (eds.),Middle English Dictionaiy (University of Michigan Press: Michigan, 1956) begger(e, n., 4;
G. Hughes, Swearing: A Social Histoiy ofFoulLanguage, Oaths and Profanity in English (Blackwell: Oxford,
1991), p. 52.
"YCA, House Book 10, fol. 39r. See SI!. Rigby,Medieval Grimsby: Growth and Decline (University of Hull
Press: Hull, 1993), pp. 131-2; Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Dictionary, stat, n., 2(b) ; degre,
n., 4(a-c), 6(a) & 8; substaunce, n., 5(a).
U6 House Book 7, fol. 109r.
7 Reynolds, 'Medieval Urban History', p. 15.
"8 Brunetto Latini, Li Livres dou Tresor, trans. P. Barrette and S. Baldwin, The Garland Library of Medieval
Literature, series B 90(1993), p. 354. See also "Soit riches et manarnis" in Riley (ed.),Munimenta Gildhallae
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Nevertheless, the relationship between wealth and the right to rule was not as
straightforward or as uncontested as Reynolds and other historians have sometimes
suggested. Quentin Skinner has demonstrated that many of the early Continental rhetorical
writers, Latini included, were deeply suspicious of individual wealth. These writers argued
that the pursuit of riches resulted in the degeneration of virtue and political factiousness, and
that ultimately wealth was the enemy of strong and stable civic government." 9
 Indeed
Latini' s pupil, Dante, is carefi.,l to divorce wealth from virtue or nobility (which, Latini
argues, qualifies a man for leadership), concluding that "wherever virtue is there is
nobleness".' 2° Skinner notes that "the radical outcome of this argument is thus the
suggestion that the quality of nobility.., is taken as a purely personal property, an individual
attainment rather than the possession of families which happen to be ancient or rich".'2'
It seems then that political commentators were qualified in the espousal of wealth as
a desirable prerequisite for leadership. Wealth was often placed below personal virtues in
importance, and these personal virtues were in turn often seen to be independent of wealth.
Thus while the Liber Custumarum advocated rule by the wealthy, this was on the condition
that the men in question also possessed other virtues. Indeed, Latini is careful to note that
a good poor man makes a better ruler than a bad rich one.' 22 Such sentiments are clearly
reflected in the civic writing of late-medieval York. While wealth was a desirable quality,
Londoniensis, 2: 18.
"9 Q. Skinner, The Foundations ofModem Political Thought, 2 vols. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
1978), 1: 42-4. However, see the views of scholastic writers, in particular Bartolus of Saxoferrato, who
suggested that wealth "tends to promote virtue." Ibid., p. 56. In a wider context the metheval period also
witnessed debate over a perceived conflict between wealth and salvation: see for example, Dives and Pauper.
Here Dives is advised that one means by which he can be both wealthy and ensure salvation is by keeping God's
commandments. PH Barnum (ed), Dives and Pauper, Early English Text Society, original series 275 & 280
(1976-1980).
120 Skinner, Foundations of Political Thought, p. 46.
121 Ibid., p. 46.
' 22 Latjiij Li Livres dou Tresor, p. 354.
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wealth in the absence of other qualities was not sufficient. As the next section will argue,
an equal stress was placed on more personal characteristics, and is also true in civic writing
of other medieval towns. For example, it has been argued that the right of the wealthy to
rule is reflected in a letter from the king to the citizens of Lincoln in 1438, which has been
translated and published by Francis Hill. In this letter the king stated that the city is best
governed by the "more worthy, more powerful, more good, and true, more influential and
more sufficient and more befitting to occupy and exercise the office of mayor and sheriffs
therein". 1
 Here straightforward terms of wealth are absent, instead the importance of both
wealth and virtue is stressed. Similar sentiments were yet more clearly stated by the elite
of medieval Wells, who commanded that in order to be elected to the Mastership of the city
a man was to be "bonis temporalis, bonis moribus"; in other words, civic leaders were
expected not only to be wealthy but to possess both money and morality.' 24
 In fact, Beaven
has noted that from as early as the thirteenth century, the aldermen of London were required
to be chosen by the "wealthier and wiser men from each ward", while men suitable to be
chosen were described in 1397 as "reputable and discreet men, either of whom in morals and
worldly goods should be fit to be a judge and an Alderman of the City".'25
While below the level of mayor there is little evidence for exclusionary closure on the
grounds of occupation within York's civic elite, exclusionary closure on the grounds of
wealth is evident at all levels of the civic hierarchy. However, occupation appears to have
been a more important issue than wealth at the level of the mayoralty. As with occupation,
exclusionary closure on the grounds of wealth must primarily be viewed as being what has
"Hi11,MedievalLincoln, p.278.
124 Cited in Shaw, Creation of a Community, p.188.
' As translated and cited in Beaven, The Aldermen ofLondon, pp. xxiv, xlvii & xix-xx.
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been termed as 'individualist exclusion'. Obviously, wealthy parentage would have been
advantageous for a rising civic official in the late-medieval period. The benefits of wealthy
parentage were not simply in terms of financial or material legacies, but were also
manifested in terms of a ready-formed network of advantageous business contacts.
Nevertheless, there are plenty of examples of men who either gained great wealth from
humble beginnings or who experienced downward social mobility after a promising start in
life. Indeed, failing business fortunes were not the only factor which served to accentuate
fluidity within the civic elite. Historians of both London and York have demonstrated the
consistent failure of successful families to survive in the male line more than a couple of
generations.' 26 As a result, social mobility was not only possible, it was also vital for the
perpetuation of the elite.
The evidence that we have looked at so far concerning occupational and wealth
restrictions on access to the civic elite suggests that in as far as social closure existed in late-
medieval York (and it has been suggested that it was less evident than has sometimes been
argued), it was achieved largely through a process of the nomination of suitable
replacements. In turn this nomination process was controlled by the prevailing ideologies
concerning the relationship of occupation and wealth to civic government. Thus t 1ri soti
closure evident within the civic elite of later-medieval York can be understood in two subtly
different ways depending on how one defines ideology. Traditionally, the term 'ideology'
has tended to be used in a pejorative sense to express "the interests of the dominant class
in the sense that the ideas which compose ideology are ideas which... articulate the
ambitions, concerns and wishful deliberations of the dominant social group as they struggle
126 See Thrupp, Merchant Class, pp. 191-233; Palliser, 'York in the Sixteenth Century', pp. 175-178 & 257.
The next chapter ll argue that the elite of late-medieval York appears much more entrenched if one takes into
account the perpetuation of a family through the female line.
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to secure and maintain their position of domination" . 127
 However, it could be argued that
the social processes of the later-medieval city should be viewed in a less cynical light. More
recently the term has been 'neutralised' and ideology is now widely taken to refer to "a
system of thought and modes of experience which are conditioned by social experiences".'28
It is in this sense that the social exclusion that is evident among the civic elite of later-
medieval York should be viewed. This is supported by the evidence concerning desirable
qualities of civic officials besides those of wealth and occupation. As has been argued
above, it appears that civic rulers were expected to be moral as well as rich. It could be
argued that this discourse merely reflects an attempt on the part of the elite to "assert the
moral superiority of the richer townsmen".' 29
 In part such an assertion is justified: the next
section will argue that morality and status are inter-dependant throughout the civic writing.
However, it will also be argued that such language should be placed, at least partly, within
the wider context of established discourses concerning governance.
IZ7JB. Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era ofMass Communication
(Polity Press: Oxford, 1990), pp. 37-8.
'28 Ibid., p.44.
' 29 ton English and French Towns, pp. 115-6.
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B) Character
So far discussion in Part One has focussed on the importance of tangible qualities such as
wealth and occupation for election to the civic elite of later-medieval York; these being the
qualities which have attracted the attention of historians in the past. Very little consideration
has been given by English urban historians to the personal qualities and characteristics
deemed necessary or desirable in civic officials. In a large part this situation reflects the fact
that prosopographical studies have dominated research on urban elites. An underlying
assumption of such studies is that factors such as family ties or occupation are more
important than personal characteristics in determining power structures or networks. This,
combined with the historical intangibility of personality or character, has led to the virtual
exclusion of such factors from consideration in the historiography of late-medieval civic
government. A notable exception to this historiographical pattern is Shaw's work on
medieval Wells.' 3° Enlarging on the emphasis that Reynolds places on the ideological
context of civic rule, Shaw's work has illustrated the importance of moral vocabularies and
discourses which stressed the personal qualities found in and expected of civic officials.
Similarly, in this section of the thesis I will argue that personal qualities and characteristics
were important both for the gaining of access to the civic elite of later-medieval York, and
for the creation or perpetuation of an ideology of civic authority.
My analysis of character differs from the preceding discussion of wealth and
occupation in several important respects. Whereas the previous section was based largely
on pro sopographic sources, the main source of evidence here will be the language used in
the civic writing of the period: in particular, in the York House Books (the majority of
which are yet to be fully transcribed), the Memorandum Books and certain unpublished
130 Shaw, Creation of a Community, pp. 188-97.
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folios of the Freemen's Register.' 3 ' More importantly though, the methodology of this
approach is significantly different from that of the previous section. Rather than exploring
the actual qualities possessed by the civic officials of late-medieval York, this section instead
focuses on those qualities which were portrayed as being necessary or desirable for civic
office. In some instances it will be possible to compare image and reality in order to
determine the extent to which the civic elite of later-medieval York lived up to a portrayed
ideal. However, such eases will be the exception. On the whole, the recovery of personality
by the historian is not possible. It is precluded by the nature of the available evidence and
by the historical intangibility and subjectivity of personality.
In any case it is worth stressing in this context that the question of 'what' the civic
officials were like is far less interesting, or indeed relevant, than that of 'why' certain
personal characteristics were portrayed as being necessary for access to the civic elite. As
Paul Strohm has written, such ideal types "offer crucial testimony on... .contemporaly
perception, ideology, belief; and- above all- on the imaginative structures within
which.. .participants acted and assumed that their actions would be understood".'32
Furthermore, it has been argued, by Ronald Weissman, that identity is constructed through
interaction.'33
 Clearly then, the language used in sources such as the House Books could
be viewed as having served to construct the identity of the civic elite of later medieval York.
Indeed, as Richard Britnell has noted, texts such as civic records "stretched [authority] to
new limits" through "safeguarding boundaries by expanding the reach of memory on
'3t For a discussion of the evolution of such records see: G. Martin, 'English Toi Records, 1250-13 50', in it
Brilnell (ed), Pragmatic Literacy, East and West 1200-1330 (Boydell Press: Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 119-30.
132 P. Strolun, Hochon 's Arrow: The Social Imagination ofFourteenth-Centuiy Texts (Princeton University
Press: Princeton, 1992), p. 4 (see also pp. 3-9 for a fuller consideration of this matter).
' 33 Weissman, 'ReconstnictingRenaissaiice Sociology', pp. 39-46; R.F.E. Weissman, 'The Importance of Being
Ambiguous: Social Relalions, Individuals and Identities in Renaissance Florence', in Zimmerman and Weissman
(eds.), pp. 269-280.
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resources and procedures, by enabling closer supervision and discipline of officials, and by
enhancing the status of those in command of the records".'34
This section argues that explicit references to the qualities which a man ought to
possess in order to be elected to certain posts (as seen in the language used in York's House
and Memorandum books and the Freemen's Register), can be said to constitute a variety of
discourses concerning good governance. These discourses in turn reflected the ideologies
of the civic elite on governance and status. It is possible that such ideologies may have
influenced the type of men who gained access to the civic elite. However, they also served
both to construct the identity of the civic elite of later-medieval York and to legitimise the
power of those in office.' 35
 That many of the discourses are in some way concerned with
issues of morality is indicative of the fact that during this period morality was often
indivisible from status.'36
I) Discretion and WiSdoi
The most immediately apparent discourse contained in the York House Books is the
discourse of discretion. It is noticeable that the term 'discreet' is used frequently in texts
emanating from the civic elite of York, especially in the context of the election of men to
various of the civic posts. For example, upon the death of "be Right honest and discret
person Oliver Middilton", an aldermen of the city, there was elected in his place "be Right
R. Brilnell, 'Pragmatic Literacy in Latin Christendom', in Britnell (ed.), Pragmatic Literacy, pp. 3-4. For a
wider discussion of these issues see pp. 3-14. See also M.T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record:
England 1066-1307 (Edward Arnold: London, 1979),passim.
This issue is explored in greater depth in the final chapter of the thesis.
'Throughout this section the two are viewed as mutually dependant. It could be argued that it is not possible
to disentangle the two and examine which preceded which. Rather, the relationship between status and morality
was symbiotic and ongoing.
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honest and discret person Robert Symson". 137 Similarly, in March 1517, the House Books
record the election of "the right discreit and honest parsons, Paul Gylle and Simon Vycars
to be alderman". 138
 Indeed, by the end of the fifteenth century the use of the word
'discreet', together with 'honest', had become the standard way of describing men who were
elected to the higher posts of civic office, and this phrase continued to be used throughout
the rest of the period in question.
Besides being used to refer to men who were elected to the aldermanship of the city,
the term 'discreet' was also used to describe men at other levels of the civic hierarchy. For
example, at the lowest level, "iiij of the moste connyng, discrete and able players" of the city
were required to go and check that the other of the city's waits were of a sufficient
standard.'39
 A requirement of the officers of the mace and sword was that they should be
"able and discrete", as well being capable of riding a horse.'° Similarly, it was not unusual
for the common clerks of the city to be recruited "discrete personne[s]".' 41 The notion of
discernment is also reflected elsewhere in House Books. Following the death of the mayor
of York in 1505 the aldermen and council of the city were instructed to chose a new mayor
"after their discrecons".142
'Discreet' in Middle English meant wise, discerning or prudent.' 43
 Indeed, it and the
'37 YCA, House Book 9, fol. 21v.
' 38 Ibid., fol. 9v.
' 39 Attreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 29.
140 Ibid., p. 353. See the records of York's Mercer's guild where, according to the guild's ordinances, the
members were to choose leaders who were described in Middle English as being "most able and discrete
persons". M. Sellers (ed.), The YorkMercers andMerchantAdventurers 1356-1917, Surtees Society 129 (1918
for 1917), p. 75.
141 Attreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 75.
' 42 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 3: 11.
143 Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Dictionary, discret(e, adj., 1(a).
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French term discré, or discret derive from Latin discretus, meaning prudent.' It is argued
here that it is in this sense that 'discreet' was used in York's civic writing, arid that its usage
occurred as part of a wider discourse of wisdom. It should be noted at this juncture that
what was being conveyed was not an impression of philosophical wisdom, but rather the
qualities of wisdom, discernment or prudence associated with the administration of justice:
namely, the ability to listen to and to judge a case fairly and wisely.' 45
 At first sight this
understanding of the term might seem strange in the context of describing city waits.
However, if we look again at the context of this example, it becomes apparent that what is
being described here is not the musical ability of the four men in question per Se, but their
ability to judge the standard of others. In other words, the civic elite was concerned that
these men should be discerning.'
In addition to the term 'discreet', the discourse of wisdom and judgement contained
in York's House Books also encompassed terms such as the Latin 'sapiens', the Anglo-
Norman 'sage' and the English 'wise'. For example, Wam
his admittance to the post of recorder of York in 1490 as uttering "so many wise and goode
words". 147 Similarly, the French word 'sage' is briefly evident at the end of the fifteenth
century, although it was never used extensively. Thus, we are informed in 1491 that the
"sagez & discret homes John Stokdale, merchant & John Huton, potter" were elected to the
"Discreet' came into English from Latin via Anglo-Norman French. Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle
English Dictionaiy, discret(e, adj.; RE. Latham (ed.), Revised Medieval Latin Word-List From British and Irish
Sources with Supplement (Published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1980),
discretlio, pp. 149-50.
145 The use of a language of justice in the House Books is discussed below.
146 For examples of a similar use of discreet elsewhere, see Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English
Dictionary, discret(e, adj., 1(a); for example, "His reward ..may be put in discrecion and iugement of iiij or ij
indeferent and discreet persones. .therupon chosen to arbiire and deine", (1439) document in Collect. Topogr.
5:15.
' 47 YCA, House Book 7, fol. 4r.
89
post of sheriff'48
A discourse of wisdom is also evident in other sources emanating from members of
the civic elite of later-medieval York. For example, the lost sepulchral memorial of John
Gilyot, mayor of York in 1464, and again in 1474, stated that he was a 'sapiens' and
'venerabilis' man who twice bore the burden of the honour of the mayoralty of the city.'49
Similarly, a discourse of wisdom is also evident in the records of the York Mercers' Guild.
As part of the master's oath (copied into the records in 1495 in Middle English) an initiand
had to swear to rule "right wisely and truly".' 5° It could be argued that in this example the
combination of 'wisely' and 'truly' (meaning fairly, or justly) again underlines the judicial
context of the discourse.
While no explicit connection is made in the York records between age and wisdom,
there is evidence to suggest that age or experience was viewed as a positive characteristic
in civic officials. For example, in 1523, those responsible for naming the candidates for the
post of sheriff were to be "the common counsaill & the eldest sersors...of(the)...crafts".'5'
Furthermore, in 1519, Anthony Middleton was excused any further civic office for six years
"for so muche as he is bot a yongman in age".' 52 Thomas Hardsange was also excused from
civic office in 1495 on the grounds that he was "nether able in havour off goods ne in
discreccon or demeanour", while a year earlier Alan Stavely had been exempted from the
office of sheriff until "he be able & sufficed as well in Reson & discrecon & as in havour of
Ibid., fol. 48r. For an identical wording see also fol. 85v.
'49 CM Barnett, 'Memorials and Commemoration in the Parish Churches of Late-Medieval York' DPhil thesis,
department of History, University of York (1997), pp. 257-8. This memorial and the issue of personal identity
is more fully explored in the final part of this thesis.
'501b1d., p. 88.
151 YCA, House Book 9, fol. 70r.
'52 Jbjd., fol. 97r.
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his gudes. . .to occupy & take uppon charge of the same"' 53 Here we can see clearly the
conflation of wealth and worthiness that has been discussed above. However, Hardsang and
Stavely' s alleged lack of reason, discretion and demeanour may well have been related to
their respective ages. It certainly seems probable that both men were relatively young. Alan
Stavely was promoted to the post of chamberlain just five years after being admitted to the
freedom of the city, whereas most men who skipped the post of bridge master took an
average of twelve years to reach this post.' 54 Similarly, Thomas Hardsang also had a faster
than average promotion up the civic hierarchy. The relative youth of the two men is also
suggested by the fact that neither man seemed to have amassed much wealth at this point
in their careers. The wider context of this suggested attitude towards age is to be found in
medieval literary, philosophic and artistic depictions of life cycle. 155 Within such schema late
middle age or old age were often associated with the virtues of wisdom or prudence.'56
Indeed, old age was sometimes referred to in relation to the virtue that it was supposed to
represent, namely 'siagesse' meaning sagacity or wisdom.' 57 Furthermore, this wisdom Was
often related to the ability to pass sound judgement.'58
Unlike a term such as 'honest', the use of the terms 'sage', 'discreet' and 'wise' in
sources emanating from the civic elite of York seem to have been restricted almost entirely
to the civic officials of the city. Moreover, these terms were applied to the holders of the
153 YCA, House Book 7, fols. 109& 138v.
'' See Appendix 1.
155 For a discussion of medieval attitudes towards life cycle, see J.A. Burrow, The Ages of Man: A Study in
Medieval Writing and Thought (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1986); E. Sears, The Ages ofMan: Medieval
Interpretations of the L/'e Cycle (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1986); lvi. Dove, The Perfect Age of
a Man 's Life (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1986).
136 Sears, TheAges ofMan, pp. 101-2, 116, 129 & 199 n.42; Dove, The PerfeclAge, pp.48,53 & 92.
157 Sears, Medieval Interpretations of the L jfe Cycle, p. 118.
' 58 Dove, The PerfectAge, pp.53 & 92.
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highest offices of sheriff, mayor and alderman. It was suggested at the beginning of this
section that the discourse of wisdom which runs throughout the House Books and other
texts emanating from the civic elite of later-medieval York related not to philosophical
wisdom but to the wisdom required for the sound administration of justice.
Interestingly, the House Books also see the use of other terms such as 'indifferent' and
'impartial' to describe mayors and other nominees chosen to act as arbitrators or to perform
some other judicial function within the city. For example, in 1487, the commons were asked
to name "ij indifferent auditours" to examine and audit the chamberlains' books.' 59 The
importance of impartiality among urban officials is also reflected in the wording of a letter
to the king from the mercers of York, Hull, Beverley and other northern towns which states
that: "governeres hath been fro tyme to tyme indifferently elect, the which governours fill
welle and indifferently hath occupied their said auctorities".'6° The Mercers go on to
complain that John Pickering, the overseas governor of England's Mercers' Company, was
a bad governor as he was prejudicial rather than impartial in his dealings with merchants of
the north of England.
H) Context
This section has argued that a discourse of wisdom associated both with age and the
administration of justice is evident within texts emanating from the civic elite of later-
medieval York. The use of language within these discourses is by no means unique to York
and needs to be placed within the wider context of contemporary ideologies concerning
'59 Atlreed (ed.), York House Bookj, p. 566. See also pp. 114, 127, 258 & 405. 'Indifferent' meant impartial,
fair or just during the medieval period. See Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Diction aty,
indifferent, adj., (a).
160 Sellers (ed.), YorkMercers andMerchant Adventurers, p. 75.
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governance.'6' Terms such as 'discreet', 'sage', 'wise' and 'venerable' were all popular with
the civic elites of other towns. For example, the twenty-four of Coventry were described
in 1423 as "wyse men & discrett".' 62 Similarly, throughout the late-medieval period the
aldermen of London and those who chose them were also required to be 'discreet'.'63
Meanwhile, in 1437, the rulers of the city of Wells described previous burgesses as having
made "by theyre sage and wyse descrecons diverse convenyent ordinances . lM That notions
concerning the importance of wisdom in civic leaders were circulating in the urban
administrative sphere from at least the early fourteenth century is also demonstrated by the
incorporation of Latini's requirements for a good ruler into London's Liber Custumarum.
Among these requirements the importance of wisdom in a leader is particularly stressed: the
ideal leader being described as 'sage'.' 65 Latini also expresses the merits of age and
experience in relation to wisdom.' It should be noted, though, that the use of similar terms
is not evident in other texts local to York such as the Mystery Plays, a fact which perhaps
further emphasises the peculiarly governmental application of these terms.'67
To what extent does this use of language overlap with aristocratic discourses? While
there seems little emphasis in chivalric literature on the importance of discretion and
161 No attempt will be made to iuicover the provenance of the revealed disco,,rse. Rather the intention is to
illustrate the wider context for the circulation of such ideas.
'C Mi). Harris (ed.), The Coventiy Leet Book or Mayor's Register, Early English Text Society, original series
134-5 (1907-8), 1: 44.
163 See, for example, Ibid, 1: xix & xx.
164 As cited in Shaw, Creation of a Community, pp. 180-81. See also King, 'Merchant Class and Borough
Finances in Later-Medieval Norwich', p. 242.
165 Rj (ed.), Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis, 2: 17.
'Brijnetto Latini, Li Livres dou Tresor, pp. 352-4.
167 F. McSparran (ed.), "Corpus of Middle English Works: The York Plays", Middle English Compendium,
Michigan University November 1997, <http:Ilwww.hti.umich.edu/dictlmedt> (9/12/98).
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wisdom, such ideals were clearly circulating at the parliamentary and royal level. 168 Ideas
concerning the importance of a ruler's role in the provision of justice were well-
established.' 69 Though much of the debate during the late-medieval period centred around
the relationship between the king and the law, there was also concern over the king's role
as an administrator ofjustie.7O Wisdom was also greatly esteemed as a dimension of kingly
rule.' 7 ' In particular, the importance of wisdom and the associated qualities of age or
experience were often stressed with regard to the king's councillors and advisors.' 72 This
is reflected in the language of the parliamentary sources of this period. 'Discreet commons'
or 'discreet councell' were common forms with which to describe or address the commons.
Thus, in 1430-1, the parliamentary rolls make reference to "the ful wyse and discret Syrys,
the Comyns of this present Indeed, ('discret' or) 'discreet' and 'wyse' were
standard phrases in Chancery English at least as early as the late-fourteenth century.' 74 The
Middle English Dictionary shows that 'discreet' and 'wise' regularly collocate from the
1380s.' 75 It seems likely, though, that the concept of the importance of discretion, wisdom
'6 For example, the words 'discreet' and 'honest' hardly occur in the work of Thomas Malory. See T. Kato (ed.),
A Concordance of the Works of Sir Thomas Maloiy (Tokyo University Press: Tokyo, 1974).
'On the importance of this issue during the medieval period see A. Black, Political Thought in Europe 1250-
1450 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1992), pp. 34-41 & 152-55; G.L. }Iarriss, 'Introduction' in idem
(ed.), Henry V The Practice ofKin gshzp (Alan Sutton: Stroud, 1985), pp. 11-13; W.M. Ormrod, Political Ljfe
in Medieval England 1300-1450 (Macmillan Press: Bassingstoke, 1995), pp. 109-29.
' 70 J. Watts, Henry VI and the Politics ofKingship (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996), p. 21.
171 Harriss, 'Introduction', p. 13.
'For example, Hoccieve advised that the wise king should: "Cheisith men eke of olde experience; Hir wit and
intellect is gloriouse; e olde mannes rode [advice] is fructuouse; Ware of yong conseil, it is perilouse" cited in
Hoccleve, 'The Regiment of Princes', ed., FJ. Furnivall, Early English Text Society, extra series 72 (1897),
lines 4943-7. The importance of counsel for the elite of later medieval York is discussed in the final chapter.
'73 Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Dictionary, discret(e, adj., 1(a).
' 74 J.H. Fisher, M. Richardson, J.L. Fisher (eds.), An Anthology of Chanceiy English (University of Tennessee
Press: Knoxville, 1984). For a summary of the use of forms of 'discreet' and 'wise' in Chancery English see the
glossary p. 330 & p. 400.
' 75 Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Dictionary, discret(e, adj., 1(a).
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and honesty in civic officials was circulating at the civic and Parliamentary level prior to the
widespread adoption of Middle English. Anglo-Norman statutes from the reign of Edward
I which deal with the appointment of local officials (coroners) stipulate that they should not
be mean or indiscreet, but instead should be honest, lawful and wise.'76
Given this wider context it is not surprising that in letters to the civic elite of York the
king frequently described the ideal qualities of a civic official in terms of wisdom and justice.
For example, in 1476, he instructed the city that they should "chese and accept unto you
suche a discreet personne for the office of your saide commen clerk..
	
Similarly, in
response to what he viewed as an unsuitable election in 1527, the king ordered that "two
of the most substanciall and discret persons of the Cytye to be Aldermen".' 78 As has been
suggested, such examples can also be found for other towns. For example, a parliamentary
bill of 1484 recorded in the records of the borough of Northampton makes reference to men
of no "...discrecion wisdome ne reason which oft in nombre exced in theire Assembles other
that been approved discrete. ' 179
Significantly, the extracts cited perhaps suggest that an ideology of civic government
which stressed the ability of civic officials to rule in a wise and impartial manner, may be
connected in part to the position occupied by the mayor as the king's minister of peace and
justice within the late-medieval city. As John Watts has noted, the king's office during the
fifteenth century was thought to comprise two main functions: the defence of the realm and
' 76 A. Luders (ed), Statutes of the Realm, 11 volumes, Royal Commission (1810-), 1(1235-1377): 27.
' 77 Attreed (ed.), York House Book., p. 75.
Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 3: 57. For the use of 'wisdomes' and 'wise' see also 2: 81.
179 C.A. Markham (ed.), The Records of the Borough ofNorthampton (Birdsall and Son: Northampton, 1898),
pp. 101-2. Francis Hill has noted that in 1438, royal letters patent were directed to the elite of Lincoln in which
Hill has iranslated the king stated that the liberties and franchises granted by him to the city allowed "the...more
good and true, more discreet..." to occupy civic office. 1-Jill, Medieval Lincoln, pp. 277-8.
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the provision of justice.' 8° It could be argued that these same two main functions of
government applied to late-medieval mayors: the defence of the civic realm (as reflected for
example in the defence of the city's franchises) and the provision of justice. This
relationship between civic and royal government is indicated not only in the language of the
civic records and of letters sent by the king, but also in the mayoral oaths of the period. For
example, the oath of office sworn by the mayor of York not only required him to be true to
the king, it also obliged him to act on the behalf of the king in preserving the city's
franchises, liberties, laws and customs. Furthermore, the mayor also promised to "doo Right
to Riche and to poore".' 8' In this context it is also interesting to look at a speech delivered
by the king to the citizens of York in 1495 following riots on the day of the mayoral
election. In his speech the king stated that the city had previously flourished when "the
maier for the tyme and his brethern by advice of the said counseill executed the lawez within
the said citie and libertes of the same accordng to the auncient customs and lawez of the said
Citie without favour or dred of any person.... Sir, ye that be rewler of my Citie ther ordre it
wiscely. . .and accordyng to due justice".'82
In summary, words such as 'discreet' and 'wise' can be located within a wider
discourse of wisdom in writing and memorialisation, which emanating from the civic elite
of later-medieval York. In Part, this discourse was associated with ideas concerning the
benefits of age in civic office-holders. Furthermore, it was particularly concerned with the
fair administration of justice among the highest members of the civic elite. The existence
of similar ideological perspectives elsewhere during this period is evident from royal and
'° Wafts, Hen,y VI and the Politics of Kingship, p. 21.
'81 Y(A, Dl, foL lv; This oath was standard to several late-medieval cities. See for example the oath in Wells,
cited in Shaw, Creation of a Community, p. 190.
'Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 115.
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parliamentary sources. However, as the final section will argue, while the language used to
express the ideological importance of wisdom and justice in civic officials was similar to that
used at the national level, the elite of York seems to have supplemented more generic terms
with a second layer of vocabulary that was more specific to the urban context.
III) 'Honesty', Morality and Decorum
As we have seen, by the end of the fifteenth century the collocation of 'honest' and
'discreet' had become the standard way of describing men who were elected to the higher
posts of civic office, and this collocation continued to be used throughout the rest of the
period of this study. While only the highest civic officials were considered to be both
'honest' and 'discreet', the term 'honest' was frequently used singly in the House and
Memorandum Books to describe men lower down the social hierarchy who were chosen to
serve in some minor form of office. For example, special powers were given to the
"serchiours and the honest personnes of the craft of coupers".' 83 Similarly, one or two of
"the most onest comeners" or "honest personez of the communaltye" were often chosen to
act as financial auditors or as arbitrators in disputes over land boundaries.'84
During the medieval period the principal meaning of the adjective 'honest' was not
'truthfW', 'ethically sound' or 'trustworthy', as it is today. In the medieval context the
meaning of the term translated more accurately as 'respectable', 'seemly', 'virtuous' or
'upright' and it was usually used to refer to someone's general reputation or standing. An
honest person was someone worthy of honourable or respectable status. 185 However, to
some extent status and honour also rested on qualities of trustworthiness. For example,
'Likewise for the craft of cutlers. Sellers (ed.), York Memorandum Book Part 1, pp. 69 & 133.
See for example, Atireed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 280 & 566.
5 Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Dictionaiy, honest(e, adj., 1(a) & (b), 2(b) & 4(a).
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Marjorie McIntosh has demonstrated that the accusation levied against William Eyre of
Salisbury that he had stolen some books resulted in him no-longer being regarded as a
person "of honest conversation"; the accusation damaged both his economic livelihood and
his "good name and fame".' 86 Financial probity was similarly important for the reputation
of the civic elite of late-medieval York. That medieval communities were concerned about
the financial discretion of their councillors is hardly surprising and has been commented on
before by urban historians.' 87 Rigby, amongst others, has noted that protests against civic
governments often involved charges of financial mismanagement or misconduct.' 88 Indeed,
nominees to the town council in late-medieval Wells were required to be "sworne not
corrupte".' Such concerns are clearly evident in the records of late-medieval York. Clear
examples survive of men who are recorded as having been dismissed from various civic
posts because of financial impropriety. For instance, John Spooner was dismissed from the
office of mayor's mace-bearer in 1477 for pocketing money that he had collected in his
official capacity.' 9° As a result of this incident the council issued an ordinance stating that
any officers (and in particular, serjeants of the mace and chamberlains) who were found to
have reserved money that they had collected publicly were to be called before the mayor and
asked to pay it back. 19' In another example, the city's common clerk, Thomas Yotton, was
dismissed in 1476 for "Diverse and many offences, excessive takynges of money,
'McIntosh, Controlling Misbehavior, p. 120.
' See for example, Reynolds, 'Medieval Urban History', pp. 15 & 21.
'88 Rigby, 'Urban Oligarchy', p. 68.
' As cited in Shaw, Creation of a Community, p. 189.
'°Attreed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 122-3.
191 Ibid.
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misguideing of our bookes, accompts and other evidences of (the) citie of Yorke".'92
Clearly the issue of financial probity among officials was not unique to late-medieval York.
Indeed, this issue can be said to constitute part of an established discourse of government
as is evident, for example, in the Quo Warranto proceedings of the late thirteenth century.'93
What was distinct about concerns over financial probity in the urban context was the
fact that they were not simply about the misappropriation of money. Two other issues also
appear to have been at stake. The first concerns the role of the civic officials as agents of
the wider civic community: as such they were expected to act in the interests of the city.'94
For example, John Beseby was thought to be "not worthy to bere any office" within the city
of York on account of "Dyvers gret offencez and mysbehavourz by John Beseby
commyttyd and doyn before tyme to the grett hurte and dyspleasour of the Commons of this
Citie".' Beseby had gone to London at the common cost on the pretence of speaking on
the behalf ofthe commons, whereas he had in fact spoken against them. Similarly, in a letter
to the king explaining the dismissal of Thomas Yotten, the city argued that his actions had
been "ayenste the pleaser of God, your lawes and our common wele and proffit", and that
therefore Yotton was ". . .not able to occupie amonges us for our wele and profflt".'
Clearly, in both of these cases offence was caused not only by the misuse of common funds,
but also by the fact that the men had acted against the interests of the commonalty.'
'Ibid., pp. 46-8.
193 D.W. Sutherland, Quo Warranto Proceedings of in the Reign of Edward 1 1278-1294 (Clarendon Press:
Oxford, 1963).
'This notion is perhaps best embodied through the concept of the 'common wele'. This will be discussed in
the fmal part of the thesis.
' 95 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 34.
'Atfreed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, p. 47.
'Obvious1y, this raises the whole issue of who decided what the common interests of the city were. This area
is explored in Part Four, pp. 205-247 below.
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The second issue was that the dishonesty involved in the misappropriation of money
was clearly seen to affect in a negative way the status or 'honourableness' of the malefactor.
Again to use John Beseby as an example, the House Books suggest that his actions were "to
the dyshonesty and slandre of the said John Beseby.. ,,198 In other words the 'dishonesty'
(ie lack of honour) which Beseby brought upon himself was considered to have a detrimental
effect on the wider status and authority enjoyed by the civic elite as a whole.' The
relationship between financial probity or trustworthiness and honour is also evident from
examples of slander accusations. In 1483 it was suggested that it was "openly known" in
the city that Thomas Wrangwish (then mayor of York) should be called "a thief'. 20° This
outburst was the result of a disagreement between Wrangwish and Thomas Watson (a dyer),
over a horse. Needless to say, the original cause of the dispute appears as almost irrelevant
in the civic records when compared with the attention devoted to Watson's slander of the
city's highest ranking civic official as being dishonest. Similarly, the civic elite were equally
outraged when on another occasion it was suggested that the mayor, Miles Newton, had
been called a "fals harlott".20'
As we have seen, York's civic officials were required to be honest, that is to say
virtuous or upright, and therefore worthy of honourable or respectable status. An important
element of this respectability was financial trustworthiness or probity. Historians of other
towns have also argued that civic elites were concerned about wider issues of morality in
'Ibid.
' On the crimes and misdemeanors of individuals being injurious to the image of the wider community (in this
case in the context of gilds), see B. MeRee, 'Religious Gilds and Regulation of Behaviour', in J.T. Rosenthal,
and C. Richmond (eds.), People, Politics and Community in the Later Middle Ages (Sutton Publishing:
Gloucester, l9W7),p. 114.
20°Attreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 278. For similar charges of fmancial impropriety levied against civic
officials see Raine (ed.), York CivicRecords, 3: 38 & 109.
201 Attreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 305. 'Harlot' meant knave, rogue, reprobate, false fellow or coward;
Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Dictionaty, harlot, n., 1(b).
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relation to the civic officials of the city. 202 To what extent was this true of the civic elite of
later-medieval York? The Middle English adjective, 'honest', carried the common meaning
of morally pure and, in relation to women, sexually pure. 203 The use of 'honest' in certain
contexts, particularly those associated with sexual purity, was clearly gendered in York as
it was in language generally. 204 For example, Elizabeth Ricardby, a citizen of York, was
said in 1487 to have been "reputed an honest madyn, clene of body, true of hands and
tong...".205 There are no examples in texts emanating from the civic elite of later-medieval
York of 'honest' being used to refer to sexual purity in men. Indeed, York's civic records
contain little evidence that male civic status was dependant upon sexual discretion. Several
of the city's most prestigious civic officials, including John Stockdale (mayor in 1501) and
Sir Richard York (mayor 1469 & 1482), are known to have had illegitimate children, and
there is no evidence that this hanned their civic careers or reputations. 205
 Nevertheless, since
the date of the birth of these children is unknown, it is not possible to say for certain whether
they were conceived prior to the men in question bearing civic office.
It is possible that sexual indiscretion was tolerated in younger men who were yet to
become masters or gain positions of responsibility. However, it is interesting that the York
House and Memorandum Books contain no ordinances or actions taken against men, civic
officials or otherwise, for sexual misconduct. In contrast, the civic authorities of other
towns seem to have been concerned to regulate the sexual morality of their officers. In 1429
202 See Kermode who demonstrates that Chester rulers were expected to keep the rules of God as well as those
of the king: J. Kermode, 'New Brooms in Early Tudor Chester?', in J.C. Appleby and P. Dalton (eds.),
Government, Religion and Society in Northern England 1000-1700 (Sutton Publishing: Stroud, 1997), pp. 144-
58.
2°3 Katji, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Dictionary, honest(e, adj., 4(b-c).
204 See, for example, Ibid., honest(e, adj., 4(c).
205 Raine (ed.), YorkCivicRecords, 2: 3.
206 York, Borthwick Institute of Flistoncal Research, Probate Register 6, fol. 185r & Probate Register 11, fol.
36r.
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it was ordained in Coventry that "no seriaunt ne oder officer taken in avowtrey be no more
officer, but that he be put out of her offices at what tyme they or ony of hem ben founden
in suche defaute". 207
 This was again revised in 1492 when it was written that anyone found
guilty of the "synnes of avowtre, ifornicacion or vsure" was to be "vtterly to be estraunged
from all goode company" 208
That the civic elite of York were clearly concerned with sexual morality in general is
demonstrated through the reporting of the punishment of disreputable women such as the
(notorious) Marjorie 'Cherrylips' in 1483 and the punishment of sexual offences at the
Wardmote Courts. 209 However, there is nothing to suggest that they were equally
concerned with the sexual morality of civic officials. 21° Perhaps this was so established a
notion that it was not regarded as worthy of mention, but this cannot be known for certain.
While there is little evidence to suggest that the requirement of civic officials to be
'honest' conferred on them the expectation of sexual morality, it could be argued that it did
commit them to a behavioural code which regulated their speech and manners. As has
already been noted, the adjective 'honest' sometimes referred to respectable or seemly
behaviour.21 ' The civic elite was clearly concerned to preserve the decorum of its officials.
This was particularly the case in the context of bad or inappropriate language, violence or
207 Harris (ed.), The Coventry Leet Book, 1: 118.
208 Ibid., p. 544; see also the example made of a capper and his paramour who were to be "carried and lad
thorowe e towne in a Carre in exausnpull off punnyshment off syne", Ibid., p. 192.
209 See for example Attreed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 261, 708 & 723; Andrew, 'The Fifleenth-Century
Wardmote Court Returns for York', 40-1.
210 Presentments in the York Wardmote courts of sexual offences among men were few. The only case
concerning a man of significant status (although never a civic official) related not to his own sexual misconduct
but to the prostitution of his servant to the servants of the alderman Thomas Gray. Andrew,'The Fifteenth-
Century Wardmote Court Returns', p.41. It is likely, though, that in heading the wardmote courts, the civic elite
was more concerned with controlling certain sections of society than with punishing sin, which was dealt with
in the ecclesiastic courts.
211 Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Dictionary, honest(e, adj., I (a-b) & 2(b-c).
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slander.212 The House Books contain numerous mentions of such acts of bad language on
the part of both members of the civic elite and those who never held civic office in York.213
No doubt a large reason for the reporting of such acts in the civic registers was that they
posed a direct threat to the authority of the civic elite.214 Slander, violence or insulting
language used against members of the civic elite was obviously not tolerated on several
grounds. Verbal or physical attacks were taken seriously because they posed a threat to the
authority and dignity of the civic body as a whole. Furthermore, violence and bad or
insulting language was often viewed as seditious or as likely to incite unrest. For example,
the miller, John Andrew, was imprisoned as a result of his actions on the day of a mayoral
election. It was felt that because of his "unsittyng langage and mysbyhavour with other
adherents he was likely to have maid a gret and inconvenient discord at the assemble in the
said Hall". 215 Such verbal attacks against members of the civic elite by commoners could
also be regarded as 'upstart language' which symbolised a transgression of the perceived
civic order.
David Shaw has suggested that incidents of bad or violent language were viewed in
an especially bad light not only because they threatened the authority of the elite, but also
because they embodied the antithesis of ideal qualities desired in leaders; namely the ability
212 B&l language and insults were generally referred to as 'unsitting(e' language in the House Books. In Middle
English this tenu was used to refer to acts or types of language which were deemed inappropriate, unsuitable or
unseemly. Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Diction aty, unsitting(e, ppl., (a).
213 example, for bad or insulting language see YCA, House Book 7, fol.l 15v, House Book 8, fols. 25v &
92v, House Book 9, fols. 37v-38r, for physical violence see House Book 9, fol. lr, Raine (ed.), York Civic
Records 2:44-5 & 77; for slander see House Book 9, fol. 63v; Raine (ed.), York Civic Records 2: 34-5 & 126-7.
214 Although, it could be argued that the conirol of sexual impropriety, particularly among single women, was
linked to the threat that their social and economic independence may have posed to the established social order.
See, for example, McIntosh, Controlling Misbehavior, pp. 71 & 110-Il.
215 Rne (ed.), York Civic Records 2: 123; The use of the word 'inconvenient' is interesting here. Convenient
in Middle English was used to mean appropriate, fitting, apt or socially or conventionally appropriate; Kurath,
Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Dictionaty, convenient, adj., 1,2 & 3(a). It is therefore interesting to
consider whether part of what was being argued by the civic elite was that discordant actions were not fitting or
suitable for the dignity or sanctity of either the occasion or the place.
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to control oneself and to act decorously. 216
 Indeed, the House Books suggest that bad
language and violent or hasty actions were viewed as especially inappropriate for members
of the civic elite. For example, in September 1497, Hugh North was banned from bearing
either the office of Sergeant or any other office within York or the Ainsty on account of his
"unsittyng langage agayn my lord maier Thalderman and be xxiiij". 217 Similarly, in 1503,
Thomas Appilby was barred from being one of the city's porters until he had apologised for
hitting a man and using 'unsitting' language. 218 In both of these examples the perceived
seriousness of the actions of the two men was such that they were barred from office. While
it is possible that the dismissal of these two men resulted from their defiance of authority,
it is also very likely that North and Appilby's physical and linguistic abuses were held to
represent a violation of an ideal code of conduct for men of a certain status. Decorous
language was linked to status during this period, hence Hoccleve's comment that "Vn-to
hygh degre Vnsittynge is to swere in any wise".219
A feature of criticism of bad language was that it involved the failure to think before
acting. On several occasions in the House Books, officials are reported as having been
reprimanded for having spoken or acted in a 'hasty' manner. For example, Roger Laton was
pardoned in 1485 for having struck one of the sheriffs and for using "hasty language".22°
Similarly, one of the accusations levied against the alderman William Nelson was that he
"came in hasty wyse" to a gathering of senior councillors. 221 While 'hasty' was often used
216 Shaw, Creation of a Community, p. 192.
217 YCA, House Book 8, fol. 25v.
218 YCA, House Book 9, fol. 1.
219 1 lloccieve, The Regiment ofPrinces, ed. F.J. Fumivall, Early English Text Society, extra series 72 (1975),
line 2361.
220 Attreed (ed.), York House Book., p. 193.
221 YCA, House Book 9, fol. 2v.
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to refer to violent or vehement words or deeds, it also encompassed a speed or rashness of
action. Particularly interesting in this respect is the submission speech of John Spooner,
one of the mayor's mace bearers, who was charged among other matters with using
c unsittyng language to the mayor. Spooner's apology begins as follows: "My lorde the
maire, it is so that I uppon [f. 69] Friday last past was tefore your lordship and ther of my
greit negligence and oversight wordes unsittyng escapet me to the greit displesour of the
said lordship... "223 Here the use of 'negligence', 'oversight' and 'escape' are telling. All
convey a sense of having acted hastily and imply an inability to control one's actions. It is
interesting to compare this example with the early fifteenth-century advice in a 'courtesy'
text that one should "Be not to hasti, no to sodeyn veniable [vengeable]; To poore folk do
ou no violence; Be gentil of langage...".224
As the discussed evidence demonstrates, civic officials were expected to display a
certain amount of decorum and, in particular, to refrain from using bad or inappropriate
language, or from acting in a hasty or violent manner. It is also evident that slander and
speaking against other men were viewed in a similar light. Among the ordinances of the
council was one which forbade officials to slander or go to court against other members of
the civic elite on pain of expulsion from civic office. 225
 Rules forbidding litigation among
members of guilds or civic councils were common during the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries? No doubt such legislation stemmed at least partly from the desire to maintain
the unity and solidarity of the group. Furthermore, these rules could also be viewed as part
222 Kath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Dictionary, hasti(e, adj., 2(a-d).
2 Atlreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 122.
224 Furnival (ed.), The Babees Book & c, p. 56, lines 33-6.
225 Attreed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 305 & 339.
226 See for example, Mcintosh, Controlling Mis behavior, p. 189; McRee, 'Religious Gilds and the Regulation
of Behavior', pp. 112-14. This is explored in greater depth below, see pp. 170-200.
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of the wider discourse which enshrined the importance of civic or guild harmony. 227 Perhaps
most importantly, though, it seems likely that slander and backbiting were agaj linked to
notions of seemly behaviour or decorum.
The House Books instruct that any civic official who had "unsyttyng words, langage,
or wordez callyng another fals, untrewe" was to be fined. 228 Particularly interesting in this
context is the case of Thomas Scotton, one of the councillors of the city. When Thomas
was accused of having "wrongfttlly defam4d] and slaunder[edl oon Richard Beryman", he
was quick to rebut this claim arguing that "he had mervell how that eny such sugestion or
compleynt shold be shewed or layd ayanest hym" and that, if anyone else were to say
anything against the said Richard, Thomas would be "the first man to depose on a buke for
hym".229 As Thomas's eagerness to dissociate himself from accusations of slander
demonstrates, the act of slandering or backbiting was considered to be as shaming as being
the recipient of false accusations. Slander was held not only to represent envy, it also
violated ideals relating to the importance of neighbourliness as a Christian ethic.°
Furthermore, like swearing or violence, it could also be said to stem from anger or malice
and represented rashness of action. That the civic elite of later medieval York viewed
neighbourliness as an aspect of respectability or honour during the sixteenth century is
represented through their instruction to two citizens that they should act "with gentle words,
one another after, as honest neighbors should do".23'
227 See for example, Mcintosh, Controlling Misbehavior, pp. 60-1.
2zs Raine (ed.), York Civic Records 2:34
2 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records 2: 34-5.
°Mcintosh, ConzroiingMisbehavior, pp. 109-10 & 188. Concepts of neighbourliness and love in the context
of group unity will be discussed in greater depth in the next chapter.
Raine (ed.), York Civic Records 4: 94. See advice in courtesy literature to "God & j neybores lufe all way";
Fumival (ed.), The Babees Book, p. 51.
106
The underlying motivation for the condemnation of violent, uncouth or 'hasty' actions
on the part of civic officials as distinct from the commonalty is likely to have been two-fold.
First, decorous behaviour (or the illusion of it) seems to have been one of the means through
which the civic elite could distance itself from, or create its identity in opposition to, the rest
of the population. This is particularly demonstrated through the juxtaposition of good and
bad conduct. For example, the attempted arrest of a cordwainer John Barrewdale by Roland
Armourer, one of the mayor's sergeants of the mace, is described as follows:
the same Roland fulfilled the Maiours commaundement and cam to the same
Barrewdale. . .saing unto hym my lord Maiour is at the tavern dore and woll that ye
shal corn to speke with hym and he shortlie answerd and said he wold not and opon
that drugh his dagger and wold aben opon the said officer; he seing that stirt bak and
for his suretie drugh his knyfe and so arrested the same Barrewdale.
Here Barrewdale is depicted as having acted 'shortlie', in other words, hastily, defiantly and
in a threatening manner. By contrast, we are told that Armourer (the civic official), far from
rising to the bait, 'stirt back', and drew his knife not in anger but 'for his suretie' .
Second, violent or hasty actions and language could be said to embody the antithesis
of the qualities required in an ideal leader. For example, the magnanimity and justice of the
mayor is frequently juxtaposed in the House Books with the hasty, violent and uncouth
actions of the commonalty, particularly in accounts of the ritualised submission of an
232 Rame (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 45.
233 A more striking account of the juxtaposition of violent or angry actions with the calm and controlled
demeanour of a civic official is offered by Shaw for early sixteenth-centmy Wells. Here the qualities displayed
by the offender are similar to those that have been outlined in the above examples from York, namely,
disobedience, anger and hasty language, while the master of the city is almost idealised in his role of the patient,
even tempered and just handler of the situation. See Shaw, Creation of a Community, pp. 194-7.
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offender, at the end of which the mayor would agree to pardon and forgive him. In these
cases the language used to describe the actions of the 'cleansed' sinner is in striking contrast
to the language used previously, thus thereby reinforcing an approved standard of conduct.
For example, when Thomas Strangewische, a servant of the Abbot of Whitby intervened in
the arbitration of a land dispute between the abbot and the prior of St. Andrew's church:
(the) Maier said he wold not suifre hym ne any other be of suche demeanours within
hym. And the said Thos asked- Who shuld let me? And the Maier answerd and said
that he wold left hym. And he said- Maister Maier I will not let for you. And therwith
he laid his hand upon his dagger. And the Maier said- Thomas, thou shall not eschuse
and commaunded to have hym to ward...
Thomas remained in ward until he was sent for, when he:
lowly submytted hym unto the Maier sayng wher he hade mysdemeaned hym in word
and dede anenst my said lord Maier he was right sory and besought hym to pardon
and forgiffe hym. And After kt humbly profered e maier his hand faithihily
promysyng for ever here after to be of good demeanour and byhavyng.4
At the beginning of the section on character it was suggested that among the quaiit1h.
represented as necessary in a civic official were wisdom, prudence and the ability tO
administer justice. By contrast, anger (which motivated violent or hasty language b
IIL 'j t tas held to cloud good judgement. It is for this reason that Latini advises thit
iL bLflLUi
234 II1	 1.), York Civic Records 3:20; YCA, House Book 9, fol. 32.
108
ruler must not be too prone to anger or the holding of grudges •235 Indeed, the lack of
thought involved in hasty or violent actions could be held to be the opposite of calm,
measured thinking as embodied by concepts of wisdom and discretion 236 Furthennore,
discord, the outcome of such actions, was in direct opposition to the goal of all discreet and
wise government; namely, civil peace and harmony.
Latini, Li Livres dou Tresor, p. 354.
Note for example, "If thou be subiecte/ and to anger tbrall,/And reason thee rule not,! nedes must thou fall.!
Conquer thy wyW and subdue thy luste,/ Thy fansy not folowing,I thy cause though be iuste;! For anger and furie/
wyll thee so chaunge/ That thy doynges to wise men! wyll appeare strange] For wrath, said Plato,! Leades shame
in a leace! The hastie man! wastes neuer trouble,Ifts mad moody mynde/ his care doth double"; Furmval (ed.),
The Babees Book, pp. 348-9, lines 764-81.
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C) Conclusion
Prosopographical evidence clearly suggests that contrary to the established historiography,
civic office-holding in late medieval York was not dominated by merchants. There is little
evidence of exclusionary closure on the grounds of occupation below the post of mayor.
Meanwhile, in terms of civic office-holding in general, the role of occupation in this system
of stratification has been overemphasised. In turn, this finding itself throws doubt on the
extent to which late-medieval urban society should automatically be viewed in terms of
social polarisation between merchants and artisans. Although such polarisation is evident
at the level of the office of mayor, the same is not true of the lower posts, even that of
sheriff. This suggests that rather than concentrating on a dichotomous division between
office holders and the politically disenfranchised, historians should pay more attention to
divisions and hierarchies within the civic elite. Indeed, the extent to which there may have
been an elite within the civic elite is explored in the next section of the thesis.
While there is little evidence of widespread exclusionary closure on the grounds of
occupation, exclusionary closure on the grounds of wealth is clearly evident among the civic
elite of later-medieval York. This exclusion was individualist and not collectivist. That is
to say, access to the elite was restricted on the grounds of personally acquired
characteristics, or a personal commitment to a specific set of values or ideas. Here the
perpetuation of social groups was achieved through the nomination of suitable replacements.
Under this mechanism, access to the elite was relatively open to newcomers. The
perpetuation of the values and ideologies (and thus the sanctity and stability) of the group
was maintained through the 'vetting' of suitable candidates.
As was outlined in the thesis introduction, central to Pareto and Mosca's theories of
elites is the notion of 'circulation', that is to say, the view that the make up of elites will
change over a period of time through the introduction of new members and the assimilation
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of new interests. Mosca argued that in order to prevent stagnation, it was vital for elites to
be open to members whose interests or skills best represented other important or influential
groups within society. As we have seen, the fifteenth century saw the increasing erosion of
the economic status of merchants both in York and in other towns. By the late fifteenth
century the unquestionable economic and social dominance of York merchants was no
longer assured. As a result of this, there appears to have been an ideological shift in terms
of the types of trades that were deemed suitable for civic officials. Access to the elite was
widened in terms of occupation. It is likely that such a shift would have held profound
implications for the status, perpetuation and integration of the group. Sociologists have
argued that elites should have a generalised recognition of their own superiority and should
possess attributes which are highly esteemed by their society. By drawing in men from a
much more diverse set of trades and occupations, the exclusivity and social cachet of the
group could well have been undermined. It might be argued however, that one of the means
through which the elite attempted to maintain controlled access to its ranks and preserve the
status of the group was through the deployment of moral vocabularies that were used to
justi1' authority. These stressed the importance of personal characteristics for civic leaders;
characteristics which reflected contemporary urban ideals of wisdom, behaviour and
decorum.
My analysis of the qualities which were portrayed as being necessary or desirable for
civic office, and the values or ideologies which underpinned these, suggests that the civic
elite of later-medieval York did just this. The House Books can be seen to contain a variety
of discourses concerning good governance. First, the importance of the qualities of wisdom
and discretion as they related to the ability to administer justice fairly were stressed.
Second, there is an emphasis in texts emanating from the civic elite of York on honesty'
(honourableness). Here, honour seems to relate not to contemporary concepts embodied
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in a chivalric code, but rather to more pragmatic qualities concerning financial probity and
trustworthiness. Finally, there is evidence to suggest that the civic elite were also concerned
that its members should conform to a certain level of decorum. This involved not swearing,
acting hastily or violently, and not slandering others. In part this ideology stemmed from
contemporary views concerning the importance of neighbourliness. Perhaps more
importantly though, anger, grudges and associated acts of violence were held to embody the
antithesis of the qualities required in an ideal leader; namely, the ability to administer justice
fairly and prudently in order to maintain peace and harmony within the city.
The final section of the thesis will discuss, the extent to which civic officials in York
lived up to the ideals, particularly with regard to financial probity. Whether or not
discourses of office-holding constituted mere rhetoric, or sincerely held ideals, it remains
clear that personality or character played an important role in determining access to civic
office. For example, both Alan Stavely and Thomas Hardsang were temporarily exempted
from civic office due to their respective lack of"discreccon or demeanour" and "Reson &
discrecon". 7
 Meanwhile, other men were permanently baned from office for violating
some of the discussed codes. The importance of ideologies concerning the personal
character of civic officials is therefore two-fold. First, they offered a mechanism through
which unsuitable men could be denied access to civic office or could be expelled from office.
Second, discourses concerning ideal personal qualities were vital in the creation or
perpetuation of an ideology of civic authority. Such discourses not only served to construct
the identity of the civic elite of later-medieval York, they also legitimised the power of those
in office.
Any stress on the character of civic officials within the York House Books tends to
create an impression of an homogeneous elite, united and distinguished by virtue of the
231 YCA House Book 7, fols., 109 & 138v.
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exemplary personal characteristics of its members. However, as has been demonstrated, the
civic elite was far from a homogeneous or coherent group in terms of occupation.
Moreover, although all members of the examined group were of above average wealth, there
were large wealth variations within the elite.
Clearly it is important to consider other mechanisms and processes through which the
inter- and intra-generational, social and ideological integration of the civic elite of York
might have been achieved. It seems likely that shared values might have been a principal
unifying means. Here then is an interesting tension: whereas social exclusion was
'individualist', social theory was corporate or commensal. In turn, this raises the question
of how the corporate and commensal values revealed in this section, and those which the
thesis will go on to discuss in Part Four of the thesis, were passed on or inculcated in future
generations of the civic elite. Although this section has demonstrated the qualities necessary
or desirable for civic office, it has not examined in depth the channels of recruitment.
Clearly, such an exploration is necessary in order fully to understand processes of social
stratification and social mobility. In particular, it is necessary to consider how, in the face
of a diverse and constantly changing personnel, the civic elite managed to secure its
ideological as well as its actual perpetuation. The importance of personal qualities and
commitment to a specific set of values have been highlighted, but these qualities would
probably have needed to have been learned. Therefore, through what means were future
civic officials identified, trained and socialised for civic office? The next section will explore
these areas within the context of an exploration of the importance of family and social
networks as forms of social stratification and consolidation.
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Part Three:
Structure: Integration and Perpetuation
In January 1506 the York House Books record that:
be said Maler & presence by an hole assent & consent awarded & demed bat be said
Richard & Alan tofore theym ather take other by ye hand & to be good &
frendly. .. .togeder & ber upon of both theyr cost... .dranke a potell of ele wyne & a
potell of malmesay.'
And so a dispute between Richard Thorneton (mayor 1502) and Alan Stavely (mayor 1506
& 1519), both then aldermen of the city, was settled over a glass of wine. However, to what
extent was the elite of later-medieval York truly unified or integrated? Anthony Giddens
has suggested in his work on modern British elites that sociologists should explore levels
of social integration within elites, that is to say, the "frequency and nature of social contacts
and relationships".2
Part Three uses prosopographical and genealogical information, discourse analysis and
an examination of ritualised actions and language to explore the social and ritual integration
and perpetuation of York's civic elite. The main questions addressed are: how unified was
the group in terms of blood, marriage and friendship ties (social unity)? To what extent and
through what means was the group constructed as an integrated and unified body (ritual
unity)? And how was the real and ideological perpetuation of the elite secured?
Part Three is divided into two sections. The first section is primarily concerned with
'YCA, York House Book 9, fol. 28v.
2 Giddens, 'Elites in the British Class Structhre', p. 5.
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the social integration of the civic elite. It examines the extent to which patrilineal, marriage,
apprenticeship and friendship ties existed between members of the group. The section looks
both at contemporaneous integration between members of the civic elite and integration
over time. It is argued that in the absence of patrilineal ties, marriage played an important
role in facilitating the integration of the officials, and that this serves to highlight the role of
women in the consolidation and perpetuation of elite groups. Further, this section also
argues that the real and ideological perpetuation of the civic elite was secured through the
nomination and patronage of 'surrogate heirs'. In particular, apprenticeship was an
important means through which potential civic officials could be trained and socialised.
The second section looks at the ways in which the elite sought to present itself as a
unified entity, and the means through which it attempted to dissipate and overcome discord
and disunity within the group. This section begins by exploring diversity and conflict among
members of the elite. 3 It then examines the ritualised integration of the civic officials. It is
argued that despite a relatively low level of social unity and a high level of discord and
factionalism between civic officials, the elite constructed or consolidated itself as a unified
group through defensive and pro-active ritual actions. In turn, these ritual actions
constituted a discourse of unanimity which reflected contemporary civil thought. This
section also explores rituals designed to allow the re-assimilation of rogue civic officials.
Ibid., p. 5. It should be noted that I am not interested in the source of conflict per se but how such conflict
related to the integration of the elite.
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A) Social Integration
I) Introduction
As the Introductory Chapter argued, it is a commonplace that medieval cities on the
continent were governed by patriarchies or family dynasties, while English towns were not.4
Despite this view, English elites (like those on the continent) have often been regarded as
coherent social entities, bound by ties of marriage, neighbourhood or guild. This prevailing
historiography has serious lacunae. First, the extent to which marriage connections might
have served to create elite dynasties in English towns has not been considered. Although
English historians have highlighted marriage links between elite mercantile and aldermanic
families, they have concentrated on patrilineal descent. 5 Little research has been carried out
on the perpetuation of elite families through the female line. Clearly, the role of women in
the formation and perpetuation of elite groups deserves further consideration.
Further, historians have concentrated their analysis on the families of aldermen and
merchants. It is not clear how kinship and socialisation patterns may have differed between
different social groups. For example, for York, Jennifer Kermode has shown strong
marriage and friendship links between wealthy mercantile (and often aldermanic) families.6
However, it remains unclear whether this pattern of social ties was the same lower down the
civic hierarchy or among men of different occupations.
Lastly, social links have been used as evidence of embryonic class formation.7
a fuller consideration of the historiography of medieval urban family, neighbourhood and guild, see Part
One above, pp. 12-22.
5 Thnipp,Merchant Class, pp. 28-9, 191-204, 222-33; Frost 'The Aldermen of Norwich 1461-1509', chapter
5; Kermode, 'Sentiment and Survival', pp. 6-10; idem, Medieval Merchants, pp. 77-90; idem, 'The Merchants
of Three Northern English Towns', pp. 16-19.
6 Kode 'Sentiment and Survival', pp. 6-10; idem, Medieval Merchants, pp. 77-90; idem, 'The Merchants
of Three Northern English Towns', pp. 16-19.
7 This is explicit in the work of Kermode, 'Sentiment and Survival', pp. 5 & 12. See also Swanson, Medieval
Artisans, pp. 3-5; and Thrupp, Merchant Class, passim.
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However, research has concentrated on links between members of (arguably) discrete social
groups, and historians have not fully considered the possible negative or divisive effect
family or marriage links could have had on the unity of social groups.
This first part of the section on integration explores some of the aforementioned
lacunae and assumptions in relation to late-medieval York. At the most basic level it
examines the extent to which the elite of late-medieval York was integrated through
common patrilineal or marriage ties. To what extent were members of the civic elite related
to other civic officials by blood or marriage? However, this section also considers some
wider issues. These include the role of women in the integration of the civic elite,
differences in social networks between men of different civic status, and the role of family
in social stratification and integration. Although the main subject under consideration is the
structure and integration of the elite, the evidence examined occasionally has implications
for my earlier discussion of access to civic office. In such cases the evidence is related to
social closure theories as in the previous chapter.
Determining family trees and genealogies for the medieval period is never easy owing
to the absence of registers of births, marriages and deaths. Urban and rural historians have
successfully used rental and property records to this end. 8 Unfortunately, property records
do not survive in sufficient quantities for York in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries for
them to be utilized to great effect. 9 However, York is fortunate in having an almost
complete series of registered wills for the medieval period.' 0 Wills are particularly useflul for
8 See the work of Raftis, Keene and Kowaleski cited in Kowaleski, 'The History of Urban Families', pp. 51-2.
9 For the nature and extent of Medieval York's surviving property deeds see S.R. Rees Jones, 'Property, Tenure
and Rents: Some Aspects of the Topography and Economy of Medieval York', DPhil thesis, department of
History, University of York (1987), pp. 1-41.
The two main series are the Registers of the Exchequer and Prerogative Court of the Archbishops of York
(BIHR) and the Registers of the Peculiar Jurisdiction of the Dean and Chapter (York Minster Archives). The
main sources used to establish genealogies were: York, Bil-IR, Probate Registers of the Exchequer and
Prerogative Court of the Archbishop, regs. 3, 5-11, 13-14; York Consistory Court Act Books AB 2 & 4; York
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reconstructing family trees since, as Phythian-Adams has argued, they are the only sources
which allow access to 'nominated kin'	 They enable the study of socially significant
relationships, that is to say relationships which convey "social roles, rights, privileges or
obligations" in other words kinship ties as opposed to physical or biological ties.' 2 This
study makes substantial use of such testamentary material, although additional information
has occasionally been gleaned from sources such as the House Books and the Freemen's
Register. '
Where possible the will or act of administration of each civic official, along with those
of his parents, siblings, wife and children have been consulted. Genealogical information
contained in wills is limited. Testators sometimes did not even include the names of wives
and children. They mentioned parents, siblings, in-laws and more distant relatives
infrequently, and even then the testators often failed to state the details of the relationship
between themselves and the legate. Most frustrating in this respect is the absence of any
mention of the maiden names of wives or the married names of daughters, making it
Minster Archives Dean and Chapter Probate Registers 1-3. Indices for both series exist and were extensively
used: F. Collins (ed.), The Register of the Freemen of the City of York, Surtees Society 96 (1897). F. Collins
(ed.), Index of Wills etc from the Dean and Chapter at York 1321-1 636, Yorkshire Archaeological Society
Record Series 38 (1907); Idem (ed), Index of Wilk in the YorkRegiszry, voL 1, 1389-1514 & vol. 2, 1514-1553,
Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Series 6 & 11(1891 & 1899). Additional sources used were: York
City Archives, Freemen's Register Dl; House Books 7-11
"Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, p. 148.
'2 A Plakans cited in D. Cressy, 'Kinship and Kin Interaction in Early Modern England', Past and Present 113
(1986): 39. The term 'kinship' is used throughout this thesis to refer to biological or marriage relationships which
also conveyed social relationships. For a discussion of the concept of kinship and the relationship between the
physical and the social categories of kinship see C.C. Hams, Concepts in the Social Sciences: Kinship (Open
University Press: Milton Keynes, 1990), pp. 27-46. To date the study of kinship in medieval England has largely
been dominated by historical demography exemplified in P. Laslett (ed.), Household and Family in Past Time
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1972). More recently, though, historians of rural society have also
examined kinship through anthropological approaches such as network analysis. See for example, J.M. Bennett,
'The Tie that Binds: Peasant Marriages and Families in Late Medieval England', Journal ofInterdisciplinary
History 15 (1984): 111-29; R Smith, Land Kinship andLfe Cycle, Cambridge Studies in Population, Economy
and Society in Past Time: I (1984),passim.
address existing historical debates, the prevalence of similar surnames among the officials of late medieval
York has also been examined.
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particularly hard to establish marriage networks. Because of these problems, it has
occasionally been necessary to consult the wills of more distant relations such as
grandparents or in-laws in order to verifj relationships.'4
Besides the problem of correct identification inherent in any prosopographical study,
testamentary sources are also limited in several other respects.' 5
 Not all of the civic officials
possessed the wealth or the inclination to have their wills registered. Thus, those men for
whom we have probate evidence cannot be considered representative of the civic elite as a
whole. Table 3:1 below summarises the biases.
Table 3:1
The Percentage of Men who held Civic Office 1476-1525 for whom Probate Evidence Survives.
By Highest Civic Post Attained'6
Highest Civic	 Number of men who For whom probate % of men who attained each post for
Post Attained	 attained each post
	 evidence survives
	 whom probate evidence survives.
Bridge Master	 89	 52	 58
Chamberlain	 100	 64	 64
Sheriff	 70	 57	 81
Mayor	 56	 50	 89
Total	 315	 223	 71
Source: Appendices 1 and 3.
As Table 3:1 above shows, the higher a man progressed in the civic hierarchy the more
likely he was to have had his will or act of administration recorded.' 7
 This bias means that
family links are more discernible among the higher civic officials than those who only
'4 For the methodology involved in successfully identifying individuals see the Appendices.
' For a summary of these problems see Kermode, 'The Merchants of York, Beverley and Hull', pp. 30-8.
16 This refers to civic officials for whom a will or act of administration survives. Although administrations are
limited in the information they contain many make reference to at least one living relative.
17 This phenomenon is likely to be due to the greater wealth of the men who reached the more senior civic posts.
However, it is also possible that the registering of wills carried a status connotation which higher civic officials
were more inclined to endorse.
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reached lower levels of civic office. In order to minimise such bias, discernible kin, marriage
or social links have been expressed as a percentage of the number of men who reached each
of the civic offices for whom testamentary evidence survives. As a result of this extensive
research it has been possible to reconstruct quite detailed kin, marriage or social
relationships for most of the civic officials for whom probate evidence survives. Much of
this information is summarised in Appendices 2a, 2b, 2c and 3.
II) Patri1ineage Marriage & Surrogate Heirs
Patrilineal Relationships
In the absence of registers of births and deaths, one of the most reliable ways of gauging the
extent that civic officials were related to each other patrileneally is through examining the
range of surnames held. For York, Edward Miller has noted the dominance of the surnames
Selby, Langton and Graa among the city's thirteenth and fourteenth-century mayors.' 8
 Even
allowing for the fact that it was common until 1393 for men to hold the post of mayor for
many years in succession, it is clear that York was dominated by several successfiul
dynasties.' 9
 York was not unusual in this respect. Cohn Platt has argued that long-lasting
burgess dynasties were "characteristic of English borough society" during the thirteenth
centuly.2° However, he also echoes the belief that by the end of the medieval period urban
dynasties rarely lasted for more than three generations. 2 ' It seems likely that throughout
England the incidence of urban dynasties was highest before the Black Death.22
' Miller, 'Medieval York', pp. 71 & 79.
'9 In 1393 it was ruled that no man was to re-occupy the office of mayor until all of the other aldermen had held
the post. Rees Jones, 'York's Civic Administration', pp. 133-4.
20 C. Platt, The English Medieval Town (Seeker and Warburg: London, 1976), pp. 104-5.
21 Ibid., pp. 98-105.
22 Kowaleskj 'The History of Urban Families', p. 57.
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Certainly, late fifteenth and early sixteenth-century York did not witness the
monopolisation of civic office by single patrilineal families evident before 1400. During the
period 1476 to 1525 there were no patrilineal dynasties comparable to the Graas, Langtons
or the Selbys of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This is immediately apparent from
the large range of surnames held. Two hundred and twenty-nine (73%) of the 315 civic
officials of this period had unique surnames. 24
 It is possible to be even more precise about
the fifty-six civic officials who reached the post of mayor during this period. A total of fifty
(89%) of these men had unique surnames. 25
 Further, of the six men who shared their
surname with another mayor, two do not appear to have been patrileneally linked. The two
dyers, William White (mayor 1491 & 1505) and Michael White (1494 &1505) were both
members of the complicated web of marriage networks encompassing the Thorntons.26
Nevertheless, despite the existence of both men's wills there is no evidence to suggest that
they were patrileneally related. 27
 Of the other two sets of mayors with a shared surname,
John Thorneton (mayor 1514) was the son of Richard Thorneton (mayor 1502).28 The two
merchants named John Shaw (one was mayor in 1510 and the other in 1538) appear to have
been related, but the nature of their relationship is unknown.29
n Miller, 'Medieval York', pp.7! & 79.
24 See Palliser's findings that at least 167 (7 6%) of the 221 sixteenth-century councillors of York had unique
suniames; Palliser, 'York in the Sixteenth Centuiy', p. 167.
Appendix 1.
26 Seep. 138 below.
27 BIHR, Probate Register 6, fol 127r, 8, fol 61r. Neither man mentions the other or the other's families in their
wills, and no mention of a relationship between the two men is mentioned in the York House Books, even on the
occasion of Michael White taking over the office of mayor from William following his death in 1505. Raine,
(ed.), York Civic Records 3:11-2.
28	 2a.
29 John Shaw junior was the apprentice of John Shaw senior. For evidence of links between the two men see
Appendix 2a.
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Genealogical information derived from wills confirms the suggestion that patrilineal
links were rare among the late-medieval civic officials of York. Table 3:2 below summarises
the information contained in Appendix 2a concerning verifiable patrilineal relationships
between men who held civic office in York during the period 1476 to 1525.
Table 3:2
Patrilineal Relationships Between Civic Officials for whom Testamentary Evidence Survives and Other
Members of the Civic Elite of York 1476 to 1525
As a % of civic officials for whom
Nature of relationship	 Number of men	 testamentary evidence survives
Father/son	 28	 13
Brother	 8	 4
Other	 10	 4
Any blood relationship*	 42	 19
This is less than the sum of the above numbers as several civic officials were patrileneally related to more than
one other civic official.
Source: Appendix 2a
As Table 3:2 shows, of the 223 men for whom some form of testamentaiy evidence
survives, a total of forty-two (l9%) were clearly patrileneally related to other officials from
the period in question. 3° Included among these forty-two men are two instances where three
generations of the same family held civic office within the period 1476 to 1525. The mercer
and draper, John Marshall (mayor 1467 & 80) was the father of William (chamberlain 1490)
who, in turn, was the father of John (sheriff 1522).' Likewise, the yeoman and tile maker
William North, (chamberlain 1497) was the father of the tanner Richard (sheriff 1513) and
the grandfather (through Richard) of John (mayor 1538 & 54), also a tanner. Indeed, the
success of the North family did not stop here as John's son, Richard (chamberlain 1561) also
3°In addition to these forty-eight men, non-testamentary sources identify a further six men as having been related
to other civic officials of the period; Appendix 2a.
3t Appendices I and 2a.
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held civic office in the city.32
A number of civic officials from the period 1476 to 1525 were patrileneally related to
men who held civic office in the city outside the dates in question. In some cases these men
also belonged to families which generated more than three generations of civic officials, for
instance, the Grenebanks, the Knolles and the Yorks. 33
 However, the most notable family
in this respect was the prolific Thorneton family. 34
 The draper, John Thorneton (bailiff
1385), was the first of the family to hold civic office in the city. Later, Richard Thorneton
reached the post of sheriff in 1446, while his grandson and namesake became mayor in 1502.
Finally, John Thorneton, son of Richard Thornetonjnr, reached the post of mayor in 1514.
Families such as the Thornetons were highly unusual. Taking all 315 men who held
civic office between 1476 and 1525, only 66 (30%) can be demonstrated to have been
patrileneally related to men who held civic office at any date. 36
 Even allowing for omissions
caused by problems in genealogical reconstruction, this proportion of around a third is
extraordinary low. However, this low figure is borne out by a study of the number of civic
officials from the period 1476 to 1525 who were Sons of former officials. Table 3:3 below
summarises the patrimony of the men who held civic office in York between 1476 and 1525.
The men are divided into three groups: men for whom there is proof that their father was
a civic official; men for whom there is proof that their father was not a civic official; and
men whose parentage is uncertain. 37
 The third group includes men of uncertain parentage
32 Appendices 1, 2a and 2b.
u See Appendix 2b for these and other examples.
This family network is discussed in greater depth below, see p. 138.
35 Appendix 2b.
36 Appendices 2a and 2b.
second group contains many men whose parentage is uncertain. However, either there was not a civic
official who shared the same surname as the man in question, or such a civic official can be ruled out on the basis
of other information.
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who shared their surname with another civic official who could have been their father.
Table 3:3
Proportion of All Men Who Held Civic Office 1476-1525 Who Were Sons of Civic Oflicials
Number of men	 As a percentage of all civic officials
1476-1525
Son of Civic Official	 26	 8
Not Son of Civic Official	 239	 76
Uncertain	 50	 16
Total	 315	 100
Sources: Appendices 2a and 2b; Collins (ed.), Freemen 's Register.
As Table 3:3 shows, at least three-quarters of the men who held civic office during the
period in question were not sons of former civic officials. Indeed, only 8% of civic officials
can be proved to have been sons of former civic officials. Similarly, Palliser has also
concluded that few of the sixteenth-century York councillors were sons of previous
coundillors.38 The civic elite of later-medieval York was not unusual in having relatively few
patrilineal ties between its members. The proportions of interrelated officials in early
sixteenth-century Coventry and Oxford were also low. 39 Indeed, in Oxford, patrilineal ties
within the civic elite appear to have been gradually loosening over the course of the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries.40
To a large extent the lack of patrilineal dynasties among civic officials reflects the
experiences of urban elite families in general. As early as the fifteenth century William
Caxton noted that "one name and lygnage. . .in this noble cyte of london! it can unnethe
38 PaThser 'York in the Sixteenth Century', p. 168. See also Kermode, 'The Merchants of York, Beverley and
Hull in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries', p. 313.
See Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, pp. 146-7; Hanimar, 'Anatomy of an Oligarchy', pp. 19-20.
40 Hammar, 'Anatomy of an Oligarchy', p. 19.
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contynue unto the thyrd heyre or scarcely to the second.. •"•41 These sentiments have been
since echoed by historians of other English medieval towns. Several reasons have been
offered for this failure: high mortality rates or reproductive weakness; declining business
fortunes; the departure of successful families to the country; and the failure of heirs to
follow their fathers into business or civic office. 42 It is likely that a combination of these
factors led to the absence of York dynasties.
A study of the fortunes of children of officials from the period 1476 to 1525 reveals
some reasons for their apparent failure to follow their fathers into civic office. Again, wills
provide the most reliable form of evidence for the existence of sons of civic officials.
However, wills cannot be taken as a complete record of all surviving sons. In particular,
eldest sons were sometimes omitted from their father's wills because as the family heirs they
were often provided for during their father's lifetime. 43 Nevertheless, economic provision
was not the only motive for leaving a will. Many testators also passed on sentimental gifts
to their children and, particularly in the case of sons, named them as executor or supervisor
of their will. Yet of the 223 civic officials for whom testamentary evidence survives, piy
121 (54%) mentioned the existence of a son in their will. Of the remaining 102 officials
for whom testamentary evidence survives, non-testamentary sources suggest that a further
I
41 William Caxton, The Prologues and Epilogues of William Caxton ed., W.J.B. Crouch, EETS, original series,
176 (1928), pp. 77-8.
See for example, Kermode, Medieval Merchants, pp. 305-12; Thrupp, Merchant Class, pp. 191-233; Platt,
The English Medieval Town, p. 98-103; Phytliian Adams, Desolation of a City, pp.221-37; Gottfried, Buiy St
Edmunds, pp. 56-60.
43 W. Coster, Kinship and Inheritance in Early Modern England: Three Yorkshire Parishes, Borthwick Paper
83 (1993), pp. 10-11; Kermode,Medieval Merchants, pp.72 & 279.
Appendix 3. An additional seven men (3%) mentioned unnamed children in their wills, but failed to indicate
whether these were sons or daughters. At 46%, the percentage of York civic officials failing to mention sons in
their wills is higher than that found by Thrupp for merchant testators in London during the period 1468 to 1527.
In this group 35% of testators appear to have been lacking male heirs.
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45% of these men failed even to become freemen of the city.
Before exploring further some of the implications of this failure of civic families to
perpetuate themselves within the ranks of the civic elite, it is first necessary to consider
briefly some of the reasons why so few sons of civic officials failed even to become freemen
of the city. 48
 One possible explanation here is that many sons mentioned in wills did not
reach adulthood. This is particularly likely to have been the case where sons were minors
at the time of their father's death. Unfortunately, there is scant evidence with which to test
this hypothesis for York, although it was certainly the case that many civic officials prepared
for the eventuality of all their children dying without issue. For example, Robert Symson
(sheriff 1504) left tenements to his children with the proviso that if all died without heirs his
properties were to pass to his relation John Thorneton (mayor 1514). Other testators
including Michael White (mayor 1494 and 1505) preferred that their property should pass
to their local church or to "poor and needy folk" in such an eventuality.50
Clearly, wills tend to assume a worst case scenario and therefore cannot be taken in
isolation as evidence of high childhood or adolescent mortality rates. Nevertheless, just such
a view is backed by evidence of infant mortality rates for other urban centres during the
same period. For example, Thrupp's work on London orphans has shown that, 49% of
orphans during the period 1468 to 1497 were less than twenty-one at the time of their
father's death. Furthermore, Thrupp estimates that 41% of these minors died before
reaching their majority. 5 ' Similarly, other historians have also argued for the importance of
high infant mortality rates (often combined with low replacement rates) in preventing the
These suggestions are included as indicators for future research rather than as evidence of conclusive findings.
49 B111R, Probate Register 6, fols. 196r-v.
50 BIITIR, Probate Register 8, fol. 61r.
Thrupp, Merchant Class, p. 204, but see also pp. 199-204.
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formation of elite dynasties in other late-medieval cities. 52 That general mortality rates were
high in York during this period has been demonstrated by Jeremy Goldberg. 53 In particular,
Goldberg has shown that the years 1479, 1483, 1504, 1505-6 and 1508-09 were all ones
characterised by exceptionally high levels of mortality. 54 Further, Goldberg has suggested
that endemic plague may have accounted for the high death rates during many of these
years. 55
 He has also noted that evidence from elsewhere suggests that the young were
particularly vulnerable to the early phases of endemic plague, although whether that would
have been true for York during a slightly later period is unclear.56
It could be argued that family structure in late-medieval English towns also had a
direct bearing on the absence of urban dynasties in England. In many southern European
cities kinship was strongly patrilineal. The structure, wealth and emotional ties of the family
revolved around the male stem line. Testators did not divide their inheritance among all the
children, but instead excluded female descendants and often favoured the interests of their
eldest son. 57 Martha Howell has argued that such was the determination to preserve the
inheritance rights of children in late-medieval Flanders that the marital property rights of
52 P1a The English Medieval Town, pp. 99-100; Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, pp. 143 & 221-37;
Dyer, Worcester in the Sixteenth Century, p. 180; Gottfried, Bury St Edmunds, pp. 46-72. For this phenomenon
in Yorkshire generally during a slightly earlier period, see J.T. Rosenthal, 'Heirs, Ages and Family Sucxession
in Yorkshire, 1399-1422', Yorkshire Archaeological Journal 56 (1984): 87-94
53 P.J.P. Goldberg, 'Mortality and Economic Change in the Diocese of York, 1390-1514', Northern History 24
(1988): 4!.
54 Ibid, p.41.
"Ibid., p. 48.
56 Ibid., p. 49.
For the development of this system in southern Europe, see D. Herlihy, 'The Making of the Medieval Family:
Symmetry, Structure and Sentiment', in D. Herlihy, (ed.), Women, Family and Society in Medieval Europe:
Historical Essays, 1978-1991 (Berghalm Books: Providence and Oxford, 1995), pp. 135-53; idem, and
Klapiseh-Zuber (eds.), Tuscans and Their Families, pp. 3 42-54.
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wives were gradually eroded. 58 In contrast, kinship in York (as in most English cities) was
bilateral and not patrilineal: relationships traced through women were as important as those
traced through men. 59
 Consequently, wealth and property were usually split among all sons,
daughters and wives.60 Alan Dyer suggests that the rarity of primogeniture and the
consequent failure to preserve a substantial body of capital for re-investment contributed to
the lack of sixteenth-century urban dynasties in England.6'
Further, it was relatively conmion for civic officials to fall on bad luck during their
lifetimes. For example, in 1503 the civic corporation awarded Miles Cireenbank (sheriff
1482) an annuity as he had "fallen in gret povertie and feblenes of his body". 62 As will be
explored in the final part of the thesis, it was not unusual for former civic officials to be
granted annuities by the corporation. Sometimes, such financial breaks were not entirely
justifiable- indeed, the extent to which Greenbank had truly fallen into "gret povertie and
feblenes" might be open to question. However, while the justifications for annuities should
perhaps not always be taken at their face value, they do at least suggest a relative decline
in the financial prosperity of the recipient. Moreover, even in cases where children were
well provided for, this did not necessarily guarantee continued wealth throughout the
childrens' lifetimes. Sons' businesses could fail and daughters could be unlucky in their
choice of marriage partners. York sources attest the poverty of some children of former
civic officials. For example, in 1582 the House Books recorded that "two of Mr Paull
u M.C. Howell, The Marriage Exchange: Properly, Social Place and Gender in Cities of the Low Countries,
1300-1550 (The University of Chicago Press: London, 1998), passim.
59 Kermode, 'Sentiment and Survival', p. 6; Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, p. 95.
60 York wills followed the custom of legitiin. The estate was divided into three parts: one third going to the
widow; one thin! divided between the children, and one third going to the church. T.F.T. Plucknett, A Concise
Histoiy of the Common Law, 5th cdii. (Butterworth: London, 1956), pp. 743-5.
61 Dyer, Worcester in the Sixteenth Centuiy, p. 180.
62 YCA House Book 8, fol. 137v.
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Gilloth daughters called Isabell Hoyser and Agnes Blaydes shall have, either of them, ijd
wekly towardes ther relief'.63
So far, this section has considered why many sons of civic officials may have been
prevented from entering civic office themselves. Clearly, though, it is likely that some sons
deliberately chose not to follow their fathers into civic office, or even to take out the
freedom of the city. For example, William Holbeck, the son and heir of William Holbeck
senior (mayor 1449, 1458 & 1470-72) did not gain the freedom of the city or hold civic
office. This was despite the fact that Holbeck junior was involved in the distribution of lead
through the city and was required to pay a fee to carry out such trade as an alien.M
While Holbeck clearly did follow his father in practising a mercantile trade, the same was
not true of many sons of civic officials. Indeed, historians of other towns have followed
Thrupp in suggesting that the children of successfiul urban families would often spurn trade
in order to set themselves up in the country as gentry Rosemary Horrox has challenged
this thesis by arguing that the rural-urban divide was not as dearly drawn as is sometimes
suggested. The York elite certainly boasted several sons of local gentry families among
its numbers. However, these men appeared most commonly as common clerks, recorders
or sergeants of the mace or sword, rather than as civic officials Included among the city's
A. Raine (ed.), Testamenta Eboracensia, 6 vols, Surtees Society 4, 30,45,53,79 & 106 (1836-1902), 5: 150.
Paul (3illow was mayor in 1522. It is interesting that these two married women should be referred to as their
father's daughters. As with the annuities, this suggests some form of financial obligation felt by the civic elite
to former members and their kin. This topic is discussed in greater depth in Part Four.
YCA, House Book 9, fol. 41v.
65 (Iottfried, Bu,y St Edmunds, pp. 153-65.
R. Horrox, 'The Urban Gentry in the Fifteenth Century', in J.A.F. Thomson (ed.), Towns and Townspeople
in the Ffleenth Century (Sutton Publishing: Gloucester, 1988), pp. 22-44.
Kermode, Medieval Merchants, p. 110.
Horrox notes with regard to the posts of esquires of the sword and mace that the holders of these offices often
cannot be linked conclusively to the gentry families whose names they sported. Horrox, 'Urban Geniry', p. 40,
note 31.
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common clerks during this period was Robert Plumpton, illegitimate son of Sir William
Plumpton. 69 The post of recorder seams to have been particularly well-endowed in this
respect, being filled by members of such local gentry families as the Vavasours, Palmes,
Rokebys, and Fairfaxes.7°
It is certainly the case that a number of members of the most successfiul civic families
in York enjoyed close social or marriage links with gentry families. 71 However, Kermode
has argued that despite such links "there was not the same degree of close interplay between
town and country families as perhaps there was in some other English towns in the sixteenth
century", and that "few urban merchants acquired sufficient rural property to remove
themselves from urban life". 72 While marriage into gentry families may account for some
of the sons of civic officials failing to enter the city's freedom or to hold civic office, the
evidence suggests that this scenario was rare. Even in cases where successful merchant or
civic families married into the ranks of the local gentry, a new gentry connection did not
necessarily result in a withdrawal from urban life. For example, Richard York's first wife
was Joan, daughter of Richard Mauleverer Esq. of Allerton. Yet York chose to remain in
the city acting as a merchant and a civic official, and on the death of his wife he re-married
to Joan Whitfield, the widow of John Whitfield, mayor of Hull. 73 Similarly, while Richard
York's daughters married into the families of Mallory of Studdley and the Barton of Kilnsey,
and his son Richard apparently married the daughter of Thomas, Lord Darcy, a second son
Test Ebor, 4: 258-60.
° Miller, 'Medieval York', pp. 74-5; Collins (ed.), Freemen's Register, pp. 215, 221; BIER, 9, fol. 90v
(Palmes); 6, fol. 181v (Vavasour).
71 See below and Kermode, Medi eva! Merchants, p. 111 for such examples.
72 Ibid.,p. 110.
Ibid.,p. 111.
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Thomas (chamberlain 1502) remained in York and held civic office. 74
 Meanwhile, Thomas
York's son, Bartholemew (chamberlain 1534), married the daughter of John Thorneton
(mayor 1514) of York's prolific and successful Thorneton dynasty. 75 Another example is
the family of John Pullen who in 1461 married Alice Gasgoigne, daughter of Henry
Gasgoigne gentleman of Harewood and member of the Gascoigne of Gawthorpe family.
Despite their gentry connections Pullan's son Ralph (mayor 1537) and his grandson Anthony
(chamberlain 1571) remained within the city and held civic office.76
It is more perhaps more likely that movement into professions such as the church or
the law accounted for the failure of some sons to follow their fathers into civic office.
Indeed, it is possible that too much emphasis has been placed upon merchants and civic
rulers at the expense of other elite groups within English medieval towns and cities.77
Continental historians have increasingly stressed the growing social and political roles of
professional groups such as bureaucrats and lawyers in medieval urban communities.78
Indeed, it has been suggested that the late middle ages in Europe witnessed an increase in
the importance of clerks, scribes and jurists, to the extent that by 1600 they had, in many
places, become "the virtual masters of their own communities". 79 It seems unlikely that the
same could be said of these types of men in most medieval English towns- though more
74 Ibid,p. 111.
" See appendices 2a, b and c.
76 Test Ebor 4: 336; York, BIHR, Probate Register 11, fol. 562r (Pullan').
criticism which could also be levelled at this study.
W. Prevenier, 'Officials in Toi and Counliyside in the Low Countries: Social and Professional Developments
from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth-Centuiy', Acta Historiae Neerlandicae (1974): 1-17; van Ken 'Elite and
Government in Medieval Leiden', pp. 51-75.
Rowan, 'Urban Communities: The Rulers and the Ruled', p. 206; L. Martines, Lawyers and Statecrafi in
Renaissance Florence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), esp. chapter 9.
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research needs to be undertaken in this area. 8° While it has not been feasible for this thesis
to undertake such a study, it is worth noting that of the fifty-five Sons of civic officials who
were mentioned in their father's wills and also went on to become freemen of the city, at
least nine men (16%) became clerics, scribes or notaries. 81
 This figure is surprisingly high
given that it was relatively uncommon for men of these occupations to enter the city's
franchise. 82 This finding may itself point to another explanation for the failure of sons of
civic officials to follow their fathers into civic office or into the freedom of the city.
In his study of the urban elite of medieval Leiden, van Kan stressed the existence of
other elites besides the civic elite. 83
 He argued that these various elite groups were
interconnected through common personnel and through maniage and kinship ties. Similarly,
it is possible that sons of York civic officials may have gone on to constitute members of
urban elites besides the civic elite. For example, William Barker's (sheriff 1483) son John
entered the freedom of the city as a 'litteratus' and a notary the same year as his father's
death in 1511. However, the son also appears in York's Consistory Court books because
he was admitted to the ecclesiastical court as a proctor in 1503.84 Interestingly, this type of
movement might also occur in the opposite direction. William Wright (mayor 1535) was
Hon-ox, 'The Urban Gentry', pp. 22-44; R.L. Storey, 'Gentlemen-Bureaucrats', in Clough (ed.), Profession,
Vocation and Culture, p. 90-125; M. McKisack, The Parliamentary Representation of the English Boroughs
during the Middle Ages, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1930), pp. 106-17; P. Jalland, 'The "Revolution"
in Northern Borough Representation in Mid Fifteenth-Century England', Northern History 11(1976): 27-5 1.
81 Thon Bankehouse, son of Thomas Bankehouse senior (mayor 1521) became free as a priest in 1505; John
Barker, son of William Barker (sheriff 1483) became free as a litteratus and notary in 1511; Thomas Baynes,
son of John Baynes (bridge master 1494) became free as a litteratus in 1504 (another son named John who was
not mentioned in his father's will also became free as such in 1503); Thomas Catour, son of John Catour
(chamberlain 1487) became free as a litteratus in 1517; William Cokay, son of Simon Cokay (bridge master
1477) became free as a priest in 1500; Thomas Dale, son of Robert Dale (chamberlain 1493) became free as
a parish clerk in 1490; John Elys, son of John Elys (sheriff 1503) became free as a litteratus in 1511; William
Feron., son of Christopher Feron (bridge master 1506) became free as a priest in 1511; William Wells, son of
William Wells (mayor 1479) became free as a priest in 1479.
These men may have been entering the freedom of the city precisely because of their father's civic status.
Van Kan, 'Elite and Government in Medieval Leiden', passim.
York BIHR., [Cons]istory Court [A]act [B]ook 5 (1497-1508), fol. 42v.
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both a merchant and a notary, and he acted as a proctor in York's Consistory Court. 85 In
so doing, Wright was following in the footsteps of his father, William Wright senior, who
was also both a notary and a proctor. In turn, Wright senior's father was one John Wright,
a weaver and bridge master of Ouse bridge in 1464. Similarly, the civic official John
Robinson (bridge master 1511) was also a public notary in the consistory courts. 88 These
examples are particularly interesting as they support Horrox's thesis that legal training did
not necessarily act as a prelude to an individual or family's withdrawal from urban life, but
instead "could be a way of broadening a family's horizons within a continuing urban
context". 89 As this research has indicated, far more work deserves to be undertaken on
professional elites within late-medieval English towns.
At the beginning of this section it was argued that the elite of late-medieval York was
not particularly integrated through patriuineage. Only a small minority of civic officials were
related through the male line to other officials of the same period. While the reasons for this
situation cannot be proved, it seems likely a variety of factors including high mortality rates,
problems with capital accumulation and transferal, movements between different spheres of
urban life and, to a lesser extent, movement out of the city all contributed to a weakening
in patrilineal patterns. As a consequence of these factors, access to the civic elite remained
relatively open in terms of family background, even if the sons of former civic officials were
advantaged in their civic careers.
85 See for example, York BIIIR, Cons AB5 (1497-1508), fols. 24r, 53v, 98v; Cons AB6 (1509-12), fol. 6r; Cons
AB9 (152 1-1525), fol. 190r. See Appendix I for his civic career.
For the relationship between William Wright senior and junior see York City Archives, York Memorandum
BOOkAY, fol. 132r. For Wright senior's activities as a proctor see, for example, Cons AB5 (1497-1508), fols.
15r, 24r, 52v, 98v.
Appendix 2b.
Appendix 1; York BIHR, Cons AB4 (1484-1489), fol. 75v.
Hoffox, 'TheUrbanGentry',p. 31.
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On average, men who held office in York between 1476 and 1525 reached their first
civic post fifteen years afler gaining the freedom of the city. In contrast, Sons of men who
had held office took an average of only nine years. 9° The possible reasons for such
accelerated promotion are diverse. Briefly, the most likely explanation is that the sons of
civic officials inherited attributes that were likely to aid civic success. The ability to govern
was not necessarily one of these inherited attributes (although inevitably there were fathers
and sons whose civic success rested at least in part on mutual talent and business acumen):
perhaps more important were inherited wealth or contacts. Of course, it is also likely that
in some instances the civic elite deliberately favoured sons of previous civic officials.
Nepotism certainly seems to have motivated some civic appointments in York. For
example, in 1500 on the death of John Spooner, mace-bearer of the city, the corporation
decided that they should give William Wrangwish the post. It made the award "in
consideracion that Thomas Wrangwish father of the said William had been twice mayor of
bis wurshipftill citie".91
Despite such cases, patrilineal links between civic officials were uncommon. This
situation has several implications for understanding the civic elite of late-medieval York.
The first is that the absence of such links denied one possible means of integrating or
solidifying a diverse group of men. Few patrilineal links existed between the members of
the elite at any one time. The lack of common genealogies also denied the elite the
possibility of a ready-made communal memoiy based on shared lineages. 92
 Second, the elite
9°Appendices 1 & 2a.
' YCA, House Book 8, fol. 79r.
By confrast, the government of late-medieval Florence derived its legitimacy at least in part from the status and
reputation of numerous ancient family names. See for example, G.A. Brucker, Renaissance Florence (John
Wiley & Sons, Inc.: London, 1969), especially pp. 89-127 & 137-51.
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was unable to guarantee its real or ideological perpetuation through patrimony. 93 Bearing
these problems of integration, communal memoiy and perpetuation in mind, the next section
will explore marriage relationships and strategies within the elite of late-medieval York.
Marriage
In his book on elementary kinship structures, Claude Levi-Strauss suggests that marriage
should be viewed as the most basic form of gift exchange. 94 Though much criticised, this
seminal work spawned the study of 'alliance systems' which examine the role of marriage
in forging kinship and social affiliations. 95 The gift or exchange of marriage partners has
been seen, both in elementary and complex kinship systems as playing an important or vital
role in the establishment of permanent relationships of solidarity and reciprocity. It could
be argued in the absence of strong patrilineal links in later-medieval York and other
medieval towns, that marriage performed the function of increasing solidarity among an
otherwise diverse group of men.
It is certainly the case that marriage ties appear to have been common among members
of medieval urban elites. Additionally, unlike patrilineal relationships, marriage links also
appear to have been common among urban elites during the two centuries following the
Black Death. Ruth Frost, working on late fifteenth and early sixteenth-century Norwich,
Indeed, it was perhaps the desire to perpetuate which prompted the speedy promotion of the sons of former
officials.
94 C. Lovi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures ofKinship, revised edn., trans. J.H. Bell, JR. von Sturmer and
R Needham (Eyre and Spottiswoode: London, 1969),passim, but see especially pp. 52-68. For an exploration
of marriage as a form of gifi exchange (with the woman as the gifi) in relation to gender and the social
subordination of women see Gayle Rubin's exegetical reading of Lévi-Slrauss: 0. Rubin, 'The Traffic in
Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex' in J.W. Scott (ed.), Feminism and History (Oxford University
Press: Oxford, 1996),pp. 105-51,especiallypp. 115-25.
R.M. Keesing, Kin Groups and Sod a! Structure (FIolt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.: New York, 1975), pp. 78-
90; Harris, Kinship, pp. 24-6.
Keesing, Kin Groups and Social Structure, pp. 78-90; Rubin, 'Traffic in Women', pp. 116-7.
136
has estimated that 50% of the aldermen were interrelated. 97
 Likewise, Maryanne Kowaleski
has noticed a high degree of intermarriage among the elite of fourteenth and fifteenth-
century Exeter. 98
 York seems to have followed this trend. David Palliser has commented
on the prevalence of marriage links between sixteenth-century councillors of the cityY9
Similarly, Jennifer Kermode has studied intermarriage among the mercantile elite of York,
and has concluded that it was common.'°° It therefore comes as no surprise to find that the
civic elite of York from the period 1476 to 1525 followed this pattern.
Although marriage ties are often hard to uncover, a number of these ties are evident
from the surviving wills of the civic elite of late-medieval York.'° 1 Table 3:5 below
summarises both patrilineal and marriage ties among civic officials from the period 1476 to
1525 as they are revealed in the testamentary evidence.'02
Frost 'The Aldermen of Norwich', p.139.
Kowaleski, Local Markets andRegional Trade, p. 106.
Palliser, 'York in the Sixteenth Ceutuiy', pp. 183-8.
'°°Kermode, 'The Merchants of York, Beverly and Hull in the Fourteenth and FifIeenth Centuries', pp. 17-19;
Kermode, 'Sentiment and Survival', p. 7.
101 Marriage relationships are listed in Appendix 2c of the thesis.
Pafri1inea1 lies have been included to enable comparisons to be drawn between the prevalence of the two types
of relationships.
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Table 3:5
Cited Patrilineal and Marriage Relationshi ps Between Civic Officials for whom Testamentary Evidence
Survives and Other Members of the Civic Elite of York 1476 to 1525: By iliehest Civic Post Attained
(Numbers expressed as a percentage of all those who reached that post and for whom testamentary evidence
survives)
Highest Civic Post Attained
Bridge Master
Chamberlain
Sheriff
Patrilineal
Relationships
8
25
21
Marriage
Relationships
13
23
39
Patrilineal or Marriage
Relationship*
19
41
46
Mayor	 32	 68	 76
All Officials	 22	 35	 45
*This is less than the sum of the previous two columns as several civic officials had both blood and marriage
relationships. Source: Appendices 2a and c.
Table 3:5 above shows, at least 45% of the men who held civic office between 1476
and 1525 for whom wills survive were related to other civic officials in this period either
through patrilineage or marriage. The fact that a minimum of almost half of the men who
held office between 1476 and 1525 were interrelated must have added cohesion to the elite.
This is particularly the case given the striking breakdown of relationships by civic office.
Table 3:5 suggests that the higher a man progressed up the civic hierarchy, the more likely
it was that he would be related to other civic officials either patrileneally or by marriage.
Of civic officials from the period 1476 to 1525 for whom wills survive, at least 76% of
mayors had family links with contemporaneous office holders, compared with 19% of bridge
masters.
Furthermore, Table 3:5 also suggests that marriage ties were far more prevalent than
ties of patrilineage. Whereas 22% of all will-leaving civic officials were patrileneally related,
35% were interlinked through marriage. Again this difference is particularly striking among
the highest civic officials: 68% of those who reached the post of mayor were linked by
marriage to other civic officials of the same period, whereas only 32% of mayors were
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linked to other civic officials by patrilineal ties.'°3
The relationship networks revealed among the civic elite are often highly complex,
with families appearing to have been linked through more than one relationship. The most
striking of these networks was that involving the Thorneton family. At least twenty-one
civic officials from the period 1476 to 1525, were part of a network of people linked by
blood and marriage, at the centre of which was the Thorneton family.' 04
 Still more
complicated was the smaller family network encompassing Ellen Stockdale and Isobel
Wilde. Here, the multiple marriages of Ellen and her stepdaughter Isobel were the key
factors behind the interlinking of so many civic officials.'° 5 The potential complexity of
medieval families is well illustrated by the relationships between these two women. As well
as being stepmother and stepdaughter, they were also linked through Ellen's first husband,
William Hancock. William's brother (Robert) was married to the sister (Maude) of Isobel's
first husband Robert Dicconson. As the wills of the members of these families illustrate, the
bonds of affection and trust between elite families linked through marriage were often
strong. For example, John Stockdale (mayor 1501) left gold rings to Robert Hancock's
103 This phenomenon is explored in greater depth below.
'°4 James Blades (sheriff 1523), William Barker (sheriff 1489), John Beisby Senior (sheriff 1486), John Catour
(chamberlain 1487), Robert Denton (bridge master 1491), Richard Hardsange (sheriff 1483), John Harper
(mayor 1489), John Norman (sheriff 1490), John Norman (mayor 1524), John Rasen (sheriff 1515), Ralph
Symson (sheriff 1529), Thomas Tailour (bridge master 1475), John Thorneton (mayor 1514), Richard
Thometon (mayor 1502), John Tong (mayor 1477), John White (sheriff 1510), Michael White (mayor 1494 &
1505), William White (mayor 1505),Wilhiam Wilson (mayor 1513), Thomas York(chamberlain 1502), Richard
York (mayor 1469 & 1482). A number of men who held civic office outside the period in question werer also
members of this family network, for example: Thomas Brounflete (sheriff 1457-8), Thomas Catour (sheriff
1465), Robert Hall (mayor 1557), John Shadlocke (mayor 1542), William Stockton (mayor 1446 & 1461),
Richard Thorneton (sheriff 1446), Bertram York (chamberlain 1534). See Appendices 2a, 2b and 2c. A smaller
version of this network has been identified independently by Jennifer Kermode see Kermode, Medieval
Merchants, p. 85.
105 This family network encompassed Thomas Burton (mayor 1522), Robert Dikonson (chamberlain 1510),
Robert Hancok (mayor 1488), William Hancok (chamberlain 1484), Robrt Johnson (mayor 1496), Horny
Marshall (chamberlain 1501), John Stokdale (mayor 1501), Nicholas Vicars (sheriff 1486) and Robert Wilde
(mayor 1527), Appendices 2a and 2c.
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(mayor 1488) widow and George Kirk's (mayor 1495 & 1512) wife, Maud.'°6 More
striking, though, are the friendship and relationship networks revealed in the wills of the
wives of civic officials themselves. For example, Maude Hancock, widow of Robert
Hancock (mayor 1488) left bequests to: George Kirk (mayor 1495 & 1512) and his wife and
his children; Agnes Jameson, wife of Thomas Jameson junior (chamberlain 1519); Robert
Dicconson (chamberlain 1510) and his wife and children; Janet Johnson, daughter of Robert
Johnson (mayor 1496); and Roger Gegges's (sheriff 1521) wife.'°7
It is interesting that Maude Hancock's will mentions more civic officials and their
family members than the will of her husband Robert (this phenomenon will be explored in
greater depth below).' 08
 Clearly, women played a vital role in the integration of the elite of
late-medieval York. Marital relationships of particular importance appear to have been the
marriages of daughters of existing civic officials to the sons of existing officials and the
remarriages of widows of former officials. Both types of marriages were significant because
they forged or developed links between existing civic families.' 09
 It could be argued that
these two types of marriage were deliberately cultivated by the elite in order to maximise
political and financial affiliations, and to increase group solidarity along the lines suggested
in studies of calliance systems'."°
Phythian-Adams has demonstrated that marriages were used to cement existing
friendships in late-medieval Coventry.' 11 The same seems to have been true of the civic elite
'°6 BIIIR, Probate Register 6, fol. 185r.
' °7 BIHR, Probate Register 7, fols. 52r-53v.
'°8 Seep. 166.
109 It is demonstrated below that most men married prior to holding civic office. For this reason, the majority
of marnages included in Table 3:5 cannot be viewed as unions between existing civic families.
"°Keesing, Kin Groups and Social Structure, pp. 7 8-90; Han-is, Kinship, pp. 24-6.
'' Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, pp. 150-1.
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of York where it was not unusual for the children of officials to intermarry. At least six
York civic officials from the period in question who were sons of previous officials also
married the daughter of another official." 2
 For example, Katherine, one of the two
daughters of the bower John Gegges (sheriff 1509), married Thomas Dawson (sheriff 1517),
son of the tailor Bartram Dawson (mayor 1511)." Similarly, in 1483, John Beverley
(sheriff 1485), the son of Thomas Beverley (mayor 1460 and elected mayor 1472), married
Anne Ferriby, daughter of John Ferriby (mayor 1478 and 1491)." It is likely that such
marriages grew out of existing friendships (possibly, although not necessarily, forged
through civic office). It is clear, for instance, that Beverley and Ferriby were close prior to
the marriage of their children. As early as 1472, Thomas Beverley's son and namesake left
a bequest often marks to John Ferriby." 5 Eight years later in 1480 Thomas Beverley senior
named John Ferriby an executor of his will." 6 Such alliances served to strengthen the
relationship between civic families. For example, on the death of Thomas Beverley senior
in 1491, John Ferriby arranged trentals and obits for the soul of Beverley, his wife and his
children." 7 That such connections may have held political as well as social significance is
"2 John T y (sheriff 1485), son of Thomas Beverley (mayor 1460 & 1472) marned Anne, daughter of John
Fereby (mayor 1478 & 1491); John Catour (chamberlain 1487), son of Thomas Catour (sheriff 1465) married
Agnes, daughter of John Tong (mayor 1477); Thomas Dawson (sheriff 1517), son of Bertram Dawson (mayor
1511) married Katherine, daughter of John Gegges (sheriff 1509); Peter (iilyot (chamberlain 1523), son of John
Gilyot (mayor 1503) married Alice, step-daughter of Peter Jackson (mayor 1526); John White (sheriff 1516),
son of William White (mayor 1505) married Joan, daughter of Richard Thonieton (mayor 1502); and John North
(bridge master 1523), son of Richard North (sheriff 1513) married Agnes, daughter of Richard Roger (sheriff
1524); see Appendices 2a, b and c
"3 Appendices 1, 2a, and c. In addition, John's brother Roger (legges (sheriff 1521) was also a civic official.
114 Appendices 2b and c; Raine (ed.), Testamenta Eboracensia, IV: 347. The 1472 election was disputed and
William Holbeck was returned to the mayoralty for the third successive year. Dobson (ed.), Chamberlains
AccountRolLs, Appendix 1, p. 211, note 9.
'' BIHR., Probate Register 4, fol. 176r.
"6 BIFJ, Probate Register 5, fol. 1 84r-v.
"1 BIHR, Probate Register 5, fols. 417v-1 8v. More examples of the effects of intermarriage on affiances within
the elite are given below.
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suggested by the assertion that the alderman, Peter Jackson (mayor 1526) was "greatly
alyed" in York "by marriage of hys wifes daughters".118
Another benefit of inter-marriage within the civic elite was that it helped to keep the
legacies of officials without male heirs within the existing elite. For example, since John
Fereby had no surviving Sons he left his land and property to his daughters and their
husbands. Anne's sister Ellen was presumably the elder of the two daughters as it was she
and her husband who received the lion's share of Fereby's estate. Ellen was herself married
to a civic official, John Metcalf (mayor 1498)."
The York evidence suggests that the remarriage of widows was equally important in
terms of the integration and consolidation of the civic elite. Interestingly, it does not appear
to have been standard practice for widows to remarry during the medieval period, although
evidence suggests that remarriage may have been more common among more wealthy
widows.'2° The York evidence does not allow an estimation to be made of the proportion
of widows of civic officials who remarried. However, it is clear that the families of at least
fifteen civic officials from the period 1476 to 1525 were linked through the remarriage of
a widow. These relationships are detailed in Table 3:6 below along with the occupation and
highest civic office attained by the men.
118 Star Chamber Proceedings 1: 3 1-2. Peter Gilyot (chamberlain 1523), son of John (lilyot (mayor 1503)
married Alice, step-daughter of Peter Jackson (mayor 1526) see Appendices 2a and c.
" 9 B11{R, Probate Register 5, fol. 417v-18v.
120 Goldberg, Women, Work and L(fe Cycle, p. 273; Barron and Sutton (eds.), Medieval London Widows, pp.
xxiv-xxvi; Thrupp, Merchant Class, p. 197; Kowaleski, 'The History of Urban Families', p. 56. For the
remarriage of widows in general see B. Hanawalt, 'Remarriage as an Option for Urban and Rural Widows in
Late Medieval England', in S. Walker (ed.), Wife and Widow in Medieval England (University of Michigan
Press: Ann Arbour, 1993), pp. 147-57.
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Table 3:6
Women Who Married More than One Man Who Held Civic Office During the Period 1476 to 1525.
Husband's	 Date of	 Second Husband's Highest Civic
Widow	 Married	 Occupation	 2nd	 Office
Marriage At Marriage	 Ever Attained
Dionesse	 1-Alex Dauson	 Mercer	 NA	 NA	 Sheriff 1489
Arrowme 2-Miles Arrowme 	 Vestmentmaker 1498	 Sheriff	 Sheriff 1496
Agnes	 1-John Elwald	 Merchant	 NA	 NA	 Mayor 1499
Clifford	 2-Edward Clifford	 Merchant	 1506	 None held	 Chamberlain 1507
Alice	 1-Robert Petty	 Tapiter	 NA	 NA	 Sheriff 1499
Dayson	 2-HemyDayson	 Dyer	 1528+	 Sheriff	 Mayor 1531
Margaret 1-Thomas Bugwith Spicerl Grocer NA	 NA	 Chamberlain 1497
Foltneby	 2-Thomas Foitneby Merchant 	 1500+	 Sheriff	 Sheriff 1488
Ellen	 1-William Hancock Apothecaiy	 NA	 NA	 Chamberlain 1484
Stockdale 2-Robert Johnson	 Grocerf Spicer	 1484+	 Chamberlain Mayor 1496
3-John Stockdale	 Mercer	 1498+	 Sheriff	 Mayor 1501
Agnes	 1-William Barker Merchant	 NA	 NA	 Sheriff 1489
White	 2-William White	 Dyer	 1503+	 Sheriff	 Mayor 1505
Isobel	 1-Robert	 Merchant
Wilde	 Dicconson	 Merchant
2-Robert Wilde
Source: Appendices land 2c.
NA	 NA	 Chamberlain 1510
1521	 Sheriff	 Mayor 1527
As indicated in Table 3:6, the most striking example of a widow of a civic official
subsequently remarrying another member of the political elite is that of Ellen Stockdale, who
consecutively married three officials: two mayors and a chamberlain. Historians have
suggested that such widows represented a 'good catch' for ambitious husbands because of
the capital, contacts and social prestige they could bring to a marriage. 12' Indeed, marriage
to a widow could in principle provide the prerequisite wealth and contacts necessary for
obtaining civic office. 1 However, what is noticeable about the remarriages of the widows
listed in Table 3:6 is that all bar one of the women remarried men who had already held civic
office. Moreover, all bar two of the women remarried men who had at least attained the
'21 Kowaleshi, 'The 1-listoiy of Urban Families', pp. 55-6.
For example, Thomas Harvey of Coveniry was elected to civic office (against his will) apparently on account
of his recent marriage to the widow of one of the city's aldermen; Phythian Adams, Desolation of a City, p. 250.
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office of sheriff, and were of an equal or higher status than their previous
These men were already well established civic officials and, as such, were likely to have been
both wealthy and well-connected. With the possible exception of Edward Clifford
(chamberlain 1507), there is no evidence to suggest that they were in need of a shortcut to
fame and fortune.'24
 Unfortunately, it is not possible to say how representative these
discussed second marriages were of remarriage in general. Nonetheless, this evidence does
suggest that in many cases it was the status of widows which increased as a result of
remarriage, rather than as historians have tended to argue, the status of their second
husbands.
Historians have also argued that the remarriages of wealthy widows were often
controlled or supervised by friends and relations anxious to capitalise on the contacts and
alliances that such marriages could provide.' For example, Carole Rawdliffe has suggested
that Nicholas Brembre arranged the second and third marriages of his sister-in-law,
Margaret Stodeye, in order to consolidate his power base in fourteenth-century London.'26
There is no evidence to suggest that the York widows were similarly used by men to form
or consolidate political alliances in medieval York, although this possibility cannot be ruled
out. What is clear, is that York widows did not always have full autonomy over subsequent
marriages. It was not unusual for widowers to bequeath goods, land or money to their
'23 Since the dates of neither of Ellen Stockdale's subsequent marriages are known, it is possible that she married
Robert Johnson and John Stockdale after they respectively became sheriff and mayor.
124 Although it is possible that their subsequent promotions were due in part to wealth or contacts acquired or
strengthened as a result of these marriages.
' 2 Bon and Sutton (eds.), Medieval London Widows, p. xxv.
126 C. Raweliffe, 'Margaret Stodeye, Lady Philipot (d. 1431)', in Barron and Sutton (eds.), Medieval London
Widows, pp. 85-98.
144
wives on the condition that they did not remariy.' It is likely that instructions such as these
were, at least in part, designed to protect the interests of the deceased's children in the event
of his widow	 As Elaine Clark has demonstrated in her research on the court
of orphans in late-medieval Bristol and London, when they came to remarry many widows
renegotiated the legal terms of the custody of their young.' 29
 As wills also reveal, it was not
uncommon for widowers to request that any subsequent marriage be 'vetted'. In such
circumstances the job of vetting the widow's choice of a future marriage partner often fell
to someone who was not immediate kin. For example, John Custance's (sheriff 1493) son,
Thomas, instructed that his widow was not to have any of his land in Acomb unless his son
and his daughter's father-in-law 'be content with' his widow's remarriage.'30
The remarriage of wealthy widows was an important enough issue to effect the wider
elite community. Nicholas has demonstrated that in medieval Ghent "the widow of a
prominent man was...a desirable commodity on the marriage market, and her late husband's
relatives could be threatened if she married the 'wrong' man".' 3 ' It has been argued above
that one advantage of civic heiresses marrying into other civic families was that an official's
wealth and contacts were preserved within the civic elite. The same argument might apply
to most of the marriages of widows of civic officials listed in Table 3:6. Indeed, it is
possible that it was in order to consolidate resources within certain social groups that
See for examples the wills of John ElwaIcI, Thomas Lewelyn and James Loundesdale; York Minster Archives,
Dean and Chapter Probate Register 2, foL 43r-v; BIHR, Probate Registers 3, fol. 3 15r-v & 5, fols. 463v-4r.
128 Kowaleski 'The History of Urban Families', p. 49; For an in-depth exploration of this topic as it related to
the Low Countiies in the medieval period, see Howell, The Marriage Exchange, passim.
129 E. Clark, 'City Orphans and Custody Laws in Medieval England', American Journal of Legal Histo,y 34
(1990): 178.
' 30 BIHR, Probate Register 9, fol. 394r-v.
"D. Nicholas, The Domestic Life ofa Medieval City: Women Children and the Family in Fourteenth-Centu?y
Ghent (University of Nebraska Press: New Haven, 1985), p. 28.
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widows often chose to remarry men of similar social backgrounds to their previous
husbands. As already indicated, other historians have suggested that merchants' widows
tended to remarry other merchants.' 32 Similarly, Derek Keene has shown that tanners'
widows in London tended to remarry tanners.' 33 The remarriage of widows to men of a
similar occupation has been ascribed to practical considerations. It is argued that since
widows often inherited their husbands' businesses, it made good business sense for them to
remarry a man in the same line of work.' However, this situation was often brought about
by the actions of civic or guild authorities. In many towns during the late-medieval period,
pressure was placed on widows to remarry through the use of ordinances forbidding them
to continue in their husbands' occupation or to train apprentices.' 35
 Moreover, in
fourteenth-century Bristol the civic ordinances actively discouraged widows from marrying
out of the community. Any widow or daughter of a burgess who married a stranger who
was not free, respectable and of upright conduct was to be entirely cast out of the liberty of
the city, and to be considered as a stranger herself for the duration of her marriage,
regardless of her previous rights and status.'36
Surrogate Heirs
It has been argued that marriages between the children of existing civic officials and the
132 Thrupp, Merchant Class, p. 28; Kermode, 'Sentiment and Survival', pp. 6-7.
133 Keene, 'Tanners' Widows', pp. 23-5.
'34 Barron and Sutton (eds.), MedievalLondon Widows, pp. xxv-vi.
135 For example, the weavers' guild in Coventry forbade widows from taking apprentices. Cited in Phythian-
Adams, Desolation ofa City, pp. 9 1-2. Fourteenth and fifteenth-century ordinances from other towns were even
more sirict, forbidding widows to practise their husband's craft for more than several months or a year after their
husband's death. See, for example, Sellers (ed.), York Memorandum Book, part 2, p. lvii; P.J.P. Goldberg (ed.),
Women in Medieval English Society (Sutton Publishing: Stroud, 1997), pp. 203 & 204. Goldberg argues that
such regulations were motivated by an attempt to protect jobs for men during periods of economic recession;
Goldberg, Women, Work, and Lfe Cycle, especially PP
.
 333-6 1.
136 Goldberg, Women in England, p. 209.
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remarriage of widows of officials played a vital role in increasing integration among the elite
of late-medieval York. Such alliances may have been deliberately forged in order to increase
solidarity within the elite. Furthermore, the elite protected and consolidated its collective
resources through encouraging widows of wealthy men to remany other men within the
group. Although these strategies increased integration among the elite, they did not
contribute to its real or ideological perpetuation in the long term. In considering how the
latter may have been achieved, it is useful to look at the strategies of elites from elsewhere.
Laurence Stone and Jeanne Fawtier-Stone have argued that a demographic crisis
among the late seventeenth and early-eighteenth century English landed elite was solved
through various strategies of indirect inheritance.' 37
 Included among these strategies was
the adoption by nobles who lacked patrilineal heirs of a 'surrogate' heir, commonly a son-in-
law.' 38
 The role of this heir was primarily to preserve the lineage of the family. Indeed, it
was not uncommon for this man to change his surname to that of his wife to ensure that the
family name was preserved.'39
Stone and Fawtier Stone have also suggested that the 'inheritor' elites shared the
political, financial and social aspirations of the established elite.' 40
 Therefore, it could be
argued that the use of surrogate heirs also served to guarantee the ideological perpetuation
of the entire social group. The idea of the use of 'surrogate heirs' is an interesting one
which, it might be argued, was similar to the strategy adopted by the elite of later-medieval
York. Clearly, the elite of late-medieval York did not face the same pressures to preserve
their family name or lineage as the early modern aristocracy. Nevertheless, it will be argued,
'37 L. Stone and J.C. Fawtier-Stone, An Open Elite? England 1540-1880 (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1984), p.
160.
' 38 Ibid., pp. 118-26.
'39 1b1d., pp. 126-42.
'40 1b1d.,p. 184.
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below that in the absence of sufficient sons, the sons-in-law and apprentices of York officials
played the role of 'surrogate heirs' in ensuring the perpetuation both of civic families and
the wider civic elite.
Marriage has been viewed by English and continental medievalists as a common
method of social advancement for ambitious men. 14' It also appears to have performed this
function in later-medieval York. Only limited evidence exists concerning male age of first
marriage in late-medieval York. However, it is very unlikely given what is known about
marriage patterns that the average age was above thirty years.' 42 Rappaport has suggested
that in sixteenth-century London marriage was often undertaken around the time of entry
into the city's franchise. There is no reason to suggest that this would not also have been
the case in late-medieval York. Most civic officials who joined York's Corpus Christi Guild
did so prior to holding civic office in the city. Furthermore, of those civic officials whose
date of ently into the guild can be ascertained, the majority (68%) joined the guild with their
wives, thus indicating that, if not the norm, marriage prior to entry into civic office would
have been common.'43 By contrast, the average age at which men held their first civic office
cannot have been below thirty-five. Twenty-one seems to have been the youngest age at
which men entered the franchise of medieval cities and Jennifer Kermode has suggested that
in York the average is likely to have been around twenty-two.' York men then took an
average ofjust over fifteen years to reach their first civic office, giving them an average age
'4t Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber, Tuscans and their Families, pp. 226-7; Thrupp, Merchant Class, pp. 28-9, 105-
6; Phythian-Adanis, Desolation of a City, pp. 85-6; Kowaleski, Local Markets andRegional Trade, p. 213.
142 Goldberg's evidence suggests that men in medieval Yorkshire tended to be married by the age of 26;
Goldberg, Women, Work and Life Cycle, pp. 225-32; See also Thrupp, Merchant Class, pp. 192-3.
143 Appendix 1.
Kermode, Medieval Merchants, p. 86; See also Thrupp, Merchant Class, p. 193. It is possible that many men
entered the freedom during their late-twenties. Rappaport estimates that the average age for enily in early-
modern London was 26. Rappaport, Worlds Within Worlds, p. 49.
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of ently into office of no younger than thn-ty-six.' 45 Clearly, in view of this evidence, most
of the discernible marriage links between York Civic officials are likely to have been
established before office holding was undertaken. It is likely that these marriages were often
instrumental in men subsequently attaining civic office.
An advantageous marriage could be important in several respects. Financially, the
dowry could offer the large capital sum necessary to enable a young man to set up in
independent business.' For example, Elizabeth Beverley, the sister of John Beverley
(sheriff 1485), was left a dowry of £100 by her other brother Thomas.' 47 Besides the dowry,
the wills of the civic elite of late-medieval York suggest that a father-in-law could also be
a good source of credit. John Wright (bridge master 1509) was far from unusual in
mentioning in his will money that his sons-in-law owed him.' 43 Indeed, Phythian-Adams has
argued that a major function of the extended family (including affines) at this level of society
was the solution of liquidity difficulties.' 49 As Part One of the thesis demonstrated, wealth
was a necessary prerequisite for civic office holding in York as it was in other medieval
towns. Furthermore, the connection between marriage and the procurement of wealth
sufficient to qualify someone for civic office was noted by contemporaries. For example,
'45 Phythian-Adams suggests that amund forty might have been the usual age at which to acquire one's first civic
office in late-medieval Coventiy; Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, p. 126.
' In some quarters at least, character was rated over wealth. The Wise Man taught his Son that "...ifou wolt
haue a wijf,/ Take hir not for coueitise, IBut wijseli enqweere of al hir Jijf, lAnd take good hede, bi myn avice,
/I)at sche be meeke, curteis, and wijs..". Furnival (ed.), The Babees Book, p. 50, lines 73-6. In other words, the
Son should seek a wife who was meek, courteous and wise rather than merely wealthy. For the qualities and
dulies expected of husbands and wives see P.P.A. Biller, 'Marriage Patterns and Women's Lives: A Sketch of
Pastoral Geography', inP.J.P. Goldberg (ed.), Women in Medieval English Society (Sutton Publishing: Stroud,
1997), PP. 66, 83-85.
147 BIHR, Probate Register 4, fol. 176; See also Richard Cely junior who received a marriage dowiy of 500
marks (f333) from his wife, while the Stonor daughters brought 200 marks (f 120) to their marriages; Hanham,
The Celys and Their World, p. 310. James Murray has suggested that the marriage dowry under Flemish law
during the medieval period created "a type of limited partnership" between the couple: J.M. Murray, 'Family,
Marriage and Moneychangers in Medieval Brugge', Journal ofMedievalHislory 14 (1988): 117.
'48 B1}R, Probate Register 13, fol. 393r.
'49 Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, p. 150.
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the Coventry civic authorities doubted Roger Lee's excuse that he was unable to afford the
office of chamberlain on account of the fact that it was known that Roger:
had with his wif, oon John Pachette's doughter, in redy money & plate xxxli., and also
it was right well knowen that he hadde right largely of his owne, or els the seid John
Pachet wold not haue maried his doughter to hymSO
Just as important as financial considerations would have been the family connections that
marriage could bring. On a practical level, an advantageous marriage could bring with it
goodwill, as well as business contacts.' 5 ' It could also provide an entrée into the civic elite;
indeed, the importance of this aspect of marriage in Renaissance Florence was implicit in the
stress laid on the importance of the social and political standing of the families of
prospective marriage partners.' 52 In fact, in late-medieval Venice, such was the importance
of marriage relations to the fortunes of patrician families that the value of daughters'
dowries often exceeded the sums left to sons.'53
All of these factors seem to have enhanced considerably the promotion prospects of
civic officials in late-medieval York. As previously stated, civic officials as a whole took an
average of almost fifteen years to reach their first civic post after becoming free. In contrast,
sons-in-law of former civic officials on average took less than ten years to reach office; a
' 30 Phytliian-Adains, Desolation of a City, p. 85.
'' Kermode, 'Sentiment and Survival', p. 7.
132 Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber, Tuscans and their Families, pp. 343-4. See for Ghent: P. Clark, 'The Civic
Leaders of Clhent 1580-1800', in P. Clark (ed.), The Transformation of En gush Provincial Towns 1600-1800
(Hutchonson: London, 1984), pp. 316-7.
'"5. Chojnacki, "The Power of Love: Wives and Husbands in Late Medieval Venice", in M. Erler and M.
Kowaleski (ads.), Women and Power in the Middle Ages (University of Georgia Press: London, 1988), pp. 126-
48.
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similar amount of time as it took the average office-holding son of a civic official.' 54
 Men
marrying into successful families and utilizing their wealth and contacts to achieve success
for themselves, may well account for the preponderance of discernible marriage links within
the elite. Nevertheless, it might also be argued that the men who married into civic families
were not the only ones advantaged by their own rapid promotion. As we have seen, the
civic elite of later-medieval York was unable to rely on patrilineal links to foster integration
or to guarantee its perpetuation. It is therefore quite possible that established civic officials
were anxious to promote 'suitable' new men into their own ranks.
In terms of integration, it is clear that relationships between civic officials and sons-in-
law who went on to hold civic office were often close. Sons-in-law frequently performed
the function of supervisors or executors of wills, a role also often fulfilled by sons. For
example, Robert Denton (bridge master 1471) chose his daughter Alice and her husband
William Wilson (mayor 1513) to be his executors.' 55
 Similarly, Thomas Scotton (mayor
1492) nominated his son-in-law John Doggeson (mayor 1508 & 1517) as his executor, and
referred to him in his will as his son.' 56
 Further, it was not unusual for civic officials to
bequeath sentimental gifts to their sons-in-law. These gifts often took the form of clothing
or silver although they sometimes had a more masculine character.' For example, John
Stockdale (mayor 1501) bequeathed his son-in-law, Robert Dicconson (chamberlain 1510),
six of his best bows and his quiver with its shaft. 158
 Likewise, John Petty (mayor 1508)
' 54 Appendices I and 2c. Similarly, Peter Clark has argued that kinship ties enhanced promotion prospects in
early-modern Ghent, Clark, 'The Civic Leaders of (Ihent', p. 318.
'55 BIHR, Probate Register 5, fol. 405v.
156 BIHR, Probate Register 6, fol. 60v-61r.
'57 For example, George Essex (mayor 1509) bequeathed his son-in-law, John Chapman (sheriff 1512), a violet
gown lined with Cyprus satin, a doublet and a silver piece; BIHR, Probate Register 7, fol. 51r.
' 58 Bllfl, Probate Register 6, fol. 185r.
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bequeathed his son-in-law, Miles Skipton (bridge master 1514), a breast plate, chainmail
sleeves, a standard of mail, a battleaxe and a sallet (helmet).'59
In addition to increasing integration among the elite, sons-in-law of civic officials
could be viewed as 'surrogate heirs' responsible for the perpetuation both of elite families
and their wider social group. Maryanne Kowaleski has argued that marriage was important
in medieval Exeter not only as a means of achieving individual success, but also for ensuring
a constant supply of new oligarchs.'6° As with aristocratic inheritor elites, ambitious men
who sought out the daughters of wealthy or politically successful civic officials were likely
to have shared similar aspirations to those of the already established elite. The rapid
promotion of men who were sons-in-law of established officials may therefore have been
deliberate. In many ways these men represented 'safe bets' for the real and ideological
perpetuation of the civic elite. Moreover, it is interesting to consider whether, like Stone
and Fawtier Stones' landed elites, the heirless civic officials of York deliberately sought out
'surrogate heirs' who would make good husbands for their daughters and perpetuate their
wealth, name and network of contacts. The York evidence certainly suggests that civic
officials took an active interest in whom their daughters married.
Although there is a general consensus among historians that English couples married
late compared with their southern European counterparts, there is little agreement on the
extent to which English urban elite marriages were arranged.' 6' Some historians have
suggested that while arranged marriages were not the norm in English urban society as a
' 59 YMA, Dean and Chapter Probate Register, 2, L215a, 76v-78r.
' 60 Kowaleski, Local Markets andRegional Trade, pp. 115-6.
161 Goldberg, Women Work and Life Cycle, pp. 204-32 & 274-5; M.E. Mate, Daughters, Wives and Widows
After the Black Death: Women in Sussex, 1350-1535 (The Boydell Press: Woodbridge, 1998), pp. 21-3; S.
McSheffrey, "'I Will Never Have None Against My Father's Will": Consent and the Making of Marriage in the
late-Medieval Diocese of London', in J.T. Rosenthal and C.M. Rousseau (eds.), Women, Marriage and Family
in Medieval Christendom: Essays in Memory ofMichael M. Sheehan (Medieval Institute Press: Kalamazoo,
1998), pp. 153-74.
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whole, they were much more common among the offspring of wealthy parents.162
Moreover, Shannon McSheffrey has argued in her exploration of masculinity and late-
medieval civic culture that it was the duty of civic patriarchs to govern social relations
within the town. 1 In particular, she argues that "it was the duty and privilege of senior men
to ensure that suitable marriages were made, and unsuitable unions prevented or stopped".1"
For McSheffiey, this duty was an extension of the civic elite's wider role as a moral
regulator within towns, as articulated through official structures such as the wardmote
courts.
Evidence for arranged marriages among the elite of late-medieval York is scarce.
However, the wills of members of the civic elite do witness to concerns over who their
daughters married. For example, Margaret North, widow of John North (chamberlain 1497)
and mother of Richard North (sheriff 1513), left goods to her niece Margaret provided "she
marries after the mind and will of my son.. "165 Similarly, Ellen Stockdale, widow of John
Stockdale (mayor 1501) was concerned about the marriage of her two daughters by her
second husband Robert Johnson (mayor 1496). She stated that if her daughters accepted
the guiding of her supervisors concerning their marriage then they were to have all the
goods that remained of her husband Robert Johnson's portion, together with her own
portion to total lOOli. However, if either of them would not marry according to this advice
they were to have only their child's portions and neither her portion nor the remainder of
162 Goldberg, Women Work and Life Cycle, pp. 231-4 & 274-5; Thrupp, Merchant Class, pp. 28-9.
' S. McSheffiey, 'Men and Masculinity in Late Medieval London Civic Culture: Governance, Patriarchy and
Reputation', in J. Murray (ed.), Conflicted Identities and Multiple Masculinities: Men in the Medieval West
(Garland Publishing: London, 1999), pp. 243-278.
164 Ibid p. 245. It should be noted that MeSheifrey argues that occasionally women in positions of authority or
responsibility were occasionally involved in the making of marriages, although their role was generally more
informal than that of men.
' 65 BIEj[, Probate Register 6, fols. 202v-203r.
153
their father Robert Johnsons goods'.' 66 Besides her three executors, Ellen also appointed
two flirther supervisors saying they were to "gyff ther faythilill conseall to my forseid
executors and daughters Malde and Jennet for ther maryegge". 167 As will be argued later,
members of the civic elite often appointed other civic officials as guardians or supervisors
of their wills. As such, even upon the death of a civic official, the identification of a suitable
marriage partner remained in the hands of the civic elite, as was the case for the Johnson
sisters. Indeed, Clark has demonstrated that while the courts of the municipal authorities
of Bristol and London were unconcerned with the welfare of orphans of the poor or the
unendowed, they "represented the interests of the deceased no less than the concerns of the
orphans" when they regulated the wardship of heirs.' 68 In particular, the courts were
concerned to protect the child's property and wealth. One aspect of this concern was the
regulation that orphans under the age of twenty-one were not allowed to marry without the
mayor's approval.' 69
 Interestingly, there is evidence to suggest that York's civic elite
jealously guarded their right to oversee the wardship and marriage of the heirs of civic
officials. For example, following the death intestate of the alderman John Metcalf (mayor
1498) in 1502, the king sent a letter to the corporation complaining that whereas:
the warde and manage of his heire...justely belongeth unto us...ye by vertue of your
office lately impaneled certain insufficient persons to have passed opon this matere to
'BIHR, Probate Register 6, fols. 227-8.
'These two men were Brian Palmer, recorder of the city, and Robert Cheston, a notary in York's ecclesiastical
courts. Unfortunately it is not known who Maud and Janet married, or even whether they lived long enough to
reach marriageable age. See also Sussex merchants cited in Mate, Daughters, Wives and Widows, pp. 31-2.
Phythian-Adams has also noted the obligation placed on relict daughters to take advice on whom they should
many from kin, including brothers-in-law; Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, pp. 150-1.
Clark, 'Orphans and Custody Laws in Medieval England', p. 170.
' Ibid., p. 172.
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the hinderance of our right and interesse.. 170
As has been demonstrated, the marriage of heirs of civic officials was often closely
supervised by parents or other members of the civic elite. In part, this supervision no doubt
stemmed from a desire that offspring should not marry unscrupulous partners. However,
it is also likely, that, as with the remarriage of widows, there existed as additional concern
to protect the wealth and network of contacts of the deceased. It was important to the elite
as a whole that such resources should remain within the community. Given this situation,
the accelerated promotion of surrogate heirs was perhaps not surprising. Marriage to the
daughters of wealthy and well-connected civic officials provided these men with a spring-
board to civic prominence and success. Yet it is equally likely that civic officials actively
encouraged such men to follow in their footsteps. The ensuing close relationships which
often developed between civic officials and their sons-in-law no doubt served to increase the
degree of integration among the elite.
Fictive kinships and apprenticeship were also important, in the selection, training and
encouragement of suitable men for civic office. Fictive kinship, meaning relations modelled
on kinship, are important in many societies because they perform the function of extending
genealogical ties.' 7' Godparentage was the most obvious form of fictive kinship in medieval
society, and it appears to have played an important role in broadening an individual's social
circle. Certificates of birth contained within the York House Books are one of the few
sources which list godparents during the medieval period.' Although wills often make
' 70 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 176.
171 Keesing, Kin Groups and Social Structure, p. 129.
" ceitificates are included in the York House Books as they testify to the fact that York freemen born in the
north of the countiy were not Scottish by birth. Claiming someone was a Scot was a popular form of slander in
York during the late-fourteenth and early-fifteenth centuries. All seventeen certificates are published together
in J. Raine (ed.), A Volume of English Miscellany illustrating the Histoiy and Language of the Northern
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reference to godparents or children, they are rarely named, making it difficult to generalise
about the types of people chosen in this role. The only godparent relationships involving
civic officials which it has been possible to trace are those of William Robinson (chamberlain
1503), John Nelson (sheriff 1514), Ralph Neleson (bridge master 1513) and Bartram
Dawson (mayor 1511). Although all four of these men were craftsmen, the status of their
godparents (where known) was of gentle or yeoman rank.' 73
 As Barbara Hanawalt notes,
this finding suggests that in selecting godparents, the parents of a townsman may have
hoped that they would "help the young man when he was looking for places and
preferment".' 74
 The certificate of William Robinson supports this interpretation. While the
reason for Robinson's move from Boulton in Westmoreland to York is unknown, it is
interesting to note that York residents who were connected with Robinson's godparents are
named in the certificate. Testif,'ing to Robinson's birth were Sir William Darnwater, a York
chantiy priest who was the son of Robinson's godmother Johanna Darnwater, and also Janet
Bell, a resident of York who had been born in Boulton and who was described in the
certificate as Robinson's "god sustser".' 75 Clearly, it is quite possible that Robinson's move
to York was influenced by connections he already enjoyed with the city through his
godparents.
Unfortunately, as indicated, spiritual kinship links cannot be reconstructed for any
other York civic officials. Therefore it is impossible to know with any certainty whether
aspirant York parents sought wealthy or influential townsmen as the godparents of their
Counties ofEngland, Surtees Society 85 (1890 for 1888), pp. 35-52. The social background of the godparents
listed in these certificates are summarised in B. Hanawalt, The Ties that Bound: Peasant Families in Medieval
England (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1986), pp. 247-8.
'73 Raine (ed.), English Miscellany, pp. 49-52; of also Hanawalt, The Ties that Bound, p. 247.
'74 flanawalt, The Ties that Bound, p. 176.
Raine (ed.), English Miscellany, pp. 49-50. 'God suster' presumably refers to the fact that the two had a
common godparent.
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children, or whether links within the civic elite were strengthened through godparent ties.
Nevertheless, Phythian Adams has suggested that the aldermen of medieval Coventry were
interlinked by just these means.' 76 Whether these ties played a role in the selection or
integration of civic officials is unclear, although this does at least seem feasible.
The study of apprenticeship is more revealing. Although apprenticeship relations are
not generally regarded as a type of fictive kinship, it could be argued that masters acted in
locoparentis. They were responsible for clothing, feeding and housing apprentices under
their care and, as will be argued, the relationships between masters and apprentices were
often very close.'77 Moreover, Barbara Hanawalt has argued that in the widespread absence
of father-to-son succession, apprenticeship was of paramount importance for the
perpetuation and survival of urban society. In particular, she argues that in cities such as
London apprenticeship played a vital role in the socialisation of future citizens, providing
a "training ground.. .for those who would lend continuity to the social and political ethos of
(the city)".' 78 So to what extent can apprenticeship be considered to have been a desirable
training or socialisation for citizenship and civic office-holding in York?
Unfortunately, evidence for apprenticeship in York is limited. Besides occasional
mentions of masters and apprentices in wills and cause papers, the only substantial sources
of evidence for apprenticeship in medieval York are a list of apprentice and master weavers
for the period c. 1450 to 1505, and records of admission to the freedom of the city by
'76 Phfljan Adams, Desolation of a City, p. 144.
' P.J.P. Goldberg, 'Masters and Men in later Medieval England', in Hadley (ed.), Masculinity in Medieval
Europe, (Lougman: London, 1999), pp. 56-70, but see especially pp. 61-2.
178 B.A. Hanawalt, Growing Up in Medieval London: the Experience of Childhood in Histoiy (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 1993), p. 171; C.F. Friedrichs, The Early Modern City 1450-1750 (Longman, London,
1995), p. 168. For a thorough exploration of the socialising role of apprenticeship, see B.A. Hanawalt, "The
Childe of Bristowe" and the Making of Middle-Class Adolescence' in Hanawalt and Wallace (eds.), Bodies and
Disciplines, pp. 155-78.
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apprenticeship for the years 1482 to 1487.179 For this reason, no estimate can be made of
the percentage of civic officials who may have been linked through apprenticeship
relationships. However, enough evidence survives to enable some valuable conclusions to
be drawn concerning the role of apprenticeship in the perpetuation of the civic elite. Table
3:7 below summarises the method of entry into the York franchise for the period 1482 to
1487. It also shows the percentage of men from each method of entry who went on to
become civic officials.
Table 3:7
Men Who Entered the Freedom of York 1482-87: By Method of Entry.
Number in Each Group	 Of Whom Became Civic Officials
By Purchase	 290	 15	 (5%)
By Patrimony	 64	 5	 (8%)
By Apprenticeship	 139	 19	 (14%)
All Freemen	 493	 39	 (8%)
Sources: Collins, York Freemen 's Register, pp. 203-12; Appendix 1.
As Table 3:7 above shows, only 8% of all men who gained the freedom of the city
between 1482 and 1486 went on to hold civic office. Whereas only 5% of freemen by
purchase and 8% of freemen by patrimony became civic officials, 14% of men admitted by
apprenticeship became civic officials. It could be argued that these statistics reflect a wider
tendency to favour apprenticeship over patrimony or purchase. For example, a York
ordinance of 1484 gave apprentices a preferential entry fee. '° This was also the case
elsewhere. Apprentices in medieval Wells, together with sons of burgesses, were given free
entry to the city's franchise. Meanwhile, in London apprenticeship had become the main
'79 YCA, Register of Apprentices, Dli; Collins (ed.), York Freemen r Register, pp. 204-12.
°Attreed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, pp. 303-4.
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method of entry into the city's franchise by the fifteenth centuly.18'
As Part Two of the thesis argued, certain qualities were deemed desirable in civic
officials, including wisdom, honesty and decorum.' 82 There is strong evidence to suggest
that one of the means through which these values may have been inculcated in younger
generations was through apprenticeship. Even before being accepted as an apprentice, a boy
had to conform to certain specifications. Included among these was an insistence that he
should be 'honest et able' and loyal, and 'sober, pious, honourable and faithful'.'83
Apprentices were often expected to be wise, a quality that together with wisdom and ability
was also expected of civic officials.' 84 Moreover, as apprentices, boys were expected to
conform to a set of behavioural norms similar to those encouraged among civic officials.
They were not allowed to gamble, frequent inns or brothels, insult members of their master's
household or gossip about trade secrets.' 85 The role of masters as moral and spiritual tutors
or mentors is nicely reflected in the will of William Garnet (sheriff 1510), who bequeathed
his apprentice 5s and his workday gown on the condition that he was to be "curtyas and
gentifi to his maystress".' Apprentices were also expected to show respect and obedience
towards their masters.' 87 Indeed, it could be argued that one of the main functions of
181 Shaw, Creation ofa Community, p. 151; R.R. Sharpe (ed.), Calendar ofLetter-Book9 of the City ofLondon:
A-L (1275-1 497), 11 vols, (Corporation: London, 1899-1912), I (1400-1422), p. 63; Rappaport, Worlds Within
Worlds, pp. 23-60, especially p. 24.
' See above pp. 84-108.
'See for example a fourteenth-centwy York indenture for apprentices of the craft of bowers. Sellers (ed.), York
Memorandum Book, part 1, pp. 61-2; partly translated in pp. xlvii-iii. See also C.M. Clode, The Early Histoiy
ofthe Guild ofMerchant Taylors of the Fraternity of St. John the Baptist, London, 2 vols. (Harrison: London,
1888), p. 344.
'Hanawa1t, "Childe of Bristowe", p. 158.
'Sellers (ed.), York Memorandum Boolç part 1, pp. 54-5 & xlvii-iii. Sharpe (ed.), London Letter-Book.i: K
(1422-61), p. 208; L (1461-149 7), pp. 163-4; Hanawalt, "Childe of Bnstowe", pp. 158-9.
'B1HR, Probate Register 8, fol. 102r.
' Thrupp, Merchant Class, p. 29.
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apprenticeship was to inculcate a reverence for hierarchy and authority in the apprentice.'88
In view of this social and moral training, it is likely that apprenticeship was particularly
encouraged as a route to citizenship because it ensured the socialisation of young men in the
expected behavioural norms of 'respectable' citizens. Moreover, men gaining the freedom
of the city through apprenticeship presumably carried with them a guarantee of
'respectability' which was not necessarily true of men who had purchased their freedom.
It may be partly for this reason that apprentices were more likely to go on to hold civic
office later in their careers.
Social networks provide a further likely reason for the enhanced political prospects
experienced by apprentices. Pamela Nightingale has argued that London Grocers may have
aided the civic careers of their apprentices by leaving them large financial or material
bequests.' 89 Similarly, it was not unusual for York apprentices to be remembered in their
master's wills, and though most apprentices only received small bequests, in some cases the
legacies were quite substantial.'9° For example, Robert Preston (chamberlain 1496)
bequeathed his apprentice, Robert Bogge, all of his books that were "fit for one prentice of
his craft to learn by" as well as his work tools.' 9 ' Similarly, the goldsmith Robert
Huchonson (chamberlain 1498) bequeathed his apprentice, John Marshall, all the tools of
his shop.'92
Perhaps more useful than financial bequests were the connections and kudos that a
188 Hanawalt argues that this was one of the main functions of guides, books of advice and courtesy texts;
Hanawalt, "'Childe of Bristowe", pp. 160-1. See also Thrupp, Medieval Merchants, p. 29.
'9°Nightingale, A Medieval Mercantile Community, p. 186.
'9° See for example, Bil-IR, Probate Register 5, fols. 405v. (Denton) & 463v-464r. (Lounesdale); 7, fols. Sir
(Essex) & 52r-53v (Hancock); 9, fol. 204r (Cure). See also Goldberg, 'Masters and Men', p. 62.
'' Bll{R, Probate Register 6, fol. 7 lr-v.
'9°BIHR, Probate Register 6, fol. 1 90r.
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high-status master might bequeath his apprentice. The York evidence suggests that with
men who gained the freedom of the city through apprenticeship, there existed a sharp
distinction between those whose masters were civic officials, and those whose masters were
not. As has been mentioned already, one hundred and thirty-nine men are listed in the York
House Books as having become free by apprenticeship between the years 1482 to 1487.
Details of these men are summarised in Table 3:8 below.
Table 3:8
Men Who Entered the Freedom of York By Apprenticeship 1482-87
Number of men	 Of Whom Became Civic Officials
Apprentices of civic officials	 51	 (37%)	 14	 (27%)
Apprentices of non civic officials 88
	 (63%)	 5	 (6%)
All Apprentices	 139	 (100%)	 19	 (14%)
Source: Collins, (ed.), York Freemen's Register, pp. 204-12; Appendix 1.
As Table 3:8 above shows, only nineteen (14%) of the 139 men who were free by
apprenticeship during the period 1482 to 1487 went on to hold civic office. However, men
who were the apprentices of civic officials were over four times more likely to hold civic
office in later years than those who were apprentices of ordinary burgesses. Put another
way, fourteen (74%) of the nineteen apprentices who became civic officials had been
apprenticed to civic officials themselves.
Obviously, the evidence discussed relates only to a period of six years, making it
impossible to gauge how representative these findings are for the whole period 1476 to
1525. However, as the evidence stands it strongly suggests that the status of the master
affected his apprentice's promotion prospects later on in life. We can only hypothesise as
to the reasons behind this phenomenon. Apprentices of civic officials would have been
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particularly well placed to capitalise on the political and trading connections of their
important and wealthy masters. Equally, however, it is likely a form of nepotism on the part
of the elite may have enhanced the promotion prospects of well-placed apprentices. It has
already been demonstrated that sons and sons-in-law of former civic officials tended to
experience accelerated promotion, and it has also been suggested that this may have been
on account of attempts by the elite to safeguard its real and ideological perpetuation through
the nomination or encouragement of sons or 'surrogate heirs'. There is no reason why the
same would not have been true of the elite's attitude towards apprentices under their care.
As has been argued, the process of apprenticeship seems in general to have served the twin
purposes of socialising young men towards becoming masters, and inculcating in them the
values and qualities sought in citizens and civic officials. It could be argued that as more
'honest and discrete' members of the urban community, masters who were civic officials
were particularly well placed to administer such 'training'. Moreover, it is likely that
masters who were civic officials also directly or indirectly encouraged their charges to take
up civic office simply by acting as mentors.
It is clear that relationships between masters and apprentices were often close. For
example, several York officials asked to be buried next to their masters, while others
requested prayers for them in their wills.' 93
 Apprentices were sometimes also named as
executors or supervisors of wills, a role traditionally reserved for close family members,
especially sons and sons-in-law.' Among the York officials the fishmonger Thomas Wright
(bridge master 1499) nominated his apprentice John Roger (sheriff 1524) as one of the
trustees of his daughter's portion, a role which demonstrates the degree of trust between the
193 See, for example, BIHR, Probate Register 5, fol. 434v (Beisby) & 473v (Hancock); 9, fol. 204r (Cure).
194 Goldberg, 'Masters and Men', p. 62.
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two men.'95 In some cases, apprentices took on a role approaching that of a 'surrogate' son,
occasionally even marrying the daughter of their master or becoming their master's chief
heir. 196 Far from being frowned on, such actions seem to have been viewed as an ideal
consummation of the quasi-paternal master-apprentice relationship. Indeed, as Hanawalt
has demonstrated, this was the fate of the apprentice in the poem "The Merchant and His
Son".' Here, as a result of marriage, the apprentice not only became his master's son-in-
law but also his heir.'98
In York, Agnes Shaw, widow of John Shaw (mayor 1538), was anxious that her
apprentice, William Cowper, should marry her wealthy ward. Following the death of her
father, Agnes Harbottle had been placed under John Shaw's wardship. At his death in 1538,
Shaw placed Agnes Harbottle under the "discretion and order" of Agnes his wife.
Meanwhile, on her own death, Agnes Shaw instructed that "It is agreed the yere and day
above written that William Cowper my servant of his mere mynde contraiie shall marie
Agnes Harbottell and unto the said Agnes I bequeath and give all my copieholde lands..
William, an apprentice of John and Agnes Shaw, had gained the freedom of the city the
previous year. Whether Agnes Shaw actually arranged this marriage or merely gave consent
to a relationship that had already arisen through the proximity of William and her ward
cannot be known. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that Agnes Shaw's bequest of
land appears connected to her request that Agnes Harbottle marry William Cowper,
suggesting that it reflected her view of William as a 'suitable' husband. In view of Cowper's
'95 BIHR, Probate Register, 8, fol. 3r.
'98 Hanawalt, "Childe of Bristowe", pp. 163-4.
''Ibid.,p. 163.
198 Tn "The Childe of Bristowe" the apprentice does not marry his master's daughter, yet still becomes his heir;
Ibid., p. 163.
199 BII{, Probate Register 11, fol. 574r-v.
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connections to the Shawes, coupled with the wealth and land bestowed on his new wife
Agnes, it is perhaps not surprising that he went on to become a chamberlain of the city in
1546.200
In conclusion, apprenticeship seems to have been important to the civic elite of York.
As with family and marriage ties, it seems to have fostered integration among the elite
group. More importantly, though, it played an important role in the perpetuation of the civic
elite. Apprenticeship was a reliable means through which civic officials could train and
socialise 'suitable' young men for civic office. Through such means the real and ideological
perpetuation of the elite was secured.
lU) Social Unity?
It has been argued that in the absence of patrilineal ties, the civic elite had to find other
methods to ensure the integration and perpetuation of the group. Apprenticeship, the
remarriage of widows, and the marriages of children of the civic elite all served this end.
Additionally, the perpetuation of the elite was secured through the nomination and
encouragement of 'surrogate heirs'. So far this section has largely concentrated on
integration within the elite over time. In particular, it has concentrated on the role of family
in the integration of the group. Clearly, however, if any conclusion concerning the social
integration of the elite is to be reached, then it is also necessary, to consider the extent to
which other bonds of affection or trust linked civic officials.
Wills provide a useflul source of evidence for bonds of affection or trust. As Kermode
has pointed out, while some b.istorians have regarded wills primarily as religious documents,
2°°BIIIR, Probate Register 11, fol. 276r; Collins, York Freemen 's Register, pp. 259 & 265.
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they in fact also served to "settle a number of personal matters". 20 ' Kermode has argued
that wills can be used to "suggest some of the networks of responsibility and of friendship
that augmented and sometimes replaced families, and which together extended the influence
of merchants throughout urban society". 2°2
 A similar methodology has been used here to
consider the social networks and bonds of trust which may have linked civic officials. To
this end, Table 3:9 below summarises the proportion of civic officials from the period 1476
to 1525 who cited other civic officials from this period in their wills.203
Table 3:9
Civic Officials 1476 to 1525 Who Cited Other Officials from this Period in their WflJ.
Highest Office Attained
	 Number Men in Each
	 Of Whom Cited Other Officials in Their Will
Group Leaving Wills 	 no.	 (%)
Bridge master
	 47	 26	 (55)
Chamberlain	 58	 30	 (52)
Sheriff	 50	 26	 (52)
Mayor	 45	 36	 (80)
All Officials	 200	 118	 (59)
Source: Appendix 3.
As Table 3:9 shows, 59% of the officials for whom wills survive cited other civic
officials from the same period in their wills. Given that many wills were extremely brief and
excluded all but intimate fhmily members, this figure suggests a strong degree of integration
in terms of social relations. It is clear that real affection lay behind the decision of many
201 Kemiode, Medieval Merchants, p.72 (although see also pp. 70-3). However, P. Cullum and P.J.P. Goldberg,
'Charitable Provision in Late Medieval York: "To the Praise of God and the Use of the Poor", Northern Histoi'y
29 (1993): 24-39, see wills primarily as religious documents.
202 Kermode, Medieval Merchants, p. 72.
203 Civic officials who were close blood relations of the testators (ie father, son or brother) are excluded. It was
common practice for testators to include sons or brothers in their wills as legatees and sometimes also as
executors or supervisors. Such cases were excluded from calculations as they could be held primarily to
represent family ties as opposed to friendship links within the civic elite.
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civic officials to cite other officials. This is evident both from the language used and the
types of bequests made. For example, Thomas Burton (mayor 1522) described Robert
Wilde (mayor 1527), who was supervisor, legatee and one of the witnesses to Burton's will,
as "my welbeloved brother". 204
 That a bond should develop between these two men was
perhaps not surprising. The two men appear to have been related, possibly as brothers-in-
law, and both men were wealthy merchants and members of the merchants' company (of
which they were both masters during the 1520's). Furthermore, they enjoyed parallel civic
careers, holding the same posts within a couple of years of each other. Both men had been
members of the council of twenty-four and had joined the council of aldermen in consecutive
years (Burton in 1521 and Wilde in 1522).
Legacies, many of which clearly held symbolic or sentimental value, also show the
strong friendship links that existed between civic officials. For example, Robert Johnson
(mayor 1496) left alderman William White (mayor 1491 & 1505) his "hupe rynge of golde
whiche that John Haister made in the yere that I was maire". 2°5 He also left alderman John
Metcalf (mayor 1498) his "cremesyn gowne furred with blakeshanke". It is possible that the
latter gift has a symbolic value since one of the colours used for aldermanic robes during this
period was "cremysyn". 206
 Except for their all holding civic office, there does not appear
to have been much common between Johnson , Metcaif and White: whereas Johnson was
204 B11IR, Probate Register 9, fol. 326r. The nature of the relationship between Wilde and Burton is unknown,
although it is possible that Burton's wife Maude was the sister of Wilde. It is also possible, though, that 'brother'
is used by Burton in a looser sense, namely to denote common membership of the council or aldermen. The use
of kinship terms and metaphors in this context is discussed below.
205 B11-IR, Probate Register 5, fols. 5 lOv-1 Iv. John Haister was free as a goldsmith in 1492; Raine, Freemen 's
Register, p. 216.
206 Violet, murray and scarlet were also used. YCA, House Book 9, fol. 49v; House Book 8, fol. 70v; Attreed
(ed.), YorkHouse Books, p. 691. The only other civic officials (or their relations) from the period 1476 to 1525
to leave crimson or scarlet gowns in their wills were John Elwald (sheriff 1499 & alderman), Roger Gegges
(sheriff 1522), Richard Thorneton (mayor 1502), and Anne, wife of Michael White (mayor 1494 & 1505).
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a grocer or spicer, Metcalf was a merchant and White a dyer. 207 Each man lived in a
different parish and there is no evidence to suggest that any of them were related. However,
all were aldermen of the city, former mayors and members of the council of twenty-four.
Testamentary sources reveal social networks and bonds which encompassed and
linked not only civic officials themselves, but also their wives. For example, John Harper
(mayor 1489) left gifts to his executors Richard Thorneton (mayor 1502) and Alan Stavely
(mayor 1506 & 1519). His widow Joanne likewise cited Alan Stavely as her executor, and
also appointed the aldermen William Nelson (mayor 1500) and George Kirk (mayor 1495
and 1512) as her supervisors. 208 There is no evidence to suggest that either Joanne or her
husband were related to Stavely, Neleson or Kirk. The York wills support the suggestion
made by other historians that women's wills were often far more "detailed and diffuse" than
mens' wills, in terms of relatives, friends and acquaintances remembered. 209 It is unclear
whether this reflects differing testamentary practices, differing attitudes towards family and
social networks, or actual differences in the range and type of male and female social
networks. It has already been argued that the marriages of widows and daughters of the
civic elite played a vital role in the creation or cementing of links between civic families, as
well as in the perpetuation of the wider group. The cited examples of social networks
revealed in women's wills also suggest that friendship networks among the wives of civic
officials might have been important in further strengthening or maintaining the integration
of the civic elite. The next section will explore this area in more depth by considering the
207	 all of them may have had trading interests is suggested by their common membership of theMercers'
Guild.
208 BIHR, Probate Register 8, fols. 98v-99r. See also, for example, the wills of Agnes Shaw, widow of John
Shaw (mayor 1538), 11, fol. 574r-v; Anne Beverley, widow of John Beverley (sheriff 1485), 5, foL 419-v; and
Ellen Marshall, widow of Henry Marshall (chamberlain 1501), 6, fol. 226r.
209 Barran and Sutton (eds.),MedievalLondon Widows, p. xvi. See P.11. Cullum, "And hr Name Was Charite":
Charitable (3iving by and for Women in Late Medieval Yorkshire', in Goldberg (ed.), Women in Medieval
English Society, pp. 183-5.
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formalised social links between the wives of councillors.
A further issue raised by Table 3:9 above is the differing degree of integration among
men of different civic status. It has already been argued that men who reached the post of
mayor were far more likely to be related, either patrileneally or by marriage to other civic
officials. Table 3:9 also suggests that they were more likely to cite other civic officials (to
whom they were not related) in their wills. Whereas between 52 and 55 percent of the men
who reached the lower posts of bridge master, chamberlain or sheriff cited other civic
officials in their will, 80% of mayors did so. This would suggest that social integration
among men who held the post of mayor was much more pronounced than among other
members of the civic elite. Table 3:10 below shows the percentage of office-holders leaving
wills who can be shown to have been related to other civic officials from the same period,
or who cited other officials from the same period in their will.
Table 3:10
Percentage of Men Leaving Wills Who Reached Each Office, Who Were Related To, or Who Cited.
Other Officials From the Period 1476 to 1525 in Their Wills
Expressed by highest office attained.
Highest Office Attained	 % of men leaving wills in each group who were related to, or who cited,
other officials from the period 1476 to 1525 in their wills.
Bridge master
	 57
Chamberlain	 64
Sheriff	 68
Mayor	 93
All Officials	 70
Source: Appendix 2a, b, c and 3.
It is noticeable that the higher a man progressed up the civic hierarchy the more likely
he was to emphasize his social ties with other civic officials. Whereas 57% of men who
reached the post of bridge master displayed social links with other officials of the same
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period, 93% of mayors did so. Of the thirty-six mayors who cited contemporary civic
officials in their wills, Robert Wilde (mayor 1527), John Shaw (mayor 1510) and John Petty
(mayor 1508) were the only officials not to make reference to existing office holders. 21° In
other words, thirty-three (73%) of the forty-five mayors for whom a will survives also cited
officials from the same period (1476-1525) who had already held civic office. Further, most
of the mayors cited men who had reached a senior position within the civic hierarchy.
Twenty-five (56%) of the forty-five mayors cited civic officials from the period 1476 to
1525 who had at least reached the post of sheriff Indeed, many of these men were actually
serving aldermen. It is possible that herein lies the crux of the issue. Whereas men held the
posts of bridge master through to mayor for a period of only one year, membership of the
council of aldermen (composed of former sheriffs) was generally for life. Moreover, most
aldermen had previously served in the council of twenty-four (which was composed of men
who had served as chamberlain or sheriff). 21 ' While official interaction among post holders
was limited to the year in which they held civic office, official interaction between
councillors was sustained over many years.
Their two councils of aldermen and the twenty-four met regularly: at least two or
three times each a month. These frequent meetings must have increased the potential for
friendships (and animosities ! ) to flourish within the group. Further, it is likely that social
interaction in other spheres of life was greatest among this group of men. As Part Two of
the thesis has argued, in contrast to the elite as a whole, men who held the office of mayor
were predominantly wealthy merchants: a group that Jenny Kermode has argued displayed
a high degree of social integration. 212 It is therefore perhaps not surprising that men who
210 AppdiS 1 and 3.
211 Rees Jones, 'York's Civic Administration', table 1, P. 128.
212 Kurmle 'Sentiment and Survival', especially pp. 12-3.
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reached the post of mayor displayed a much higher degree of social integration in terms of
marriage and friendship links. Further, as a wider point, these findings further support those
expressed in Part Two concerning the existence of hierarchies within elites.
Evidence from other towns suggests that there may also have been more fundamental
differences in the socialisation patterns among people of differing wealth and social status.
For example, Phythian Adams has suggested that patterns of socialisation among kin and
affines in late-medieval Coventry differed for different social groups. Elite families were
more likely to have enjoyed extended networks of family and friends, whereas among those
lower down the social scale networks seem to have been more limited and localised. 213
 As
has been mentioned, most of the work which has been carried out on family and marriage
in late-medieval towns has concentrated on elites. These findings therefore clearly highlight
the need for more research to be carried out on family and social networks among different
social groups within medieval towns. Further, evidence suggesting the existence of
pronounced differences even within the civic elite warn historians against making
generalised conclusions about civic elites based only on analysis of the highest office holders.
213 Phythian Adams, Desolation of a City, pp. 148-57. Parish and neighbourhood seem to have been more
important in terms of social networks among people lower down the social hierarchy than for members of urban
elites Burgess, 'Shaping the Parish', pp. 27 1-3; Thrupp, Merchant Class, pp. 34-7.
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(B) Discord& Ritual Unity
I)L Introductioi
Contrary to the views of urban historians such as Kermode, or Swanson, there is little
evidence to suggest class formation, embryonic or otherwise, among the civic elite of later-
medieval York. 214
 Although all of the elite enjoyed above average wealth, the group was
nonetheless diverse in terms of occupational makeup, and with the exception of the highest-
ranking civic officials, it lacked sufficient ties of family, marriage or friendship to be
considered (lilly unified, coherent and homogeneous social group. Further, historians who
have concentrated on divisions between ruling elites and the 'masses' have often overlooked
evidence of disputes and factionalism within elites themselves.
This section challenges some of these assumptions and examines the ways in which
York's elite sought to present itself as a unified entity and the means through which it
attempted to dissipate and overcome discord and disunity within the group. It is argued that
in the absence of any innate integration and unity it was necessary for the civic elite of later-
medieval York to construct itself as a unified and integrated group through the use of
ritualised language and actions. This section begins by exploring diversity and conflict
among members of the elite. 215 It then examines the ritualised integration of the civic
officials. It is argued that despite a relatively low level of social unity and a high level of
discord and factionalism between civic officials, the elite constructed or consolidated itself
as a unified group through defensive and pro-active ritual actions. In turn, these ritual
actions constituted a discourse of unanimity which corresponded to patterns in
214 Kermode, 'Sentiment and Survival', pp.5 & 12; idein ,Medieval Merchants, pp. 77-90; idem, 'The Merchants
of Three Northern English Towns', pp. 16-19. See Swanson, MedievalArtisans, pp. 2-4; Thrupp, Merchant
Class, especially pp. 27-41.
213 am not primarily interested here in the source of conflict, but in how such conflict related to the integration
of the elite.
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contemporary civil thought.
II) Discord and Factionalism
Much attention has been given to violence, discord and unrest in late-medieval towns and
cities.216 However, most of this interest has been directed towards large-scale disturbances,
or has focussed around disturbances between different factions and interest groups within
medieval towns. Such outbreaks of discord and violence are explored in the fmal section
of the thesis. Here, the focus is on squabbles and unrest within the civic elite and the
implications of such fracas for the real and perceived unity of the group.
Unsurprisingly, the period 1476 to 1525 witnessed numerous isolated disputes
between members of York's civic elite, as it did between people at all levels of society.
Interestingly, though, structures such as family, neighbourhood and guild, which have often
been viewed by historians as important in promoting social harmony or unity, were
themselves often the cause of disputes. For example, in 1484, John Tonge (mayor 1477)
issued a king's writ against Richard Thorneton (mayor 1502) who was his nephew by
marriage. The dispute was over a property in Walmgate which had been bequeathed in the
will of Richard Thorneton senior (sheriff 1447), the father-in-law of Tong and the
grandfather of Richard Thorneton junior. 217
 As a result of this action the two men
submitted to arbitration and the disagreement seems to have been relatively successfully
contained. In other cases, however, disagreements might encompass wider family members.
216 See, for example, Nightingale, 'Capitalists, Crafts and Constitutional Change', pp. 3-35; Barron, 'Ralph
Holland and the London Radicals', pp. 160-83; McRee, 'Religious Gilds and Civic Order', pp. 69-97; RB.
Dobson, 'The Risings in York, Beverley and Scarborough', pp. 112-42; A.F. Butcher, 'English Urban Society
and the Revolt of 1381', in Hilton (ed.), The English Rising of 1381, pp. 84-111; C. Dyer, 'Small Town Conflict
in the Later-Middle Ages: Events at Shipston-on-Stour', Urban History 19(1992): 183-210.
217 A (ed.), York House Books, p. 320; Sellers (ed.), YorkMemorandum Boo/c part 2, pp. 296-7. It should
be noted that some legal disputes over property were 'collusive' or fictional and acted as a means of establishing
secure legal titles or final concords which had already been agreed between the two parties. There is no evidence
to suggest the disagreement between Tong and Thorneton was such a case.
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In 1506, Richard Thorneton (by then an alderman) was again involved in a dispute with Alan
Stavely (mayor 1506 and 1519, and also an alderman). Although the cause of the dispute
is unclear, it seems that Thornton's son John, his daughter-in-law Agnes, and Agnes's
brother James Blades (sheriff 1523) all became involved, as did Stavely's brothers (including
William Stavely, chamberlain 1498). Similarly, the role of family members in disputes
involving the elite is also signalled by a case from 1505. According to the House Books an
"affray" occurred at the house of Lady Hancock, widow of Robert Hancock (mayor 1488),
which involved William Wilson (mayor 1513), John White (possibly sheriff in 1510), William
Nettleton (bridge master 1504) and Simon Vicars (mayor 1521).218 As a result of this
dispute Wilson had to spend the night at the mayor's house, while White and others were
committed to the ward of the sheriff John Hall (mayor 1516), and the remaining men were
required to spend the night with the other sheriff, Oliver Middleton (sheriff 1 504).219
Interestingly, the House Books specifically state that while the men were in ward they were
not to be visited by their wives or children 220 Presumably, this was because the authorities
were anxious to prevent the dispute from escalating even further.
Unfortunately, the exact causes and outcomes of the disputes cited are unknown.
However, the House Books are more specific about a dispute between William White
(mayor 1491 & 1505) and the seemingly troublesome Richard Thorneton (mayor 1502) who
were both aldermen and neighbours. 221 The dispute concerned some tenements that were
built and extended by Thorneton, but which adjoined other tenements owned by White. In
particular, Thorneton was accused by White of having allowed his tenement to encroach
218 YCA House Book 9, fol. 21r.
219 Ibid
220 Ibid.
221 YCA, House Book 8, fols. 12 Iv, 113r, 123v.
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onto the street by a foot. Eventually the dispute was settled by the searchers from the crafts
of tailors and carpenters who somewhat unsurprisingly found in favour of Thorneton who
had recently been elected as the city's mayor for the forthcoming year. Perhaps tactlessly,
the corporation also decided that Thorneton should have these tenements rent free for the
forthcoming year in view of the fact that he was "to bear the charge of Mayoralty". 222
 As
well as family and neighbourhood, trade could also be a cause of squabbles among the elite.
For example, in 1482 the alderman William Wells (mayor 1479) proposed to commence an
action of debt against his fellow alderman, William Todd (mayor 1487), over the sale of a
ship. Similarly, in 1489 the mayor, John Harper, was involved in a dispute against John
Metcalf (mayor 1498) over the sale of a pipe of red Gascony wine4
Although all of these disputes remained relatively contained, splits within the elites had
the potential to spark more serious and wide-ranging disturbances. On at least four
occasions between 1476 and 1525, disputes which began within the civic elite threatened
the wider peace and stability of the entire city. 5
 The first such dispute took place in 1482
and seems to have derived from a personal rivalry between Richard York (mayor 1469 &
1482) and Thomas Wrangwish (mayor 1476 and 1484). The origins of this dispute are
unclear but it appears that there was a rivahy between these two men and their supporters
over which of them should be elected to the post of Mayor. The dispute culminated in
widespread rioting during which the Common Bell on Ouse bridge was rung. As a result,
the King intervened ordering the existing mayor to remain in his post for the time being and
222 YCA, House Book 8, fol. 123v. The abuse of power by the elite is examined in greater depth in the final
section on power and authority.
2 At1reed (ed.), York House Books, p. 253.
224 Ibid p. 657.
225 Each of these disputes is examined in greater detail in Part Four of the thesis below, pp. 205-247.
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York and Wrangwish to relinquish their claims to the post. 226 Four years later, in 1486, the
aldermen John Harper (mayor 1489), William Todd (mayor 1487) and John Fereby (mayor
1478 & 1491) were involved in a dispute over seniority and order of precedence in civic
processions, an incident which supports McRee's suggestion that civic ceremonies could
serve to foster division as well as unity amongst their participants.227
 Although this squabble
seems to have been contained within the civic elite, it clearly disturbed the internal harmony
of the group and eventually resulted in the Earl of Northumberland becoming involved.228
The next dispute comprised an ongoing conflict over the misuse of official power during the
period 1498 to 1516, which involved Alan Stavely (mayor 1506 & 1519), William Stavely
(chamberlain 1498) and various other members of the elite including William Barker (sheriff
1483), John Gilyot (mayor 1490 & 1503) and John Birkhede (mayor 1507).229 As will be
explored in the final section of the thesis, there are indications that this dispute at times
became tied up with battles over access to power within the wider enfranchised
commuthty.° The final dispute in 1516 involved the entire council of aldermen when it
became divided over the election of a new alderman.' As will be shown below, this dispute
led to widespread rioting within the city and again required the intervention of the king to
restore peace.
Such disputes were clearly problematic as they held the potential to undermine the
22 Attreed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 247-8 & 70 1-2. As is discussed in Part Four below, Wrangwish was
a colourful and controversial figure within the city. It is possible that these two men supported opposing sides
in the Wars of the Roses.
7 McRee, 'Unity or Division?', p. 189.
Atireed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, pp. 476,479,481, 512, 529 & 531.
YCA, House Book 8, fols. 40v, 74r-v, 75r, 95r, 97r, 102r & 109v; 9, fols. 2v, 28v, 38v, 39r, 40v-4 lv & 44r;
Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 144; Raine (ed.), York Civic Records 3: 51.
230 See Part Four, pp. 205-247 below.
n Raine (ed.), YorkCivicRecords, 3:51-2,54 & 55-9.
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status and authority of the civic elite. First, a disgruntled populace could easily capitalise
on disputes within the corporation as a means of airing their own grievances, thus
threatening the peace and established order of the city. Second, the image of integration
provided an important buttress to the city's jealously guarded autonomy. As McRee has
demonstrated for medieval Norwich, disorder was apt to lend a city a reputation for "lak of
good and vertuous gouemaunce", thereby prompting the crown to revoke the city's liberties
and impose an external governor. 232 Consequently, historians have viewed unity before the
crown as particularly important.3
Both dangers are well illustrated for York in a dispute over the election of a new
alderman following the death of John Shaw (mayor 1510) in 1516 Whereas five of the
existing aldermen (including the mayor, who claimed a double vote) wanted John Norman
(mayor 1524), six others voted for William Cure (sheriff 1511), and one voted for Simon
Vicars (mayor 1521). There ensued a "gret debate and devysion ...not only emonges them
self bot also amonges many other cytyzyns of the Citie" over whether Norman or Cure
should be elected 235 As the House Books noted, a dispute that had begun within the
aldermanic circle soon escalated into "dyvers grett notts and affrayez to the gret
disterbaunce and the brech of the king's peace", which was clearly detrimental to the
stability of the city. 236 That the divisions within the council of aldermen created or
intensified problems within the civic elite at large is further suggested by a dispute over the
z3 B. MeRee, 'Peacemaking and its Limits in Late Medieval Norwich', English HistoricalReview 109 (1994):
831-2. See also C. Barton, 'The Quarrel of Richard II with London, 1392-7', in F.RJi Du Boulay and C.M.
Barton (eds.), The Reign ofRichardll. Essays in Honour ofMay McKisack (London University Press: London,
1971), pp. 173-201; llill,MedievalLincoln, p. 290.
Thrupp,Merchant Class, p. 99; Shaw, Creation of a Community, p. 187.
234 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 3: 51-3.
235 Ibid., 3: 52.
236 Ibid.
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sherifFs feast soon afterwards. In December, William Barker (mayor 1525 & 32), one of
the sheriffs of York, announced that he would not fund a dinner for the city council as was
customary. Instead, the other sheriff John Wederall (sheriff 1516) was called upon to do
so, whereupon he declared that he "utterly deneyed to make dynar bot oonly within his own
housse and that he wold not byd none to dynar with hym bot a certan of the Aldermen and
othure frends". 7 Presumably, Wederall supported one faction within the aldermanic circle
and was only willing to play host to this group of men.
As well as threatening the unity of the wider civic elite and the peace and stability of
the city, the aldermanic dispute also had ramifications for York's autonomy. On hearing of
the disturbances the king sent an investigative commission to York headed by the archbishop
of York. The commission perceiving "the gret dyvysion and part takyng between the forsaid
Aldermen likely to be the subversion of the said Citie", declared the election void and
banned Norman and Cure from standing for the post? 8 Instead, the archbishop was
appointed to choose someone who he "thynke able and most convenyent for that rome", and
the aldermen were required to promise "to be aiway from hensforth in oon unite and
concord". 9
 Further, those aldermen leading the two factions were imprisoned in the Fleet
prison.240
By January 1517, any appearance of division among the aldermen had largely
vanished. Indeed, it is possible to speculate that the group had actually become more united
in the face of a new common enemy: the king. Another alderman, Bertram Dawson (mayor
237Ibid, 3:53-4. As a result, the archbishop who had been acting on behalf of the king throughout the aldennanic
dispute, ruled that no sheriffs feast should be held that year.
238 Ibid
239Ibid., 3: 53.
2401bid., 3: 56-7.
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1511) died before the archbishop had time to appoint Sha.w's successor? 4' The corporation
took advantage of this opportunity to solve their differences by appointing both Norman and
Cure to the council. They also appointed as mayor William Neleson (mayor 1500), one of
the imprisoned ringleaders in the dispute.242
 Meanwhile, Thomas Burton (mayor 1522), the
most senior of the city's chamberlains and a past recorder of York was sent to London to
plead for the support of the archbishop. 243
 However, by this stage the damage was already
done and the city's right to self-government hung in the balance. The King responded to
the elections by sending the council a furious letter stating that the council "nothyng
regardyng our said commandement in that behalf have contrarie therunto of your 'wilfuil
mynds" chosen Norman and Cure as aldermen, and Neleson as mayor, to his "gret mervaylle
and dyspleasour". 244
 The king demanded that John Dogeson (mayor 1508 & 17) be
appointed mayor of the city instead, and that all of the aldermen, citizens and commons of
the city were to "accept hyni in the sayd ofice and to be unto hym obedyent in all thynges"
or else "abyde our dyspleasour and answer therefore unto us at your uttermost perylF'.245
Further, two new aldermen were to be chosen in place of Norman and Cure?
As the described dispute demonstrates, division amongst York's civic ocials could
have serious ramifications for the stability and autonomy of the entire city. Moreover, as
will be argued, unity and integration was seen as synonymous with strong leadership during
Ibid., 3 54. This selection took place in the presence of the King's conunissioners "seyng and lokyng upon
the ordie of eleccion".
242 ibid., 3: 54-5.
Ibid. 3: 55.
4 1bid.,3: 56-7.
245 1b1d,,3: 57.
246 
These orders were accepted by the council 'who appointed Simon Vicars (mayor 1521) and Paul Ciillowe
(znayar 1522) as aldemuni. They then sent a serious of grovelling letters to the archbishop apologising for their
earlier actions; Ibid, 3: 59-61.
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the medieval period. 247
 It was therefore vitally important to the integrity and authority of
late-medieval elites that unity and integration, or the illusion of these, be both constructed
and defended. As Stephen Rigby has argued, "consensus did not simply exist; it had to be
created and maintained" 248
ifi) Ritual Unity
Those arguing for the essential stability of late-medieval urban society have focussed on the
importance of the role of feasting, celebration and ritual in reducing tensions and increasing
hannony and community. 249
 For example, Phythian-Adams and Mervyn James have both
placed emphasis on the role of ritualised performances such as Corpus Christi cycles in
promoting 'cohesion' and 'social integration' in late-medieval towns.25° More recently,
though, this view has been challenged by historians who argue that far from promoting
'social wholeness', such rituals actually created exclusivity, and occasionally incited
conflict.25 ' Clearly, York's annual Corpus Christi plays, together with civic processions
such as the annual riding of boundaries, played an important role in projecting the unity, as
well as the status, of the civic elite. That the corporation appreciated the importance of
these activities is reflected in the frequently repeated order that all civic officials attend such
247 See A. Black, Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to the
Present (Methuen: London, 1984), pp. 68-9; Shaw, Creation of a Community, pp. 176 & 186-8.
248 Rigby, 'Urban 'Oligarchy', p. 67.
249 See in particular, Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City.
250 Phythian..Adams, 'Ceremony and the Citizen', pp. 238-64; James, 'Ritual, Drama and Social Body', pp. 16-
47
See for example, S. Lindenbaum, 'Rituals of Exclusion: Feasts and Plays of the English Religious Fraternities'
in M. Twycross (ed.), Festive Drama: Papers from the Sixth Triennial Conference of the International Society
for the Study ofMedieval Theatre (Brewer: Woodbridge, 1996), pp. 54-65.
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occasions alongside their fellow councillors. 252 The visual unity of the civic elite of York
was further enhanced on urban ceremonial Occasions through the use of a livery, a practice
employed by other urban corporations. 253 Indeed, the role of urban ceremonial and drama
in the construction of "social unity within a hierarchy", has already received a considerable
degree of attention from other medievalists.254
By contrast, very little research has been carried out on the importance of
performative unity for late-medieval elites outside of the area of drama and civic ceremony.
In particular, little attention has been paid to the role of everyday or secular ritual and
ritualised actions within civic elites. However, Shaw's pioneering work on the elite of late-
medieval Wells demonstrates the potential richness of this area. 255 It is in literature on
medieval guilds that everyday ritual in towns has been most fblly explored. Both McRee and
Rosser have examined in much detail the role of guild feasts, ritual actions and social codes
in lessening tensions and increasing integration among guild members and civic elites of late-
medieval towns. 256 In particular, Rosser has stressed the active and dynamic purpose of
rituals in his work on medieval guilds. He has argued that, far from being "mere optimistic
symbol(s) of idealized community", rituals should instead be viewed as processes through
252 See for example, Attreed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, pp. 5, 40, 281, 293, 674, 691; Raine (ed.), York Civic
Records 2: 96 & 146-7; YCA, House Book 7, fols. 12v & 40r; House Book 8, fol. 76r.
u3 For the use of civic liveries in York, see Attreed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 250, 259,287-8, 289,478,482,
584, 679 & 691; Raine (ed.), York Civic Records 2: 106, 146-7, 155, 165, 169, 170, 177, 184-5; 3: 15 &30.
For the importance of liveries for civic elites and guild members elsewhere, see Dyer, Worcester in the Sixteenth
Centuiy, p. 196; Rigby, 'Urban 'Oligarchy", p. 66; R.F.E. Weissman, Ritual Brotherhood in Renaissance
Florence (Academic Press: New York, 1982), pp. 82-4; McRee, 'Unity or Division?', pp. 192-3. York
councillors were sometimes reluctant to adopt this liveiy over that of their guild as is indicated by the constant
re-issuing of ordinances governing the dress of coundillors during public occasions. Similarly, civic officials in
Exeter also had to be reminded of this duty; MacCaifrey, Exeter, 1540-1 640, p. 41.
254 Rigby, 'Urban 'Oligarchy", p. 67; See also Sacks, 'Celebrating Authority in Bristol 1475-1640', pp. 187-
223; Zemon Davis, 'The Sacred and the Body Social', pp. 40-70; Muir, Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice;
essays in Hanawalt and Reyerson (eds.), City and Spectacle.
255 Shaw, Creation of a Community, pp. 177-215.
256 McRee, 'Unity or Division?', pp. 189-207; Rosser, 'Going to the Fraternity Feast, pp. 430-46; McRee,
'Religious Gilds and Civic Order', pp. 69-97.
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which relations could be reconstructed and renegotiated. 257 Ritual was used to "define,
protect and alter" social relations. 258 Similarly, McRee has argued that the collective
activities of governing guilds, such as feasting, worshipping and marching in procession,
brought civic leaders together in friendly circumstances and emphasized the ties that bound
them to one another. 259
 Further, he also stresses the importance of the more active
mechanisms such as arbitration through which guilds could act to diffuse existing conflicts.
Although the evidence does not suggest that late-medieval York possessed a
'governing guild' which catered exclusively for the city's civic elite, it could be argued that
the elite itself utilised guild-like rituals and language in order to promote harmony and unity
among its members. 26° It is likely that ritualised activities such as feasting, and the use of
language and social codes, may have served as mechanisms through which alliances could
be renegotiated, differences overcome and relationships consolidated within civic elites, just
as they were within medieval guilds. 'Ritualised actions', meaning the ritualised or
formalised use and invocation of rules, language, gestures, feasting and drinking, were
important to the civic elite in two respects. First, they served to project an impression of
unity or integration to the population at large, allowing the city's elite to present itself to the
rest of the community as a united group.' They enabled the elite to create a "unique social
identity for its brethren", something that would have been particularly important in York,
given the wide variety of trades and occupations from which the civic elite were drawn.262
257 Ros	 'Going to the Fraternity Feast', p. 432.
258 Weissman, Ritual Brotherhood, p. ix.
9 McRee, 'Religious Gilds and Civic Order', p. 96.
26000 the much neglected topic of 'governing guilds' see McRee, 'Religious Guilds and Civic Order', pp. 69-97;
Membership of York's Corpus Christi Guild and the Mercers' Guild is discussed in Part Four below, pp. 254-
265.
261 McRee, 'Unity or Division?', p. 190.
262 McRec, 'Religious Gilds and Civic Order', p. 97.
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As McRee has argued, such portrayal of unity was desirable as it served to frustrate the
ambitions of citizens who "depended upon splits within the leadership to advance their
position"? Second, the rituals also served to forge a sense of common identity among the
members of the civic elite.
This section begins by considering the rules and codes which aimed to protect the
unity and integration of the civic elite. Throughout medieval Europe, guilds and urban
governments sought to lessen factionalism and increase integration by urging members not
to 'wrong' one another in word or action? In many guilds and corporations this ethos was
embodied in constitutions. It was common for guilds like the Guild of St. Thomas of
Canterbury in Lynn to fine or expel members who "bere obir any falshede, thefte or wroung
on hand". 5
 Other guilds refused "eny riotour" or "ober contekaf'. 2 Civic officials were
often subject to similar controls. For example, in Exeter civic officials were not allowed to
insult each other, while in Worcester words of reproof were forbidden.267 As we have
already seen, York was no exception in this respect. In 1500 the House Books recorded
that by
An auncient ordinaunce. . .any Alderman or any other of the xxiiij. . .havyng and
unsyttyng words, langage or wordez callyng another fals, untrewe, or thoughtyng hym
or makyng comparyson with his brother or felowe. . .to forfett and lese xli... 268
263 Ibid p. 96.
264 Black, Gui ids and Civil Society in European Political Thought, p. 70.
J. Toulmin Smith (ed.), English Gilds, Early English Text Society, original series 40 (1870, reprinted 1963),
p.48; see also pp. 11, 94-5 & 100.
2 Ibid.,p. 4.
267 MacCaffrey, Exeter, 1540-1 640, p.40; Dyer, Worcester in the Sixteenth Centuty, p. 191.
2 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 158; Aflreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 305.
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It was argued in Part Two that such legislation against slander and backbiting is likely
to have reflected notions of seemly behaviour or decorum expected of certain groups,
particularly civic officials. 269 However, such legislation also can be seen to have performed
two additional functions. First, it aimed to lessen discord within the elite. Second, it was
designed to promote an illusion of unity to those outside the group. It is notable that in
York the ordinance of 1500 makes special reference to arguments occurring in the presence
of the mayor, at council meetings, in processions or at "any other assemble". 27° This
suggests that the elite was anxious to avoid public displays of discord which might
undermine the unity, and therefore the authority, of the elite. Similarly, medieval guild
ordinances forbade wrong doing against fellow members and expelled maintainers of
quarrels "by whom be fraternite myght be ensclaundred".27'
The desire to keep discord within the bounds of elite groups was almost universal in
late-medieval towns. Guild organisations commonly forbade fellow members from seeking
external redress until after they had attempted to solve a dispute internally. 272 For example,
the ordinances of the guild of St. Katherine in Norwich stated that:
if eny discorde be bytwen bretheren and sisteren, first yat discorde shal be shewede
to other bretheren and sisteren of ye gilde, and by hem acorde shal be made, Wit may
be skilfully. Ande if he mowen nought bene so acorded, it shal be lefulle to hem to
gone to ye comoun lawe.. •273
269 See above, pp. 96-108.
270 Rame (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 158.
271 Toulinin Smith (ed.), English Gilds, p. 4.
272 See McRee, 'Religious Gilds and the Regulation of Behaviour', pp. 122-3.
273 Toulinin Smith (ed.), English Gilds, p. 21; see also pp. 4, 55, 76, 84, 98 & 115.
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Civic corporations often had similar rules. In 1502 the York House Books recorded that:
if ther be any dette, dewte, trespase, offense or any other cause of grieff hereafter
appyn betwix any of the xij, xxiiij or betweix any other fraunchest man shall not from
hensfurth compleyn to the kyngs grace or to any lord or other person nor sew any
court at London or any other place tefore al suche cause and matere be shewed to the
Maier. •274
Although the ordinance covered all freemen, as well as coundillors, the penalties for
breaking the ordinance were much greater for men who held civic office. Whereas failure
to comply incurred a 40s fine for freemen, for members of the twenty-four the fine was lOu
and for aldermen 2Oli. 275
 Again, this legislation was probably aimed both at discouraging
discord and preserving an appearance of unity to those outside the circle. However, it is
also likely that guilds and civic governments invoked such rules in an attempt to avoid
outside interference which, as we have seen, could threaten the autonomy of the group as
a whole.
The desire to keep disputes within the confines of exclusive groups also led to codes
of secrecy. York councillors, like those in Exeter and Wells, were forbidden to disclose
matters discussed at council meetings to those who were not councillors. 276 In 1484,
William Tayte (sheriff 1478) was expelled from the council of twenty-four for disclosing the
274 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 173.
275 1bid.,2: 173.
276 See Attreed (ed.), York House Book.i, p. 465; W.T. MacCafiley, Exeter, 1540-1 640: The Growth of an
English County Town, 2nd edition (Harvard University Press: Cambridge Mass., 1975), p. 41; Shaw, Creation
ofa Community, p. 186. For similar rules in guilds, see Toulmin Smith (ed.), English Gilds, pp. 55, 58, 61,65,
69,76, 79, 81 &92.
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"secretes and privetes" of the council chamber. 277
 Such codes protecting the secrecy of
council business allowed elites to push through sensitive or inflammatory legislation or
elections with a minimum of external resistance. Unpopular decisions could be presented
asfaits accomplis. 2 Further, they helped to preserve the external or perceived unity of the
elite by hiding any dissent within the group from external view.279
Interestingly, the privileging of information also took place within the civic elite of
York. Highly contentious issues were often discussed only by the council of aldermen rather
than by all of the city's councillors. 28° For example, the election and dismissal of aldermen
in York, which (as we have seen) was often a contentious issue within the aldermanic circle
as well as the wider population, was discussed only "when the xxiiij were departed".28'
Thus, in 1499, only the aldermen were party to a disagreement within their group over
whether the dismissed alderman, Thomas Scotton (mayor 1492), should be re-instated to
the council. 2
 As well as promoting an image of unity and discouraging discord from
spilling over into the wider population, such codes of intimacy may have created "a special
knowledge that separated members from non-members". 2 The act of sharing privileged
277 Aeed (ed.), York House Books, p. 339.
278 Mthcegh the success of this strategy is open to question.
279 It is interesting to note that historians have sometimes acted as accomplices in this matter. Many of the
sections omitted by Raine in his editions of the York House Books consist of disputes within the civic elite!
280 See Shaw who has argued that any dissent in Wells was discussed in private first; Shaw, Creation of a
Community, pp. 187-8.
'YCA, House Book 8, fol. 45r.
282 Ibid. Whereas most of the aldermen thought that Scotton should be re-admitted to the council, John Gilyot
(mayor 1490 and 1503) and John Stockdale (mayor 1501) disagreed, and said "as yet he shuld not". Scotton was
a troublesome figure throughout the latter stages of his civic career. He initially refused to accept the office of
alderman and was subsequently warned and discharged on several occasions for failing to attend meetings
(although he refused to give up his office) before finally being discharged from office in November 1500. YCA,
House Book 7 fols. 4r. & 9r, Attreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 536; Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 159-
60.
283 Weissman,Ritual Brotherhood, p. 82. See Shaw who suggests that legal demands of freemen fostered a sense
of the community's "specialness"; Shaw, Creation of a Community, p. 158.
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knowledge no doubt served as a source of common identity and as a means of underlining
the exclusivity of the elite. The secrecy of this information would also have served to
construct a knowledge-based power relationship between office-holders and non office-
holders, as well as a 'knowledge hierarchy' inside the elite itself. This 'knowledge
hierarchy' mirrored the divisions that existed within the elite in terms of levels of social
integration and occupational structure. However, it could be argued that the rules
governing disputes, litigation and secrecy should be viewed within the context of wider
discourses of unanimity and communal harmony.
Anthony Black has argued that throughout the medieval period an essential feature
of civic ethos was the idea of the city as a corporate community capable of expressing a
unified will.284
 Similarly, Susan Reynolds has also stressed the high value placed on civic
unity during the medieval period. 285 A discourse of unanimity is clearly evident throughout
the York House Books. Elections were commonly recorded as being by "unaninii at
communi omni assensu et concensu" or of "one hole and common assent". 286
 Similarly,
ordinances were recorded as having been "determyned and fully assented and agreed" to,
or as having been reached (sometimes "after long concideracons had among theym") by
"oon hole mynde, will and content". 287 York was not unusual in this respect: terms and
phrases such as 'unison' and 'unanimous assent' were also used in other late-medieval
Black, Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought, pp. 68-9. Notions of organic unity alongside
hierarchy, particularly as represented by comparison to the human body, will not be considered here. However,
see Black, Political Thought in Europe, pp. 14-17.
2 Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities, pp. 190-1.
Atfreed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, pp.61 & 115. See also YCA, House Book 7, fols. I 5r, 19v, 47r-v & 1 14r,
8, fols. 1 lr, 13v, 38r, 99v.
YCA, House Book 7, fols. 20r, 61r & 108r. See also fols. 12v, 89v; 9, fol. 22r; Attreed (ed.), YorkHouse
Books, pp. 45, 46,78, 215, 216.
186
towns such as Grimsby and Wells. 288 That this may have been standard throughout
European towns is perhaps indicated not only by widespread practice, but also by the
existence of a thirteenth-century diplomatic phrase book which recommended the use of
phrases such as 'unanimity of council' 289 Anthony Black has suggested that regardless of
whether such language was merely a rhetorical device or something more expressive of
reality, it still reflected a general belief in the organic unity of society and the perceived need
to promote communal harmony in the face of familial and factional conflict.290
Reynolds has suggested that consensus or unanimity was particularly important in
elections as they were supposed to express the will of the community as a whole.29'
Consequently, it has been suggested that during the medieval period unanimity was seen to
legitimise actions and decisions in a way that majority did not. 292 The importance of the
wider community agreeing with decisions taken on their behalf by the elite is well illustrated
by the election of John Hastings to the post of esquire of the sword in 1485. This was
recorded in the House Books as being "answered and granted" by the commons "with there
hole voice.. .without contradiction of any man".293
The desire for unanimity no doubt lay in part behind the frequently repeated
requirement in York that aldermen should attend meetings and arrive on time. 294 Failure to
attend meetings would have served to demean the status of civic office and would have
Rigby, Medieval Grimsby, p.1 10; Shaw, Creation of a Community, p. 187.
289 Cited in Black, Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought, pp. 68-9.
290 Ibid
291 Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities, pp. 190-1.
292 Shaw, Creation of a Community, p. 186.
293 Attreed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, pp. 355-6. This subject is considered in greater depth in Part Four of the
thesis, see pp. 205-247 below.
294 See Attreed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, pp. 60, 465,674; Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 190 & 3: 15;
YCA, House Book 9, fols. 5 & 75.
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constituted a breach of aldennanic obligations. Interestingly, the House Books sometimes
record the assent of councillors who were absent from meetings. For example, in February
1482, it was recorded that "Thorns Neilson, Johannes Gylliot, Johannes Marshall adhunc
absentes concordi sunt as omniurn infrascriptum". 2 The civic elite of later-medieval York
was also noticeably reluctant to hold elections or to swear in new officials in the absence of
one or more of the aldermen. For example, in 1486, it was decided that a new recorder
should not be chosen until the city's MPs had returned from London.297
The consequences of non-attendance of meetings are well illustrated in the case of the
dismissal of alderman Thomas Scotton (mayor 1492). Much of the discussion and
disagreement over the proposed reinstatement of Scotton in 1499 centred on the legitimacy
of the original decision to discharge him, which was taken in the absence of some of the
aldermen. As a result of this case it was ordained that the mayor "shall not elect of newe
ne discharge non alderman without thassent and consent of x or viij of his brether at the
leest".298
Unanimity and the lack of discord were also viewed as important as part of the wider
ideal of communal harmony. 2 Factionalism and discord were seen both as harmful to a
city's stability and authority, and as inherently immoral or sinful, violating the Christian
ethics of peace and friendship. Medieval guild ideals of brotherhood, friendship and love
For example, the reason for Thomas Scotton' s dismissal was given as his failure to give "ayde, assistence and
attendaunce as he aught to do", and the fact that he had "long stand an Alderman and brother ...and had not don
his duete in that rome" (my emphasis); Raine (ed.), York Civic Records 2: 160. Attendance at council meetings
was also compulsory in medieval Worcester; Dyer, Worcester in the Sixteenth Centuiy, p. 196.
296 Thomas Nelson (mayor 1454 & 1465), John Gilyot (mayor 1490 & 1503) and John Marshall (mayor 1467
& 1480), 'who were absent, agree to everything written within'. Atireed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, p. 248.
297 Attreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 469. See also p. 637. YCA, House Book 9, fols. 63v & 76r.
298 Raise (ed.), York CivicRecords, 2: 141. This ordinance was repeated in 1514, see ibid., 3:43-4.
299 See Black, Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought, pp. 69-70; idem, Political Thought in
Europe, pp. 17-18.
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appear to go back before 13OO.°° All three continued to be invoked as civic values
throughout Europe during the later-medieval period. 30 ' Black argues that, as with ideals of
peace and common good, these civic values were the essential glue of unity which promoted
stable government and which served to counterbalance potentially disruptive forces such as
family and class.302
Such values were often invoked by guilds in ordinances or oaths of admission. For
example, the ordinances of the Guild of St. Katherine in Aldersgate, London, record that
upon admission to the guild, newcomers were to "in tokenynge of loue, charite, and
pes. . .schule kusse eueri other .. Similarly, the first rule of the Guild of St. John the
Baptist in York was that members should cherish each other in brotherly love. 304 A
discourse of love, brotherhood and friendship is also evident on the part of the civic elite of
later-medieval York. For example, it was customary for sheriffs of the city to provide the
mayor with the cloth for his civic livery, and this is recorded as having been carried out by
the sheriffs with "lu1jng worde". 305 Similarly, Thomas Clerk managed to avoid being fined
by the elite after refusing the post of sheriff in 1523, in consideration of his "kynde wordes
& lufyng demeanor". 306 However, this type of language was most commonly used in the
York House Books following disputes within the elite. At such times York officials were
300 For the invocation of the ideals of brotherhood, friendship and love in early-modern guilds and communes,
see Black, Guilds and Civic Society in European Political Thought, pp. 57-60.
°' Ibid., pp. 69-70; idem, Political Thought in Europe, p. 18.
3°'Black, Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought, pp. 69-70.
303 Touhnin Smith (ed.), English Gilds, p.6. For the symbolic importance of kisses in the initiation rituals of late
medieval guilds, see McRee, 'Unity or Division?', pp. 190-1.
304 Touhnin Smith (ed.), English Gilds, p. 146.
305 YCA, House Book 10, fol. 109v.
306 Ibid., fol. 75r.
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ordered to be "loufyng as brether to gedder" or "fill and loufyng frends".307
'Brotherhood' was invoked far more frequently in the York House Books than either
love or friendship. Like members of medieval guilds, York aldermen were referred to as
"brothers", presumably in order to convey or promote unity and conviviality. 308
 This
language was also employed by the elite in non-official contexts. For example, John
Norman (mayor 1524) left money at his death in 1525 for a dinner to be made for his
"brother aldermen".309 However, kinship terms do not appear to have been widely used in
York for men below the council of aldermen. One rare example is the will of Thomas
Dawson who requests that his "brothers" in the council of twenty-four attend his burial.310
However, as will be argued in the final chapter, Dawson's will was unusual for reasons other
than his choice of language. He was also the only member of the council of twenty-four
during the period 1476 to 1525 who requested a civic funeral in his will. It is possible that
in requesting the presence of his brothers, Dawson was not only asserting his civic identity
but also following in a family tradition: His father Bertram Dawson (mayor 1511) made the
same request before him, although on this occasion he requested the presence of his
"brothers" in the council of aldermen.31'
Social boundaries which both emphasised internal unity and social exclusivity would
have been established through the usage of the language of love, friendship and brotherhood,
as well as the discourses of governance discussed in Part Two of the thesis, notably the
almost exclusive use of terms such as discreet or venerable. Moreover, the limitation of a
307 Ibid., 8, fol. 92v; 7, fol. 52. See also 9. Fol. 28v.
See Atireed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, pp. 294, 320; Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 140-1, 156, 160; 3:
6 & 31; YCA, House Book 9, fol. 19r.
309 B1HR, Probate Register, 9, fol. 327r.
310 Ibid., 11, fol. 429.
" Ibid. 9, fol. 39r.
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language of kinship to members of the city's council of aldermen would have further divided
them from the rest of York's civic elite, and would have served to further enhance the
cohesion of this group. Here again we have another example of the notion of an elite within
the elite.
Interestingly, the discussed language was not simply reserved for the aldermen, its
usage was also extended to the aldermen's wives, who were referred to as "sisters". For
example, in his will of 1537, John Burton, one of the city's mace bearers, referred to "my
lord mayre with his brether, my ladye maresse with her sustress". 312 Similarly, Johanne
Harper, the wife of John Harper (mayor 1489), made reference in her will to "the mayre and
his breder mares and hyr susters". 313
 It could be argued that the use of kinship terms for the
wives of aldermen further underlines the role of wives in the integration of the highest civic
officials.
So far this section has considered usage of language in the ritual construction of unity
among the civic elite of later medieval York. Far from being a purely rhetorical device, the
repetition of terms of love, friendship and brotherhood reconstructed mentalities. However,
language was not the only ritual action that served to promote communal harmony among
the elite of later-medieval York. For Rosser, one of the most important roles of medieval
guilds was their function as mechanisms through which changes in the 'social structure'
could be negotiated and overcome. 314 Communal drinking and eating would have served
three purposes. First, as McRee and Reynolds have suggested, annual feasts were one of
the most ancient ways of sustaining a spirit of fraternity, and promoting unity and good
312 Bu goes on to list the "sheryfse with ther wyfes and all the xxiiij with the chamberlanes and ther wyfes".
BIER, Probate Register 11, fol. 249.
Ibid., 8, foL 98v-99.
314 Rosser, 'Communities of Parish and Guild', Pp. 29-55.
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fellowship. 315
 Indeed, annual banquets were often intended for "the promotion of love and
charity among the members". 316
 Additionally, as Rosser has argued, feasting offered
opportunities for the establishment, re-enforcement and re-negotiation of relationships
between guild members, particularly those of different occupations and social status.317
Finally, feasting like oath-taking might be regarded as a 'defining activity', in that it served
to underline who was 'in' and who was 'out' of the group.318
The festivities associated with the election of new civic officials were perhaps of
particular importance to the elite of later-medieval York. For example, following the
election enrolment of Robert Wilde (mayor 1527) to the council of aldermen in 1522,
"brede, wyne and ayle" was brought into the council chamber "and there the same Maire,
his Brethem, Sheriffs and all the affore namyd did lovingly drink togyder in tokyng of luf
after their auncient custome". 319
 Not only did such acts of conviviality serve to reinforce
friendship and unity among the elite, but they bound those men associated with the election
of officials into the initiation rites for new members. York's sheriff's feast is particularly
interesting in this respect. The new sheriffs were required to ride round the city at some
point between their election day on the feast of St. Michael Archangel, and Christmas each
year reading aloud the King's proclamation, and they were required to host a dinner for the
mayor and councillors. 32° Upon carrying out these duties the sheriffs had to present
315 McRee, 'Unity or Division?', p. 191; Reynolds, English Medieval Towns, p. 180. See also Rosser, 'Going
to the Fraternity Feast', pp. 430-46.
316 Ro	 'Going to the Fraternity Feast', p. 431. The Guild of St Thomas the Martyr in Oxford stated that the
purpose of their annual feast was to promote brotherly love; MeRee, 'Unity or Division?', p. 191.
317 Rosser, 'Going to the Fraternity Feast', pp. 431-3.
318 Ibid., p. 431.
319 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 3: 84. See also YCA, House Book 8, fol. 122r.
320 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 162, 179; 3: 10, 53-4; 63, 75, 85; YCA, House Book 8, fol. 122r. F.
Drake, Eboracum: Or the Histoiy andAntiquizies of the City of York (Bowyer: London, 1736), pp. 196-7.
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themselves on the following day when they took the oath to become members of the council
of twenty-four. In contrast, on the election of the city's chamberlain it was customary for
the outgoing officials to treat the initiates to a dinner or breakfast.32'
The burial of aldermen was also viewed as an important ritual occasion for the
members of the élite. 3
 Attendance by the mayor and aldermen at the funeral of one of their
number seems to have been standard in late-medieval York, although it is unknown whether
such attendances were compulsory, as it was in Worcester. 323 This practice is revealed both
in the wills of civic officials and in the city's House Books. For example, on the death of the
mayor, John Petty, in 1508, the House Books record that his body was "nobly entered at
the pariche church.. .with the swerd and mase born by the esquyers afor the body and corse
and sex Aldermen beryng the sayd corse. .". Similarly, the body of the mayor John
Fereby, who died in 1491, was also carried to the church by six of the aldermen, preceded
by the sword and mace. The aldermen John Rasen (sheriff 1515) and John Shaw (mayor
1510) each left money in their wills for the aldermen who would bear their bodies to the
church, interestingly, so did Shaw's widow. 3 Obviously, burial rituals were concerned with
asserting the status of the deceased as much as with confirming the status or unity of the
group as a whole. 326 Indeed, it was customary during the medieval period for the body of
the deceased to be accompanied or borne by men or women of a similar status, and
321 YCA, House Book 9, fol. 65v.
322 In medieval Wells, wives of the city's burgesses took part in a meal hosted by the mayor's wife while the
mayor Ireated the burgesses to a feast in the city's common hail; Shaw, Creation of a Community, p. 200. There
is no evidence for a similar activity taking place in York.
323 Dyer, Worcester in the Sixteenth Centuiy, p. 196
324 Rnjjie (ed.), York Civic Records 3: 25.
BIHR, Probate Register 9, fols. 383 (Rasen), 26 (Shaw); Probate Register 11, fol. 278 (Shaw).
326 See for example, R. Dinn, 'Death and Rebirth in Late Medieval Buiy St Edmunds', in S. Basset (ed.), Death
in Towns: Urban Responses to the Dying and the Dead, 100-1600 (Leicester University Press: Leicester, 1992),
p. 155.
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sixteenth-century heraldic regulations dictated that the principal mourners should be of the
same sex and status as the deceased. 327 Further, as with the feasts and ridings discussed
above, the procession of the civic regalia ahead of the corpse that was carried and
accompanied by the aldermen, would have acted to reassert visually the status and unity of
the civic elite to any onlookers.
Edward Muir has stressed the role of rituals of death in the sustenance of the social
community of the living. 328
 He suggests that one of the main functions of funeral rites was
to "reassert the ties of kinship among survivors". 329
 For York's aldermanic circle, their
quasi and real ties of kinship would have been reasserted not only through attendance at the
funeral, but also through the participation in the post funeral feast. It was also common for
London livery companies to hold such feasts following the funeral of one of their
members. 33° In his will of 1525, the alderman John Norman (mayor 1524) left money for
his executors to make a "worshipful" dinner for his "brother" aldermen of the city and
"other such worshipful persons as they shall think best to have there". 33 For the civic elite
it is clear that on these occasions the ritual family included aldermen's wives as well as the
aldermen themselves. John Burton, the city's mace bearer, requested in his will the presence
at his funeral of the mayor and his 'brothers', the mayoress and her 'sisters', the sheriffs and
their wives, and the chamberlains and the twenty-four with their wives. 332 Similarly, Jane
Harper, the widow of John Harper (mayor 1489) left money for spices and wine for a dirge
C. Gittings, 'Urban Funerals in Late Medieval England', in Bassett (ed.), Death in Towns, p. 177.
328 E Muir, Ritual in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997), pp. 44-52.
329 Ibid, p. 46. See Dinn, 'Death and Rebirth in Late medieval Bury St Edmunds', p. 157.
330 Gittings, 'Urban Funerals in Late Medieval England', pp. 175-6.
BIHR, Probate Register 9, fol. 327 (Norman).
332 Ibid. fol. 249.
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for the mayor, his brothers and the mayoress and her sisters. 333 Unlike occasions such as the
sheriffs' feast, funerals may also have served to reinforce the image of the elite as a
'community' composed both of serving officials and of past officials who had since died.
However, while it is plausible to suggest that communal drinking and feasting were
identified as a means of promoting unity, harmony and brotherhood within the civic elite,
the reality was often less harmonious. Civic officials were not always happy to put aside
their differences and go along with acts of conviviality. Indeed, it may be wondered whether
civic feasts occasionally stuffed up more trouble than they solved. The sheriffs' feast seems
to have been particularly problematic in this respect. It was an expense that many sheriffs
seemed less than happy to take on, as is evident from the frequency with which sheriffs were
fined for failing in this duty. 334 Further, expense was not the only issue. As we have seen,
in 1516, one of the sheriffs refused to give a feast for the whole of civic elite, preferring
instead to invite only "certan of the Aldermen and othure frends". 335 An event which was
intended to revitalise conviviality and unity among the group was instead used to opposite
ends. Few other acts could so pointedly have served to assert divisions and animosity within
the elite. Even the funerals of aldermen were not sacred in this respect. The House Books
record that at the burial of Thomas Scotton in 1503, the alderman William Nelson (mayor
1500) accused the mayor, John Gilliot, of doing him wrong and used other 'unsittyng
Ibid., fol. 98v-99.
See Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 162; 3: 27. The civic authorities come across as somewhat cold-
hearted in their discussions over who should pay for the Sheriffs' feast of 1504. A couple of days before the feast
it was reported that Oliver Middleton (sheriff 1504) was "so sore seke and lykly to depart from this mortall
waride". It was decided that the dinner should be held anyway, but there remained the problem of funding.
Eventually it was settled that Middleton's friends should bear half the cost. Should Middleton "discese tofore
none of the said Tuesday", Middleton's replacement was to bere the charge, however, "if it please God that he
lyff to none of the said Tuysday then the said Oliver to bere the half charge of the dyner of his awn cost". Ibid.,
3: 10.
" Ibid., 3:53-4; As a result of this, the archbishop who had been acting on behalf of the king throughout the
aldermanic dispute, ruled that this year no sheriffs' feast was to be held.
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langauge' 336
So far this section has concentrated on ritual activities aimed at promoting the values
of love, brotherhood and friendship. However, as we have seen, the promotion of such
values was not always successftul. Indeed, activities designed to promote harmony or unity
could themselves provoke or antagonise divisions within the elite. "Active peacekeeping
measures", meaning measures designed to defuse conflicts already under way, have been
explored in the urban context by McRee. 337
 Although he accepts that it is inaccurate to view
the elite and the commons as two organised and unified parties, he suggests that the lack of
detail in the Norwich records makes it impossible to trace divisions within the two groups
or individual allegiances. 338
 Instead McRee has concentrated on peacemaking procedures
in disputes between the elite and the commons. For York, however, the evidence is more
detailed, allowing an examination to be made of peacemaking and peace-preserving
procedures within the civic elite. Shaw has argued that when issues arose in medieval Wells
which threatened to split the elite, "a great deal of patience and moderation was used to
avoid deep damaging division" as the "solidarity of the oligarchy was inextricably connected
with the integrity of the Community as a whole". 339
 Similarly, in York a system of
arbitration and rituals of submission and reconciliation were used to diffuse potentially
divisive disputes.
The first stage of the process of reconciliation consisted of the solution of the
disagreement or quarrel. In York, as in other late-medieval towns, this was often achieved
336 YCA, House Book 9, fol. 2v. The dispute seems to have been over property.
337 McRee, 'Peacemaking and its Limits in Late Medieval Norwich', p. 833.
Ibid., p. 836, including note 1.
Shaw, Creation of a Community, p. 176.
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through arbitration. 34° The use of arbitration in this context is interesting as it favoured
social harmony over abstract justice. 34 ' Sometimes this consisted of the "mediacion of
freinde of both parties".'2 More often, though, arbitrators were 'impartially elected' by the
mayor. Those chosen tended to be the type of men who had held or who went on to hold
civic, territorial or guild office. 343 Further, the men chosen as arbitrators in each case often
corresponded in status to those involved in the dispute. In cases where civic officials were
involved in a dispute, it seems to have been common practice for high-ranking civic officials
or other high-status men to be chosen as arbitrators. For example, a dispute in 1503
between the mayor John Gilliot (mayor 1490 & 1503) and the alderman William Neleson
(mayor 1500) was resolved by Brian Palmer (the city's recorder) and eight of the city's
aldermen. 3 Similarly, a more wide-ranging dispute in 1505 between two parties which
included on one side the alderman, Richard Thorneton (mayor 1514), and on the other side
the alderman, Alan Stavely (1506 & 1519), was resolved by arbitrators who included four
aldermen and Thomas Dalby, the provost of Beverley. 345 The choice of high-ranking
officials in such cases avoided any possible inversion of civic status which might both have
° For the importance of arbitration procedures in late medieval towns, see E. Powell, 'Arbitration and the Law
in England in the Late Middle Ages', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series 33 (1983): 49-67;
ide,n, 'Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration in Fifteenth-Century England', Law and HistoryReview 2(1984):
21-43; L. Attreed, 'Arbitration and the Gmwth of Urban Liberties in Late Medieval England', Journal ofBritish
Studies 31(1992): 205-35; MeRne, 'Peacemaking and its Limits', pp. 831-66. Very little work has been carried
out either on arbitration or rituals of submission and reconciliation in late medieval towns, despite relatively
abundant source material. it is an area which clearly deserves further research.
34t Shaw has also argued that arbitration was politically astute since by delegating the decision process to others,
it avoided the master or mayor making too many enemies. Shaw, Creation of a Community, pp. 208-12,
especially p. 210.
342 YCA, House Book 7, fol. 6v. See also fols. 9r, 17v, 22r, 23r, 25v.
° Carpenter, 'The Post of Bridgemaster', pp. 40 & 41-2.
YCA, House Book 9, fol. 9. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the aldermen found in favour of the current mayor John
Gilyot. Ironically, William Nelson was fined under an ordinance which had been made when he himself was
mayor.
34 YCA, House Book 9, fol. 28v.
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prejudiced the legitimacy of the final decision and undermined the status of civic office.
Once a dispute was resolved, rituals of submission or reconciliation were used in an
attempt to overcome any ill-feelings. Submission rituals were used to re-assimilate rogue
officials or freemen back into the community. 3 Perhaps more importantly, though, they
served to reassert civic authority and status following a loss of face (corporate or individual)
on the part of the civic elite. Submission rituals will be examined in greater detail in the final
chapter. Briefly, though, the spoken and body language of these rituals was that of
repentance and humility. The wrongdoer would go "lawlie uppon his kneys" and apologise
for his misdemeanour, "besechyng" the 'victim' for forgiveness and saying that he "sore
repentes and lowliee prays your lordship forto forgyfe and stand my gude lord". 347 Here,
the humble status of the wrongdoer in comparison to the wronged man was ritually
reasserted. For the healing of factions between men of similar civic status, rituals of
reconciliation were used in preference to rituals of submission. 348 In contrast to submission
rituals, reconciliation rituals emphasised friendship, love and brotherhood. Further, they did
not incorporate any ritualised construction of status hierarchies.349
The language used in reconciliation rituals was generally that of brotherhood,
friendship or love. For example, following an argument involving "unsittyng langage"
between the two aldermen William White (mayor 1491 & 1505) and John Elwald (mayor
For examples of the use of these rituals in York, see Atireed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 29,265, 301; YCA,
House Book 7, fol. I 13r.; 8, fol. 25v.; 9, fol. 26v.
7 Atlreed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, p. 77; See YCA, House Books 7, fol. 1 13r, 8, fol. 25v; 9, fol. 26v. 'Master'
was used in the place of 'lordship us cases where the person being apologised to was not the mayor,'.
3 Mthough there are a few instances recorded in the House Books of reconciliation rituals between men who
had not held civic office, most of those recorded were between members of the civic elite. Further, York
councillors appear only to have been subjected to submission rituals if they slandered the current mayor. See
for example, YCA, House Book 9, fol. 9r.
A wise move, given that many of the disputes solved this way were over matters such as precedence in
processions.
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1499), the two were ordered to "be loufyng brether to gedder". 35° Others were ordered to
be "ftill and loufyng frends".351 Often reconciliation was more elaborate and involved ritual
actions, although, there is no evidence that kisses were used as in late-medieval Wells. In
York, it was often required of the quarrellers that they "take ather ober by the hande".352
For example, in 1506, the mayor and council attempted to settle a dispute involving Richard
Thorneton (mayor 1502) and Alan Stavely (mayor 1506 & 1519), by ordering that 
"be said
Richard & Alan tofore theym ather take other by ye hand & to be good &
frendly... .togeder".353
Reconciliation was another occasion in which feasting and drinking were used in York
to promote conviviality and unity. For example, we saw at the beginning of this section how
Stavely and Thorneton were reconciled after a disagreement when they took each other by
the hand and "ber upon of both theyr cost... .dranke a potell of ele wyne & a potell of
malmesay".354
 Wine was also used in reconciliation rituals elsewhere. For example,
communal meals were used by the Guild of the Holy Cross in Stratford-on-Avon to end
malicious speech and preserve peace among its members. 355 The importance of such acts
of reconciliation for the stability of the civic elite at large is signalled by the occasional
involvement of the rest of the council. Following the long-running dispute between William
350 YCA, House Book 8, fol. 92v.
351 Ibid., 7, fol. 52r.
352 Ibid., 7, fol. 52r. For the use of kisses in Wells, see Shaw, Creation of a Community, p. 207. For a broader
consideration of kisses in peacemaking rituals, see W. Frijhoff, 'The Kiss Sacred and Profane: Reflections on
a Cross-Cultural Coiiftontation', in J. Breminer & A. Roodenburg (eds.), A Cultural History of Gesture, From
Antiquity to the Present Day (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1991), PP. 2 10-36.
353 YCA, House Book, 9, fol. 28v. See also Attreed (ed.), YorkHouse Bookj, p. 512.
354 YCA, House Book, 9, fol. 28v.
Cited in McRee, 'Unity or Division?', p. 191, see also pp. 192 for feasts in general. For the use of feasting
and drinking in reconciliation in other late-medieval towns, see A.D. Brown, Popular Piety in Late Medieval
England: The Diocese ofSalisbury (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995), p. 169; Shaw, Creation of a Community,
pp. 199&207.
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Todd (mayor 1487) and John Harper (mayor 1489), Todd was ordered to pay 1011 to
Harper, and Harper was ordered to apologise to Todd before the rest of the council for
calling him a "coyner and a money-maker". 356 The House Books record that "eithre of
theime shuld be fully frenedid with the othre and take handes" and that there was to be "a
diner to be made emonges the hole company in confirmacion of the saide aggrement and
concorde..
McRee has argued that the peacemaking mechanism that had been developed by the
early-fifteenth century "could not cope with conflicts based on strong personal enmities or
disagreements over fundamental or political values". 358 The York evidence suggests that
despite the use of rituals and languages of harmony and unity, discord and factionalism
among the elite remained common. Indeed, at times, the civic elite seems to have been riven
with factionalism.
Although not always successful in preventing faction, the rituals outlined above were
clearly important in alleviating much tension. First, they allowed the re-assimilation of rogue
officials and facilitated the negotiation and closure of potentially long-running and divisive
disputes. Second, and particularly important in the light of the revealed discord, they
allowed the presentation of the elite to the rest of the city as a coherent and tangible body.
This was particularly important if the elite was successfully to defend its autonomy, but it
was also important in discouraging any disgruntled elements within the city from taking
advantage of perceived factionalism for their own ends. Further, as we have seen, York's
elite seems to have subscribed to the civic values of harmony, love and friendship, and
viewed factionalism and discord as inherently sinflil. Finally, the rituals may also have
3 AtIreed (ed.), TorkHouse Books, p. 51. For the histoty of the dispute see also Ibid. pp. 476, 479, 481 & 529.
357 Ibid., p. 512.
358 McRee, 'Peacemaking and its Limits in Late Medieval Norwich', p. 866.
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served to create and reassert a sense of common identity and status among the otherwise
disparate members of the civic elite.
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C) Conclusion
In keeping with the rest of the thesis, Part Three has concentrated on social structures and
processes as opposed to key events. In particular, methods of social mobility and social
stratification and cohesion have been closely examined. While Part Two concentrated on
the requirements for civic office holding, Part Three has looked at the means of attaining
these qualities and the typical channels of recruitment and social mobility. Moreover, it has
also examined the variety of ways in which a relatively diverse group could enhance its real
or ritualised unity.
Whereas in the past wealth and occupation have been viewed as the primary means
of social stratification or consolidation in medieval towns, Part Three has underlined the
importance of alternative social processes. Kinship, marriage and fictive kinship all played
vital roles in this respect, providing channels of recruitment and social mobility, and the
means through which potential members of the civic elite could be trained and socialised.
In the absence of patrilineal ties, marriage and surrogate kinship offered alternative ways of
protecting the real and ideological perpetuation of the group as well as increasing its social
integration. Although much emphasis has been placed by historians on the patriarchal nature
of late-medieval society and the influence of this both on families and systems of
government, it has been suggested here that women played a key (if veiled) role in the
creation and maintenance of elite groups.
It has also been argued that while elements within the elite, namely those at the very
top of the civic hierarchy, displayed a significant degree of social integration, civic elites as
a whole did not show signs of embryonic class-formation. Not only was the York elite
diverse in terms of occupation and wealth, but the patrilineal, marriage, and social ties within
the elite were generally weak. While marriage could be used as a means of consolidating
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wealth or political advantage, it is likely that familial ties between members of the elite and
those who did not hold civic office served to blur the distinction between rulers and the
ruled. 359 This area has not been explored here. However, it is clearly one that deserves
much further research. In the context of the relative lack of family ties among members of
the civic elite as a whole, the importance of ritual actions in the creation and consolidation
of unity and harmony within the group was great. Indeed, it could be argued that it was
only through ritual that the elite was able to present itself as a unified, coherent or conscious
social body, and even then not always successfully.
Part Three also develops the findings of Part Two in arguing against the binary
division of late-medieval society into opposing groups or 'classes'. Within the civic elite
gradations of civic power were reflected in hierarchies of wealth, occupation, knowledge,
social cohesion and ritual unity. Building on this finding, Part Four of the thesis will
examine the extent that there existed a similar blurring of boundaries at the other end of the
civic hierarchy. In particular, it will consider the extent to which there existed an elite
'substructure' below the office of bridge master. One of the main contentions of this thesis
is that the relationship between civic elites and the rest of the urban population in late-
medieval urban society was necessarily inherently antagonistic. The findings of Part Three
have gone part of the way towards arguing for the essential fluidity of late-medieval society.
The elite did not become ossified, rather it adapted in order to incorporate new interest
groups. It could be argued that, because of this 'circulation', civic society was far more
flexible and stable than has often been credited. However, in order for this area to be more
fully explored, it is necessary that the elite be examined in terms of its relationship with the
commonalty of the city. In particular, serious outbreaks of urban unrest and rebellion, and
their causes, need to be examined. It is to these areas that the thesis now turns.
Carpenter, 'York Bridgemasters', pp. 65-6.
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Part Four:
Power and Authority
Clark and Slack's "overriding emphasis on crisis, conflict and social polarisation" in early-
modem towns continues to colour medievalists' perceptions of urban government and social
structure during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.' Under this schema, violent tensions
and unrest have been seen as the inevitable outcome of what has been viewed as a society
polarised in terms of wealth and power. This final part challenges some of these
assumptions in relation to late-medieval York. In particular, it questions the extent that
power within medieval cities was centralised in the hands of the civic elite, and the extent
that violence and unrest were either inevitable or the result of 'class' conflict between civic
officials and the politically disenfranchised. It draws on prosopographical research and
discourse analysis to examine the practice and ideology of civic power in the city.
Part Four begins by drawing on the work of Susan Reynolds and Stephen Rigby in
reviewing the ideology of urban authority, both in general, and in relation to York in
particular. In essence, it argues that much of the authority of the civic elite derived from
their relationship with the commons. 2 Part Four then moves on to examine authority in
later-medieval York in a less static sense. It relates the various disturbances and
constitutional changes in the city to the ideological and practical administration of civic
power. Points of conflict included protests against 'peculation and misgovernment' and the
failure of the elite to defend or respect the commons' rights of consultation and
representation. However, it is argued that any interpretation of the unrest as symptomatic
'Pearl, 'Change and Stability in Seventeenth-Century London', p. 140. For a discussion of this histonography
see above, pp. 1-22.
2 T'gh Part Four the term 'commons' is used to refer to those who had not held higher civic office in York.
It includes the members of the council of forty-eight whose role it was to represent these people. This council
is examined in greater depth below.
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of an increasingly antagonistic division between the civic elite and a disgruntled commons
is easily overstated. Instead, this part suggests that the causes of conflict and unrest in later-
medieval York were more complex than have previously been appreciated. While some of
the disturbances can be ascribed to protests over maladministration, the evidence also
suggests that some of the disturbances should also be viewed in the context of dynastic
power struggles within the wider realm.
The final section of Part Four develops on Rappaport's argument that it is erroneous
to view higher civic offices as a city's 'primary sources of power'. It begins by exploring
whether this period witnessed an increased or decreased 'democratisation' of York's civic
government. It then goes on to examine the extent to which civic power was diffused
throughout the city through networks of guild, parish and ad hoc minor civic posts that were
frequently interlocked with the civic cursus honorum. As a result of this analysis, wider
points are made concerning the distribution of power in later-medieval cities. In conclusion,
this section calls for a fundamental re-consideration of the dominant historiography that
emphasises centralised civic power and an almost class-based division between the mlers and
the ruled.
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A) Authority and Conflict
I) Introduction
Access to civic power, and its execution, have been viewed as highly contentious issues in
late-medieval England. However, with the exception of Rigby and Reynolds, few historians
have examined in detail the ideological basis of civic power and authority.3 The civic elite,
in particular the higher officials, have been viewed as the locus of civic authority. However,
too often the elite has been examined in isolation both from the rest of the city and from
wider ideologies of urban rule. As a result, the ideological and practical role of the
commons in the government of later-medieval towns has been underestimated. Further, this
understanding has also prevented historians from viewing urban unrest in the context of
contemporary theories concerning the legitimacy and authority of civic power. Urban unrest
was common throughout the late-medieval period, and much of it has been ascribed to quasi
class-based struggles over the control and administration of town government.4
Analysis of unrest in York during the late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth centuries and
the city's various constitutional changes are no exception to this historiography. The city
experienced a range of disturbances during this period, including election-day riots in 1462,
1471, 1482, 1484-5, 1489, 1491, 1504, 1516 and 1529. Serious outbreaks of unrest and
violence connected with inflammatory issues such as common land were also witnessed,
Reynolds, English Medieval Towns, pp. 18 1-7; idem, 'Medieval Urban Histoiy and the History of Political
Thought', pp. 14-23; Rigby, English Society in the LaterMiddle Ages, pp. 165-77; idem, 'Urban 'Oligarchy",
pp. 62-86. See also, Hilton, English andFrench Towns,passim.
4 For detailed individual studies of urban unrest in other towns see for example, Nightingale, 'Capitalists, Crafts
and Constitutional Change', pp. 3-35; Barron, 'Ralph Holland and the London Radicals', pp. 160-83; MeRee,
'Religious Gilds and Civic Order', pp. 69-97; idem, 'Peacemaking and its Limits in Late Medieval Norwich',
pp. 831-866; Dobson, 'The Risings m York, Beverley and Scarborough', pp. 112-42; Donner-Harris, 'Laurence
Saunders', pp. 633-51.
Calendar ofPatent Rolls 1467-77, p. 239; Afireed (ed.), YorkHouse Book!, pp. 247-9, 25 1-2, 254,629-30,
633, 639, 642 & 706; Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 66-7, 191-4; 3: 1-9, 55-9, 120-8, 351-3. These
disturbances are all sunimthsed in Miller, 'Medieval York', pp. 82-4.
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with the years 1476, 1480, 1481, 1487 and 1494 proving to be being particularly turbulent.6
Indeed, during the unrest of 1487, William Wells (mayor 1479) was murdered by one of the
city's millers, John Robson. 7
 Another former mayor, William Holbeck (mayor 1470-2), had
fared somewhat better in 1476 when he managed to take sanctuary for his life at the church
of the Friars Preachers. 8 Alongside this rioting and violence, the commons also petitioned
the civic elite on constitutional issues on several occasions during this period. 9 Possibly as
a result of these disturbances and petitions, the city underwent a number of constitutional
changes. In particular, there were several modifications in the method of electing the city's
mayor, and in 1517 the composition of the common council was also altered.'°
Most York historians have viewed much of this unrest in terms of an increasingly
radical craft-based commons lobbying for a greater role in the government of the city. For
example, Miller has argued that "the rule of the city by a mercantile oligarchy was under
heavy fire from a 'democratic' movement which drew its strength from the crafts"." Acts
of violence within the city, including the murder of William Wells, have been interpreted as
evidence of the common's resentment of the oligarchy.' 2 Further, historians have viewed
York's constitutional changes as "the result of continuous targeted pressure from the
6 Atlreed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, pp. 60-1, 218-9, 235, 560-2, 564-5, 590; Raine (ed.), York CivicRecords,
2: 107-23.
7 Attreed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 560-2.
8 jfler 'Medieval York', p. 82.
commons petitioned the elite in 1475, 1484, 1490 and 1504. Sellers (ed.), York Memorandum Boolç part
2, pp. 245-7; Attreed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 353-4 & 674; Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 3: 6-8.
'° These changes are discussed more fully below. For details of the changes, see Kermode, 'Obvious
Observations', pp. 89-9; idein , Medieval Me rchants, appendix 1, pp. 323-26; A.G. Dickens, 'Tudor York', in
Tillot (ed.), VCH: The City of York, pp. 137-8.
Miller, 'Medieval York', pp. 8 1-84 (quote p. 84).
' 2 Kermede 'Obvious Observations', p. 99.
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burgesses".' 3
 As such, the York unrest has been placed firmly within the context of a
historiography which views late-medieval urban society in terms of an antagonistic division
between rulers and the ruled.
However, neither the sources of the civic elite's authority nor the disturbances
themselves have been examined in the context of contemporary theories concerning the
legitimacy of civic power. Moreover, although Swanson has suggested that rivalry and a
decline in the degree of occupational homogeneity in the aldermanic 'class' possibly lessened
the elite's ability to deal with the economic and political threats posed by the artisans,
historians have not fully considered the role of faction or competition within the civic elite
in the troubles.'4
 Finally, the work of Attreed and Palliser and that of the political historian
Michael Hicks, suggests that some of the late fifteenth-century disturbances may have been
due primarily to wider unrest within Yorkshire resulting from political instability caused by
the Wars of the Roses, and therefore did not self-evidently constitute demonstrations against
the ideological authority of York's civic elite.'5
H) The 'Commons' and the 'Elite'
It is clear that the civic elite of later-medieval York derived its legitimacy from a variety of
sources: God, the king and the people. It has already been argued that York's civic elite
also sought to derive its legitimacy, at least in part, from an emphasis on the personal
' Ibid., p. 92.
Swanson, 'Crafismen and Industry', p. 339.
'5 L.C. Atireed, 'The Relations between the Royal Government and the City of York, 1377-1490' (Unpublished
MA Dissertation, Centre for Medieval Studies, University of York, 1979), Pp. 104-109; D. Palliser, 'Richard
III and York', in R. Horrox (ed.), Richard III and the North, Studies in Regional and Local History 2 (Hull,
1986), pp. 51-81, especially, pp. 62-69; M.A. Hicks, 'Dynastic Change and Northern Society: The Fourth Earl
of Northumberland 1470-89', and 'The Yorkshire Rebellion of 1489 Reconsidered', both in M.A. Hicks,
Richard III and His Rivals: Magnates and Their Motives in the War of the Roses (The Hambledon Press:
London, 1991), pp. 365-94 & 395-418; A.J. Poll ard,North-Eastem England During the Wars oftheRoses:
Lay Society, War and Politics 1450-1500 (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1990), pp. 375-82.
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characteristics of its officers, namely: wealth, 'discretion', 'honesty' and 'wisdom'. These
virtues, together with associated expectations of high standards of morality, were seen to
legitimise status and authority.' 6
 Further, as Susan Reynolds has argued, the hierarchy of
wealth and power within late-medieval cities was viewed as part of the divine order of things
sanctioned and ordained by God.' 7
 Finally, it is hard not to conclude that for York, as for
medieval Coventry, the civic hierarchy was "dictated from within by the obligations of
wealth" and "legitimised from without by authority from the crown".'8
Rigby has suggested that while urban political theory explicitly expressed a descending
concept of power in which town rulers ultimately owed their legitimacy to higher powers
such as the king or God, "much political practice implicitly embodied an ascending concept
of power, in which the basis of political authority lay in some form of popular consent".'9
The York evidence would seem to confirm this suggestion. This part will argue that the
commonalty of the city (whose make-up will be discussed) were not excluded from
involvement in civic government, rather they were actively engaged in government in a
number of ways. Further, it will also be suggested that in York (if not elsewhere), an
ascending concept of political power was not only implicitly embodied through political
practice, but it was actually explicitly sanctioned, lobbied for and encouraged.
An active understanding of the concept of citizenship, which stressed the role of the
people in the government of cities, is clearly evident in late-medieval York. Freedom was
16 See pp. 86-108 above.
'7 Reynolds, 'Medieval Urban History and the History of Political Thought', pp. 14-23. See also Shaw, Creation
of a Community, pp. 178-83; Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, pp. 137-41.
'8 Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, pp. 140-1. Unlike in medieval Coventry, where Phythian Adams has
suggested that civic rule was also "sanctioned from above, through the means of moral and religious observance,
by the Omnipotent", there seems to have been little official stress placed on the morality and religiosity of the
civic officials of medieval York. See above pp. 86-108.
'9 Rigby, English Society in the Later Middle Ages, pp. 171-2 (quote p.17 1).
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viewed by the elite as conveying obligations and "oneres communitatis" (communal burdens)
as well as economic and social privileges. 20 Men entering the freedom of late-medieval York
swore to share in "lotto et scotto" (lot and Scot) these obligations. In other words they
agreed to paying the 'scot' of taxes and bearing the 'lot' of office holding. 2' Men who did
not meet these obligations were penalised. For example, in 1505, Richard Cutts, a freeman
who moved out of the city with his wife and household (thereby avoiding both tax and civic
office), was told that he could re-enter the franchise only on the payment of a fine and a
guarantee that in the future he would "bere his charge as a citicen". 22 Often these 'burdens'
were purely financial. For example, in 1484, all citizens of 'substance' were to contribute
to the city waits' fee?' Similarly, in medieval Coventry a freeman was expected to
contribute to the wealth of the city "after his substance & faculteez".24
The 'lot' of office-holding was no less contentious than the burden of office holding
in terms of time and money. Indeed, it seems likely that the burdens of office were tiered
according to wealth. As has already been argued, office holding was viewed as a duty for
the more wealthy, 'discrete' and 'honest' citizens. However, it is possible that less
substantial citizens also had an obligation to participate in the local government of the city.25
For example, in 1494, the aldermen appointed four of the "most discrete persones" in each
parish to collect a subsidy. The House Books further record that "And if the said iiij
20 Aed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, pp. 33, 34, 69,85 & 112; YCA, House Book 9, fol. 25r.
21 Ibzd See Riley (ed.), Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis, 1: 269; Rappaport, Worlds Within Worlds, p. 36.
22 YCA, House Book 9, fol. 25r.
23 Attreed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 332-3.
24 Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, p. 137.
25 is possible that even those who were not freemen had obligations. In London attendance at the wardmote
court was mandatoiy for all householders and adult males, freemen or not. Rappaport, Worlds Within Worlds,
p. 35. Involvement in other forms of office holding in York is discussed in greater depth below, see pp. 248-273.
210
persones in every parish soo elect refuse and wilnot perfourme. . .than my lord Maire to
discharge tham .. .ofther fraunches" and to punish those who "wilnot doo ther dewtyes".26
Failure to fulfil civic duties was problematic on several levels. On a practical level,
Phythian-Adams has shown that in Coventry the refusal of men to serve in the city's lower
offices created a recruitment crisis higher up the civic hierarchy to the level of mayor,
ultimately causing unrest within the city. 27
 Ideologically, failure to hold civic office was
viewed as detrimental to a city's common good. As the letter from the king to the citizens
of Lincoln makes clear, refusal of men of substance to hold civic office forced men of less
substance (and hence less discretion) into civic government "to our heavy damage and
prejudice". In York, as in most medieval cities, the exemption of more substantial citizens
from the duty of civic office could only be allowed if a compensatory contribution was made
to the city's financial 'common wele' through the payment of a fine. 29
 Indeed, substantial
men who wanted the benefits of freedom without the obligation of civic office had to obtain
(usually by means of an additional fee) special dispensations in order to enable them to enter
York's freedom. For example, both Robert Appleyard, a gentleman and haberdasher, and
master John Chapman, a public notary and proctor at York's consistory court, both
purchased the freedom of the city with the proviso that they were to be exempted from
holding civic office in the city.3°
York's economic decline seems to have generated or exacerbated problems in
recruitment to civic office. As the city's financial insolvency increased, so too did the
26 pjj (ed.), York Civic Records, p. 118.
27 Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, pp. 250-52.
28 fljllMedia1Lincoln p. 278.
For the use of the term 'conmion wele' to refer to the city's financial resources, see Attreed (ed.), York House
Books, p. 305.
30 YCA, House Book 8, fol. 128v; 10, fol. 25r. See also Ibid., 7, fols. 8r & 9v.
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financial burdens of civic office, particularly for the chamberlains. In York, as elsewhere,
more and more men sought exemption from civic office towards the end of the medieval
period on the grounds of insufficient wealth. 3 ' Kermode has suggested that exemptions
from office in York were not so much a reflection of a crisis of office-holding, as cynical
attempts by the elite to extract money from men who were never serious candidates for civic
offlce. However, it can be argued that this case has been overstated. Certainly, the elite
were anxious given the state of the civic finances to extract "as myche. . . as can be gotte"
from men keen to circumvent their civic responsibilities. 33
 However, in the light of the
evidence already discussed on access to civic office, Kermode's interpretation of the type
of men who were likely to hold civic office during the period in question seems to be too
narrow.34
 Consequently, the number of genuine candidates for office who purchased
exemptions has been underestimated.35
 Furthermore, the number of men who purchased
exemptions from office, and who then went on to hold the office of sheriff has also been
underestimated.36
31 For similar problems elsewhere, see Phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, pp. 250-52; 1-Jill, Medieval
Lincoln, pp. 277-8; Rigby, Medieval Grimsby, pp. 138-41. Tudor Worcester does not seem to have faced this
problem, a factor which Dyer ascribes to the fact that Worcester officials were not expected to meet expenses
or financial shortfalls out of their own pockets. Dyer, Worcester in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 195-6.
32 J Kermode, 'Urban Decline: The Flight from Office in Late Medieval York', Economic History Review,
Second Series (1982): 179-98. Kermode argues that the men who typically purchased exemptions from civic
office would never have been considered as serious candidates for the post of sheriff on the grounds of wealth
or occupation.
33 YCA, House Book 8, fol. 135r.
See above, pp. 57-83.
Indeed, almost all of the men who wem fined in this way had already served in the office of chamberlain, itself
a financially onerous post It was in recognition of this fact that the civic authorities allowed men to be
temporarily exempted from the post of sheriff. See, for example, YCA, House Book 7, fol. 14 lv.
36 Kermode names only four men who fell into this categoty, but examples that I have found include: Miles
Harom (sheriff 1496), John Beisbyjnr. (sheriff 1506), John Birichede (sheriff 1497 & mayor 1504), John Carter
(chamberlain 1500), John Dogeson (sheriff 1497 & mayor 1508 & 1517), John Elys (sheriff 1503), John Gegges
(sheriff 1509), William Huby (sheriff 1506), Hugh Hewlay (sheriff 1525), Thomas Jameson (sheriff 1498 &
mayor 1507), JohnLangton (Sheriff 1509), John Lincoln (sheriff 1502),Oliver Middleton (sheriff 1504), Roger
Sawer (sheriff 1507) and Robert Symson (sheriff 1504). Moreover, the fact that more men did not fall into this
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The 'commons', 'commonalty' or 'communitas' of York appear prominently
throughout York's Memorandum and House Books as attending elections, consenting to
ordinances and regulations, and scrutinising the city's financial accounts. 37 However, it is
by no means clear who constituted this group: whether it included all adult male York
residents or only the freemen of the city, or whether it constituted a body supposed to
represent the interests of one of these two groups. In reality it seems likely that these terms
were used in a variety of ways. 'Commons' seems to have derived from the French term
'commune', or the Medieval Latin 'communa', and it effectively meant the body politic.38
In medieval towns this term was originally used to refer to sworn confederations of
townsmen, usually under the leadership of an elected mayor. 39 As such, these bodies were
often analogous with early guild merchants or other groups of burgesses. 4° However, the
revolutionary overtones of some such groups meant that by the thirteenth-century the term
'commune' had generally been replaced by the similar, but more neutral term
'communitas' •41 Indeed, 'communitas' was often used to express incorporation.42
Clearly, notions of political independence were deeply entwined with the concepts of
'community' and group will, a point which will be further elaborated on below. As such,
it is not surprising to find that the terms 'commons' or 'commonalte' were often used to
express the general will or interest of the political community of a town. So, for example,
categoiy can be explained in part by the fact that a number of men purchased life exemptions from civic office,
and many other men died before their exemption period ran out; see appendix one for details of such examples.
37 McRee, 'Peacemaking and its Limits in Late Medieval Norwich', p. 835.
38 Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Dictionary, commune, n.,1 & 2; see also commUnes, n., 1(a).
39 Reynolds, Medieval Towns, p. 106; idem, Kingdoms and Communities, pp. 170-83.
° Reynolds, Medieval Towns, pp. 107-8.
41 Ibid,p. 108.
42 Ibid., Medieval Towns, p. 108.
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in 1435, a London chronicle recorded that "All the weyrs. .by the meier and cominalte were
distroyed, by cause they were ayens the cominalte and ifrauncheise off London".43
There remains ambiguity over of whether the political community included all the adult
male residents of a town or city, or only a select body. It is clear that 'cominalte' was often
used in order to distinguish the higher civic officials from others within medieval towns. For
example, proclamations and letters were commonly addressed to "1e maire, sherriefs,
aldremen & cominaltee (of Norwich)" or to the "Mayer of the cytte (of London), the
Aldermen and comnalte of the same cytte". But to what extent did the 'commonalty'
include the non-freemen? McRee has argued that urban government was "the product of
a process of continual negotiation among the individuals and groups who could make a
claim to political power". 45 This argument suggests that the term 'commonalty' was not
static, but instead embraced those who had enough social or economic power to be able to
claim a stake in a city's governance at any given time.46
There is a discernable implication in many civic records that not all townsmen were
considered to be of the 'commonalty'. For example, in 1424, the London Letter books
recorded that "All e comynalte of e Cite, and all e Cite, was well plesed with hym", a
statement which would appear odd if the 'commonalty' is understood to imply all of the
inhabitants of the city.47 The York records remain somewhat elusive and ambiguous on this
matter. There are suggestions that at times 'commonalte' may have included those who
43 Loudon Chronicle in BL Cotton Julius B.2, cited in Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Diction azy,
cominUne,n.,1 & 2; see also cominUnalte, n., 1(a).
44 Ibid., commUne, n.,1 & 2; see also eonimunaltë, n., 2(a).
45 McRee, 'Peacemaking and its Limits', p. 835.
However, McRee also suggests that in Norwich the 'commonalty' only included freemen; Ibid., p. 836.
47 London Letter Book E, cited in Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Diczionay, commUne, n.,1
& 2; see also commiinaltë, n., 2(a).
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were not freemen. For example, House Book nine contains a letter from the king addressed
to the "Mayre, Aldermen, Cytyzens and Commonaltie of our Citie of York", a phrase which
is repeated several times throughout the letter, and in one instance is altered to "cytyzins and
inhabitaunts"." 'Commoners' was certainly used to refer to those who were not free, as is
shown by a list of payments due to the city for the payment of the minstrels. 'Citizens' were
to contribute 4d, while "every Comonere that is of substance" was to pay at least 2d and
"every othere Comonere exept the veray pore Commoners which be not of power nor
abilitie therto id".49
Nevertheless, it is possible that an important distinction was drawn between the term
'commoners', or non-citizens and the terms 'commons' or 'commonalty'. As McRee has
suggested was the case for medieval Norwich, certain York records suggest that the
'commonalty' referred only to the citizens of York. In terms of attendance at important
meetings and elections, the civic records often made the claim that "all the hole
Commynaltie of the.. .Cytye" were present at the guild hall. 5° Given that on other identical
occasions the records sometimes speciI,r instead that "the searchers of every craft with other
citizens" met in the guild hail, it might be conjectured that the latter group of men were
analogous with the 'commons'. 5 ' Similarly, the ordinances concerning the governance of
medieval Lincoln likewise seem to use the terms "commonalty" and "citizens"
interchangeably.52
48 Raine (ed.), YorkCivicRecords, 3: 55-7.
49 Ibid., 1: 102.
50 Ibid., 3: 58. Obviously, if the commons were comprised of all citizens or all residents they would not have
fitted into the guild hail. However, the assertion that 'all' of this group was gathered here should not be taken
literally.
Ibid., 2: 104.
52 Hill, Medieval Lincoln, appendix VII, pp. 402-5.
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Attendance of York freemen at civic elections and the reading and amendment of city
ordinances was periodically encouraged throughout the later-medieval period. Increasingly,
though, medieval towns chose to represent the views of the commons through the use of a
common council. Indeed, Reynolds suggests that the introduction of common councils from
the late-fourteenth century onwards was designed to answer the need for increased
consultation within the city, something which previously had been dealt with through ad hoc
assemblies. 53 Unlike the common councils of medieval London and other towns, such as
Norwich, the York council of forty-eight was not chosen by ward. 54 Rather, the council of
forty-eight appears to have been intended by the late-fourteenth century to broadly represent
the city's craftsmen, although by the middle of the fifteenth century it was composed of
craft searchers. 55 On several occasions during the late-fifteenth century the House Books
record that "the sercheours of diverse craftes" were summoned to the guild hail in order to
act "in the name of the Commonaltie". 56 However, it would be misleading to suggest that
the city's searchers were the only means through which the will of the commons was
represented during this period. On other occasions the records make a distinction between
the commons as represented by searchers, and other citizens or members of the
'commons'. 57 Furthermore, in 1504 it was agreed that the common seal of the city should
not be used "bot with thassent of the Commons or sersours togedder assembled".58
53 Reynolds, Medieval Towns, p. 173.
54 Ibid., pp. 173-5. It should be noted that ward based and craft based councils were not mutually exclusive
systems: in practice, the common councils of towns such as London and Norwich were dominated by craft
representatives, even though they were represented by the ward. For common councils elsewhere, see Phythian-
Adams, Desolation ofa City, p. 123; Hill,Medieval Lincoln, p. 276; Shaw, Creation of a Community, pp. 170-
2; Dyer, Worcester in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 191 & 197-8; Rappaport, Worlds Within Worlds, pp. 173-5.
55 Miller, ?vledieval York', p. 80; Sellers, YorkMemorandum Book; part 1, pp. viii-ix.
56 See, Raine (ed.), York Civic Records 2: 108, 117 and 163.
57 Ibid., 2:80, 104, 113.
58 Ibid., 3: 9.
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The role and level of involvement of common councils in the election of civic officials
varied from town to town. Between 1343 and 1464, and again between 1489 and 1517, the
York commons chose the mayor from two candidates nominated by the outgoing mayor.
During the intervening period the role of the commons was significantly increased.59
Furthermore, the candidates for other posts, although not chosen by the commonalty, had
to be approved by them. The constitutional functions of the forty-eight were significant as
they clearly indicated that the ideological basis of political authority lay in the consent of the
people. Indeed, the civic elite of later-medieval York was often at pains to record that
candidates for civic offices had been elected with the "assent and consent of be serssours of
eveiy craffue and cytesans and commons of this said cyte". 6° Furthermore, incoming officials
were expected to take their oaths of office before "the hole Commonaltie after the auncient
custome".6'
Important decisions within the city also had to be referred to the commons. Besides
participating in elections, the constitutional functions of the council of forty-eight included
consenting to city ordinances and legislation, and consenting to the imposition of financial
burdens. Again, this consent was something that the elite was often at pains to stress. So,
for example, in 1506, a variety of "grauntez and dimisisions...(were) shewed unto the
sersours in the name of the Commons assembled in the Common Hall.. .(which) thei
affermed and graunted". 63 Likewise, in 1495, following a dispute over common lands, the
39 The details of the modes of election to civic office in York are discussed in Kermode, 'Obvious Observations',
pp. 89-90; Miller, 'Medieval York', pp. 70-3 & 78. Changes in the election procedures during this period are
discussed in greater detail below. For the role of common councils of other towns in the election of civic
officials see above footnote 54.
60	 House Book 7, fol. 22v.
61 Raine (ed.), YorkHouse Books, 2: 2.
62jJer 'Medieval York', p. 80. Again, for the similar role of common councils in other towns, see footnote
54 above.
63 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 3: 21.
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mediation of the earl of Surrey was accepted by the "most party of the serssours of every
craft and occupacion within this (Citie), in the name of the hole body of the Commons of
the same.M
The strength of the authority of the commons was such that on occasions they could
overrule the decisions of the elite. The most dramatic example of this concerned the request
made by Lord Clifford in May 1489 that he and his troops should be allowed to enter the
city and rest overnight. The House Books record that the elite was willing to allow them in
"if the Commons will assent and agre to the same.. .to the which thai wold in nowise agre".65
Rappaport details a similar occurrence in London in 1546, when Catherine Parr's request
that one of her courtiers be made a citizen was referred to the common council "without
whose consent her highness' request could not be granted". Examples such as these
suggest that the consenting role of common councils in late medieval towns was somewhat
analogous to the role of the House of Commons within Parliament.
As in other towns, the commons of York were keen to defend their rights and powers.
It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that the commons of York justified the bill that
they presented to the civic elite in 1475 on the grounds that "Forasmuch as we be all one
body corporate, we think that we be all in like privilege of the commonalty, which has borne
none office in the city". 68
 The commons' rights of representation and consultation were
' Ibid., 2: 117; Similarly, see Sellers (ed.), YorkMemorandum Book; part 1, pp. 12, 14, 30, 40, 42,44; York
Memorandum Book; part 2, p. 52.
65 ine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 47. Of course, given the circumstances of this request it is possible that
the civic elite was being somewhat disingenuous in this matter, and were really attempting pass the buck to the
commons. Apart from anything else, it is perhaps unlikely that a meeting of the commons or their representatives
could be called at this short notice. However, the reality of the situation is not entirely relevant here, as the claim
of the elite to consult with the commons underlines their ideological acceptance of the role of the commons.
Rappaport, Worlds Within Worlds, p. 175.
67 On this point, see Rees Jones, 'York's Civic Administration', pp. 122-3.
Sellers (ed.), YorkMemorandum Book; part 2, p. 246.
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perhaps stressed most explicitly by the citizens of Norwich, who in 1414 became embroiled
in a bitter dispute with the elite over the government of the city. In particular, it was
complained that the elite had "contrary to the force and effect of the [city's] charter"
amended customs, and had elected officials purely "of their own authority" and without the
necessary consent and assent of representatives of the commonalty. 69
 Moreover, the elite
had denied the commons' right to oversee the city's finances. In other towns failure to
obtain the consent of the commons could undermine the authority of any decisions made.
For example, Rigby has noted for medieval Grimsby that lack of such assent or consent
occasionally provided justification for resisting civic officers.7°
It is clear that in York as in many other medieval towns, the legislative authority of
the civic elite ultimately rested (ideologically and practically) with the commons of the city.
However, the powers of the elite were further limited through the need for them to be seen
to be acting in the interests of the city's 'common wele' or 'common good'. 7 ' Not only was
the notion of common good vague, but it was also used variously to justify contrasting
forms of government. It is therefore unsurprising to find that the notion of 'common wele'
was also variously invoked by medieval townsmen to justify essentially conflicting points of
view. For example, both the commons and the elite of Norwich claimed to be acting in the
interests of the common good of the city during their dispute in 1414 over the powers of the
69 This interesting dispute is transcribed and translated in Hudson and Tingey (eds.), Records of the City of
Norvich, pp. 66-93 (quote p. 73). It is examined by McRee in 'Peacemaking and Its Limits in Late Medieval
Norwich', pp. 846-53.
70 Rigby, Medieval Grimsby, p. 110. As an extension of this logic, London citizens even tried to claim that the
mayor was only mayor to those who had elected him, and therefore not to those who were excluded from the
city's elections. Barron, 'Ralph Holland and the London Radicals', p. 177.
71 Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English Dictiona?y, commfln(e wele, phr., 1(a). For a discussion of
'common good' in late-medieval political thought, see Skinner, The Foundations ofModern Political Thought,
1: 44-8, 58-9 & 60-5; rvLS. Kempsahail, The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought (Clarendon
Press: Oxford, 1999).
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commonalty with respect to the election of civic officials. 72 Indeed, it could be argued that
the very vagueness of the term 'common good' was the basis of its value as a tool in the
civic officials' armoury of rhetoric, a point not missed by York's civic elite, who declared
that ordinances were "made, devysed and establisshed.. .for the common welle of [the]
Citie".73
However, in addition to its rhetorical qualities, the notion of common good was also
useful in two other respects. First, it could be used as a corporate value alongside notions
of peace, love or brotherhood to unite an otherwise factional society. 74 Second, despite its
vagueness, it nevertheless placed an onus on civic officials to govern in the interests of the
whole community. Again this onus was often explicit in civic officials' oaths of office. In
York, elements of the civic oaths followed those for London officials dictated by Royal edict
in Statute Rolls from the reign of Edward I." In particular, the mayor of both towns swore
to "doo Right to Riche & to poore". 76 Even more explicit in this respect were two
ordinances from the York House Books. In 1486 the House Books warned that any official
who "use and effectually shewe his counsaill parcially in favour of any persone or persones"
would be punished and ultimately barred from holding further office.77 Likewise, in 1499
it was enacted that "if any Maier of this Citie that is.. .remyse, nedigent, or for favour,
kinship, aliaunce, maistership, frendship" failed to administer the frill fine or forfeit that was
72 lludson and Tingey (eds.), Records of the City ofNonvich, pp. 66-93.
Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 3: 90.
For the role of notions of common good as a counterbalance to factionalism, see Black, Guilds and Civil
Society in European Political Thought, p. 70
See Luders (ed.), Statutes of the Realm, 1: 26 & 249-5 0.
76 YCA, Freemen's Register Dl, fol. lv. Similarly, see Rigby, Medieval Grimsby, p. 108.
Attreed (ed.), York House Book., p. 466.
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due would lose his whole mayoral fee of fifty pounds. 78 Unfortunately, there is little
indication as to the reason for these ordinances, but it must be wondered whether they were
enacted in response to the partial behaviour of some members of the civic elite.
As well as having obligations to the people of York, the civic elite were also expected
to act in the wider interests of the city. Indeed, York officials seem to have shared the
conviction expressed by the king's privy council in 1446, that "If hit be in prejudice of
comune wele, it is unlawful". 79 In 1476, Thomas Yotton, common clerk of the city, was
found "not able to occupie amonges us for our wele and proffit" and was dismissed. 8° It
seems as though the mere act of failing to represent the interests of the city was also held
to be contrary to the town's 'common wele'. This is demonstrated, for example, through
the dismissal of the alderman Thomas Beseby (a case I have already mentioned) for his
"grett hurte and dyspleasour of the Comons", namely speaking against the interests of the
commons when he was supposed to be acting on behalf of them.81
Although York's civic elite were the prime agents of civic power, this power
ultimately depended on the consent of the commons for its legitimation. This point holds
serious ramifications for our conception of both urban rule and the structuring of urban
society. Most importantly, the revealed 'philosophies' embody a more diffuse system of rule
which blurs the distinction between rulers and the mled. The extent to which York's elite
was true to these philosophies, and in, particular the injunction to rule in the interests of the
78 Raine (ed.), York CivicRecords, p. 139.
1446 Proclamation of the Privy Council 6.44, cited in Kurath, Kuhn and Lewis (eds.), Middle English
Dictionary, commun(e wële, phr., 1(a).
It appears that he had been embezzling funds, and not keeping the common records properly. Atireed (ed.),
York House Book.c, pp. 46-8.
81 Raine (ed.), York CivicRecords, 3:34.
The term 'philosophies' is used loosely here and is not intended to suggest a coherent system of beliefs.
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common good of the city, will be explored more fully below. Indeed, the revealed
ideologies of civic government and authority also acted as a framework through which civic
power as a point of conflict can be more fully examined.
III) Authority and Conflict
Reynolds has suggested that medieval townsmen "demanded only the traditional and
accepted right of consultation and objected only to the traditional evils of peculation and
misgovernment". 83 In contrast, other historians have stressed the quasi class-based nature
of late-medieval urban conflicts, viewing them as an inevitable consequence of a fundamental
division between the rulers and the ruled. 84 This section begins by looking at the evidence
for the abuse of civic government and complaints about such abuses. It then moves on to
explore discord in late-medieval York in the context of the revealed ideologies of
government.
'Peculation and Misgovernment'?
Although the civic elite was supposed to act in the interests of the 'common wele' they
clearly did not always do so. Maryanne Kowaleski, writing on fourteenth-century Exeter,
has shown that the elite of that city abused their position in a 'vañeiy of ways. She arues
that the "powers of political office were frequently manipulated for personal financial
gain". 85 The elite escaped taxes and other levies, and obtained privileged access to lucrative
town contracts. Perhaps most damningly, though, she suggests that the "immense power
n Reynolds, Medieval Towns, p. 186.
See above pp. 10-22.
Kowaleski, Local Markets andRegional Trade, p. 113.
Ibid.,pp. 113-4.
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and influence of the Exeter oligarchy affected even the administration of justice", so that
members of the oligarchy were far more likely to receive a favourable decision in a debt case
than creditors of a lower political standing. 87 Interestingly, there is little evidence of unrest
in medieval Exeter despite this corruption.
Unfortunately, the York evidence does not allow a similar study to be made. 88 In
particular, the scarcity of court records makes it impossible to carry out a proper
investigation into the administration of justice in the city. However, the evidence which
does survive at least allows a few comments to be made in this area. Timothy Andrew has
noted, in his study of the late-fifteenth century York wardmote court returns, that there is
little evidence of direct manipulation of the law. 89 However, while he suggests that it is
unclear whether certain sections of society were given preferential treatment, it is
nevertheless noticeable that the more wealthy and well-connected malefactors would
sometimes escape with a suspicious absence of fines. 90 Moreover, evidence from
government records suggests that contemporary suspicions may have existed in York that
wealth and civic office influenced the outcome of legal cases. For example, Kermode has
shown that a York vintner complained to Chancery that he was unlikely to have a fair
hearing in York over a debt case, as his opponent, Thomas Neleson, was rich and "of
standing in the city". 9' Similarly, William Scauceby (chamberlain, 1473) himself a prominent
Kowaleski, Local Markets andRegional Trade, pp. 113-4.
The only lay court records that survive for the medieval period are selected late-fifleenth century wardmote
records and some sheriffs' court records. For the wardmote records, see YCA, Chamberlains Account Book
CBI a, fols. 136r-139r Wardmote Court Book E3 1, pp. la-20a. Although these remain unpublished, they have
been transcribed by Andrew, 'The Fifleenth Century Wardmote Court Returns for York', Appendix. For the
sheriffs' court records see YCA, Sheriffs Court Books E25 & 25a.
Ibid.,p. 41.
° Ibid., pp. 34-5. The results of arbitration cases is rarely recorded in the records, however there are some
instances of arbitrators finding in favour of civic officials in cases in which they were involved. See Attreed
(ed.), York House Books, p. 44; YCA, House Book 9, foL 23r.
Kermode, Medieval Merchants, p. 63.
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merchant and member of the civic elite, claimed in another case that his opponent William
Wells (mayor 1479) would be believed in York as he was an alderman?2
Similar accusations were occasionally levied at the elites of other towns, particularly
during periods of conflict or unrest. Indeed, it could be argued that accusations of injustice
were useftil tools with which disgruntled townsmen could attack civic officials. In Coventry,
for example, Laurence Saunders (himself a civic official) together with his supporters,
complained to the crown in 1480 that the mayor and his officials had "denye hym Justice"
in an ongoing dispute over common lands. 93
 Meanwhile, in London, during the turbulent
period of Ralph Holland's activities, a man was imprisoned for producing bills which
claimed that one of the city's aldermen had perverted the course of justice by delay, favour
and negligence. 94 However, while such examples serve to underline the perceived
importance of the administration of fair and impartial justice by civic officials, they cannot
be taken in isolation as evidence of malpractice on the part of civic elites in general.
More convincing in the case of York are allegations of financial misconduct. For
example, in 1504, a merchant, Robert Whetley, seems to have refused to co-operate in the
collection of a royal aid, instead demanding to know how individuals had been assessed for
the recent levy. Not content with accusations of tax fixing, Whetley went on to say that the
levy, which was to total £160, could be collected four times over "if ilkon of theym that hase
ben Maier had leved all forfetts and wronggez of theym that hase ben Maier tofore theym".95
This was by no means the first complaint of this sort in medieval York. Kermode has shown
Ibid., pp. 63-4.
93 llarris (ed.), Coventry Lee: Book, p. 432.
Barron, 'Ralph Holland and the London Radicals', p. 181. See also Ibid., pp. 17 3-5 where Barron has shown
that unrest in London during 1443 was in a large part caused by a Commission of the Peace which was seen to
be acting against the interests of the artisans and as being procured by the city's recorder and common clerk.
95 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, pp. 8-9, 11 & 16 (quote p. 9).
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that as early as 1311 and 1316, the city's tax collectors were accused of fraud. 96 While it
is not possible to comment on the fairness of the 1504 levy, there is evidence to suggest that
in more general terms Whetley may have been justified in his complaint. It is noticeable, for
example, that in the lay subsidy of 1524 a total of six out of the seven York men who
received a reduction from previous years in the amount on which they were levied were high
ranking civic officials. 97 Moreover, these men included the serving mayor, one of the
serving sheriffs and three of the city's aldermen. Finally, the seventh man, William Wilson,
though not a civic official himself was nonetheless one of the collectors of the subsidy!98
The York House Books also suggest that Whetley was correct in his accusations of
other financial "wronggez" on the part of the civic elite. Besides receiving reductions in
taxation levies, the elite of York also received other financial privileges. In particular, the
council was clearly in the habit of awarding annuities or financial bonuses to civic officials.
Elderly former civic officials who were said to have fallen into poverty or ill health, such as
Miles Greenbanke or Thomas Fynch, were often awarded annuities 99 Further, it was not
unusual for serving officials to receive other financial bonuses. In particular, the rent of
council-owned properties appears to have been particularly open to abuse. For example,
I have already discussed a dispute which broke out in 1502 between Richard Thornton
(mayor 1502) and William White (1491 & 1505) over encroachments made by some
Kermode, Medieval Merchants, p.61.
These men were James Blades (sheriff 1523), Thomas Drawswerd (mayor 1515 & 23), Peter Jackson (mayor
1520), John Norman (mayor 1524), Ralph Pullan (mayor 1537), William Wright (mayor 1518). The reasons
given for the reduction in taxable wealth include foolishly trusting their goods to "dyverse persons", "chaunce",
the loss of goods at sea and the cost of civic office. Peacock (ed.), 'Subsidy Roll for York and Musty', pp. 170,
171, 173, 176, 177, 178 & 179.
Ibid.,pp. 177& 179.
YCA, House Book 8, fol. 11 9v; 9, fol. 22r. See also Ibid., 8, fol. 122v; 9, fol. 30v. The frequency with which
esquires of the swords and mace received such bonuses suggests that the council was almost operating a pension
system for such men.
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building-work that Thornton had carried out on a tenement in North Street. 10° The council
not only found in Thornton's favour, but declared that in view of the fact that he was to
"bere the charge of Mayoralty", he ought to have the tenement rent free for one year.'°'
Further evidence that the council may have been in the habit of offering favourable rates to
members of the civic elite is suggested by the ordinance of 1503, which ruled that from
thenceforth no aldermen or members of the common council (council of twenty four) should
be allowed to rent out the old bailey or any of the city's common ground "hot if they will
giff as muche as Any other will"'02
As cases such Thornton's show, reductions in rent or taxes were commonly justified
in the name of offsetting the expense of civic office. Whether such examples represented
a genuine worry over the expense of civic office, or merely a cynical attempt to justify the
effective embezzlement of common funds is hard to say. It is clear, however, that the
commons entertained few doubts in judging this matter; Whetley was far from alone in his
charges. Financial misconduct or mismanagement was a common subject of petitions of
complaint in York, and it was possibly one of the main causes of unrest in York during this
period, as it had been throughout the later medieval period.'03
 In particular, the 1490
petition presented by the commons to the mayor and council called for the scrutiny of past
mayoral accounts, a reduction in the recorders and mayors' fees, and a reduction in the
'°°YCA, House Book 8, fols. 1 13r, 12 lv & 123v.
'°' Ibid., 8, fol. 123v. Other suspicious rent arrangements included a reduction in the rent charged to John
Birkhede in 1503 due to the ill repair of the house. Ibid., 9, fol. 3r.
'°2 lbid., 9,fol. lv.
103 See, Dobson, 'The Risings in York, Beverley and Scarborough', esp. p. 120; Rees Jones, 'York's Civic
Administration', pp. 1324. For worries over the fmancial propriety or competence of elites in other towns, see
Reynolds,Medieval Towns, p. 176; Barron, 'Ralph Holland', especially p. 172; Hill ,MedievalLincoln, p. 277.
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amount of legal counsel retained by the city.'°4 The commons were not successftul in their
request for the reduction in fees paid to the mayor and council.' 05
 However, the
chamberlain's account rolls suggest that their request for a reduction in the number of
lawyers retained by the city was met. Whereas in 1486 the city retained at least ten lawyers
besides the recorder, by 1499 this number had fallen to only two.'° 6 The elite was again
attacked over financial issues in 1529 when the commons reiterated earlier demands for a
reduction in the mayor's fee.'° 7 Interestingly, on this occasion the battlelines were not
straightforwardly drawn with the elite and the commons on opposing sides. Rather, the
House Books suggest that the commons were "stiry[ed]" by five members of the city's
council of twenty-four.'°8
Concern over financial corruption or incompetence among civic officials was also
evident within the elite itself at times during this period, illustrating that it is not possible to
view concerns over financial peculation simply in terms of the elite versus the commons.
One such example concerns the Stavely brothers, Alan (mayor 1506 & 1519) and William
(chamberlain 1498). These two men were involved in various disputes with other members
of the civic elite in the period 1498 to 1516. Although there were a variety of issues
involved, these disputes seem to have been particularly concerned with the use of financial
'°4 Atlreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 674; Miller, 'Medieval York', p. 83. For the history of the dispute over
mayors fees, see Rees Jones, 'York's Civic Administration', pp. 132-4.
105 Kermode, MedievalMerchants, p. 62.
'°6 Dobson (ed.), ChamberlainsAccountRolls, pp. 184 & 206. The number of legal counsel retained by the city
seems to have crept up slightly during the early-sixteenth century, without ever reaching levels seen prior to
1490. YCA, Chamberlains Account Rolls, C5:1 (1501-2)- C6:5 (1523-4), although see in particular, C5:l
(1501-2), C5:2 (1506-7), C5:3 (1508-9), C6:3 (1518-19), C6:4 (1520-1).
'°7 Raine (ed.), YorkCivicRecords 3: 120.
' five men were John Richardson alias Paynter (sheriff 1527), Hugh Hewlay (sheriff 1525), James Blades
(sheriff 1523), Leonard Shaw (chamberlain 1529) and William Holme (mayor 1546). Raine (ed.), York Civic
Records 3: 120-8. The possibility that these five members of the elite were stirring up the city's commons in
order to pursue their own agendas is discussed in more detail below.
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power. The first of the disputes took place in 1498, when Alan Stavely was overheard
saying that William Barker (sheriff 1483) was not fit to be an alderman as he had gained
some wheat by false means and had also made an unlawfiul fine.' 09
 Alan apologised to
Barker for these statements and this dispute seems to have ended here.
However, in 1500, following an ordinance forbidding York freemen from purchasing
lead other than that which had been weighed at the city crane, William Stavely became
embroiled in a dispute involving similar charges of corruption among civic officials. It began
in February when Stavely was fined and imprisoned for breaking the ordinance on lead and
refusing to cooperate with the civic authorities over the matter."° Stavely's obstinacy seems
to have stemmed from his conviction that each one of those who convicted him had "bought
more lede than he ded"." Interestingly, this does not seem to have been an empty
accusation. Although Stavely was fined £6 by the authorities, he was subsequently
reimbursed £3 of the fine on condition that he did not reveal this arrangement to anyone so
that it would not set a precedent."2
 Stavely, however, was obviously not content to let the
matter drop, and in August 1500 he brought proof to the council chamber of the fact that
three aldermen of the city- John Elwald (mayor 1499), John Gihiot (mayor 1490 & 1503)
and William Barker (sheriff 1483)- had all bought lead weighed at Boroughbridge."3
Perhaps as a result of this action, the council decided the following month that lead could
'°9 YCA, House Book 8, fol. 40v. The election of Stavely to the post of sheriff nine months later, was perhaps
indicative of the speculation and politicking which may have surrounded election to civic office.
"°For the ordinance concerning lead, see Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 144. William had bought his lead
from a Miles Stavely, a lead man from Richmondshire who may have been his (and Alan's) brother.
YCA, House Book 8, fol. 74r-v.
'Ibid., fol. 87r; see also Ibid., fol. 75v.
113 Ibid., fol. 95r.
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be bought from anywhere. 114
 Meanwhile, William Stavely received a 'reward' of 6s 8d for
the searches which he had made through the books of one William Tankerd of
Boroughbridge, while the mayor of York's was subsequently fined over the affair."5
To what extent should complaints such as those of the Stavelys, Whetley or the
commons in general be viewed simply as protests against 'peculation and misgovernment'?
It is possible that financial issues were used by members of the elite such as the Stavelys or
the five members of the twenty-four in 1529 as a means of pursuing their own private
quarrels and vendettas. Further, as will be argued in the next section, members of York's
civic elite and other substantial citizens sometimes used inflammatory issues in order to
manipulate the commons to their own ends." 6
 Equally, it is perhaps unwise to take the
complaints of the commons at their face value. As was mentioned above, government
(whether ascending or descending in form) was often represented as being in the interests
of the 'common wele', making it hard for people to attack civic rule without laying
themselves open to the charge of attacking the common good of the city. As Rigby has
argued, since the rule of the rich was generally justified for the good of society in general,
urban conflicts "normally centred on the alleged failure of the rich to carry out their side of
the social contract, rather than rejecting the social contract per
Added to this problem, not only were the values of peace and friendship widely
accepted in late-medieval civic thought, but from the crown's point of view one of the main
"4 lbid., fol. 97r.
"5 lbid., foL 102r & 103r. This was clearly not the end of the matter. In 1501 the issue went to higher arbitration
with the justices of the King's assize. See Ibid., fol. 109v.
116 See the actions of John de Northampton in London during the late-fourteenth centuiy; Nightingale,
'Capitalists, Crafts and Constitutional Change', pp. 3-35, especially p. 33.
"7 Rigby, 'Urban 'Oligarchy", p. 68.
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aims of civic government was the maintenance of the king's peace.' 18 For these reasons,
protests against civic government or governors could easily be presented merely as
destructive or subversive acts, a spin that civic elites may well have capitalised upon. For
example, in 1386, the London aldermen described John de Northampton and his followers
as men who in the time of Edward ifi had been regarded as "rioters, brawlers, disturbers of
the peace, initiators and maintainers of common quarrels and riots in the city.. .men engaged
to the utmost of their power in oppressing the people and subverting the city"." 9 Similarly,
during the disputes within London sixty years later, Ralph Holland's opponents justified his
imprisonment on the grounds that he had threatened men with violence, and they later
accused one of his followers as having uttered words which violently threatened the king's
peace.'2° Perhaps most telling in this respect, though, is the dispute between the 'venerable'
citizens and the commons of Norwich over the method of civic government.' 2 ' In replying
to the (apparently well ordered) complaints of the commons, the elite began by calling the
latter body "de certaines rioteuses persones del Comunalte".'22
How then should we view the complaints in York against financial management?
Were these simply complaints against the (sometimes evident) corruption of the civic elite?
Or were constrained complaints over 'peculation and misgovernment', one of the few
effective means by which a discontented commons could protest about an elite which
embodied wider and more fundamental causes of dissatisfaction? It is certainly clear that
more fundamental causes of dissatisfaction lay at the heart of other disturbances in York
"8 Black, Guilds and Civil Society, pp. 69-70.
"9 Nightingale, 'Capitalists, Crafts and Constitutional Change', p. 7, note 15.
' 20 Bon 'Ralph Holland', pp. 164 & 176.
121 Hudson and Tingey (eds.), Records of The City ofNorwich, pp. 64-108.
122 Ibid., p. 78.
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during this period.
The constitutional changes introduced in York during the late-fifteenth and early-
sixteenth centuries have been viewed as a response to pressure from the commonalty for
increased participation in civic government. In particular, historians have tended to view
the numerous occasions on which election days were disrupted by rioting as symptomatic
of fundamental dissatisfaction with the government of the city.lZ Arguably, however, it is
the petitions presented by the commonalty to the elite during this period which provide the
best gauge of the contemporary causes of dissatisfaction. As has been seen, the content of
these petitions was often specific, dealing with financial matters or being directed towards
individual instances of misgovernment. However, on several occasions the York commons
were more radical and wide-reaching in their demands.
The commons most famously justified its requests as they were outlined in a petition
cited earlier which was presented to the elite in 1475, on the grounds that "Forasmuch as
we be all one body corporate, we think that we be all in like privilege of the commonalty,
which has borne none office in the city".' 24 Clearly, this statement must be viewed as an
overt and bold reassertion of the commons' rights of consultation and representation in the
government of the city. In this respect it is somewhat analogous to the actions of the
Norwich commons in 1414.125 However, the actual demands that followed were
conservative both in terms of their content and language. The main request was that only
'able' men should be appointed as bridge masters or chamberlains.'26
Far more radical were the actions of the commons in 1504. On this occasion the
' There was election day rioting during the period in question in 1462, 1471, 1482, 1489, 1492 and 1516.
124 Sellers (ed.), York Memorandum Book, part 2, P. 246.
MeRee, 'Peacemaking and its Limits in Late Medieval Norwich', especially pp. 846-53.
126	 the full petition, see Sellers (ed.), York Memorandum Boo/c part 2, pp. 245-7.
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mayor and council were kept in the city's guildhall by a crowd of 3,000 until six o'clock in
the evening, when the commons finally agreed to submit their nominations for rnayor2l
Even then, only a few of the commons agreed to take an oath of obedience to the flew
mayor, and he was not allowed to leave the building until he had signed a bill of demands.'28
Unfortunately, the "many and gret" articles of the bill are not recorded, although a letter
from the ringleaders of the riot to the searchers and commons of York noted that they
concerned the "hool Comon well of the Citie".' 29
 That the commons were determined in
their demands is indicated by the fact that they hired one Thomas Merley, a lawyer, to
represent their case.' 3° More radical still was the commons' request later that same year that
"thei myght have theyr eleccon of the Shireffs lyke as they have of the Maier", in other
words, that they should have a role in the sheriffs' election, a request that was not
granted.'3'
These actions have been interpreted by York historians as evidence of a 'mercantile
oligarchy under heavy fire from a 'democratic' movement'.' 32 However, it can be argued
that the situation was in fact far less clear-cut. The events of 1504 were distinct from the
other York disturbances in several important respects. First, though the commons were
frequently vocal in the defence of their rights of consultation and representation, the events
of 1504 are the only documented occasion on which the demands made by the commons
V Raine (ed.), York Civic Records 2: 19 1-2
'Ibid., 2: 192.
'29 Ibid.,2: 194.
' 30 For the quotes see Ibid., 3: 7; 2: 193.
131 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records 3: 8; YCA, House Book 9, fol. I 9v.
132 See Miller, 'Medieval York', p. 84; Swanson, Medieval Artisans, pp. 122-7; Kermode, 'Obvious
Observations', 99-10 1.
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were either 'radical', or 'democratic' . '33
 There is no record of the commons having lobbied
for an increased active share in the government of the city at any other time. Of course, it
might be supposed that the constitutional changes of 1464 and 1473, which increased the
role of the crafts in mayoral elections, represented an attempt by Edward IV to diffuse
election-day disturbances. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the changes of
1464 and 1473 were made in direct response to pressure from the commons: indeed, it is
equally likely that Edward IV was simply attempting to remodel York's constitution to make
it like London's. Clearly, due to the paucity of the records it is difficult to assess the
significance or typicality of this event. However, just as it would be unwise to dismiss this
incident out of hand as a unique occurrence, so too is it unwise to ascribe similarly radical
motives to all of the disturbances during this period in the absence of any other supporting
evidence.' 34
 As will be argued, this was the only occasion on which there was an evident
and uncomplicated divide between artisan commons on the one hand and the civic elite on
the other. Far from being symptomatic of a craft-based 'democratic movement' attacking
a 'mercantile oligarchy', it is arguable that the unrest of 1476 to 1525 should instead be
viewed within the context of existing ideologies of government and ongoing dynastic turmoil
within the wider realm.
Consultation and Representation
Some of the most serious disputes in late fifteenth-century York were concerned with the
133 Indeed, it is questionable whether even the events of 1504 could be termed democratic.
}Iistorians such as Swanson or Kermode might argue that their analysis of these disturbances is based not oniy
on rhetoric, but also on their analysis of the socio-political relations within later-medieval York. This thesis
argues, however, that the socio-political relations within later-medieval York were less polarised than has
previously been suggested.
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encroachment or enclosure of common lands. 135 Rioting in York over this issue was rife
between 1484 and 1494. Again, this area of dispute and unrest was not unique to York.136
Interestingly, historians have not tended to consider this issue in the context of Civic
authority. However, an exception here is Maiy Dormer Harris's interpretation of the unrest
led by Laurence Saunders in Coventry during the late-fifteenth century. Harris has
suggested that the problem in Coventry was wider than the issue of common lands, and
related to a tension between wards as traditional representatives of common rights, and
newer methods of civic government which were unable to draw on custom or tradition as
a form of legitimation.' 37 The encroachment and enclosure of common lands was certainly
a powerfiul and potentially explosive issue in its own right. However, it can be argued that
in York too, the riots over common lands should be viewed within the context of wider
notions of civic authority. I will argue that a key issue in these disputes was the role or duty
of civic oficiaJs as representatives of the commons' interests.
The first set of riots over common lands in York during the period in question took
place in 1484, following the city's relinquishment of a series of common rights to Lord
Lovell, St. Mary's Abbey and St. Nicholas's Hospital.' 38 The rioting reached its peak ten
years later over the case of the Vicar Lees.' 39 While the York commons lacked Saunders'
eloquence or bravado in insisting that they should never have their common rights until they
'35 For disputes over common land in York, see Attreed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 340-1; Raine (ed.), York
Civic Records 2: 107-23, especially 110-12; Miller, 'Medieval York', p. 83;
'Reyno1ds, Medieval Tois, p. 178. See J. Thompson, The Transformation ofMedieval England 13 70-1527
(Lougman, London, 1983), pp. 40-6; and, for a slightly later period, S.M. Harrison, The Pilgrimage of Grace
in the Lake Counties 1536-7 (Royal Historical Society: London, 1981), pp. 60-66.
' 37 M. Dormer-Harris, Life in an Old English Town: A Histoty of Coventry (London: Sonnenschein & co. Ltd.,
1898), p. 110-11.
' 38 Attreed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, pp. 294, 303, 320-1, 335-41 & 439-41.
139 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2:107-23; Miller, 'Medieval York', p. 82.
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had "striken of the hedes of iij or iiij of thes Churles hedes that mien vs", they shared
Saunders' sentiments in laying the blame for the loss of common lands at the door of the
civic elite.' 40 Indeed, it was reported in 1511 that a certain Nicholas Roger was heard
arguing that "Maister Kyrke shulde never be Maire for he lost the Vycar Lees".' 4' The same
Roger also claimed with reference to the Vicar Lees that he would not "awayl his bonet" to
any but three of the aldermen as "they gafe hym nether mete ne drinke".' 42 These comments
indicate that Roger both blamed the elite for the loss of the common rights, and also felt that
through the loss of the Lees the civic elite had failed properly to defend the interests of both
the commons and the "comon well".' 43 It is impossible to determine whether Roger believed
that the lands were lost merely through incompetence or with the active consent of the elite.
However, Roger's slander of Kirk as a "fals traytour" might suggest that suspected Kirk of
having been duplicitous in the matter.'
In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that on this occasion York's civic elite had
relinquished the common lands lightly. The House Books from the 1490s are full of details
of the various stages of land disputes with the Vicars choral and Sir James Danby.'45
However, the same is not true of the dispute a decade earlier over the land relinquished to
°Hariss (ed.), Coventiy Leet Book, p. 556. For disputes involving Laurence Saunders in Coventry see Ibid.,
pp. 430-38, 454-64, 5 10-13, 556-7 & 574-80.
141 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 3: 36. George Kirk was mayor in 1495 and 1512. In 1494 he had been
chosen by the commons in his capacity as alderman as one of the five men to go to London and negotiate over
this issue. The other men were the recorder and the alderman, William White, together with John EIwald and
John Stockdale of the twenty-four. Ibid., 2: 114.
'42 Ibid., 3: 36. It is unclear whether the reference to meat and drink refers to the practical use of the common
lands, or was meant as a more general comment on the practical usefulness of the aldermen from his point of
view.
143 For the invocation of the protection of York's common land in the name of the city's 'common wele', see
Ibid., 2: 114& 115.
'44 Ibid., 3: 36.
' 45 Attreed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, pp. 522-3, 663, 680-1.
235
St. Nicholas's Hospital. Here the land seems to have been handed over at the specific
request of Richard III.' The House Books recorded that the request was accepted with
the proviso that "the commons agree to the same", and the subsequent transfers were
recorded as being agreed to by "all the hole commonalte" of the city.' 47
 However, in the
light of the subsequent rioting it seems unlikely that all of the commons bad in fact agreed
to this action. Moreover, the mayor at that time was Thomas Wrangwish, a well-known
supporter of Richard 111.148
Aside from the rioting, there are several other indications that Wrangwish may have
acted without the consent of the commons, and that the commons may have resented this.
First, following the riots, the commons presented the mayor with a petition, the first article
of which was a request that "the common seal of the citie be duly kepid and not be deiverd
ne sealid therwith without thassest of all the comons".' 49 This could be read merely as a
general concern. However, it is worth noting that the indenture relinquishing common rights
had been presented under the authority of the city's common seal.' 5° Moreover, as will be
shown, several similarly innocuous sounding requests in the same petition can be interpreted
as attacks against Wrangwish.'5'
Second, a suggestion that the elite may have attempted to hide their role in the
'Ibid., pp. 303 & 439. Raine has argued that "the most unpopular thing Richard ever did in York was to ask
for and receive from a compliant Council some common pasture", Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, I: viii.
While there is no evidence that a similar request was made on behalf of Lord Lovell in 1483, Kermode has noted
that Lovell was Richard ifi's chamberlain at the time. Kermode, 'Obvious Observations', p. 100.
' 47 Attreed (ed.), YorkHouse Books, pp. 303 & 439-4 1.
a summary of the relationship between Richard Ill and Wrangwish see Palliser, 'Richard Ill and York',
pp. 64-6. It appears that Wrangwish retained this affiliation even afler Richards death; Attreed, 'The Relations
between the Royal Government and the City of York', pp. 106-9.
' 49 Attreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 353.
150 Ibid., p. 439. For rules in medieval Lincoln concerning the presence of an element representing the commons
at the sealing of documents with the city's common seal, see Hill, Medieval Lincoln, p. 279.
Miller, 'Medieval York', p. 82.
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relinquishment of the land arises out of the almost simultaneous repetition of the ordinance
that councillors should not divulge council business outside the chamber.' 52
 Again this could
have been coincidental. However, shortly following the presentment of the commons'
petition and the punishment of those involved in the riots over common land, the ordinance
was again re-issued. 153
 Further, William Taite, one of the council of twenty-four, was
discharged for having disclosed "the secretes and privetes of the said chambre".' 54 Perhaps
most tellingly, though, the evidence points out that his indiscretion was provided by one of
the ringleaders in the riots.'55
As with the Laurence Saunders affair in Coventry, the York commons seem to have
regarded the loss of lands as a failure in the civic duty of the elite to represent the views and
best interests of the rest of the city. However, as already hinted, the disturbances were also
bound up with other issues. In particular, the relationship between Richard ifi and York has
been discussed by historians, and it seems likely that Richard was fted by certain members
of the elite, but resented by the commons.' This is not the place to discuss or examine
Richard ifi's relationship with York in detail. However, Richard's influence in the city was
clearly pertinent to issues of authority and unrest in later-medieval York. In particular, there
is evidence to suggest that the commons may have felt that their authority was compromised
or threatened by Richard's patronage of the civic elite.
in first letter from Richard ifi over the lands was discussed on 17 March. The grant of the pasture was made
on the 27 March and the ordinance concerning council secrets was first reissued at a meeting later on the 27
March; Attreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 305.
'531b1d., pp. 339-40.
'54Ibid., p. 340.
' Wandesford's involvement is discussed below.
See, Palliser, 'Richard ifi and York', pp. 51-81; Attreed (ed.), York House Books, p. xxiii; The relationship
between Richard III and York stemmed back to his time as Duke of Gloucester. To avoid confusion I have
avoided calling him both Richard III and the Duke of Gloucester, instead referring to him as Richard.
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Attacks made against Richard and mayor Wrangwish suggest that the commons may
have resented the interference of Richard in York, and may even have viewed this
interference as a threat to their own role in the government of the city. We have already
seen that resentment against the elites' failure to safeguard common lands resulted from an
original request made by Richard. Concern over his role in the government of York seems
to have been an even greater cause of contention. In 1482, the city witnessed serious rioting
on the day of the mayor's election. This rioting appears to have been sparked by a rivalry
between two of the mayoral candidates, Richard York (mayor 1469 & 1482) and Thomas
Wrangwish (1476 & 1484).' Following these disturbances the king ordered that both men
should relinquish their claims to the post! 58 However, the prospect of Wrangwish's
mayoralty continued to cause concern within the city. The following year, during a
discussion over ale concerning who the commons should have for their mayor in the
forthcoming elections, someone suggested that he thought "it wold plees the communs" that
Wrangwish, should be mayor on the grounds that he was "the man that my lord of
Gloucestre will do for".' 59
 In response to this the cooper William Welles replied "if my lord
Gloucestir wold have hym mair the communs woidnot have hym mare".' 6° When questioned
about this statement Welles claimed that what he meant was that "the mair must be chosyn
be the commonalte and not be no lord".'6' Clearly, the interference of Richard in the
government of York was resented in some quarters. Furthermore, a slander made against
'Attreed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 247-9,251, 252, 254 & 702. Richard York does not seem to share in
Wrangwish's support for Richard Ill, and he was knighted by Henry VII in 1487 for having stayed loyal to the
king during Lainbert Simnel's rebellion. Raine (ed.), Test. Ebor. 4: 134.
' 58 Atreed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 247-9, 251, 252, 254 & 702; Miller, 'Medieval York', p. 82.
' 59 Ibid., p. 707.
'° Ibid., p. 707.
'61 Thid p. 707. During the same year there was also another slander case involving Wrangwish in which he was
accused of being a thief. Ibid., pp. 278-9.
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Richard some months earlier which stated: "What myght he do for the cite? Nothing bot
gryn of us", suggests that at least some of the commons felt that Richard had little to offer
them in compensation for his interference.162
Resentment against Wrangwish was ftirther indicated through the bill presented by the
commons to the civic elite in 1484.163 Besides offering general criticism of the government
of York, the bill can be interpreted both as an attack on Wrangwish, and as a defence of the
rights of the commonalty. As has been mentioned, the bill began by re-iterating the fact that
the common seal should only be used with the consent of the commons. It then suggested
a range of measures concerning the city's officers of the mace and sword, and the captaincy
of York soldiers. In particular, it was requested that in order to reduce costs "ther be noo
more at any tyme any of our aldermen to be an captayn bot onely ather the mase berer and
swerdberer . lM
 Further, the role of the commons in the election of these officers was re-
asserted with the injunction that these offices were not be sold but "to be chosen and elect
by the mayre and his brether and with thassent of the comons".' 65 Quite possibly, the
existence of financial concerns over the captaincy of soldiers should be viewed in the context
of ongoing complaints about the nonpayments of soldiers who served in Scotland two years
ear1ier.' However, as Miller has suggested it is also likely that, the terms of the bill
constituted a thinly veiled dig at Wrangwish who had played a prominent role as captain of
York troops at that time.' 67 It should also be noted that the Wrangwish family seems to
'62 Ibjd p. 696.
'63 Jbid pp. 353-4.
164 Ibid p. 353.
' 65 Ibid p. 354.
Ibid., pp. 263-4, 265, 267-9 & 272-3.
'67 Miller, 'Medieval York', p. 82. For Wrangwish's activities as a captain of Iroops see Ibid., pp. 236,256-7,
284-5, 295,297 & 298.
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have enjoyed connections with the post of sword bearer. A John Strangwishe orWrangwish
held the post from 1481 to 1485, and then again from 1486 to 1487. During this time he
was involved in the dismissal (initially against Edward IV's will) of the previous incumbent,
John Eglesfeld.' Further, in 1500, the House Books recorded that Thomas's son William
was to be given the post of sergeant of the mace on account of the fact that his father had
been mayor of the city.'69
Outside Influences
Clearly, the riots and disturbances in York during the 1480s seem to have been provoked
or fuelled by a variety of inter-connected issues. Aside from the rivalry between the two
aldermen, York and Wrangwish, there existed concerns over the encroachment and
enclosure of common land, over the financial management of the city's finances, and over
the payment and captaincy of the city's troops. Resentment felt in certain quarters of the
city towards Wrangwish and Richard ifi in relation to these issues, related to wider concerns
over the administration of power and authority in later medieval York. In particular, the
commons were anxious and willing to assert vocally their rights of consultation and
representation. Infringements of these rights were strongly resisted and resented. Actions
of resistance like the Coventry protests involving Laurence Saunders, or the fourteenth-
century disputes between the elite and commons of Norwich, underline both the perceived
importance of the role of the commons in the governnient of later-medieval towns, and the
determination of the commons to protect this role.' 7° At the same time however, it is vital
'Ibid., pp. 267, 355, 366, 533, 624-5, 675 & 700-1.
' 69 YCA House Book 8, fol. 79r.
'70 Haij (ed.), Coventry Leer Book, pp. 430-38, 454-64, 510-13, 556-7 & 574-80; Hudson and Tmgey (eds.),
Records of The City ofNorwich, pp. 64-108.
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that the historian also views the protests discussed in relation to other activities within York
and Yorkshire at the time.
Pamela Nightingale has demonstrated in her account of civic unrest in Richard il's
London, that dissatisfaction among the city's commons was capitalised on by the factional
leader, John de Northampton. She concludes that Northampton "was not a radical leader
fighting for the destruction of the merchant oligarchy and for its replacement by a more
broadly based civic government", but rather that he was "pursuing, first, the narrow
sectional interests of his mystery, and, secondly, his own personal power".' 7 ' Similarly, it
seems likely that concerns amongst the commons of York over the enclosure of land, and
the actions of Wrangwish and Richard III, were manipulated and exacerbated by men
anxious to pursue their own agendas.
As was argued in the previous chapter, York's elite was keen to lay stress upon events
which enhanced the group's solidarity and played down any internal discord or divisions.'72
Further, Attreed has demonstrated that during the late-fifteenth century, certain 'sensitive'
material concerning the city's dealings with Richard ifi was kept separate from the main
body of the House Books.' Due to this selective and doctored reporting, the details of
events in York during this period are often extremely hazy, making it difficult for the
historian to establish what was happening politically within the city.' 74 Nevertheless, despite
these problems, several pieces of evidence suggest that much of the unrest within York
during this period was instigated or exacerbated, not by a disgruntled commons protesting
against the elite, but rather by political factionalism and allegiances among civic officials and
'' Nightingale, 'Capitalists, Crafis and Constitutional Change', pp. 3-35 (quote p. 33).
172 See above pp. 170-200.
' 73 Attreed (ed.), York House Books, appendix III, pp. 704-32.
'74 Royal records such as printed rolls do not shed any further light on these events.
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members of the Yorkshire gentry.
In particular, certain evidence suggests that some of the unrest within York during the
late-fifteenth century may have been a factor of factionalism surrounding Richard ifi and the
Wars of the Roses. In the first place, it is suspicious that much of the unrest during the
1480s seems to have been connected with Wrangwish, a well known supporter of Richard
ifi. Moreover, the evidence suggests that where unrest during the later 1480s was clearly
connected to certain individuals it frequently had a national or a regional political dimension.
Roger Laton and Thomas Wandesford, both gentlemen and York citizens, were especially
shady and suspicious figures.'" Both men appear to have played prominent parts in the riots
over common land in 1484, and they were punished for their role in this affair together with
another gentleman, John Hastings.' 76 Laton in particular does not seem to have been an
ordinary participant in the rioting. As well as being on the panel of men who were
appointed to speak with the commons following the riots, it was also Laton who presented
the commons' bill of complaints to the mayor and council, thereby further suggesting that
he had played a key role in the events.' Laton re-emerges in the records several times
during the next few years in the context of minor disputes, and on one occasion in 1486 he
was accused of insulting the sheriff and striking one of the sheriff's servants. 178
 The same
month he delivered another bill of petition to the civic elite "in the name of all the
'75 Roger Laton obtained freedom of the city in 1481 as a gentleman, but was later referred to in the House Books
as esquire. Thomas Wandesford became free as a gentleman in 1484; Collins (ed.), York Freemen 's Register,
p. 202; Attreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 357.
' 76 AIIreed (ed.), York House Books, p. 336.
" Ibid., pp. 336 & 341. This Bill appears to have been aimed at Wrangwish although, as we saw above, it
ostensibly aimed at protecting the use of the common seal and dealing with the appointment of the mayor's
sergeants.
pp. 357, 363 & 397-8.
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comons".'79
The role and the motivation of Laton and Wandesford in the common land riots and
subsequent skirmishes is unclear. It has been suggested that these disturbances may have
been triggered or exacerbated by Richard ifi's relationship with members of the civic elite.
Interestingly, the evidence suggests that by 1486 both men were involved in activities
directed against Henry VU' 8° News of the impending invasion of Lincoln, Love!! and
Simnell had reached England at the beginning of May that year, and it was while keeping
watch at Bootham Bar that the ex-mayor William Wells was murdered by the miller John
Robson.' 8 ' It has been suggested that this act of murder should be viewed as evidence of
simmering resentment against the ruling oligarchy.' 82 Equally convincing, though, is the
suggestion that Wells' murder may have been motivated by national politics, and that it was
perpetrated by pro-Ricardian sympathisers in the city.' 83 During the same period Laton
again seems to have been stirring up trouble. In a letter concerning the murder of Wells,
Henry VII requested that Laton should be sent to Pontefract for trial over matters
unspecified together with Robson and another man named John Unfortunately, the
civic elite was unable to comply with this request as Laton had already left the city and his
'Ibid, p. 399. Following on from this was another series of disputes which again involved the city's sheriffs.
Ibid., pp. 469,488-9, 491, 530-1 & 538.
' 3 There is not necessarily an inconsistency here. It is possible that Laton and Wandesford's involvement in the
common land riots and the subsequent bills were either a-political (in terms of national politics) or reflected in-
fighting among members of Richard III's retinue. It is also important to note that while the two main factions
during the Wars of the Roses were the Lancastrians and the Yorkists, there was also much rivalry and
factionalism within and beyond the two main 'parties', and switches of allegiance were not uncommon.
' Attreed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 557-8 & 560-2. On the Simnell Rebellion in general, see Pollard,
North-Eastern En gland During the Wars of the Roses, pp. 375-7.
'Kermode, 'Obvious Observations', p. 99.
' 83 Palliser, 'Richard III and York', p. 67; Attreed (ed.), York House Books, p. xxiii.
' 84 Aeed (ed.), York House Books, p. 564.
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whereabouts were unknown.' 85 However, in August 1486, a York man Alexander Dawson,
was punished by the mayor and council for allowing Laton "then standing oute of the kinges
grace.. .in to the said citie at suche tyme as his rebelles approached unto the same".'86
Laton's involvement in political subversion is finally indicated by his beheading on the
Pavement in August 1487 for "certain poyntes of treason committed by hyme ayenst the
kinges highnesse".'87
Wandesford' s crimes were far less spectacular. Like Laton he was punished for
making a riotous assembly during the common land riots of 1484, and he was also charged
with the task of speaking with the commons over this matter.' 88 The next indication of
Wandesford's seditious or riotous activities does not come until January 1487. At that time
the contents of a letter of testimonial from the mayor for Wandesford suggests that rumours
were abounding concerning Wandesford's involvement in riots and other activities against
the king, the king's peace and laws, and the king's citizens.' 89 Finally, following the
election-day riots of 1489, Wandesford was charged, together with the merchant John
Metcalf and other "gentlemen", with having unlawfully taken the keys to Bootham bar and
opened the gates on the morning of the electjons.'9° This act of opening Bootham bar on
the morning of the mayoral elections presumably allowed undesirable elements into the city,
and it appears as particularly suspicious given that the elections had been preceded by royal
'Ibid., p. 565.
Ibid., p. 590.
Ibid., p. 588.
'Ibid., p. 336.
Ibid., p. 528. Interestingly, despite Wandesford's involvement in the riots of 1484 the mayor denied such
accusations against Wandesford and confirmed his good character.
Metcalf was probably the man of that name who became mayor in 1498. At that point he had yet to hold civic
office in the city, although was free as a merchant. Ibid., pp. 629 & 633.
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proclamations warning people to keep the king's peace. Trouble may well have been
expected from outsiders, as a warning had been issued that no one was to "go defensable
arraied be it estraunger or ffraunchest man.. .bot that every estraunger leve his wapyn at his
innes and not to entermeit hym ne thame of the eleccion of the major".'9'
Laton and Wandesford were not the only men to play a prominent role in the
incitement of politically motivated violence within the city during this period. Thomas
Wrangwish's association with Richard III and his connection with a number of the
disturbances in York during the early 1 480s (often as a target of resentment) has already
been commented on. Wrangwish played a more direct and serious role in the disturbances
witnessed in the city in 1489 as part of 'Egremont's Rising' or the 'Yorkshire Rebellion' of
1489.192 The rebellion began in April, prompted it seems by attempts to collect an
unpopular tax in the North, and by 15 May the rebels had entered York.' 93 Wrangwish was
also charged with procuring three men from Acomb to take part in the uprising, and having
allowed 5,000 of the rebels into York through Walmgate and Fishergate Bars, which he was
deemed to have defended inadequately in his role as alderman.' 94 In June, Wrangwish was
convicted of treason for his role in these activities by a jury which included four of his fellow
aldermen.' 95 Although he was sentenced to hang, he and other participants in the uprising
received royal pardons the following month.' Perhaps unsurprisingly, the York
191 Ibid., p.631.
Attreed, 'Relations between the Royal Government and the City of York', pp. 106-9. See also, Hicks, 'The
Yorkshire Rebeffion of 1489 Reconsidered', pp. 365-94 and idem,'Dynastic Change and Northern Society', pp.
395-418.
' 93 Hicks, 'The Yorkshire Rebellion of 1489 Reconsidered', especially pp. 396 & 406.
194 Ibid., p. 401. The rebels were armed with bows and arrows which had been supplied by aYorkfletcher
named Hugh Buntyng, possibly the same Hugh Buntyng, fletcher, who held civic office as a bridge master in
1514 and as a chamberlain in 1528 (and who died in 1530). Appendix 1.
' 95 Hicks, 'The Yorkshire Rebellion of 1489 Reconsidered', p. 398.
'CPR (1485-1494), p. 271.
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House Books make no mention of Wrangwish's actions and give sparse treatment to the
role of York in this uprising in general.
Given the sparsity of the evidence available, it is unlikely that historians will ever be
able to fully unravel the complex events and allegiances which caused such unrest in York
during the late-flfIeenth century. Indeed, it is not even possible to argue that this period was
marked by a significant increase in violence, since civic records such as the House Books,
which provide the main sources of evidence for such unrest in York, only begin to survive
consistently from the late-fifteenth century onwards.
In the first section of this part it was argued that the extent of the involvement of the
commons in the government of later-medieval York has been under-estimated by historians.
The latter section has concentrated on the role of the revealed political relationship between
the elite and the commons in the disturbances in York duiing this period. Historians have
argued that urban unrest both in York and elsewhere can be explained in terms of conflict
between these two groups. This section has shown that to a certain extent such an analysis
is justified. Financial peculation and political or administrative mismanagement, whether real
or merely perceived, seem to have elicited protest from the commons in the form of bills of
complaint, and they possibly provided contributory causes of violent action such as rioting
within the city. Further, the commons were anxious to defend their role within the political
life of York. Again, the evidence suggests that they defended their rights of representation
and consultation through the use of bills of petition and other less peaceful protest. Indeed,
there is even evidence to suggest that on occasions, the commons may have made more
radical demands, requesting an increased role in the electoral system. To this extent, it is
possible to interpret some of the unrest evident in this period in terms of antagonism
between the elite and the commons. However, the evidence does not suggest that unrest
in York can be ascribed wholly or mainly to pressure for increased 'democracy', or to an
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inherently antagonistic division between a craft-based commons and a mercantile oligarchy.
Such a view is overly simplistic in terms of the demarcation line between those involved in
disturbances or disputes, and also in terms of the causes of the unrest which seem to have
been complex and multiple.
While members of the commons protested against corruption among the elite, so too
did other members of the elite. As the previous chapter on the structure of the civic elite
showed, the elite of late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth century York was riven with
factionalism. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that several of the recorded disturbances
of the period seem to have been sparked by factionalism within the elite itself. We have seen
how rivalry between two main mayoral candidates in 1482 caused unrest and rioting
amongst the wider popu1ation.' Similarly, rivalry within the civic elite also caused rioting
within the city in 1516, when the council of aldermen was divided over which candidate
should join their ranks.' 98 Finally, unrest within the city was instigated or exacerbated in
1529 when five rogue members of the council of twenty-four became involved in the 'plot'
to reduce the mayor's fee. Also challenging the identification of a division between a 'craft-
based commons' and a 'mercantile elite' is the prominence enjoyed by gentlemen such as
Laton and Wandesford as ringleaders in several of the disturbances.
Examining the cause of the disturbances, the actions and activities of key players such
as Laton, Wandesford and Wrangwish, sugge)hat any antagonism between the elite and
the commons was complicated by a variety of other interwoven factors. Complaints against
financial peculation, the desire of the commons to defend their role within the civic
constitution, and inherent factionalism within the elite, all seem to have been exacerbated
in York by rivalry and dynastic power struggles within the wider realm. In his analysis of
'Atfreed (ed.), York House Books, pp. 247-9, 25-2, 254 & 702.
1 Raine (ed.), YorkCivicRecords, 3: 51-3 & 55-9.
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the 1489 Egremont Rising of 1489, Hicks concluded that "even in the North, local politics
were affected by Royal action".' It could equally be argued that in turn these 'local
politics' affected the politics of towns and cities. The fact that the line between national and
local politics could easily become blurred can be illustrated with reference to sixteenth-
century Coventry. Phythian-Adams has shown that in Coventry rebels planned to murder
the city's mayor and aldermen, not as a protest against the ruling elite, but as part of a
treason plot against the king. 20° The experiences of medieval York and Coventry warn us
against the dangers of over-arching or one-dimensional explanations of historical events, and
they suggest that unrest during this period in other towns should be re-examined with an eye
to local and national allegiances, events and circumstances.
A final criticism of a historiography of unrest which views urban unrest as
symptomatic of an inherently antagonistic divide between the commons and the elite is that
it both feeds off and reinforces the notion of a centralised and sharply graduated linear
system of power within late-medieval towns. It is to this topic that Part Four now turns.
11icks, 'Dynastic Change and Northern Society', p. 388.
200 phythian-Adams, Desolation of a City, pp. 253-4.
248
B) Structures of Power
I) Introduction
Despite changes such as the introduction or expansion of common councils, the late fifteenth
and early sixteenth-centuries have been viewed as ushering in the 'closed corporations' of
the Tudor period.20' Studies of late-medieval or Tudor town governments overwhelmingly
have concentrated on the higher civic offices. It is partly for this reason that historians have
viewed civic government as being oligarchical in nature. 202
 More recently, though, this trend
in scholarship has slowly begun to change. In particular, Rappaport has argued that it is
erroneous to view higher civic offices as a city's "primary sources of power". 203 The work
of historians such as Pearl, Rappaport and Kowaleski has demonstrated the important role
minor offices played in increasing participation in civic government. 204
 Not only have the
lower civic offices been seen as significant in this respect, but there has also been an
increasing emphasis on the role of institutions such as parishes (or wards) and guilds. It has
been suggested that in sixteenth and seventeenth-centuiy London as many as one in ten adult
males participated in some form of local government. Pearl has argued that London urban
government consisted of "a multitude of overlapping courts and jurisdictions in which the
citizens and housekeepers were either represented or took part in person". As a result of
201 See, for example, Clark and Slack, English Towns in Transition, pp. 126-140; S.M. Jack, Towns in Tudor
and Stuart Britain (Macmillan Press: Basingstoke, 1996), pp. 70-90.
0 A cnticism which has also recently been levelled at early-modem urban historians also: P. Withington, 'Urban
Political Culture in Late Seventeenth-Centmy England: York 1649-1688', (Unpublished PhD Thesis, department
of Histoiy, University of Cambridge, 1998), pp. 58-60. Withington states that the "depiction of York in the grip
of an unyielding oligarchy is predicated on the assumption that only those householders occupying the most
senior civic offices need be studied in any great depth", p. 59.
203 ppapoi Worlds Within Worlds, p. 175 if.
204 Ibid.; Pearl, 'Change and Stability', pp. 139-165; Kowaleski, 'Commercial Dominance', especially pp. 192-3.
See also Carpenter,'The Office and Personnel of the Post of Bridgemaster',passim.
205 Rappaport, Worlds Within Worlds, pp. 180-2; Pearl, 'Change and Stability in Seventeenth-Century London',
pp. 152-56.
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this she suggests that the roots of urban government were diverse and pluralistic".206
Similarly, it seems equally likely that power was diffused throughout towns by means
of territorial and guild hierarchies rather than being entirely centralised in the hands of
medieval civic elites. Medieval urban guilds and parishes have both recently been the focus
of research. In particular, historians have begun to consider the importance of these two
bodies in the social structuring of late-medieval towns. For example, Beat KUmin has shown
that while historians tended in the past to view the parish as a "purely ecclesiastical
institution", this was not how it was viewed by contemporaries. 207 KUrnin suggests that the
parish acted simultaneously as a spiritual focus and as "a political centre" which played a
vital role in the development of rural and urban communal identities. 208 Similarly, historians
such as Rosser and McRee have concentrated attention on the social and political
importance of urban guilds. As a result of this renewed interest, historians have begun to
follow Phythian-Adams' lead of two decades ago in placing guild or parochial office within
the career-cycle of 'successful' citizens. 21° For example, Judy Ann Ford has illustrated that
in late-medieval Sandwich, parochial office holding formed part of a "cursus honorum of
public positions in which the secular and religious were intermeshed".21'
This section examines the extent to which civic power was difihised in late-medieval
York through parochial, ward or guild hierarchies. In particular, it assesses the extent to
206 Pearl, 'Change and Stability in Seventeenth-Century London', p. 152.
207 KUnIn The Shaping of a Community, p. 53.
208 Ibid., p. 54. For recent work on the English parish see also the essays in French, Gibbs and KUmin (eds.),
The Parish in English Life; Brown, Popular Piety, passim; Burgess, 'Shaping the Parish, pp. 246-286.
209 Rosser, 'Going to the Fraternity Feast', pp. 430-46; idem, 'Communities of Parish and Guild', pp. 29-55;
idem, 'Crafts, Guilds and the Negotiation of Work, pp. 30-1; McRee, 'Unity orDivision?', pp. 189-207; idem,
'Religious Gilds and Civic Order', pp. 69-97; idem, 'Religious Gilds and Regulation of Behaviour in Late
Medieval Towns', pp. 107-22.
210 Phyjan..Ads Desolation of a City, pp. 125-7; C. Burgess, 'Shaping the Parish', pp. 255-8.
211 Ford, 'Marginality and the Assimilation of Foreigners', pp. 201-11 (quote, p. 210).
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which territorial or guild office in later-medieval York could be viewed as an extension of
the city's civic cursus honorum. It also examines the effects of the late-medieval
constitutional changes on the distribution and allocation of power within the city. Through
this analysis in wider issues such as the political polarisation of society and the means of
political and social mobility will be addressed.
[flincreasin or Decreasing Oligarchy2
To what extent did medieval York's constitutional amendments result either in an increased
or decreased 'democratisation' of civic government? Rigby has argued that 'democratic'
changes in other towns were only short-lived, and it is certainly the case that amendments
made in 1464 to the method of electing York's mayors did not last long. 212
 Election
disturbances continued throughout the period and in 1489 the changes were revoked and
previous procedures were restored in response to a request from the elite. It is difficult to
say whether the type of men elected to the post of mayor altered as a consequence of the
constitutional changes. It is certainly the case that the percentage of artisan mayors
increased during the period of election by the crafts. Only one of the fourteen mayors from
the period 1456 to 1472 was drawn from the crafts, in comparison to three of the fourteen
mayors from the period 1473 to 1489.213 However, this slight change should be viewed in
the context of more general changes in the occupational composition of the civic elites at
all levels of the hierarchy at this time. Moreover, the restoration of the 1464 procedure in
212 Rigby English Society, pp. 172-5.
213jffi Snawsell (mayor 1468) was a goldsmith, William Chimney (mayor 1486) was a draper, John Newton
(mayor 1483) was a dyer and William Lambe (mayor 1475) was an ironmonger.
251
1489 seems to have had no effect at all on the type of men elected to the office of mayor.214
More profound were the effects of a change in the constitution in 1517, which altered
the composition of the common council. According to this legislation the common council
was henceforth to be made up of two members from each of the thirteen major crafts and
one from the fifteen minor ones. 215 The members were chosen by the aldermen from a list
of candidates submitted by the crafts, and only men who had already served on this council
were eligible to be elected to the post of sheriff. Swanson has viewed this change as an
attempt by the corporation to protect the existing socio-economic hierarchy by excluding
certain crafts from the government of the city. 216 However, it seems more likely that the
immediate catalyst for the changes was rioting in the previous year caused by rivalry within
the civic elite over who should be elected to the post of alderman. 217 It is probable that
Henry Vifi used the opportunity created by the riots to instigate changes intended to bring
increased stability to elections. Henceforth, the new council, together with the twenty-eight
senior searchers of the crafts, was required to choose the mayor from the existing body of
aldermen, and also determine the candidates for the post of sheriff. Since the members of
the common council were chosen by the civic elite, and since access to elections was
restricted to those sifting on the new common council, the potential for disturbances at
elections should have greatly decreased. 218 Further, a ruling that men could only hold the
post of mayor twice, and then only after an interval of at least six years had elapsed, was
214 Between 1490 and 1506, three of the fourteen men elected to the post of mayor were drawn from the crafts,
an identical proportion to that of the previous sixteen years. These men were William White, dyer (mayor 1491
& 1505), Michael White, dyer (mayor 1494 & 1505) and Thomas Grey, goldsmith (mayor 1497).
215 Dickens, 'Tudor York', pp. 137-8.
216 Swanson,MedievalArtisans, pp. 123-6.
217 this dispute see above p. 246. There is no indication that the crafts which Swanson argues were excluded
(the butchers and the tanners) were those involved in the rioting.
218 PaJli	 Tudor York, pp. 64-8.
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probably designed to reduce rivahy within the elite by ensuring that all aldermen received
their turn in office. 219 Palliser has gone a stage further by viewing the 1517 constitution in
the context of constitutional changes elsewhere, and he argues that it formed part of a wider
royal policy aimed at creating "small, self-perpetuating and, it was hoped, trustworthy
oligarchies".220
Historians such as Swanson and Palliser have tended to view the constitutional
changes of 1517 as evidence of a reduction in wider access to or participation in the political
life of late-medieval York. The changes have been placed within the context of a dominant
historiography which stresses the closure of civic office over the early-modern period.
However, it could be argued that the effects of these changes in terms of craft participation
in the government of the city were, far from clear-cut. Though access to the common
council was controlled by the elite, the role of the council was greatly increased. In effect,
the request made by the commons in 1504 that they should participate in the election of the
city's sheriff was granted, while the crafts again regained the right to elect the mayor
directly.
Historians have viewed the composition of the new common council as the most
reactionary aspect of the constitutional changes. In particular, Swanson has argued that the
nomination of the thirteen major crafts and fifteen minor ones was heavily biassed towards
the mercantile occupations to the exclusion of crafts such as the tanners and butchers.'
However, the reality seems to have been somewhat different. York historians have
219 More stringent measures had been introduced in 1372 when it was enacted that no-one was to be re-elected
in the eight yeals following their holding the post, while in 1492 re-election was barred until all of the other
aldennen had served in this capacity. However, unsurprisingly, these rules were no longer being adhered to by
1517.
220 London's common council had long been dominated by more 'mercantile' crafts and it is possible that Heniy
Vifi was anxious that the common councils of other towns should be similarly constituted. Paffiser, Tudor York,
p.69.
Swanson, MedievalArtisans, pp. 123-6.
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overlooked a list contained within the House Books of members of the conmion council in
1522.222 A study of the men mentioned in this list reveals that only five years after the
changes to the common council in 1517, the occupational composition of the council was
significantly different from that which is thought to have been prescribed. That the choice
of men was in some way governed by craft membership is indicated by the fact that much
of the list follows the order of the crafts as they appear in a document of 1547 which
confirmed the changes of 1517 223 However, several of the mercantile occupations were
omitted, while a number of craft occupations were added or duplicated. For example, the
1522 list of common councillors, like the 1547 charter, began with two merchants.224
However, it then skipped any mention of the drapers, grocers and apothecaries, none of
whom seems to have been represented in the common council of 1522.225 The occupations
of most of the next seventeen men listed appear to match the order in which the remainder
of the thirteen minor crafts were listed in the 1547 charter. 226
 Similarly, later sections of the
list also match the order in which the minor crafts were listed in the 1547 charter.227
However, a number of the crafts seem to have been over-represented in the 1522 list. At
least two tanners, William Hewbank (chamberlain 1530) and Alan Selybarne were members
m yc , House Book 10, fol. 46r. This list is noted by Raine, although not transcribed by him in his edition of
the House Books.
223 The charter of 1547, which embodies the letters patent of 1517, lists the crafts as follows. First, the major
crafts: mercers, drapers, grocers, apothecaries, goldsmiths, dyers, skinners, barbers, fishmongers, tailors,
vintners, joiners, glaziers. Then the minor crafts: hosiers, innholders, vestmentmakers, chandlers, bowers,
weavers, walkers, imnmongers, saddlers, masons, bakers, butchers, glovers, pewterers, armourers; YCA, A3 3,
Confirmation Charters of Edward VI (1547). It is not possible to be certain of the identity or occupation of all
of those listed in 1522. However, enough of the men can be identified to be certain that, in places, the order in
which the men were listed was identical to that in the above charter.
224 These two men were Thomas Abney (chamberlain 1519) and Thomas Alleyn.
225 It is possible, though unlikely, given the high status of these occupations, that the men on the 1522 list who
it is not possible to identify were drawn from these crafts.
226 See Appendix 4.
227 Ibid
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of the 1522 common council, despite the fact that the craft of tanners was not mentioned
in the 1547 charter of confirmation. 228 Other minor crafts, such as the bakers, bowers and
armourers had two representatives on the common council rather than the prescribed one.9
These differences suggest either that the changes of 1517 which prescribed the
constitution of the new common council were not rigorously adhered to, or that the charter
of 1547 did not reflect accurately the 1517 changes. It is possible that the constitution of
the common council was altered in 1547 either to reflect, or to instigate, a decline in access
to the common council on the grounds of occupation. Either way, it is clear that at least as
late as 1522 the common council was still largely representative of non-mercantile
occupations. Moreover, as Dickens has argued, its effectiveness as a lobbying body, that
safeguarded "popular interests" appears to have increased after 151 7•230 This evidence
suggests that it is erroneous to view the changes of 1517 as instigating a closure in access
to York's civic government.
ifi) 'Diffuse Power': Guilds
The councils and higher civic offices were not the only means of political participation.
Medieval towns often witnessed strong links between guilds and civic administration.23'
This was particularly the case in seigneurial or royal boroughs where guilds sometimes
228 Ibid. Similarly, a plumber, Heniy Wright (chamberlain 1520) was also included on the 1522 common
council.
229 The bakers were Richard Norton (bridge master 1521) and Hugo Ryg; the bowers were Richard 011ff and
William Kykby; and the armourers were William Flogeson and Thomas Skyrro. See Appendix 4.
°Dickens, 'Tudor York', p. 138.
231 Although historiographically a distinction has been made between religious guilds, crafi guilds and merchant
guilds, it is often not easy to make such a clear distinction between the two. On this point, see McRee, 'Religious
Gilds and Civic Order', pp. 69-74, especially note 2.
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fttlfihled a role as 'surrogate' town councils. 2 In some incorporated towns too, religious
guilds assumed a similar governmental role to that of the older merchant guilds. 3 The
relationship between civic governments and guilds was often highly complex and varied
from town to town. In towns such as Windsor, religious guilds were responsible for the
election of civic officials. 234 Elsewhere, guilds were under the administrative control of the
corporation. For example, in Norwich, where membership of the Guild of St. George was
automatic for civic officials, the master of the guild was always the city's outgoing mayor.235
It is craft guilds which have been most closely associated with the government of later-
medieval towns, though. The association between craft guilds and political office was often
enshrined in a city's constitution. As we have seen, York's common council was from 1517
composed of two representatives from each of the major crafts and one from each of the
minor ones. Even before this date, guild searchers were often used to represent the views
of the comnionalty and as agents of the civic elite. For example, guild searchers were
increasingly used as enforcers of trading and standards legis1ation. 7 Moreover, by the
sixteenth century they were also held personally responsible for the maintenance of peace
and law and order within York. 8
 Swanson in particular has argued that by the end of the
2 Bmwn,PopularPiety,pp. 126-7, 170-1 & 177; McRee, 'Religious Gilds and Civic Order', p.73; G. Rosser,
Medieval Westminster 1200-1540 (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1989), pp. 285-93; Gottfried, Buty St. Edmunds,
pp.186-92. In the countiyside too, guilds played an important role in local government; V.R Bainbridge, Gilds
in the Medieval Countryside: Social and Religious Change in Cam bridgeshire c. 1350-1558 (The Boydell
Press: Woodbridge, 1996), pp. 123-47.
233 McRee, 'Religious (3uilds and the Regulation of Behaviour', pp. 74-5. For Merchant guilds see Gross, Gild
Merchant, pp. 77-105.
4 McRee, 'Religious Guilds and the Regulation of Behaviour', p. 72.
'35 1b1d., p.91.
236 YCA, A33, Confirmation Charters of Edward VI (1547).
237 Rees Jones, 'York's Civic Administration', pp. 123-4.
238 See Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 3: 2. On this occasion, following rioting within the city, the craft
searchers were to "serche emong his occupaconz what personz of the same wer most principal offendours" and
then to bring the mayor "the namez of al suche personz".
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medieval period craft guilds were under the political control of civic elites to such an extent
that it is "more helpful to see craft organisations as vehicles of civic administration than as
organisations for industrial protectionism". 9
 Arguably, however, this case has been over-
stressed. As Rees Jones has suggested, far from being oppressed, craft guilds often gained
as much as the civic elite from their increased powers. 24° Moreover, as this thesis has
shown, Swanson's (inherent) assumption of a division in medieval society between a
mercantile oligarchy and a politically disenfranchised artisan class is unsound. As holders
of civic offices themselves, craft officials should be viewed less as agents of the civic elite
than as co-members who contributed to the city's political and ideological environment.
However, it is not the intention in Part Four to explore this issue in greater depth. Nor
will Part Four consider the religious, social or organisational functions of York guilds per
Se, all of which have been considered elsewhere 24' Rather, this section concentrates on
what could loosely be termed 'civic guilds' and their role in the distribution and exercise of
power within later-medieval York. 242
 The main guilds under consideration here are the York
Corpus Christi Guild, the St. Anthony Guild, the St. Christopher and George Guild, and the
n9 H.C . Swanson,Medieval British Towns (Macmillan Press: Basingstoke, 1999), pp. 98-9. For greater detail,
see in particular idem ,Medie'valArtisans, passim. For this theme in the context of a more general historiography
of guilds, see Rosser, 'Crafts, Guilds and the Negotiation of Work', pp. 2-9.
240 Rees Jones, 'York's Civic Administration', pp. 123-4. Rosser has also argued against Swanson's model:
Rosser, 'Crafts, (luilds and the Negotiation of Work', pp. 3-31.
241 See the introductory chapter to Virginia Bainbridge's book on guilds which places secondary works within
the ideological contexts in which they were written; Bainbridge, Gilds in the Medieval Countiyside, pp. 1-21;
Toulmin Smith, English Gilds; JiF. Westlake, The Parish Gilds ofMedieval England (Society for Promoting
Christian Knowledge: London, 1919).
242 tenu 'civic guilds' is used to refer to those guilds which had strong links with the civic administration of
the city, either through common personnel or through administrative connections. it is not intended as a
watertight category. McRee has termed guilds which "provided financial assistance to local government, helped
to elect city officials, and contributed to the elaborate ceremony that marked late-medieval public life" as
'governing guilds'. McRee, 'Religious Gilds and Civic Order', p. 69. This tenn has not been used here as
(unlike in Norwich) it would be wrong to suggest that York guilds had a direct role in, or were formally
integrated with, the government of the city.
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York Mercers' Guild.24
In York, links between the civic guilds and the corporation existed both in terms of
administrative ties and common personnel. Although none of the guilds played a formal role
in the government of the city, the civic elite as a corporate body was involved, to various
degrees, in the administration of the 'civic' guilds. For example, though posts within the
Corpus Christi Guild were held solely by clerics, the charter of incorporation included the
names of three of the city's past mayors. 2 The ties between York's civic administration
and the guilds of St. Anthony and St. Christopher and George were even stronger. Little
is known about the former guild, although it is clear that it was responsible for the
performance of the Paternoster play in the Corpus Cluisti cycle. 245 The civic corporation
was clearly involved in the supervision of this activity, and in 1495 it fined the guild for
failing to perform the play. 2 Further, it is clear that by the sixteenth centuiy the guild
provided a dinner and breakfast for the mayor, aldermen and their wives among others at
a house near the guild hail.247 The corporation was also at times directly involved in the
running of the St. Anthony Guild. Following charges of embezzlement against the guild
masters in 1509, the corporation examined the guild accounts and took charge of the guild's
243 For an overview of York guilds, see B.P. Johnson, 'The Gilds of York', in A. Stacpoole (ed.), The Noble City
of York (Cenalis Press: York, 1972), pp. 447-610; Crouch, 'Piety, Fraternity and Power', passim. For the
Corpus Christi Guild see R.H. Skaife (ed.), Register of the Corpus Christi Guild in the City of York, Surtees
Society 57(1872). For the St. Anthony guild, which was an amalgamation of a guild of the same name and the
Paternoster Guild, see A. Raine, Medieval York: A Topographical Suri'ey Based on Original Sources (John
Murray: London, 1952), pp. 9 1-5. For the St. Christopher and George guild, which was an amalgamation of the
two guilds of that name, see E. White, The St. Christopher and St. George Guild of York, Borthwick Papers 72
(1987). For the York Mercers' Guild, see Wheatley, 'The York Mercers' Guild'.
2	
'Piety, Fraternity and Power', p. 283.
245 Raine,Medieval York, pp. 94-5.
246 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 2: 118.
247 Ibid, 5: 181-3; Johnson, 'The Gilds of York', p. 486.
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keys and rolls until a new master was chosen. 248 Similarly, the corporation also became
involved in the guild of St. Christopher and George in similar circumstances in 1533. On
this occasion, the mayor obtained the right to oversee the guild's annual accounts in
response to the charges of embezzlement. 249
 Links between the civic administration and the
guild already stretched back many years, since the guild and the civic corporation jointly
frmnded the building of the city's new common hall in 1445.250
Links between municipal governments and guilds could be more obscure, consisting
(on the surface at least) of little more than common personnel. For example, Phythian
Adams has demonstrated for Coventry that membership of one of the city's two civic guilds
was a necessary stage in the civic life cycle of ambitious young men. 25 ' More recently,
McRee has noted that the likelihood that some members of the guild of St. George in
Norwich would go on to hold civic office was enshrined in the mling that those "liche in
tyme comyng to ben drawen un to ke estat of meyer' shreue or alderman" were to pay a
higher entry fee. 252
 Similarly, Blockmans has argued that civic elites in the Netherlands often
belonged to "quasi-religious archery guilds". 253
 Likewise, it has also been suggested that
in York guild membership may have been part of a "complex route to political power".254
248 Raine (ed.), York Civic Records, 3: 26-7. The corporation also intervened in a guild dispute in 1417/18;
Sellers (ed.), YorkMemorandum Book; part 2, pp. 70-1.
249 White, The St. Christopher and St. George Guild of York, pp. 6-7 & 12-14.
250 Ibid., pp.2-4.
Phythian Adams, Desolation of a City, pp. 118-127. See also the guild of St Mary in hull; Crouch, 'Piety,
Fraternity and Power', pp. 339-48.
252 Cited in McRee, 'Religious Gilds and Civic Order', p. 80. As McRee notes, in practice this higher fee was
never levied, no doubt due to the difficulties involved in predicting who would go on to hold civic office.
253 Blans The Burgundian Netherlands, p. 174.
254 Crouch, 'Piety, Fraternity and Power', pp. 288-9.
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Evidence for the membership of York guilds is hard to reconstruct. Only the Corpus
Christi Guild has a surviving membership register and even here, the process of
reconstructing a membership can be beset with difficulties. 255 Generally, only names (and
not occupations) were recorded, and therefore the scarcity of details precludes the accurate
identification of many members. 256 However, the membership register does allow a rough
estimation to be made of the proportion of civic officials who belonged to the guild.
Although no register survives for the Mercers' Guild, surviving account rolls can be used
to identil,' some members. 257 Unfortunately, few records of the other York guilds survive.
In the absence of such records, York historians have relied instead on bequests in wills for
evidence of guild membership. 258 Due to these limitations, the accurate and complete
reconstruction of guild membership among York civic officials is not possible. However,
Appendix 1 lists membership among civic officials of the Corpus Christi Guild and Mercers'
Guild. This information, combined with other forms of guild evidence from both York and
elsewhere, allows important conclusions to be drawn concerning the place of guilds in
York's power hierarchies.
The first point to be noted is that in contrast to many other medieval towns, there
were no York guilds which catered exclusively for the civic elite and their families. Thus,
Skaife (ed), The Register of the Guild of Corpus Christi.
'16 Although parish of residence was generally recorded in guild account rolls from 1476, the survival of these
rolls is sporadic. Crouch, 'Piety, Fraternity and Power', p. 276.
I am veiy grateful to Louise Wheatley, archivist of the York Mercers' Guild for this inlormalion. For details
of membership of the guild and shipping activity before 1500, see Wheatley, 'The York Mercers' Guild',
appendix.
'u Crouch, 'Piety, Fraternity and Power', pp. 22-3; White, The St. Christopher and St. George Guild, pp. 14-15.
Membership among the civic elite of the Guild of St. Anthony and the Guild of St. Christopher and George was
primarily reconstructed using the wills of civic officials. Testamentaiy bequests to these and other York guilds
are also listed in Crouch, 'Piety, Fraternity and Power', appendix; and E. White, 'Bequests to Religious Guilds
in York' (Unpublished MS in BIHR).
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none of York's guilds can be viewed as "a club for the city's political class". 259 It is possible
that the highest-ranking civic officials were more likely to belong to the smaller, more
exclusive, civic guilds of St. Anthony, and St. Christopher and George. However, in the
absence of reliable evidence of membership, this must remain a speculation. In Hull, the
merchants re-founded the St. George Guild in order to represent "their communal interests
more exclusively" when the size and socio-economic profile of membership of the town's
guild of St. Mary's increased.° Perhaps in York too, the smaller guilds of St. Anthony, and
St. Christopher and George, served a perceived need for exclusive communal interests and
a desire for the cachet of social exclusivity.
Despite the absence of a guild that catered exclusively for York's civic elite, there
nonetheless appears to have been a strong relationship between civic office and guild
membership in the city. Table 4:1 below summarises the percentage of civic officials from
the period 1476 to 1525 who belonged to York's Corpus Christi Guild, or Mercers' Guild.
Membership of both guilds is expressed in terms of a percentage range rather than a definite
percentage.26'
259 McRee, 'Religious Gilds and Civic Order', p. 90.
260 Crouch, 'Piety, Fraternity and Power', pp. 347-8 (quotation p. 348).
261 The minununi number refers to the number of men who can be accurately identified as having belonged to
the Corpus Christi Guild. The maximum number includes all of those who were definitely members together
with men who may have belonged to the guild but whose membership is uncertain. The latter group includes
men for whom someone of the same name is recorded as entering the guild, but for whom a lack of additional
evidence precludes definite identification.
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Table 4:1
Percentage ol' the Civic Elite 1476 to 1525 who Belonted to the York Corpus Christ Guild or the York
Mercers' Guild: By Hinhest Civic Post Attained
Highest Civic Post
Attained
Bridge Master
Chamberlain
Sheriff
Percentage of all Men who Attained each post who were members of:
Corpus Christi Guild Mercers' Guild
	 Either or Both Guilds
17-36%	 13%
	
26-43%
	
46-70%	 39-45%
	
60-74%
	
61-77%
	
47-49%
	
80-86%
Mayor	 74-93%	 84-86%	 95-100%
All Civic Officials 46-66%	 42-43%	 61-72%
Source: Appendix 1.
As Table 4:1 demonstrates, a majority (46-66%) of civic officials from the period 1476 to
1525 probably belonged to the Corpus Christi Guild, while less than half (42-43%) of civic
officials belonged to the Mercers' Guild. A significant number of the civic officials belonged
to only one or the other of the guilds, so overall the percentage of civic officials who
belonged to either the Corpus Christi Guild or the Mercers' Guild was relatively high
(between 6 1-72%). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the correlation between civic office and guild
membership was more pronounced in the highest civic offices. Whereas less than half of the
bridge masters (26-43%) were members of one or the other of the two guilds, almost, if not
all, of the mayors were members (95-100%).
Furthermore, most men joined the two guilds around the same time as they entered
the freedom of the city, but before they had held any civic office. That guild membership
may have played a role in the route to political power is indicated by the fact that men who
belonged to one of these two guilds tended to progress up the civic hierarchy faster than
those who did not. On average, men who held civic office during the period in question
took 15.4 years to reach their first civic post after becoming free. In contrast, men who
belonged to the Corpus Christi Guild took an average of 12.9 years, while those who
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belonged to the Mercers' Guild took an average of 10.8 years. 262 The fact that membership
of the Mercers' Guild seems to have been more advantageous than membership of the
Corpus Christi Guild in this respect, may have been due to the fact that it was a much
smaller, and possibly more selective guild.
It is likely that the enhanced promotion prospects enjoyed by members of these two
guilds was due to a variety of factors. First, many guilds were exclusive and selective.263
Trexier has argued for Florence that guilds acted as "a filter mechanism for controlling
access to political office.2M Members could be screened on the basis of wealth, and
occupation, but also on less tangible factors, such as respectability or social connections.
For example, new members of the Hull Corpus Christi Guild who were unrelated to existing
members were charged a higher admission fee. 265 Personal contacts and networks appear
to have been used by the keepers of the Corpus Christi Guild to recruit new members.266
The guild account rolls reveal that new members were often recruited in groups by parish,
no doubt with the keepers selecting the most 'respectable' households for potential
members. 267 Ultimately of course, the fact that members of the Corpus Christi Guild and
Mercers' Guild often enjoyed successful civic careers? perhaps reflects a similarity in
selection criteria between the guilds and the civic elite; for instance, both may well have
favoured wealthy merchants who were related to other civic officials.
262 Appendix 1. It should be noted that merchants who did not belong to the Mercers' Guild took, on average,
5.8 years longer to reach their first civic post after becoming free than those who did belong to the guild (14.6
years as opposed to 8.8 years). As this indicates, the speedier election of men who were members of the
MerGers' Guild is not merely a factor of the relatively high proportion of merchants belonging to the guild.
263 R.osser, 'Communities of Parish and Guild', p. 34.
264 Trexler, Public Lfe in Renaissance Florence, p. 15
265 Rosser, 'Communities of Parish and Guild', p. 36.
266 Crouch, 'Piety, Fraternity and Power', pp. 278-9.
267 Ibid., p. 287.
263
It may also be significant that many guilds had strict moral codes. 268 For example, the
ordinances of York's Paternoster Guild ordered that all members were to keep themselves
to 'good and worthy business and company'. 269 Rosser has argued that moral regulation
bestowed on guild members an additional stamp of respectability. 270 It is likely that in York
the selection processes and moral regulations of the guilds lent a social cachet of
'respectability' or 'acceptance' to all guild members, which in itself might have enhanced the
promotion prospects of a civic official. More work needs to be undertaken on York guilds
in this respect. However, it is interesting to note that the discourses of power contained
within records of the Mercers' Guild seem to be similar to those contained within Yorks'
civic records. Officers of the Mercers' Guild, like those comprising the civic elite were
expected to be "able and discrete", and to govern "indifferently", "wisely and truly" and with
"honestee" and "connyng", indicating that similar personal qualities were valued in both
groups.27'
Medieval guilds also offered a variety of opportunities for mixing with fellow
guildsmen and women. Craft and religious guilds may have offered opportunities for
'networking' and the negotiation of trade alliances and business contracts, particularly
among men of different occupations. Indeed, guilds themselves could open up all manner
of business opportunities for their members. David Crouch has suggested that political
motivations may have influenced the decision of several of the city's butchers to join the
Corpus Christi Guild. He has shown that while it was unusual for butchers to hold civic
2	 the role of religious guilds in the regulation of behaviour, see MeRee, 'Religious Gilds and Regulation
of Behaviour', pp. 107-22.
2 Tou1min Smith (ed.), English Gilds, p. 137.
270 Rosser 'Communities of Parish and Guild', pp. 36-7.
271 Sellers (ed.), The YorkMercers and Merchant Adventurers, pp. 75, 88 & 128. See pp. 86-108 above.
272 Rossi 'Crafts, Guilds and the Negotiation of Work', pp. 30-1.
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office in the city before 1450, on three occasions butchers attained this post after joining the
Guild and supplying mutton for the Guild's annual feast. 2 This example suggests that guild
membership, and its concomitant political and social connections, were particularly
important for artisans eager to hold civic office.
Finally, guilds might have offered more practical means of assistance for civic careers.
As has been mentioned, guild offices seem in towns such as Coventry to have formed part
of the standard hierarchy of offices held by the more successful members of the civic elite.274
The same appears to have been tme of late-medieval York. York civic officials tended to
join the Corpus Christi Guild and the Mercers' Guild around the time they gained the
freedom of the city. Thereafter, guild posts combined with civic office to form an unofficial
cursus honorum. The merchant John Elwald is a typical example. 275 Elwald became free
in 1471 and also joined the Corpus Christi Guild that year. The following year he became
a member of the York Mercers' Guild, and in 1482 he became its constable. Elwald then
held the civic office of chamberlain in 1486, and sheriff in 1490, before becoming master of
the Mercers' Guild in 1492. Finally, he was elected mayor in 1499. As this example
demonstrates, the posts of craft searcher and constable were usually held before entry into
civic office, while the posts of master of the Mercers' Guild and Master of the Guild of St.
Christopher and George, were normally reached alter entry into the post of sherig but prior
to entry into the post of mayor. Whether experience in these posts was necessary, desirable
or merely coincidental is impossible to say. Not enough evidence exists for guild posts in
York to enable any firm conclusions to be drawn. However, in the light of evidence from
elsewhere it is perhaps likely that guild membership and office holding were part of an
273 Crouch, 'Piety, Fraternity and Power', p. 284.
274 Phythian Adams, Desolation of a City, pp. 118-127.
275 See Appendix 1.
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informal cursus honorum which also encompassed civic and, as will be argued, territorial
offices.
1V 'Diffuse Power': Parish
One of the means through which the parish offered opportunities for local office holding was
through church posts such as that of churchwarden. Although not directly connected to the
administration of civic power within the city, this post was nonetheless an important one in
several respects. KUmin suggests that the "considerable degree of authority and power"
attached to the post would have meant that it "must have had a great deal of attraction for
ordinary people". 276 Moreover, for some men the experience gained in this post was
arguably an important springboard to higher civic office holding later in a career.
Unfortunately, evidence for local administration in York is sparse. The only medieval
pre-Reformation parish records to survive for York are those of St. Michael Spurriergate,
and even these only survive from 15 18.277 For the most part it is impossible to identify
medieval churchwardens in York other than through isolated mentions in other sources such
as wills. Clearly, patterns of office-holding may have differed from parish to parish, and
therefore, in the absence of sufficient records from other parishes, no definite conclusions
can be reached concerning the relationship between the post of churchwarden and higher
civic office in York. Nevertheless, the references to churchwardens contained in the St.
Michael Spurriergate records can still be used to suggest some likely patterns of office
holding within later medieval York. Appendix 6 lists the men who are named in these
276 KUmin The Shaping of a Community, pp. 199-200. For the role of church wardens see ibid, pp. 27-31.
These have been transcribed and published by C.C. Webb (ed.), Churchwardens 'Accounts of St. Michael,
Spurriergate, Yorlç 1518-1548,2 volumes, Borthwick Texts and Calendars 20 (1997). Webb notes that isolated
accounts compiled by the fabric wardens of St. Margaret Walmgate, and its guild of St. Ann, survive from the
years 1394 and 1397 respectively; BIHR, Parish Records, Y/MARG 35 & 36.
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records as having held the office of churchwarden in St. Michael Spurriergate between 1518
and 1548.
Christopher Webb has shown that in the parish of St. Michael Spurriergate, wardens
were drawn from "both extremes of the financial spectrum". 278 There was a hierarchy within
the post of churchwarden, and men could only become senior wardens after previous
experience in the post at a more junior level. 279 Webb has suggested that on the whole, men
seem to have first held the post of junior churchwarden prior to serving in civic office,
Appendix 6 confirms this suggestion.28°
To what extent did churchwardens go on to hold civic office? At least eighteen
(42%), and possibly as many as twenty (47%), of the forty-three men who are recorded in
the Spurriergate accounts as having held the office of churchwarden went on to become
civic officials, including three men who eventually became mayor. 28 ' It was not unusual for
civic officials to return to the post of churchwarden in a more senior capacity following
service in civic office as a chamberlain or, more unusually as a sherif1. 2 John Lewes
(mayor 1550) was typical in this respect, although he was unusual in terms of the number
of times he held this office. He first held the post of churchwarden in 1523, serving again
in this capacity on five subsequent occasions before becoming one of the city's chamberlains
in 1532. He then returned to the post of churchwarden in 1534 and 1535, before becoming
Webb (ed.), Accounts ofSi. Michael, Spurriergate, p. 11. This contrasts with the situation in London where
church wardens generally enjoyed high status and wealth. Thrupp, Merchant Class, p. 186.
V9 (ed.),Accounis ofSL Michael, Spurriergaie, p. 11. Similarly, Burgess also argued for St. Mary-at-Hill
in London that the office of senior churchwardcn could only be held by those with previous experience in the post
as junior warden: Burgess, 'Shaping the Parish', pp. 26 1-2.
	
°	 (ed.), Accounts of St. Michael, Spurriergate, p. 11; Appendix 6.
Details of these men and their civic and parochial careers are contained in Appendix 6. An additional two men
(William Barker and William Watson) may also have held civic office, but the commonness of their names and
the absence of any other identil'ing information precludes accurate identification.
282 However, service as a churchwarden seems to have ceased once the mayoral office (or possibly the post of
alderman) was reached.
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one of the city's sheriffs in 1537. Finally, Lewes again acted as churchwaiden on five
occasions between 1539 and 1547 before becoming the city's mayor in 1550.283
Similarly, historians of other medieval towns have also suggested that men may have
held the post of junior churchwarden before attaining civic office. Clive Burgess has
suggested for St. Maiy at Hill, London, that the elite of the medieval parish were self-
electing; those who had already served as wardens invited others of sufficient status and
ambition to take on a junior post as a first rung on the civic ladder. 284 Like Ford, he sees
service as a churchwarden as "essential for access to the elite". 285 This could well have also
been the case for York. That the post of churchwarden was important in York's cursus
honorum is indicated by a study of the names of men listed as living in the parish of St.
Michael Spurriergate at the time of the lay subsidy of 1524. Of thirty-three identifiable men,
eleven held civic office. 286 Meanwhile, at least six of these eleven men (5 5%) can be
identified as having served in the post of churchwarden prior to holding a civic post.287
Furthermore, the fact that four of the men, John Beisby (sheriff 1506), John Geldert (sheriff
1515), Thomas Dawson (sheriff 1517) and John Roger (sheriff 1524), cannot be identified
as having held the post of churchwarden prior to attaining civic office is explained by the
fact that the earliest St. Michael's account postdates the start of their civic careers. The
possibility of their having held the post of churchwarden prior to 1518 therefore cannot be
283 For details of Lewes's civic career, see Appendix 6.
2 Burgess, 'Shaping the Parish', p. 262.
285 Ibid., p. 262; Ford, 'Marginality and the Assimilation of Foreigners', p. 210. See also Kilmin, The Shaping
of a Community, pp. 3 1-9.
John Beisby or Beirby (sheriff 1506), John GeldeTt or (3eldard (sheriff 1515), Thomas Dawson (sheriff 1517),
John Roger (sheriff 1524), Robert Ekiylton or Heckleton (mayor 1543), William Thikpenny (chamberlain 1537),
John Wright (chamberlain 1527), Richard Bateman or Bayteman (chamberlain 1534), Richard Savage(sheriff
1540), Hugh Buntyng or Bustyng (chamberlain 1528) and John Lewys or Lewes (mayor 1550). Appendices I
and 6; Peacock (ed.), 'Subsidy Roll for York and Ainsty', pp. 177-8; Collins (ed), Freemen 's Register.
2 Robei1 Heckleton,, William Thikpenny, John Wnghl; Richanl Bateman, Hugh Bunting, John Lewys; Appendix
6.
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ruled out.
As the discussed evidence demonstrates, experience in the post of churchwarden may
well have been a desirable pre-requisite for holding civic office. Not only would
churchwardens have proved their administrative abilities, but they had also been given the
seal of approval from the existing elite by virtue of their appointment to the post. Service
in a post such as this may have proved an individual's qualities of 'honesty', discretion' and
'wisdom', which were necessaiy characteristics for higher civic officials. Moreover, Webb
has demonstrated that new junior wardens in York were "nearly always shepherded by more
experienced colleagues as they took on more responsibility in their second year". 288
 Men
such as John Lewes, who both had experience of the post of churchwarden and were
members of the civic elite, often acted in this capacity. It is therefore easy to see how the
hierarchical and mentoring system of churchwardenship could have acted as a patronage
system for the wider civic elite.
Aside from churchwardenships, medieval parishes also offered a range of other
administrative positions which were even more closely connected to the civic government
of the city. During the medieval period most English towns witnessed a gradual change
from a 'territorial' to a 'conciliar' pattern of administration. 289 In matters of defence and
local policing, historians have accepted the continued importance of wariis, parishes and
even tithings. However, with the exception of ward-based higher civic offices, such as that
of alderman in York, the role of local structures in the administration and distribution of
civic or political power in the later-middle ages has often been overlooked.
Relics of the older territorial system were still in use in York at least as late as the
Webb (ed.), Accounts ofSt. Michael, Spurriergate, p. 11.
9 Rees Jones, 'York's Civic Administration', p. 123; Hudson (ed), Leet Jurisdiction in the City of Norwich,
pp. lxxii-lxxxii.
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1 490s. 29° During the late-fifteenth centuly the parishes and wards of York retained an
important role in the policing and administration of justice within the city.' Throughout
the medieval period two aldermen were assigned to each of the city's wards. 2 Further,
lower posts were available for men to serve as parish constables and ward jurors. These
posts carried significant responsibility and power. However, as with the post of
churchwarden, evidence for these positions is sparse. York wardmote court books only
exist for the years 149 1-2 and 1494-6, and even then in an incomplete and damaged form.293
Further, there are difficulties in identifjing accurately those named as parish constables or
ward jurors as their occupations were rarely stated in the records. Nevertheless, this
problem has partly been overcome by cross-referencing information with prosopographical
evidence collated for the purpose of this thesis?4
Recently York historians have tentatively begun to suggest that local posts may have
formed part of the wider civic hierarchy, with parish constable and ward juror possibly
leading on to the civic post of bridge master. As Table 3 .2b below shows, a total of
twenty-three (7%) of the civic officials from the period 1476 to 1525 can be positively
290 In addition to the wardmote courts which are discussed below, see Miller, 'Medieval York', pp. 76-7.
' For details of the role of the ward in the policing and the adninistration ofjustice in York, see Andrew, 'The
Fifteenth Centuiy Wardmote Court Returns for York', pp. 11-15.
The ward assigned was dictated by the latest vacancy and did not necessarily correspond with the parish in
which the alderman lived.
293 Yodc Civic Archives, Chamberlains' Account Book CB 1 a, fols. 1 36r- 139r; Wardmote Court Book E3 1, pp.
I a-20a. Although these are unpublished they have been transcribed in Andrew, 'The Fifleenth Century
Wardmote Court Returns for York', Appendix.
294 Parish of residency and date of death are useful in this respect.
Rees Jones, 'York's Civic Administration', p.131; Andrew, 'The Fifleenth Century Wardmote Court Returns
for York', pp. 23-5. Tim Andrew has calculated the percentage ofjurors and constables who went on to become
bridge masters. It has been necessary, though, to recalculate the percentage who went on to become civic
officials to take into account those who missed out the post of bridge master. Further, the additional
prosopographical information concerning parish of residence and date of death of the civic officials during this
period has enabled a greater degree of accuracy in the identification of parish jurors and constables than was
previously possible. However, the research that follows supports Andrew's findings which remain valid.
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identified as having served as parish constable or ward juror. Of these men the majority only
reached the post of bridge master, and none of the men reached the post of mayor.
However, although the number of civic officials who can be shown to have served in local
posts is not high, Timothy Andrew has argued that analysis must take into account the
scarcity of records detailing these posts combined with the relatively high turnover of
personnel. As he has shown, the number of parish constables and ward jurors who went
on to become bridge masters is much higher than would be expected bearing in mind these
factors. This indicates that there may have been a stronger relationship between the local
posts and the civic hierarchy than is at first apparent. Moreover, a study of these men
throws up some interesting implications for access to civic office and the structure of the
elite. The political careers of civic officials who can be shown to have held the posts of
parish constable or ward juror are summarised in Table 4:2 below.
Table 4:2
Civic Status of Civic Officials 1476 to 1525 Who Can be Shown to Have Held the Posts of Parish
Constable or Ward Juror Durrn2 the Period 149 1-96
a) Stains At Date of Earliest Recorded Local Office I b) Eligilest Civic Status Reached During Lifetime
no.	 %
Not Free	 5	 22
Freeman	 17	 73
Bridge master 1
	 4
Total	 23	 99*
no.	 %
Bridge master 12
	
52
Chamberlain	 7	 30
Sheriff	 4	 17
23	 99
*Totals do not always equal 100 due to rounding error.
Source: Appendix 1.
As Table 4:2a above demonstrates, men who served in local posts generally had not
previously held civic office, indeed five of the men were not even freemen. Clearly, the
Andrew, 'The Fifteenth Century Wardmote Court Returns for York', pp. 23-5.
2Ibid.
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posts of parish constable and ward juror were relatively junior ones. This situation contrasts
sharply with that a century earlier. Names of men acting as parish constables in 1380 are
contained within York's Memorandum Books. It is clear from a prosopographical
examination of these men that in 1380 the post of parish constable was relatively high-
status. Over half of the identifiable men can be demonstrated to have already served as
chamberlain. 2
 Perhaps as centralised civic government gradually replaced the older
territorial system, the power and status of the territorial posts also declined, resulting in a
parallel downwards shift in the status of the incumbents.
Rappaport has argued that in London the increased centralisation of government
served to decrease the involvement of the unenfranchised in local government and
administration. 300
 Similarly, in York, the increased use of official councils, particularly the
council of forty-eight, helped to exclude the rest of the commons from civic meetings and
elections. Paradoxically, though, in other respects the increased centralization of power in
medieval York seems to have had an opposite effect: the status of the men holding territorial
posts such as that of ward constable seems to have fallen, meaning that access to this form
of government actually expanded rather than contracted. 30' Perhaps more significantly,
there is evidence to suggest that these posts may have played a vital role in increasing access
to the civic elite in general.
Table 4:3 below compares the occupations and civic careers of civic officials who held
298 Sellers (ed.), YorkMemorandum Boo/c part I, pp. 151-5.
299 AppIix 5.
30°Rappaport, Worlds Within Worlds, p. 35.
301 While undoubtedly desirable, freedom may not have been an absolute prerequisite for some territorial posts
even dining the late fifleenth-centuiy. See, Andrew, 'The Fifteenth Centtuy Wardmote Court Returns for York',
pp. 103-4. A study of the names of men who served as parish sergeants during the late fourteenth and early
fifteenth-centuries suggests that likewise, freedom was not a prerequisite for some territorial offices during the
earlier period. The names of the men who held these posts are published in Sellers (ed.), YorkMemorandum
Boo/c part I, pp. 12-9, 19-20, 22, 30-1, 236.
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the territorial posts of parish constable or ward juror, with the general experiences of men
who held civic office during the period 1476 to 1525.
Table 4:3
Comparison Between All Civic Officials 1476 to 1525 and Those of This Group Who Also Held the
Territorial Posts of Parish Constable and Ward Juror
Civic Officials Who Held	 All Civic Officials 1476
Territorial Posts 	 to 1525
(23 men)	 (315 men)
Average gap between freedom and civic office
Number of men in each group who:
Practised a mercantile occupation	 I
Held the post of bridge master 	 20
Held the post of chamberlain 	 7
Held the post of sheriff
	
4
22 years
(4%)
(87%)
(30%)
(17%)
15 years
101
	 (32%)
206
	 (65%)
219
	 (69%)
122
	 (38%)
Held the post of mayor	 0	 (0%)	 57	 (18%)
Source: Appendix 1
As Table 4:3 above shows, all but three (87%) of the twenty-three of the civic officials
who held the posts of parish constable or ward juror also served as bridge master. This
figure is high given that only 206 (6 5%) of the 315 men who had been civic officials during
the period 1476 to 1525 had held this office.
I have suggested elsewhere that the post of bridge master may have represented a type
of 'buffer zone' between the civic elite and the politically disenfranchised. Among the men
who were bridge masters during the second half of the fifteenth centuly it is possible to
identify two crude but distinct types of office holders: those for whom the post of bridge
master represented the point of access to higher civic office, and those for whom it
represented the pinnacle of their civic career. 302 It would appear that the men who can be
302 Carpenter, 'The Office and Personnel of the Post of Bridge Master', especially pp. 44-5.
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identified as having held territorial posts fell strongly into the latter group. Only one of
these men practised a mercantile trade. Furthermore, these men took 50% longer on
average to reach their first civic office after becoming free than men who cannot be proved
to have held territorial posts. Finally, the percentage of civic officials who held territorial
posts who went on to hold the offices of chamberlain, sheriff and mayor are much lower
than those for civic officials as a whole.
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C) Conclusion
Part One of the thesis argued that Clark and Slack's emphasis on "crisis, conflict & social
polarisation" has dominated the historiography of later-medieval towns. According to this
historiography, historians have conceptualised civic power as being centralised and
concentrated in the highest civic offices. Tensions and unrest have been viewed as an
inevitable consequence of this polarisation of power. This section has challenged this view
and has sought to place the civic elite of later-medieval York within the wider context of the
population of York as a whole.
It has been argued in the first section of Part Four that while it is possible to interpret
some of the unrest in later-medieval York in terms of antagonism between the elite and the
commons, the evidence does not suggest that the unrest in York can be ascribed wholly or
mainly to pressure for increased 'democracy', or to an inherently antagonistic division
between a craft-based commons and a mercantile oligarchy. The section argued that such
a view is overly simplistic in terms of the demarcation line it presupposes between those
targeted and those involved in disturbances or disputes, and also in terms of an
understanding of the causes of unrest which, surely should be seen to have been multiple.
To a large extent, the Clark and Slack thesis of conflict and unrest both feeds off of
and reinforces the notion of a centralised and sharply graduated linear system of power
within late-medieval towns. Again, this aspect of their thesis has been challenged here in
relation to the distribution of power in later-medieval York. The first section of Part Four
explored the role of the commonalty in the government of the city. It has been argued that,
to a large extent, the authority of the civic elite derived from its relationship with the
commons. The role of the commons in the city appears to have been somewhat analogous
to the role of the commons in Parliament. That is to say, it acted as a petitioning body
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which also had the power to approve or veto important decisions, a role which has perhaps
been under appreciated in the past. Similarly, it has been suggested that some of the
discourses of power contained in the York records are similar to those contained in central
government sources. The extent and nature of interaction between central and local
government during the medieval period at the practical and ideological level is an area which
warrants further investigation.
The second section of Part Four has developed on ideas current amongst early modern
historians such as Rappaport and Pearl, who believe that civic office was not the primary
source of power within late-medieval or early-modern towns, but that power was diffused
throughout the city by means of minor civic, territorial or guild posts. The York evidence
concerning offices such as churchwarden, parish constable and ward juror supports this
view.
I have also sought to challenge the conceptualisation of the cursus honorum as a linear
progression of civic posts beginning with the position of bridge master or chamberlain.
Rather, I have argued that the cursus honorum should be conceptualised as a variety of
stages or tracks in which civic offices were interlinked with territorial and guild offices. As
section three on structure has shown, men who were related to civic officials often achieved
faster promotion. Likewise, other groups of men such as the wealthy, or members of
particular guilds, were also more likely to be successful in their civic careers. Such men
were often able to skip some of the more lowly posts. However, higher civic office was also
remarkably open to men drawn from a variety of backgrounds. It seems likely that one
reason for this was that men from less advantageous backgrounds were able to prove
themselves at a lower level of urban government, often by holding territorial or guild posts
or by holding the post of bridge master.
As Part Two on access showed, personal characteristics such as discretion, wisdom
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and honesty were valued in higher civic officials. Moreover, Part Three suggested that the
civic elite was anxious to recruit men with similar values and aspirations as themselves. It
may have been the case that territorial or guild office offered an additional means through
which these qualities and values could be inculcated or nurtured. Again, this evidence calls
into question the division of late-medieval urban society into rulers and the ruled. As this
section has demonstrated, the gradations of civic power were much more fluid and subtle
than most historians have envisaged. As the thesis conclusion will argue, this point in turn
challenges our wider conception of how late-medieval urban social structures operated.
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Part Five
Conclusion
To what extent were the men who held civic office in York during the period 1476 to 1525
an 'elite'? This depends on how you define 'elite'. It was argued in the Introduction that
even among sociologists of Elite Studies, there is no clear consensus over what an 'elite' is,
or how it should be defined. Of course, it is always possible to define key terms and then
measure groups against such definitions. The problem with this approach is that the terms
and scope of the initial definitions limit the inquiry. These definitions are themselves
arbitrary, subjective and they can be self-determining. Finally, there is also the risk that such
studies can become tunnel-visioned. Potentially more interesting questions remain unasked,
such as 'how and through what processes are elites formed and maintained?', and 'in what
ways do elites interact with the rest of society?'.
Rather than adopting any single prescriptive definition here, this thesis has instead
problematised the notion of'élite' status. The Introduction discussed areas of disagreement
within elite studies. These include the problem of boundaries between elites and the
communities in which they operate, the relationship between class, status and 'power', the
interplay between different spheres of social stratification, the assumption of group
coherence and consciousness, and the notion of the importance of the 'circulation of elites'.
The thesis has used these issues as catalysts for exploring the social structure of
late-medieval York. This approach has offered two main benefits. First, it has necessitated
a more penetrative and wide-ranging exploration of social groups and structures in the city
than a reliance on prescriptive definitions would otherwise have prompted. Second, it has
helped reveal the assumptions and shortcomings of past studies of English urban elites and
social structures, and it has offered a framework though which these areas might be
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approached in the future.
Boundaries and elite hierarchies
Many studies of elite groups begin by delineating the group in question. However, one of
the most problematic areas in elite studies is where the boundary between an elite and the
rest of society should be drawn. The depth of the chosen elite stratum determines the
conclusions reached concerning the characteristics of the group. This issue is central to the
study of urban elites. In the past, historians have explicitly or implicitly viewed the civic
elites of late-medieval cities as those who held the higher civic offices, that is to say those
who progressed higher than the post of chamberlain, with some historians restricting their
studies yet fru-ther to aldermen or councillors.' This thesis has concentrated on those who
held the posts of bridge master, chamberlain, sheriff; or mayor. However, it has not sought
to find a dividing line between the elite and the rest of medieval York's urban community
from the outset. Indeed, the thesis has argued against the construction of such artificial
boundaries. Rather, it has sought to examine the relationship between higher and lower
civic offices, and territorial and guild posts. It has also considered gradations of hierarchy
amongst the higher civic officials.
Looking at gradations within York's civic hierarchy, it is clear that there was a
distinct innermost group within the elite which comprised those men who had reached the
post of mayor: most of whom also belonged to the city's council of aldermen. This group
was distinct from the other civic officials in several respects. First, the vast majority of this
group practised mercantile trades. There seems to have been exclusionary closure on the
grounds of occupation at this level of the civic hierarchy. Second, alongside common
See above, pp. 10-11.
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occupational backgrounds, these men were also linked through numerous blood, marriage
and social ties. The ritual ties between members of this group were also very pronounced.
A language of 'brotherhood' for themselves and 'sisterhood' for their wives ritually divided
these men from the rest of the elite and enhanced the cohesion of the group. Similarly, the
status and unity of the group seems to have been further reinforced through funeral rituals
and group feasting, again both activities in which wives would have participated. Finally,
this group was bound by special codes of secrecy, and their access to privileged information
would undoubtably have served as a source of common identity and as a means of
underlining their exclusivity.
Moving down the civic hierarchy, as Part Two of the thesis demonstrated, each civic
group below the level of mayor was characterised by a proportionally smaller degree of
occupational and financial homogeneity. Likewise, the degree of exclusivity in terms of
levels of wealth and types of occupations also decreased down the civic hierarchy. Finally,
as Part Three of the thesis has shown, the lower the level of civic office, the lower the level
of social and ritual integration. The lower civic offices not only offered less real power, they
presumably also conveyed less social prestige. However, it is pointless attempting to
determine the line at which the degree of exclusivity, integration, power and prestige
enjoyed by officials was insufficient to warrant them being considered members of the civic
'elite'. This issue is both subjective and hopelessly relative.
More interesting is a consideration of the ways in which the civic elite may have
extended beyond those who held higher civic office. The thesis has argued that in the past
higher civic offices have been viewed as the primary sources of power in cities. This thesis
follows on from the work of historians such as Rapapport and Pearl in rejecting such a view,
and instead stressing the role that minor civic offices and territorial, parochial and guild
offices played in widening participation in local government and diffusing power throughout
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later-medieval and early modern cities. 2 Within sociology a key area in elite studies is the
study of elite substratum, particularly recruitment substratum and administrative substratum.
It could be argued that below the post of bridge master, York's civic elite extended into an
administrative substratum comprised of ad hoc civic posts, guild posts, and territorial
offices. Holders of these positions had an important role in terms of the day to day running
of the city. Many such posts also offered an important degree of power, albeit in a more
limited sphere than that offered by the higher civic offices. Historians should not overlook
the importance of the role of these lower posts in the efficient functioning of medieval towns
or in extending participation in the political life within urban centres.
Interestingly, the research conducted as part of this thesis has also suggested that the
holders of many of these posts may also have comprised part of the recruitment substratum
to the elite. As Part Four of the thesis concluded, posts such as churchwarden, parish
constable and ward juror may have been part of a complex route to political power. For a
number of men service in posts such as these was the first step on the cursus honorum. It
is likely that service in these posts would have offered the opportunity of office holding
experience, and would have acted as points of entry into the ethos or ideology of the elite.
These posts may also have provided an arena for up-and-coming young men to be talent
spotted, and for them to cnet;ork with established members of the elite.
Clearly, historians need to undertake more work on the role of such posts in civic
hierarchies and the social and political structures of late-medieval towns. It has not been
feasible to undertake a thorough prosopographic study of the men who held such posts as
part of this thesis. However, it would be possible to conduct such a study for York or other
towns given the surviving evidence that is available. More prosopographical research in this
2 ppa	 Worlds Within Worlds, pp. 180-2; Pearl, 'Change and Stability in Seventeenth-Century London',
pp. 139-166.
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area would be useful in furthering our understanding of the type of men who held these
posts, and also the roles which these posts played within urban social and political
structures. In particular, it would be interesting to consider whether the widespread
distribution of political power served to decrease or diffuse tensions in cities as Kowaleski
has suggested was the case in medieval Exeter.3
Class, status and power
In stressing the importance of such lower civic, parochial, territorial and guild posts, the
thesis has rejected a notion of the polarisation of political power that is prevalent in the
dominant historiography of medieval English urban centres. A perceived polarisation
between wealthy merchants who dominated civic office and poorer artisans who were
largely excluded from the political life of the city has been seen by some as evidence of a
class-based structuring of late-medieval urban society. 4 As was outlined in the Introduction,
one of the main problems with the study of elite groups is confusion over the relationship
between the concepts of 'class' (a group's relative economic power) and 'status' (a group's
relative social standing). It has been argued that this confusion is reflected in the
historiography of late-medieval and early-modem urban elites as is evidenced through the
way that terms such as 'elite' and 'class' have been used interchangeably. 'Merchant class',
'mercantile elite' 'political class', 'civic elite', and even 'urban elite' are used to refer to
wealthy merchants in late-medieval towns. Historians have either explicitly argued for, or
implicitly accepted, a conflation of wealth or occupation and social and political standing.
Indeed, wealth and occupation are widely viewed as having determined political power and
social status in late-medieval urban communities. Under the schema offered by historians
Kowaleski, Local Markets andRegional Trade, pp. 95-119.
' See especially Swanson, MedievalArtisans, pp. 2-4; although see also pp. 6-13 above.
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such as Clark and Slack, Swanson and Hilton, late-medieval urban society has been
characterised in terms of class division. 5 That is to say, binary division along the lines of
wealth, occupation and civic power, with inherent antagonism and discord proving endemic
between the two groups.
This thesis has challenged this dominant historiography. As Part Two of the thesis
demonstrated, it is clearly the case that wealth was viewed to a certain extent as a necessary
pre-requisite for access to civic office, particularly the higher civic offices. However, the
terms 'wealth elite' and 'political elite' can not be viewed as interchangeable. Many of the
wealthiest men within the city never held civic office. Indeed, the evidence suggests that
wealth alone was insufficient as a determinant of access to civic posts, a point to which I will
return.
The perceived dominance of civic offices by merchants has also underpinned the
class-based view of urban centres. Under this schema, historians have viewed occupation
as the primary or dominant means of social stratification. This thesis does not endorse this
view. Prosopographic research on the men who held civic office in York during the period
1476 to 1525 has revealed that merchants did not dominate civic office during this period.
Most (over three-quarters) of the civic officials practised non-mercantile trades. Clearly, by
the later-fifleenth century a mercantile oligarchy no longer governed the town. Further, this
thesis has found that there is little textual evidence of exclusionary closure on the grounds
of occupation, apart from at the level of the mayoralty. Obviously, these conclusions relate
to York during a specific period. However, they are important as they suggest that certain
periods and places may have witnessed more occupational variety among civic officials than
has been suggested in the past.
Clark and Slack (eds.), Crisis and Order, especially pp. 19-35; idem, English Towns in Transition, especially
pp. 126-140; Swanson, 'The Illusion of Economic Structure', pp. 29-48; Hilton, English andFrench Towns,
pp. 87-104.
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In the light of such evidence it would seem that historians may have been misguided
in the stress they have placed on occupational polarisation, just as they have with political
polarisation. Further, the significance of factors other than occupation and wealth in
determining access to civic office has been underestimated. In particular, with the exception
of Shaw, historians have paid very little attention in the past to the importance of personal
characteristics. One of the reasons for this is the relative intangibility of character. Perhaps
this is because English studies of civic officials and urban government have tended to be
exclusively historical with the exception of studies of urban drama and ceremonial.
Although this thesis is firmly rooted within the historical tradition it has drawn on
other disciplines in terms of the methodologies used and the types of questions asked.
Literary discourse theory and close textual analysis have been particularly useful in this
respect. A reading of the variety of discourses contained within York's civic documents
reveals the perceived importance of personal characteristics in terms of access to the civic
elite and its projection of itself to the wider urban community. Qualities such as wisdom,
discretion and honesty all seem to have been particularly important in this respect. Wealth
in the absence of these characteristics was not sufficient.
It could be argued that one of the reasons for studying elite groups is that they
provide a means of gauging the attributes and qualities esteemed by the society in which
they operate. What is particularly interesting in this respect is that those qualities of
wisdom, discretion and honesty sought in York civic officials largely parallel those promoted
at the level of central government. Notions of an ideal leader seem to have derived as much
from royal and parliamentary government as they did from civic humanism. Clearly, the
ideology of government in later-medieval York should be placed firmly within the context
of the wider political realm.
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Coherence
In focussing on the extent to which civic offices in later-medieval towns were filled by
wealthy merchants, historians have often taken for granted the coherence of civic elites.
However, one of the key sociological debates over elite groups is the extent to which they
necessarily constitute coherent groups. An important distinction has been made between
social coherence and moral or ideological coherence in this respect. Neither of these has
been fully studied in relation to elite groups in medieval English towns, although, to a certain
extent, coherence has been assumed. As we have seen, men who held civic office in
later-medieval towns have been viewed as being structurally and ideologically linked by
virtue of common wealth, occupation, and civic status. Further, historians have viewed
family ties and guild membership as having reinforced this class-based status hierarchy. This
thesis has challenged these views. This Conclusion has already argued that the men who
held civic office during the period studied were not primarily drawn from mercantile trades.
Interestingly, Part Three of the thesis suggests that the level of patrilineal ties within the
group was also low. Similarly, Part Four of the thesis suggests that York had no 'civic
guild' to which most of the civic officials would have belonged. Less than half of the civic
officials belonged to the Mercers' Guild or the Corpus Christi Guild.
The evidence suggests that marriage might have played an important role in
structurally unifjing at least the higher civic office holders within the group. Marriage
seems to have been used as a means of creating and consolidating alliances and of
maintaining wealth, or less tangible assets such as social standing within a particular
community. However, the role of women in consolidating the group seems to have gone
beyond acting as a marital lynchpin between civic officials. Testamentary evidence suggests
that women may have played an important active role in maintaining social relationships with
other civic officials and their families. However, the role of women in the formation and
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maintenance of York's civic elite was not confined to marriage and informal social relations.
The wives of the higher-ranking civic officials also had an official ritual role to play. As
terms such as 'lady mayoress' and 'sisters' applied to the wives of the aldermen 'brothers'
demonstrate, such women were viewed as being as much part of the civic elite as were the
men themselves.
This thesis has mainly concentrated on civic officials and group manifestations of
status. However, the evidence that has been looked at in relation to the wives and daughters
of the civic elite suggests that the role and inclusion of women in civic or urban elites might
be a profitable area for friture research. More work needs to be undertaken on the ritual
assimilation of women into the civic elite; indeed, it would be interesting to consider
whether there were any specific duties or expectations attached to the wives of aldermen,
sheriffs and mayors. It would also be interesting to consider the extent to which such
women derived personal status from their relationship to the civic officials. Testamentary
evidence, memorialisation or, where surviving, books of hours might be revealing in this
respect. In terms of marriage relationships between civic officials, historians have often
represented women as passive participants. The York evidence suggests that they may have
taken an active role in brokering such alliances. Further, the evidence that relates to the
remarriage of civic wives to other civic officials suggests that women were able to 'marry
up' in terms of civic status. Clearly, progression up the social hierarchy by means of
marriage was as possible for women as it was for men. Again, these issues warrant further
investigation.
Marriage and social relationships seem to have played a significant role in socially
uniIring the higher post-holders within York's civic elite. However, the evidence does not
suggest that such ties were common enough to have united the group as a whole. This is
particularly the case given that the men who held civic office during this period practised a
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variety of occupations and were from a range of family backgrounds and religious, social
or ceremonial guilds. Indeed, we might wonder whether the civic officials constituted a
structurally or 'morally' unified group within York society. As was demonstrated in Parts
Three and Four of the thesis, discord and factionalism within the group were certainly rife.
Yet, the elite was clearly aware of the need for perceived unity at least. Again, an analysis
of discourses contained within York's civic writing is particularly illuminating in this respect.
These discourses placed much stress on harmony and corporate unity, and there seems to
have been an interesting tension between corporatism and individual values. While the
records stressed and advocated corporate unity, qualities that promoted access to the elite
were strongly individual. Valued characteristics such as character (wisdom, honesty etc)
and experience in lower parochial, tenitorial or civic posts could not easily be passed on
from generation to generation. Ritual seems to have been used to buffer tensions here, as
it was to negotiate more tangible tensions within the elite.
Historians have undertaken a significant amount of work on the role of urban drama
and ceremonial in this respect. 6 More recently, urban historians have begun to look at the
importance of secular or everyday rituals, including those of language and gesture. 7 This
thesis has followed on from the work of historians such as Shaw, Rosser and McCree in
stressing the importance of such rituals. Ritualised language, drinking and feasting, together
with specific rituals such as those of submission and re-assimilation, appear to have played
an important role in the promotion and projection of cohesion among the civic elite. They
allowed the re-assimilation of rogue officials and facilitated the negotiation and closure of
6 See for example, Phythian-Adams, 'Ceremony and the Citizen', pp. 238-64; James, 'Ritual, Drama and the
Social Body', pp. 3-29; Hanawalt and Reyerson (eds.), City and Spectacle in Medieval Europe, passim; Sacks,
'Celebrating Authority in Bristol 1475-1640', PP. 187-223; Zemon Davis, 'The Sacred and the Body Social',
pp. 40-70; Muir, Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice,passim.
'' See in particular, Shaw, Creation of a Community, pp. 177-2 15; Rosser, 'Going to the Fraternity Feast', pp.
430-46; McRee, 'Unity or Division?', pp. 189-207; idem, 'Religious Gilds and Civic Order', pp. 69-97.
287
potentially long-running and divisive disputes. Importantly, they also allowed the
presentation of the elite to the rest of the city as a coherent and tangible body. Finally, the
rituals may also have served to create and reassert a sense of common identity and status
among the otherwise disparate members of the civic elite.
Clearly, much more work needs to be undertaken on the construction of elite groups
as coherent entities. This thesis has concentrated on the elite as a body and has looked at
c corporate rituals and constructions of group unity or status. However, it would also be
interesting to consider the role of more individual or personalised rituals such as
memorialisation, rituals of death, and place of burial in the construction of civic unity and
identity. For example, to what extent might common burial patterns among the officials or
the commemoration of past officials through annual obits have served to construct the elite
as a group comprised of serving and long-dead civic officials? Moreover, to what extent
might the status of the civic elite have fed off the group's promotion of illustrious civic
officials of the past?
Recruitment and 'circulation'
Besides the potential problem of coherence, the relative diversity of the group and the
scarcity of patrilineal succession posed a further potential problem for the elite: that of the
recruitment and assimilation of new civic officials. In the past, historians have paid little
attention to the processes through which elite groups were maintained or perpetuated, in
real or ideological terms. The process of recruitment seems to have been complex. We
have already seen that the elite could not depend on occupation or patrilineage as a means
of selecting or recruiting new officials. Family played an important role in this respect. In
the absence of widespread father-son succession into civic office, the importance of marriage
ties and quasi-kin relationships such as godparenthood and apprenticeship were particularly
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important. Each of these provided channels of recruitment and social mobility, and a means
through which potential new members of the elite could be selected, trained and socialised.
Further, Part ifi also argued that sons-in-law of civic officials often acted as 'surrogate
heirs' to civic officials lacking male heirs, perpetuating their wealth, name and network of
contacts. In sharing similar aspirations to those of the already established elite, these
surrogate sons may have represented 'safe bets' for the real and ideological perpetuation of
the civic elite in ensuring the perpetuation both of elite families and their wider social group.
Guilds were also important in this respect. Indeed, we have already seen how guild,
parochial and territorial offices comprised part of the elite's recruitment substratum. It
seems likely that in addition to offering experience of office holding, guild membership also
acted as a "filter mechanism for controlling access to political office". 8 Members were
screened on the basis of criteria such as wealth, occupation, respectability or social
connections. Membership of the more prestigious guilds such as York's Corpus Christi
Guild or the Mercers' Guild was likely to have further enhanced the likelihood of promotion
up the civic hierarchy by offering members a social cachet of exclusivity and respectability
and providing the opportunity to 'network' with existing civic officials.
It could be argued that besides ensuring the real and ideological perpetuation of the
civic elite, the continued recruitment and assimilation of new eivi offici1s frotu teiativebj
diverse family and occupational backgrounds played an important role within the evolving
social structure of the city. The Introduction introduced the notion of the 'circulation of
elites'. According to Pareto, in order for an elite group to survive it is necessary for it to
continue to recruit and assimilate new interest groups within the society in which it operates.
The period of 50 years covered in this thesis is too short to allow Pareto's ideas to be
S Trexier, Public Life in Renaissance Florence, p. 15
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exaniined properly. However, to a certain extent his thesis is borne out by the changing
profile of the civic officials in York over the wider medieval period. In crude terms,
alongside the economic fluctuations experienced by the city, the landowners of the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries were replaced by the merchants of the early fifteenth century, and
then by the artisans of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.9 Similarly, families
represented within civic office came and went. The extent to which these occupational
changes may have been matched by other changes in the social make-up of the elite remains
unstudied. Potential areas of study in this respect include the importance of the
representation of certain political or religious groups.
The concept of the 'circulation of elites' holds important implications for social
stability. Historians have argued that the failure of the York elite to represent the growing
economic interests of artisans among their ranks resulted in increasing antagonism, discord
and violence within the city.'° This thesis has called into question this interpretation of
events, stressing the extent to which artisans did hold civic office during this period. It has
also been argued that there is little evidence to suggest that most violence and unrest was
aimed primarily at increasing 'democracy' within the city. Indeed, the thesis has highlighted
the important role of the commons in the government of York. Much of the power and
authority of the elite rested on their relationship with the commons. The commons were
certainly anxious to defend and uphold their rights of representation and consultation if they
felt that these were being undermined. However, the violence and unrest surrounding the
elite during this period also related to the representation within the civic elite of other
important, powerful and vocal interest groups. Interference in the government of the city
9 Miller, 'Medieval York', p. 71; Part Two above.
10 Miller, 'Medieval York', p. 84; Swanson, MedievalArtisans, pp. 122-7; Kermode, 'Obvious Observations',
99-101; see also, pp. 221-231 above.
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by Richard ifi, or those seen to be acting in his interests, seems to have been particularly
resented, and it seems possible that much of the unrest surrounding the elite during this
period related to a power tussle between people involved in the complicated factionalism
surrounding national politics at this time.
New directions
This study has primarily been concerned with structures and processes rather than events.
Through focussing on the men who held civic office in late-medieval York, it has offered an
important critique of the way that historians have approached urban social groups and
structures in the past. It has also revealed some of the ways in which late-medieval urban
society operated in terms of its values, its stratifications, and the interaction of different
processes and means of social stratification. These conclusions relate not just to
late-medieval York, but also to the ways in which we categorise and conceptualise
communities in general.
Although this thesis has concentrated on the civic elite, civic officials were only one
of several potential elite groups within the city. Historians have viewed civic office as one
of the major determinants of status in late-medieval towns, an impression that this thesis has
done little to dispel. However, civic office was only one of the criteria on which status may
have been accorded. In his study of Medieval Leiden, van Kan has illustrated how the urban
elite of the city was comprised of a wealth elite, a civic elite, a professional elite and an
aristocratic elite." It has proved beyond the scope of this thesis to consider all such groups
in late-medieval York, although a couple of them have been touched on alongside the civic
elite. This thesis has highlighted the need to consider the role and position of what appears
"Van Kan, 'Elite and Government in Later-Medieval Leiden',passim.
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to have been an increasing number of professional men within the city, such as men who
worked as recorders, lawyers or common clerks for the city, and as proctors and advocates
from the church courts. Another important group within the city was the clergy. The
probate evidence from the civic elite suggests that there may have been familial and social
links between the two groups. Similarly, the civic records demonstrate that there were also
administrative and ritual links between the civic elite and the professional and religious
'elites'. In what ways did potential elite groups such as these interact with other groups
within the city? What qualities determined access to these 'elites'? How did they portray
themselves? How socially and morally unified were they? How powerful were they within
the city? These are some of the questions which deserve to be addressed for York and other
late-medieval towns.
Perhaps it is now time for historians to turn their focus away from the civic officials
and towards other important groups within late-medieval urban society. The approaches
and methodologies that have been adopted in this thesis in relation to the civic elite could
equally well be applied to alternative elite groups such as wealth elites, professional elites
or religious elites. Clearly, the research which has been carried out on civic elites deserves
to be complimented by the similar study of other important groups wIthin towns and the
ways in which they interacted with the civic elite and the commonalty. Such research is vital
if we are to further our understanding of the varied and simultaneous modes of social
stratification and consolidation in later-medieval towns.
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Appendices
A) Content
Of the six appendices the first three are based on prosopographical research into the 315
men who held civic office in York during the period 1476 to 1525. Rather than attempting
exhaustive prosopographical or biographical listings, the appendices only contain
prosopographical or biographical information which is discussed in the main body of the
text. Appendix 1 is the only one of the appendices to list all 315 of the men who held civic
office in York during the period 1476 to 1525. It contains details of the names,
occupations, date and method of freedom, civic careers, membership of the Mercers' Guild
and Corpus Chiisti Guild, service as a parish constable and date of death of the men. They
are listed alphabetically by surname for ease of reference. Appendix 2 contains tables
relating to genealogical information concerning the officials. Again each of these three
tables is listed alphabetically. Appendix 3 covers all 223 of the civic officials for whom
some form of probate evidence survives. It includes the probate references of the wills and
administrations belonging to the civic officials and details of the number of sons mentioned
in each will or administration and whether they went on to become York freemen and! or
hold civic office. It also lists the other officials from the period in question who were cited
in each of the wills. Appendices 4, 5 and are different in that, although they depend upon
prosopographic research, they relate primarily to individual sources. Appendix 4 details the
membership of York's common council in 1522, while Appendix 5 details the men listed in
one of the Memorandum Books as having held the post of parish constable in 1380. Both
of these appendices are listed in the order in which they appear in the original source.
Finally, Appendix 6 details alphabetically the men listed in the parish records of St Michael
Spurriergate as having held the post of churchwarden during the period 1518 to 1548.
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B) Prosopographic Methodology
Prosopography as a methodology is discussed in greater detail in the thesis Introduction.
However, it is also necessary to detail in greater depth the sources and methods used in the
compilation of these appendices. The first stage of the research consisted of identifying the
names and occupations of the men who held the posts of bridge master, chamberlain, sheriff
and mayor. Ths was primarily achieved through the use of lists of office holders contained
within York's Freemen's Register (Dl). However, due to the incomplete nature of some
of these lists, it was also occasionally necessary to supplement this information with other
sources, in particular the York House Books and one of the Chamberlains Account Books
(CB 1 a). These sources and their folio numbers are all listed at the end of Appendix 1.
Following on from this, the date and method of entry into the city's freedom was researched
using York's Freemen's Register. In medieval York freedom was regarded as a prerequisite
for civic office. In the few cases where it was not possible to identify a civic official's
occupation from lists of officeholders, it was sometimes possible to obtain this information
from the Freemen's Register. In such cases a positive identification was recorded when only
one man of that name (first-name and surname) was recorded as free in the thirty-year
period prior to the office in question. This method of identification was also used where the
occupation of the civic official was known, but the occupation of the freeman was not stated
in the Freemen's Register. For the vast majority of men though a positive identification in
the Freemen's Register was achieved using a combination of both name and occupation.
Unsurprisingly, the commonness of certain surnames, for example Robynson and White,
precluded the possibility of identifying the civic officials in the freedom lists and these cases
are indicated in Appendix 1.
Once this basic list of names, civic offices and occupations was compiled it was
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possible to reconstruct the civic careers of the men who held civic office during this period.
Thus, the records of the 621 civic offices held between 1476 and 1525 were compacted
down into a list of the civic careers of 315 individuals. From here the wills and
administrations of the officials were identified and read. Although a total of 200 wills and
23 administrations survive for the civic officials, in many cases it was necessary to read more
than one will before the correct one could be identified (or incorrect ones ruled out). In
many cases the wills, or the marginal notes in the probate registers, indicated whether the
testator had held civic office. Where such information was lacking identification was made
possible through the use of additional information such as occupation. In addition to the
wills of officials themselves, where traceable the wills of wives, parents, children and siblings
have also been identified and read in order to assist the reconstruction of genealogical
information.
As well as enabling the reconstruction of genealogical information, the wills also
provided additional means by which civic officials could be positively and negatively
identified in other sources such as the Corpus Christi Register, Wardmote Court Records
and as witnesses and legatees in other peoples wills. Date of death, parish of residence and
the names of wives were all particularly usefl.il in these respects. Particular care has been
taken to be sensitive to the possibility of misidentification. Where more than one freeman
of the same name is known or thought to have been alive during the period in question,
names alone have never been used as the sole means of identifying civic officials in other
sources. Despite the body of information which it has been possible to build up though
there inevitably remain officials about whom we know little for certain. Included in this
group are two types of men. The first type includes men included in lists of officials who
then fail to crop up again in any of the sources examined besides the Freemen's Register.
The second type encompasses those who due to the commonness of their names it is often
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impossible to identif,' with certainty (sometimes even through the use of additional
information) in other sources. Throughout the appendices, italics have been used to indicate
such information or relationships which were likely but unverifi able. This information has
been listed for reference purposes only and, unless specifically stated, it has not been
included in the statistical detail in the main body of the thesis. All sources used are listed
in each of the relevant appendices.
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